Surveys the general advantages proposed by the liberalization of the European energy markets, most notably those to the consumer & to emergent utility providers that are now able to absorb clientele breaking away from the former monopoly of state providers. Having favored total opening of the market, the European Commission has put central focus on achieving a proper regulation of those initiatives they have set in motion. It is demonstrated that deregulation also involves a certain degree of reregulation, in which transport networks, now fundamental to the functioning of the open market, will have to adhere to key principles of investment & access control. With competition there will also be the need for information to be made available to the consumer to make transparent the offers of competing providers. With these new developments come two threats, ie, the complexity of financing of the new utility companies, & the avoidance of total market dominance by a small group of providers. Adapted from the source document.
A wide range of organizations are pursuing economic performance objectives in various organizational contexts. However, in parallel with their continued economic performance some of them pursue performance objectives of social utility.Our research is organized around three articles that analyze, independently from each other, several governance or management systems whose respective deployments have effects on economic performance and social utility performance that some organizations set as objectives to be achieved simultaneously, and which may generate new tensions between logics.Our results shed light on how specific management tools influence the articulation of different logics and can support a militant structure in its pursuit of social utility objectives and legitimize, internally, its action. They also show the relative impact of new legislative and regulatory constraints on the governance of mutual insurance companies and, consequently, on the tensions between the approaches they pursue simultaneously. They also bring out the strong links that exist between different populations, each with its own logic within the same organization, when it comes to the type of management of one.We show that an organization of the social economy is not reduced to its status, or even to its original hybridity, and that it can carry an integrative logic of "common well-being", qualified as a policy in this research, because it wants to simultaneously achieve social, societal, economic and environmental performance objectives.We also provide elements that allow a better understanding of the posture of researcher - observer - participant. ; Un grand nombre d'organisations poursuivent des objectifs de performance économique dans des contextes organisationnels divers. Or, parallèlement à la poursuite de leur performance économique, certaines d'entre elles poursuivent des objectifs de performance d'utilité sociale.Nous avons entamé cette recherche afin de comprendre comment des organisations hybrides de l'économie sociale, concilient des logiques qui peuvent paraître contradictoires, logique économique et logique d'utilité sociale, qu'elles doivent articuler et qui peuvent être sources de tensions.Notre recherche est organisée autour de trois essais qui analysent, indépendamment les uns des autres, plusieurs dispositifs de gestion, de gouvernance ou de management dont les déploiements respectifs ont des effets sur la performance économique et la performance d'utilité sociale que certaines organisations se fixent comme objectifs à atteindre simultanément et qui peuvent susciter des tensions nouvelles entre les logiques.Nos résultats apportent un éclairage sur la manière dont des outils de gestion spécifiques influencent l'articulation de différentes logiques et peuvent accompagner une structure militante dans sa poursuite d'objectifs d'utilité sociale et légitimer, en interne, son action. Ils montrent, également, l'impact relatif des nouvelles contraintes législatives et règlementaires sur la gouvernance des sociétés d'assurance mutuelles et, en conséquence, sur les tensions entre les logiques qu'elles poursuivent simultanément. Ils font, aussi, émerger les liens forts qui existent entre les populations différentes, porteuses de logiques différentes au sein d'une même organisation, lorsqu'on intervient sur le type de management de l'une.Nous montrons qu'une organisation de l'économie sociale n'est pas réduite à son statut, ni même, à son hybridité originelle, et qu'elle peut porter une logique intégrative de « mieux-être commun », qualifiée de politique dans cette recherche, car elle veut atteindre simultanément des objectifs de performance sociale, sociétale, économique et environnementale.
