Suchergebnisse

Originally published in 1967. In the past half-century, Utilitarianism has fallen out of favor among professional philosophers, except in such "amended" forms as "Ideal" and "Rule" Utilitarianism. Professor Narveson contends that amendments and qualifications are unnecessary and misguided, and that a careful interpretation and application of the original theory, as advocated by Bentham, the Mills, and Sidgwick, obviates any need for modification. Drawing on the analytical work of such influential recent thinkers as Stevenson, Toulmin, Hare, Nowell-Smith, and Baier, the author attempts to draw a more careful and detailed picture than has previously been offered of the logical status and workings of the Principle of Utility. He then turns to the traditional objections to the theory as developed by such respected thinkers as Ross, Frankena, Hart, and Rawls and attempts to show how Utilitarianism can account for our undoubted obligations in the areas of punishment, promising, distributive justice, and the other principal moral convictions of mankind. He contends that the Principle of Utility implies whatever is recognized to be clearly true in these convictions and that it leaves room to doubt whatever is doubtful in them. Narveson concludes with a rationally forceful proof of the Principle of Utility. In the course of this argument, which draws on the most widely accepted recent findings in analytical ethics, Narveson discovers an essential identity between the ethical outlooks of Kant and of Mill, which are traditionally held to be antithetical. Both thinkers, he shows, center on the principle that the interests of others are to be regarded as equal in value to one's own. A new view of Mill's celebrated "proof of utilitarianism" is developed in the course of the discussion.

I. Preference Orderings and Utility Theory -- 1. Relational Systems -- 2. Preference Relations -- 3. Some Remarks on Utility Theory -- 4. Linear Inequalities -- II. Ordinal Utility -- 1. Some Classical Representation Theorems -- 2. Lexicographic Utility -- 3. Utility Theories with Respect to n?-Sets -- 4. Ultraproducts and Ultrapowers -- 5. Approximating an r*-Valued Utility Function by a Real Valued Function -- 6. Non-Standard Utility Functions Always Exist -- 7. Utility Functions for Partial Orderings -- III. On Numerical Relational Systems -- 1. First-Order Languages -- 2. Some Preliminary Considerations -- 3. Universal and Homogeneous Relational Systems -- 4. Saturated Relational Systems -- IV. Utility Theories for More Structured Empirical Data -- 1. Some Remarks -- 2. The Empirical Status of Axioms -- 3. Utility Theories which are Axiomatizable in an Ordinary First Order Language -- 4. Extensive Utility -- 5. Conjoint Measurement of Utilities -- 6. On Certain Mean Systems -- V. On Utility Spaces, The Theory of Games and the Realization of Comparative Probability Relations -- 1. A Generalization of the Von Neumann/Morgenstern Utility Theory -- 2. Non-Standard Utilities in Game Theory -- 3. Some Aspects of the Realization of Comparative Probability Relations -- Appendix I. Ordinal and Cardinal Numbers -- Appendix II. Some Basic Facts about Filters and Ultrafilters -- Index of Names -- Index of Subjects.

AbstractThis paper is concerned with a method for the assessment of utility functions of multi‐numeraire consequences. It is proven that given von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms of "rational behavior" and two additional assumptions, the utility function for (x, y) consequences can be written as U(x, y) = Ux(x) + Uy(y) + KUx(x) Uy(y).K is a constant that must be evaluated empirically. This form shall be designated as a quasi‐separable utility function. It is more general than the separable utility function and is shown to be nearly as easy to use.Implications and ramifications of such a utility function and its requisite assumptions are discussed. A technique for practical application of this work is presented.

In his book The War Trap Bruce Bueno de Mesquita claims to offer a deductive theory of international conflict based on the assumption that foreign policy makers attempt to maximize their expected utility. The theory is subjected to a systematic empirical test that seems to provide impressive confirmation. The first part of this article examines Bueno de Mesquita's theory and argues that it cannot be derived from his assumptions. The second part examines the operational version of the theory, which was the one actually tested, and argues that it can be more plausibly interpreted as a version of a different theory—one that Bueno de Mesquita claims to have discredited. The essay concludes by discussing the significance of this book with regard to the question of whether theories of individual rational choice can explain foreign policy decisions.

A typology of issues, based on a theory of public advocacy in regulatory proceedings, is used to explain differences in utility regulatory policies. The theory focuses on grass-roots advocates (citizen groups) & proxy advocates (state officials such as the attorney general or a consumer counsel); the issues involve different levels of technical complexity & consumer conflict. It is hypothesized that grass-roots advocates will be effective when issues are low in technical complexity & proxy advocates effective when issues are low in consumer conflict. Aggregate data from 51 public utility commissions confirm these expectations, through multiple regression analysis & profit analysis in four issue areas. Case studies are derived from interviews with 284 public advocates, utility company executives, & public utility regulators in 12 states. Within the same regulatory policy domain, issues differ in complexity & conflict, with important policy consequences. 3 Tables. Modified HA.