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The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.

The European preoccupation with a unified market, and indirectly with territorial restrictions, remains problematic. The first sentence of the Commission Green Paper of 22 January 1997 on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy reads: "The creation of a Single Market is one of the main objectives of the European Union." This axiom is then repeated again and again. Everything can be discussed except the market integration. Territorial restrictions will be vigorously pursued in the future as in the past. This article examines the handling of territorial restrictions in community law and how past practices may influence a future position on vertical agreements. Case law development is briefly summarized and compared with the parallel US development and proposals ventured.

The purpose of this paper is to elaborate a clear and precise definition of competition as an object of protection and regulation through economic crimes. For this purpose, the tools of economic analysis are used, in order to provide a substantial content, as concrete as possible, to this concept, and these tools are applied to a specific case: the vertical restrictions on competition. It is proposed that, as a general rule, what the law has to protect in these cases is the maximization of social welfare. However, some special cases are also studied in which this definition is not sufficient, proposing complementary criteria of definition, which meet the needs of distributive justice and protection of the political system against monopolies. ; Resumen: El artículo intenta elaborar una definición clara y suficiente precisa de la competencia como objeto de protección y de regulación a través del Derecho Penal económico. Para ello, se utilizan las herramientas propias del análisis económico, para dotar de un contenido material lo más concreto posible a dicho concepto, y se aplican dichas herramientas a un caso concreto: el de las restricciones verticales a la competencia. Se propone que, como regla general, aquello que el Derecho ha de proteger en estos casos es la maximización del bienestar social. Se estudian asimismo, no obstante, algunos casos especiales en los que dicha definición no resulta suficiente, proponiéndose para ellos criterios complementarios de definición, que atiendan a necesidades de justicia distributiva y de protección del sistema político frente a los monopolios.

An approach to the legal system and social and commercial structure of the European Union awakens in some neophytes in such matters an enormous intellectual curiosity, designed not only to delve into the nature of the institutions of the European Union, but in the exploration of how these could be applied in the Colombian environment. These institutions will be studied, then, as means of regulation of economic activity, which by adopting prohibitory and / or punitive actions, advocate the conservation and projection of the domestic market and seek relevance in terms of the relationship with the international market. ; Una aproximación al sistema jurídico y a la estructura social y comercial propia de la Unión Europea despierta en unos neófitos en tales materias una ingente curiosidad intelectual, proyectada no solo en ahondar en la naturaleza de sus instituciones, sino en la forma en que estas podrían aplicarse en el entorno colombiano. Se estudiarán, entonces, estas instituciones como medios de regulación de la actividad económica, las cuales, al adoptar acciones prohibitivas y/o sancionatorias, propugnan por la conservación y proyección del mercado interno y buscan oportunidades, en cuanto a las relaciones con el mercado internacional.

We examine the empirical research on interfirm contracts that has been inspired by Oliver Williamson's work on transaction costs. We eschew the vast and supportive empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision, covered elsewhere, focusing instead on vertical market restrictions. We organize our discussion around specific restrictions, emphasizing the evidence concerning restrictions, such as contract duration and adjustment clauses, that have been studied most through transaction cost lenses, but also the findings from studies of vertical restraints, namely those restrictions that have been the focus of antitrust policy. We conclude with some general thoughts about how what one can learn from these studies can inform antitrust policy regarding vertical market restrictions.

We examine the empirical research on interfirm contracts that has been inspired by Oliver Williamson's work on transaction costs. We eschew the vast and supportive empirical literature on the make-or-buy decision, covered elsewhere, focusing instead on vertical market restrictions. We organize our discussion around specific restrictions, emphasizing the evidence concerning restrictions, such as contract duration and adjustment clauses, that have been studied most through transaction cost lenses, but also the findings from studies of vertical restraints, namely those restrictions that have been the focus of antitrust policy. We conclude with some general thoughts about how what one can learn from these studies can inform antitrust policy regarding vertical market restrictions.

In this paper, we discuss from an economic perspective two alternative views of restrictions of competition by sports associations. The horizontal approach views such restrictions as an agreement among the participants of a sports league with the sports association merely representing an organization executing the horizontal cooperation. In contrast, the vertical approach views the sports association as being a dominant upstream firm enjoying a monopoly position on the market stage for competition organizing services, an important input for the actual product - the sports game. Taking the recent financial fair play (FFP) initiative by UEFA (the Union of European Football Associations) as an example, we demonstrate that the different views lead to different assessments of restrictive effects and, thus, matter for competition policy decisions. The economic story of the potential restrictive effect of FFP on players' and player agents' income may fit more plausibly to the horizontal approach, whereas the potentially anticompetitive foreclosure and deterrence effects of FFP may be economically more soundly reasoned by taking the vertical view.

In a preliminary reference judgment in the Maxima Latvija case, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has ruled that commercial lease agreements including a clause conferring on the anchor tenant the right to approve lease agreements that the property owner may conclude with third parties do not restrict competition 'by object'. Consequently, a full analysis of the economic effects of the agreement in question is necessary to establish whether it impedes competition. The CJEU sets out the criteria to be applied to examine the competition impact of the agreement.