A wide range of organizations are pursuing economic performance objectives in various organizational contexts. However, in parallel with their continued economic performance some of them pursue performance objectives of social utility.Our research is organized around three articles that analyze, independently from each other, several governance or management systems whose respective deployments have effects on economic performance and social utility performance that some organizations set as objectives to be achieved simultaneously, and which may generate new tensions between logics.Our results shed light on how specific management tools influence the articulation of different logics and can support a militant structure in its pursuit of social utility objectives and legitimize, internally, its action. They also show the relative impact of new legislative and regulatory constraints on the governance of mutual insurance companies and, consequently, on the tensions between the approaches they pursue simultaneously. They also bring out the strong links that exist between different populations, each with its own logic within the same organization, when it comes to the type of management of one.We show that an organization of the social economy is not reduced to its status, or even to its original hybridity, and that it can carry an integrative logic of "common well-being", qualified as a policy in this research, because it wants to simultaneously achieve social, societal, economic and environmental performance objectives.We also provide elements that allow a better understanding of the posture of researcher - observer - participant. ; Un grand nombre d'organisations poursuivent des objectifs de performance économique dans des contextes organisationnels divers. Or, parallèlement à la poursuite de leur performance économique, certaines d'entre elles poursuivent des objectifs de performance d'utilité sociale.Nous avons entamé cette recherche afin de comprendre comment des organisations hybrides de l'économie sociale, concilient des logiques qui peuvent paraître contradictoires, logique économique et logique d'utilité sociale, qu'elles doivent articuler et qui peuvent être sources de tensions.Notre recherche est organisée autour de trois essais qui analysent, indépendamment les uns des autres, plusieurs dispositifs de gestion, de gouvernance ou de management dont les déploiements respectifs ont des effets sur la performance économique et la performance d'utilité sociale que certaines organisations se fixent comme objectifs à atteindre simultanément et qui peuvent susciter des tensions nouvelles entre les logiques.Nos résultats apportent un éclairage sur la manière dont des outils de gestion spécifiques influencent l'articulation de différentes logiques et peuvent accompagner une structure militante dans sa poursuite d'objectifs d'utilité sociale et légitimer, en interne, son action. Ils montrent, également, l'impact relatif des nouvelles contraintes législatives et règlementaires sur la gouvernance des sociétés d'assurance mutuelles et, en conséquence, sur les tensions entre les logiques qu'elles poursuivent simultanément. Ils font, aussi, émerger les liens forts qui existent entre les populations différentes, porteuses de logiques différentes au sein d'une même organisation, lorsqu'on intervient sur le type de management de l'une.Nous montrons qu'une organisation de l'économie sociale n'est pas réduite à son statut, ni même, à son hybridité originelle, et qu'elle peut porter une logique intégrative de « mieux-être commun », qualifiée de politique dans cette recherche, car elle veut atteindre simultanément des objectifs de performance sociale, sociétale, économique et environnementale.
A wide range of organizations are pursuing economic performance objectives in various organizational contexts. However, in parallel with their continued economic performance some of them pursue performance objectives of social utility.Our research is organized around three articles that analyze, independently from each other, several governance or management systems whose respective deployments have effects on economic performance and social utility performance that some organizations set as objectives to be achieved simultaneously, and which may generate new tensions between logics.Our results shed light on how specific management tools influence the articulation of different logics and can support a militant structure in its pursuit of social utility objectives and legitimize, internally, its action. They also show the relative impact of new legislative and regulatory constraints on the governance of mutual insurance companies and, consequently, on the tensions between the approaches they pursue simultaneously. They also bring out the strong links that exist between different populations, each with its own logic within the same organization, when it comes to the type of management of one.We show that an organization of the social economy is not reduced to its status, or even to its original hybridity, and that it can carry an integrative logic of "common well-being", qualified as a policy in this research, because it wants to simultaneously achieve social, societal, economic and environmental performance objectives.We also provide elements that allow a better understanding of the posture of researcher - observer - participant. ; Un grand nombre d'organisations poursuivent des objectifs de performance économique dans des contextes organisationnels divers. Or, parallèlement à la poursuite de leur performance économique, certaines d'entre elles poursuivent des objectifs de performance d'utilité sociale.Nous avons entamé cette recherche afin de comprendre comment des organisations hybrides de l'économie sociale, concilient des logiques qui peuvent paraître contradictoires, logique économique et logique d'utilité sociale, qu'elles doivent articuler et qui peuvent être sources de tensions.Notre recherche est organisée autour de trois essais qui analysent, indépendamment les uns des autres, plusieurs dispositifs de gestion, de gouvernance ou de management dont les déploiements respectifs ont des effets sur la performance économique et la performance d'utilité sociale que certaines organisations se fixent comme objectifs à atteindre simultanément et qui peuvent susciter des tensions nouvelles entre les logiques.Nos résultats apportent un éclairage sur la manière dont des outils de gestion spécifiques influencent l'articulation de différentes logiques et peuvent accompagner une structure militante dans sa poursuite d'objectifs d'utilité sociale et légitimer, en interne, son action. Ils montrent, également, l'impact relatif des nouvelles contraintes législatives et règlementaires sur la gouvernance des sociétés d'assurance mutuelles et, en conséquence, sur les tensions entre les logiques qu'elles poursuivent simultanément. Ils font, aussi, émerger les liens forts qui existent entre les populations différentes, porteuses de logiques différentes au sein d'une même organisation, lorsqu'on intervient sur le type de management de l'une.Nous montrons qu'une organisation de l'économie sociale n'est pas réduite à son statut, ni même, à son hybridité originelle, et qu'elle peut porter une logique intégrative de « mieux-être commun », qualifiée de politique dans cette recherche, car elle veut atteindre simultanément des objectifs de performance sociale, sociétale, économique et environnementale.
