Suchergebnisse

Adapted from the source document.

El objetivo es construir un modelo ideal de compra de votos basado en un solo comprador que controla los recursos del estado. Se establecen los límites del modelo mediante definiciones de compra de votos y democracia. El modelo incluye dos momentos. Uno en que hay abundancia de recursos y otro en que estos se hacen escasos. Se discute las conductas probables de compradores y vendedores, haciendo énfasis en la posibilidad de los compradores de manipular las variables económicas para obtener más votos con menos recursos y la respuesta de los vendedores ante ese hecho. Se culmina con una reflexión sobre las consecuencias para la democracia de una expansión de la compra de votos. ; The objective is to build an ideal model for buying votes based on a single buyer who controls the state's resources. The limits of the model are established through definitions of vote buying and democracy. The model includes two moments. One in which there is an abundance of resources and the other in which these are scarce. The probable behaviors of buyers and sellers are discussed, emphasizing the possibility of buyers to manipulate the economic variables to obtain more votes with fewer resources and the response of sellers to this fact. It ends with a reflection on the consequences for democracy of an expansion of vote buying. ; 333-348 ; fermenta@ula.ve / humanic@ula.ve ; marco.ortizpalanques@gmail.com ; www.saber.ula.ve/fermentum

En este artículo se aborda la construcción conceptual de los posibles efectos de la compra de votos por parte del gobierno sobre el sistema político. Los efectos identificados son: mayor participación del dinero del Estado en la formación del ingreso en los sectores más bajos, y aumento de los votos hacia el partido gubernamental con tendencia a convertirse en el único importante. El modelo considera la compra de votos como única variable independiente. Aunque el modelo pretende basarse en los beneficios inmediatos recibidos por los líderes y los votantes en la formación de un proceso de decisión colectiva, otros elementos han sido también considerados. Se pretende que sea particularmente aplicable a los regímenes contemporáneos de amplio poder ejecutivo y fuertes ingresos estatales. ; In this article it is tackle the conceptual construction of the possible effects of the governmental vote buying on the political system. The identified effects are: higher participation of the state resources in the lower echelons of the income distribution and increasing tendency in the incumbent party to become the predominant one. The model considers vote buying as the only independent variable. Although the model's goal was to elaborate over the immediate benefits received by both leader and voters as a collective action process, other elements were also considered. Contemporary strong executive branch democracies with important revenues are included in the specific scope of application of this model. ; 289-315 ; marco@ula.ve ; trimestral

Although vote buying is a common practice in Colombian elections, there is little research that explores how networks operate and what their effects are on democratic institutions and the well-being of the population. This paper describes the operation of a vote buying network, based on a highly relevant case study occurred in Colombia, and discuss some of the implications of this practice. I argue that vote buying not only constitutes two electoral crimes, but impacts on political representation, elections, and deepens social inequalities. The case shows that vote buying affects especially the poorest, they are, paradoxically, the most likely to participate in a transaction. ; A pesar de que la compra de votos es una práctica común en las elecciones colombianas, existe poco desarrollo investigativo que documente cómo operan las redes y cuáles son sus efectos en las instituciones democráticas y en el bienestar de la población. Este trabajo describe el funcionamiento de una red dedicada a la compra de voto a partir de un estudio de caso de gran relevancia ocurrido en Colombia, y expone algunas de las implicaciones de esta práctica. Se sostiene que la compra del voto, además de constituir los delitos de corrupción al sufragante y financiamiento ilegal de las campañas, impacta negativamente en dos pilares de la democracia moderna: la representación y las elecciones; profundizando las desigualdades sociales. El caso evidencia que la compra de votos afecta en especial a los más pobres, siendo estos, paradójicamente, los más propensos a participar en la transacción.

