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"Expected Utility and Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Behavioral Decision Theory" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Rational Choice Theory in Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

Following an overview of James Heckman's (2000) article on the state of econometrics to shed light on the role of statistics in political science, efforts to link theory & data in formal empirical research are scrutinized. The empirical content of formal models is described, using the example of political outcomes in a democracy to illustrate the simultaneous equations model. Why contemporary theorists see such a model as inadequate is addressed, along with how they are moving beyond them. In addition, why they view such empirical work as unsatisfactory is considered as well as how they are pursuing stronger theory-data links. However, benefits of inadequate models for structuring empirical work are noted. Attention turns to a series of thumbnail sketches of examples from microinstitutionalist theory & austere political theory with simultaneous equations modeling & structural estimation; examples come from US politics, comparative politics, international relations, & international political economy. Four standards guide a look at the substantive contributions of formal empirical work: (1) understanding political phenomena & solving empirical puzzles, (2) advancing rich theory & stimulating new theory, (3) rejecting theory, & (4) improving public policy. Advances in the study of voter turnout are seen to demonstrate the utility of formal empirical work. A call is made for more & improved research of this kind. 3 Figures. J. Zendejas

In evaluating the state of democratic theory, an integrative approach combining normative & explanatory perspectives is used to focus on what to expect from democracy & how to realize this. Disagreements in this regard are illuminated, with much attention given to Schumpeterian competition as a theory of democratic power relations management. It is contended that a perspective targeting the legitimate control of power relations makes more sense than one turned to the common good, but the former can be compatible with a stripped-down version of the latter. Mechanisms for democracy's progress are scrutinized, dividing Joseph Schumpeter's critics into those who see his competitive democracy as desirable but insufficient & those who find it undesirable. Wholesale rejection of Schumpeter is itself rejected, & an examination of electoral systems is undertaken to demonstrate competitive democracy's utility, with an eye toward enriching the approach rather than dumping it. It is contended that an incremental approach is necessary for the democratization of those societies seemingly antithetical to it; in looking at democracy's durability, it is clear that its installation & survival are not easy. How to supplement Schumpeterian democracy is pondered, highlighting the problematic nature of a purely procedural scheme & considering the democratic theory centered on institutional devices, eg, constitutional courts, geared to limiting democracy's penchant for producing outcomes counter to its constitutive ethos. 1 Figure. J. Zendejas

Contends that analyzing the measures, called countervailing actions, that victims of corruption take to recuperate their losses provides a viable approach to understanding variations in corruption in different societies & over time. Three forms of countervailing actions are distinguished: evasive, in which victims reduce their reliance on officials; direct, in which individuals increase officials' cost for performing corrupt acts, & illicit, in which victims participate in corrupt acts themselves. The use of countervailing actions in several sectors & elements of South Asian societies, eg, postal services, utility departments, & college admissions boards, is examined. After discussing global & specific causes of countervailing action use, the effects of utilizing the different forms of countervailing actions are noted. In addition, factors associated with countervailing actions that account for variations in corruption in distinct societies & over time are identified. The study's implications for researching corruption in the future are also considered. 17 References. J. W. Parker

"Dieses Papier stellt die Frage nach den oberen und unteren Grenzen von ökonomischer Ungleichheit und versucht diese Grenzen anhand eines spieltheoretischen Modells als Ergebnis eines Verteilungskonflikts zwischen zwei antagonistischen Gruppenzu erklären und zu quantifizieren: Die eine der beiden Gruppen besteht aus relativ unterprivilegierten Bevölkerungssegmenten, die stärker am Nationaleinkommen partizipieren und so die ökonomische Ungleichheit abbauen möchten. Dadurch gerät diese Gruppe in Konflikt mit der antagonistischen Gruppe der Privilegierten, die ihren Anteil am Nationaleinkommen halten oder gar erhöhen möchte und somit die Ungleichheit in der eigenen Gesellschaft implizit zu vergrössern trachtet. Das dieser Arbeit zu Grunde liegende spieltheoretische Modell nimmt an, dass beide Gruppen über entsprechende Strategien zur Erhöhung oder Verteidigung ihrer Einkommensanteile verfügen und diese auf rationale Weise nach Massgabe der zugeordneten Payoffs nutzen. Die vorerwähnten Auszahlungsfunktionen sind jedoch nicht konstant, sondern tragen dem sinkenden Grenznutzen zusätzlicher Einkommensanteile und den Kosten aus der sich verändernden Macht des Konfliktgegners Rechnung. Für rational handelnde Akteure scheiden daher unter bestimmten Ungleichheits- und Machtbedingungen gewisse Strategien aufgrund eines negativen Payoffsaus, sodass sowohl die Erhöhung als auch die Senkung von ökonomischer Ungleichheit an Grenzen stösst, welche für die beteiligen Akteure bezüglich Ungleichheit den kollektiven Handlungsspielraum definieren. In dieser Arbeit wird versucht, theoretische Aussagen über die Grenzen dieses Handlungsspielraums abzuleiten, um so das zu Grunde liegende Modell anhand von international vergleichbaren Aggregatdaten empirisch überprüfen zu können. Dabei stelltsich das statistische Problem, Modellparameter von Hüllkurven so zu schätzen, dass diese die real beobachtbaren Verhaltensdaten von den unzugänglichen Teilen des Verhaltensraums trennen. Die hierzu vorgeschlagene Lösung beruht auf iterativer Regression und erlaubt sowohl die empirische Bestätigung des spieltheoretischen Modells als auch die quantitative Bestimmung jener Schranken, welche die Einkommensungleichheit in etwa 50 untersuchten Ländern nach oben und unten begrenzen." (Autorenreferat)