In this thesis, we propose a model of intertemporal choice built on the hypothesis of a rational individual with an imperfect knowledge of his own time preferences. At the time of choosing, the individual who seeks cognitive consistency reconciles several successive cognitions: his normative preference – represented by the discounted utility model (DU) - that he perceives with more or less precision and one or several myopic preferences imposed by the context of the decision. We handle first the general case of a myopic preference for the most immediate reward. This preference is generated by a primacy effect in the perception by the individual of the sequences of outcomes or consumptions. In the chosen formalization, the preference for primacy drives the individual to use a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, which explains a great set of anomalies of the DU model. Then we tackle the particular case where (at least) one of the choice options arouses a "visceral" preference and those where one option constitutes a status quo, modifying again the discount function and driving new inconsistencies. We test the general "sequential discount" model and the model with status quo on experimental data. Finally, we apply the modelisation to lifecycle savings decisions. The individual is supposed to be permanently subject to consumption "cues" that suggest him a myopic preference for immediate consumption that he cannot anticipate. Therefore he constantly experiments overconsumption compared to his plans. We show that the existence of an illiquid asset enables this individual to constrain his future consumptions and to avoid a critical insufficiency of savings when retiring. ; Dans cette thèse est proposé un modèle de choix intertemporel bâti sur l'hypothèse d'un individu rationnel ayant une connaissance imparfaite de ses préférences temporelles. Au moment du choix, l'individu qui recherche la cohérence cognitive réconcilie plusieurs cognitions successives : sa préférence normative - représentée par le modèle d'utilité ...
This article explores three approaches to language policies. Utility, domination, passion. Each paradigm matches policy preferences and political contexts in France, the US and the EU. (Linguistic) non-domination is assumed to be the ideal linguistic situation ; my claim is that it can be achieved through a mindful balance between utility and passion, in particular through a multilingual management in intermediary institutions (schools, workplace, civic associations). Linguistic democracy requires that parity of participation trumps unifying language policies. ; Cet article propose trois paradigmes pour comprendre les politiques de la langue : l'utilité, la domination, la passion. Chacun de ces paradigmes correspond à des préférences politiques en France, en Europe, aux États Unis. La situation linguistique idéale ou juste est une situation de non-domination : elle peut être obtenue par une conjugaison sensible entre les paradigmes de l'utilité et de la passion, et notamment par une gestion multilingue dans les institutions intermédiaires : l'école, l'entreprise, les associations citoyennes. La démocratie linguistique demande que la parité de participation, quelle que soit la langue, l'emporte sur l'exigence d'apprentissage de la langue nationale ou officielle.