Exchanging one's vote for particularistic benefits - practices usually grouped under 'clientelism' - is often thought to weaken programmatic links between citizens and politicians and disincentivize public good provision, as well as undermine voter autonomy and the ideal role of elections. However, empirically analyzing this key phenomenon for the working of democracies entails formidable challenges. We conduct list experiments on a large sample of households to estimate the incidence of clientelistic vote buying, as well as the extent to which respondents refrain from openly recognizing this behavior. Nearly one out of every five respondents engage in clientelism and, surprisingly, they do not feel ashamed to admit it. Using the literature to guide our analysis, we examine the robust correlates of clientelism, finding that vote buying increases with poverty, reciprocity, disregard for the rule of law and, challenging several theories, interest in politics. ; Con frecuencia se argumenta que intercambiar el voto por beneficios particulares - practicas usualmente agrupadas como 'clientelismo' - debilita los vínculos programáticos entre ciudadanos y políticos y desincentiva la provisión de bienes públicos para el bienestar general, además de atentar contra la autonomía del elector y el papel ideal de las elecciones. Sin embargo, es difícil analizar empíricamente este crucial comportamiento para la democracia. Para superar este reto, aplicamos experimentos de lista a una muestra grande de hogares para estimar la incidencia de la venta de votos y calcular qué tanto los encuestados se abstienen de reconocer abiertamente este comportamiento. Casi uno de cada cinco encuestados se involucra en el clientelismo y, sorprendentemente, no se sienten avergonzados de admitirlo. Usando la literatura existente como guía, examinamos la incidencia y correlaciones más sobresalientes del clientelismo, encontrando que la compra de votos aumenta con la pobreza, la reciprocidad, el desconocimiento del imperio de la ley y, desafiando varias teorías, el interés por la política.

Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the individual level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing in uences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.

El artículo hace algunas reflexiones sobre el concepto "clientelismo" con base en una investigación comparativa en la zona metropolitana de la ciudad de México entre abril y agosto de 2012. Partiendo de la definición, se presentan resultados sobre la existencia de estrategias y estructuras clientelares de los tres partidos políticos relevantes desde el punto de vista de los intermediarios políticos, y se muestra lo que quedó a cambio de esas estructuras. ; Abstract: The article reflects on the concepts of "clientelism" on the basis of a comparative study of the metropolitan area of Mexico City between April and August of 2012. On the basis of this definition, it presents results on the existence of clientelistic strategies and structures controlled by the three main political parties from the point of view of the political intermediaries and shows what remains of these structures.

What are the effects of natural disasters on electoral results? Some authors claim that catastrophes have a negative effect on the survival of leaders in a democracy because voters have a propensity to punish politicians for not preventing or poorly handling a crisis. In contrast, this paper finds that these events might be beneficial for leaders. Disasters are linked to leader survival through clientelism: they generate an in-flow of resources in the form of aid, which increase money for buying votes. Analyzing the rainy season of 2010-2011 in Colombia, considered its worst disaster in history, I use a difference-in-differences strategy to show that in the local election incumbent parties benefited from the disaster. The result is robust to different specifications and alternative explanations. Moreover, places receiving more aid and those with judicial evidence of vote-buying irregularities, are more likely to reelect the incumbent, supporting the mechanism proposed by this paper.

In theory, under the conditions of open electoral competition, an active civil society and institutions that guarantee accountability, clientelism and vote-buying lose their attraction and disappear in the long run. Based on an analysis of political processes in the Federal District, this article examines the survival and transformation of political clientelism in democratic Mexico. An attempt is made to evaluate the causes and consequences of the persistence and continued relevance of political clientelism, placing emphasis on the diversification of "client supply" in the context of local democratization. This diversification increasingly includes the provision of individualized benefits relating to public security, in exchange for political support. Adapted from the source document.

Este artículo forma parte de una serie de investigaciones sobre el fenómeno del clientelismo político en Galicia (España). El objetivo principal es comprobar la relación teórica y empírica entre el fenómeno del clientelismo y su financiación por métodos corruptos. El artículo utiliza una definición teórica de clientelismo y corrupción como fenómenos diferenciados, pero que pueden llegar a ser interdependientes y superponerse en un plano empírico, dando origen a fenómenos híbridos. El texto propone un marco analítico para explorar el nexo entre ambos conceptos, especialmente cuando la corrupción se convierte en un instrumento de financiación de las redes clientelares. El artículo presenta los resultados de una investigación original, basada en tres minuciosos estudios de caso de relaciones clientelares donde se ha producido corrupción política para financiar la maquinaria partidista y distribuir favores. ; This article is part of a series of investigations on the phenomenon of political clientelism in Galicia (Spain). The main objective is to verify the theoretical and empirical relationship between the phenomenon of clientelism and its funding through corrupt methods. The article uses a theoretical definition of clientelism and corruption as differentiated phenomena that can, nevertheless, become interdependent and overlapping at an empirical plane. This, in turn, gives rise to hybrid phenomena. The text proposes an analytical framework to explore the linkage between both concepts, especially when corruption becomes an instrument for financing patron-client networks. The paper presents the results of an original research based on three thorough case studies of clientelistic relationship where political corruption has taken place to finance the party machine and distribute favours. ; SI