This article explores three approaches to language policies. Utility, domination, passion. Each paradigm matches policy preferences and political contexts in France, the US and the EU. (Linguistic) non-domination is assumed to be the ideal linguistic situation ; my claim is that it can be achieved through a mindful balance between utility and passion, in particular through a multilingual management in intermediary institutions (schools, workplace, civic associations). Linguistic democracy requires that parity of participation trumps unifying language policies. ; Cet article propose trois paradigmes pour comprendre les politiques de la langue : l'utilité, la domination, la passion. Chacun de ces paradigmes correspond à des préférences politiques en France, en Europe, aux États Unis. La situation linguistique idéale ou juste est une situation de non-domination : elle peut être obtenue par une conjugaison sensible entre les paradigmes de l'utilité et de la passion, et notamment par une gestion multilingue dans les institutions intermédiaires : l'école, l'entreprise, les associations citoyennes. La démocratie linguistique demande que la parité de participation, quelle que soit la langue, l'emporte sur l'exigence d'apprentissage de la langue nationale ou officielle.
Transport network administration has always played a vital role in the technical aspects & limitation of the energy industry insofar as they were integrated into the utility companies of their respective countries. It is demonstrated here that network administration is to have a central role in the newly opened European energy markets. Administrators are generally characterized by their independence & general standing as monopolies, & simultaneous ownership & operation of the energy system in question. French network administration is situated in contrast to that of other major European countries, & it is suggested that the French agency is superior in critical business terms such as total energy output, network size, profitability, etc, but behind other nations insofar as the diversification of utility services is concerned. The success of the eventually unified European energy market will depend primarily on the expansion of cross-border infrastructure, & it is advanced that it is through placing the network administration at the heart of the open market development & ensuring their independent functioning that optimal results will continue to be reached. 3 Figures. Adapted from the source document.
This article reviews several issues related to the Swiss tax framework in the field of philanthropy, primarily focusing on the direct taxes. It describes the philanthropy-related tax incentives in Switzerland, summarizes their main criticism and presents the ongoing proposals for legislative changes in this respect.
Preserving the utility of anonymized data is one of the biggest limitationto the research field of Privacy Preserving Machine Learning. On theone hand, people claim a maximum level of privacy to protect their personalinformation from malicious intruders. And on the other hand, researchers,industries and governments demand a higher level of utility in order to developproducts that are interesting and suitable to the specific needs of theircustomers. The research presented in this thesis tackles the privacy-utilitytrade-off by using unsupervised learning approaches. Firstly, the Multi-viewCollaborative Self Organizing Maps as a way to cluster the data locally oneach view of the data set, but collaborate by exchanging information abouttheir findings. Secondly, the 1D Kernel Density Estimation, as a way to improvethe utility of the anonymized data while respecting the distributionof each feature in the dataset. Lasty, a supervised learning layer using theWeighted Learning Vector Quantization is added in order to enhance thelearning of the previously proposed approaches, and give more representativeprototypes to pseudo-anonymize the data. The tests were done on morethan six different datasets, and the results show an improvement in the accuracyof the models compared to the state of the art MDAV algorithm. Theresearch presented give some interesting ways of using machine learning toachieve privacy preservation through multiview microaggregation ; Depuis la mise en vigueur du Règlement Général sur la Protection des Données (RGPD), l'intérêt pour la protection et la sécurité des données a évolué. D'une part, les nombreux accidents de fuite de données. D'une autre part, l'évolution exponentielle des utilisateurs des appareils connectés dans le monde entier, ont fait de l'anonymisation des données une nécessité pour la sécurité des individus y figurant. Depuis les années 2000,plusieurs techniques d'anonymisation des données ont été proposées, certaines relèvent de la cryptographie, d'autres des statistiques et certaines ...
Recognition of public utility through the Council of State archives : marginal notes, deletions and hand-written addenda in documents exchanged between Councillors of State and Cabinet Ministers, France 1901-1914 The 1901 law on associations confirmed the evolution of the French Republic toward the acceptance of intermediary bodies between the State and citizens. However, the evolution was limited in scope: defining the general interest remained a prerogative of the State, which entrusted some associations to pursue the common good under its control. It is the reason why the article 10 of the law granted legal personality only to associations recognised as being of "public utility" by a decree of the Council of State. But neither the 1901 law nor the application decree made the criteria of this recognition explicit. Therefore, this paper will analyse these criteria through administrative practices. In the considered period, the Council of State examined more than 500 applications, which led delegates of associations, Cabinet Ministers and Councillors of State to exchange numerous documents: annotated, crossed-out drafts of decrees, letters and notes. Such writings destroy the view of the State as a monolith, imposing a top-down, a priori defined general interest: on the contrary, decisions resulted from disputed negotiations between different actors. They rose from power relations closely related to diverging conceptions of "public utility", either connected to State continuity or to political considerations. ; Après la libéralisation des syndicats professionnels et des sociétés de secours mutuels, la loi 1901 relative au contrat d'association confirme l'infléchissement de la culture républicaine française, qui semble alors admettre l'existence de corps intermédiaires entre l'Etat et les individus. L'évolution est pourtant limitée : la définition de l'intérêt général reste une prérogative de l'Etat, qui peut en confier la réalisation à des associations choisies et soumises à sa surveillance. Tel est le sens de ...
In my work I present a theory of alternative rationality to the traditional (neoclassical)) one on the basis of the insights gathered by the Hungarian economist Tibor Scotovsky (1910-2002) by studying the psychological theory of "arousal". In particular, I examine and put into question the propriety of the utility maximization principle, the principle of decreasing marginal utility, the principle of revealed preferences, of self-interest, of full rationality and of the utilitarian hedonism. By analyzing the dynamics on which, according to Scitovsky, individuals learn, think and decide, I conclude that Scitovsky has in fact proposed a theory of rationality alternative to neoclassical one; for he connects the individuals' satisfaction not to a predetermined outcome (end), but to the process (means). That vision has many elements in common with that of Herbert Simon (i.e. procedural rationality); for Simon (1972b, 1978 and 1987b) too links individuals' satisfaction to the procedures and to the intrinsic motivations (aspirations) which engage them and not to the outcome of whatever "expected utility". Nevertheless Scitovsky perspective also partially differs from that of Simon, according to the fact that Scitovsky understands emotions as the essential elements which engage and control the cognitive process. Thus, to Scitovsky, emotions don't bound, on the contrary heighten the level of individuals' rationality. Indeed, Scitovsky does not conceive human behaviour simply as an automatic response of an internal or external stimulus; he believes in the fundamental role played by the mind in selecting and processing information. Consequently (differently from Simon) to Scitovsky human behaviour is the consequence of a cooperative participation of reason and emotion. That is the reason why, to Scitovsky, (again differently from Simon) emotions don't bound the cognitive faculties of an individual; on the contrary they are fundamental for foresight, prevent, and correct possible errors in abstract reasoning. ; Mon travail ...
In this thesis, we propose a model of intertemporal choice built on the hypothesis of a rational individual with an imperfect knowledge of his own time preferences. At the time of choosing, the individual who seeks cognitive consistency reconciles several successive cognitions: his normative preference – represented by the discounted utility model (DU) - that he perceives with more or less precision and one or several myopic preferences imposed by the context of the decision. We handle first the general case of a myopic preference for the most immediate reward. This preference is generated by a primacy effect in the perception by the individual of the sequences of outcomes or consumptions. In the chosen formalization, the preference for primacy drives the individual to use a quasi-hyperbolic discount function, which explains a great set of anomalies of the DU model. Then we tackle the particular case where (at least) one of the choice options arouses a "visceral" preference and those where one option constitutes a status quo, modifying again the discount function and driving new inconsistencies. We test the general "sequential discount" model and the model with status quo on experimental data. Finally, we apply the modelisation to lifecycle savings decisions. The individual is supposed to be permanently subject to consumption "cues" that suggest him a myopic preference for immediate consumption that he cannot anticipate. Therefore he constantly experiments overconsumption compared to his plans. We show that the existence of an illiquid asset enables this individual to constrain his future consumptions and to avoid a critical insufficiency of savings when retiring. ; Dans cette thèse est proposé un modèle de choix intertemporel bâti sur l'hypothèse d'un individu rationnel ayant une connaissance imparfaite de ses préférences temporelles. Au moment du choix, l'individu qui recherche la cohérence cognitive réconcilie plusieurs cognitions successives : sa préférence normative - représentée par le modèle d'utilité escomptée (DU) - qu'il perçoit avec plus ou moins de précision et une ou plusieurs préférences myopes dictée par le contexte de la décision. Nous traitons d'abord le cas général d'une préférence myope pour la récompense la plus proche dans le temps. Cette préférence, générée par un effet de primauté dans la perception des revenus ou des consommations, conduit l'individu à adopter un escompte quasi-hyperbolique dans tous ses choix intertemporels, expliquant un grand nombre d'anomalies du modèle DU. Nous abordons ensuite le cas où une des options de choix fait naître une préférence « viscérale » et celui où une option fait figure de statu quo, induisant de nouvelles incohérences. Nous testons le modèle général d' « escompte séquentiel » et le modèle avec statu quo à partir de données expérimentales. Enfin, nous appliquons la modélisation aux décisions d'épargne de cycle de vie. L'individu est supposé être assujetti en permanence à des signaux de consommation qui induisent chez lui une préférence pour la consommation immédiate qu'il ne peut anticiper. Ce faisant, il expérimente constamment des excès de consommation par rapport à ses plans. Nous montrons que l'existence d'un actif illiquide peut lui permettre de contraindre ses consommations futures et d'éviter une insuffisance d'épargne critique au moment du passage à la retraite.