En el presente artículo, tres destacados académicos entrevistados (Roderic Ai Camp, WayneA. Cornelius y Kenneth F. Greene) argumentan que el retorno del sistema autoritario mexicano es poco probable debido a la existencia de instituciones democráticas que han surgido en los últimos años; sin embargo, no resulta claro cómo las instituciones políticas y los ciudadanos puedan restringir las viejas prácticas de los gobiernos priístas, como la compra del voto,el fraude electoral y el clientelismo. ; In the present article, three acknowledgeable scholars are interviewed (Roderic Ai Camp,Wayne A. Cornelius and Kenneth F. Greene) they argue that the return of the Mexican authoritarian system is unlikely because the emergence of democratic institutions in the last years;however, it is not clear how political institutions and citizens may restrict the old and anti-democratic priista practices such as vote buying, electoral fraud and clientelism.

Relations between poor people and the government that creates the Programa Bolsa Familia at Brazil may be summarized in two dimensions: 1) favor direct relationships without the intervention of collective action and 2) are distant relations in terms of type of interaction and communication between the authorities and beneficiaries. While there are instances of formal social control, operation of the program makes minimal intermediation and highly institutional and civic organizations have little room to act and to represent the beneficiaries of Bolsa Familia in institutionalized interfaces. Direct links generate positive effect low levels of political patronage vote buying and coercion, but also generate unintended effects such as the lack of program operation, difficulty to defend themselves collectively by irregularities and create an active citizenry. ; Las relaciones entre los pobres y el gobierno que genera la implementación del programa Bolsa Familia pueden resumirse en dos dimensiones: 1) se privilegian «relaciones directas» sin intermediación de acción colectiva y 2) también «relaciones lejanas» en términos del tipo de interacción y comunicación entre las autoridades y los beneficiarios. Si bien existen instancias formales de control social, la operación del programa hace que la intermediación sea mínima, altamente institucional y que las organizaciones civiles tengan poco espacio para actuar representando a los beneficiarios. Estas relaciones generan bajos niveles de compra y coacción del voto, pero crean también efectos no intencionales como son el desconocimiento de la operación del programa, dificultad para defenderse de manera colectiva de abusos de poder, así como obstáculos para generar ciudadanía activa.

Describimos algunas características del ambiente político en Colombia, a partir de una base de datos panel única con cerca de 10,000 hogares. Comparando respuestas en 2013 y 2016, documentamos una persistente falta de interés en política y un clientelismo prevaleciente, con vínculos personales dominando a las afinidades partidistas. El involucramiento en la compra clientelista de votos, en cambio, es bastante variable en el tiempo, y los hogares entran y salen de estas relaciones. Contradiciendo las más simples y optimistas teorías de la modernización, no encontramos que incrementos en la riqueza del hogar estén correlacionados con el abandono del clientelismo. En cambio, los cambios en la debilidad del estado (medida con la evasión tributaria) sí se correlacionan fuertemente con cambio en el clientelismo. Fortalecer el estado parece, por lo tanto, una tarea prioritaria. Entendiendo los esfuerzos de construcción de paz como un paso en esta dirección nos conduce a examinar las actitudes hacia el reciente proceso de paz entre el gobierno y las FARC. ; We describe some features of the political environment in Colombia, drawing from a unique panel dataset of about 10,000 households. Contrasting responses in 2013 and 2016, we document a persistent lack of interest in politics and prevailing clientelism, with personalistic links dominating partisan affinity. Engagement in clientelistic vote buying, instead, is quite variable in time, with households getting into and out of these exchanges. Rejecting the simplest and more optimistic theories of modernization, we do not find that increases in household wealth correlate with the abandonment of clientelism. Instead, changes in the weakness of the state (as proxied with tax evasion) correlate strongly with changes in clientelism. Strengthening the state therefore seems a priority. Viewing peace-building efforts as one key step in this direction naturally leads to the examination of the attitudes towards the recent peace process between the government and the Farc.

In Bogota reforms in 1991 blocked a market for buying and selling of votes. The patronage lost effectiveness, citizens developed a vote of opinion and the city demonstrated an outstanding performance in the provision of public goods and services. This story is illustrated by a new panel with data at the district and the polling station from 1988 to 2003. An interesting episode exposes preferences class of bogotanos by each of its mayors. However, the main result is the collapse caused by structural reforms. Before 1991, the most exposed areas to patronage generated a higher percentage of votes for the traditional parties and got more coverage in public services after 1991, the two relationships are no longer true. A patronage machine collapses.