In the context of a growth model in Ramsey with natural resource and pollution and based on certain assumptions of the ecological economy, this paper examines the effects of voluntary decay policies on production and well-being. The instrument of these policies is a tax levied on the natural resource. These policies are implemented by the public authorities as a result of the shift in the utility function of households caused by increased pollution. Compared to the situation of leave to do, their result is both to reduce production and pollution on the one hand and to increase welfare on the other. A later reaction by public authorities following the shift in the utility function of households means that the taxation of the natural resource must be higher in the first periods. If the authorities' preference for the future is greater, then the utility gains due to the decay policy are lower for the first generations of dynasty and higher for the subsequent generations. The impact of technical progress saving the resource or improving the treatment of pollution is also analysed. ; With the help of a growth model à la Ramsey with a natural resource and pollution and relying on postulates of ecological economics, this paper studies the impact of voluntary degrowth policies on production and welfare. The instrument of these policies is a tax levied on the natural resource. These policies are assumed to be applied by the public authorities after the downturn of the households'utility function due to the increase of pollution. With respect to the laisser-faire situation, their impact is to simultaneously decrease production and pollution on the one hand and increase welfare on the other. A delayed reaction of the public authorities after the turnover of the households'utility function implies a higher tax rate on the resource during the first periods. If the authorities'preference for the future is higher, then welfare gains from the degrowth policy are lower for the first generations of the dynasty and higher for the ...
The Soviet Manager and Innovation : A Behavioral Model. The objective of this paper is to employ the utility approach and formulate an optimization model that is capable of explaining the observed behavior of the Soviet firm. The analysis concentrates on some utility maximizing policy adjustments consistent with the special set of institutional constraints under which the Soviet manager is forced to operate. It points the way to better understanding of the possible patterns of managerial behavior, permits greater insight into the operation of business firms in the Soviet Union and yields some original results. The model developed in this paper shows that, despite the constraints established by the central production plan, the Soviet manager is able to secure a set of opportunity choices with respect to the firm's output — inventory policy. In fact, the manager's ability to create and then preserve that range of opportunity choices turns out to be his major survival requirement in the Soviet system. The analysis shows that, under static conditions where the set of institutional and technical parameters is fixed, the range of the Soviet manager's policy options necessarily diminishes over time and choice must ultimately disappear. The utility-maximizing manager has, therefore, strong incentive to change his economic environment and, in the process, renew his set of opportunity choices. A way to achieve such renewal is via cost-saving innovations. 'The paper argues that, contrary to the conclusions of most authors, the Soviet system has a built-in incentive for the manager to search for cost-saving improvements, provided the manager can choose the rate which the effects of these improvements are made known to the state. It is the Soviet manager's ability to innovate and conceal the full effects of the innovations from the state that determines his capacity to survive. The existence of this innovative potential is important, of course, because it helps to explain how the Soviet economy can experience some economic advances in an environment which is ridden with waste and inefficiencies.
