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Allegations of voter fraud accompany many real-world elections. How does electoral malpractice affect the acceptance of elected institutions? Using an online experiment in which people distribute income according to majority-elected rules, we show that those who experience vote buying or voter disenfranchisement during the election are subsequently less willing to comply with the rule. On average, the detrimental impact of electoral malpractice on compliance is of the same magnitude as removing the election altogether and imposing a rule exogenously. Our experiment shows how corrupting democratic processes can impact economic behavior and sheds light on the behavioral mechanisms underlying "rule legitimacy".

Although elections have become the norm not only in democratic regimes but also in autocratic ones, the legitimacy of the electoral process in different countries is often contested. Facing strong international pressures to prove democratic credentials, eventual winners have a strong incentive to ensure high levels of voter turnout. Conversely, leaders of parties likely to lose the election have an incentive to reduce turnout—for example, through boycotts—to delegitimize the election. In such situations, turnout is a major dimension of competition. To overcome the potential delegitimizing effects of low turnout, incumbents will often turn toward clientelistic mobilization, as high turnout can be a powerful rejoinder to those who denounce elections as a sham and can put observers' concerns about the legitimacy of the electoral process to rest. We develop a theory to explain how such campaigns will target particularistic benefits. We argue that what we term "legitimacy buying" will be primarily aimed at "staunching the bleeding" of supporters who are usually consistent voters but have doubts about the legitimacy of the election. This theoretical prediction departs from theories used to explain vote buying in contexts in which the legitimacy of the elections is largely uncontested by significant groups in society. The theory is supported by data from a list experiment on vote buying conducted after the Honduran 2009 elections, which occurred in the wake of President Zelaya's ousting and in the midst of a boycott promoted by his supporters.

Corruption is one of the socioeconomic malaises that bedeviled the Nigerian State for many decades which virtually eroded all aspects of good governance and effective service delivery to the populace. It has affected democratic governance particularly electoral process with vote buying, bribing of electoral body officials and manipulation of the entire process. This paper investigated how corruption affected the process and outcome of the 2015 General Elections. The methodology adopted is qualitative case study of data collection and analysis where some agencies and stakeholders that are related to the area of study were selected for interview including INEC, EFCC, politicians, party stakeholders, academicians and members of the general public through focus group discussion. The paper discovered that, the entire process of 2015 General Elections was affected by corruption and corrupt practices in terms of using public treasury for campaign activities by politicians from the two major parties; APC and PDP in their campaign and other electoral activities comprising of vote buying, excessive media campaign, spending above limit and bribing of INEC officials. The paper recommends that, for corruption to be eschewed in the electoral process, the INEC should be allowed a free hand in running the elections and the EFCC should be involved in screening contestants for political office and violaters of electoral laws should be banned from active politics permanently. The paper contributed to the existing knowledge by presenting an area that has not been given adequate attention particularly in the methodology of research of this nature.

Political transaction has become a common phenomenon that accompanies elections. It does not only occur in countries with well-established democratic systems, but also in developing nations. Academic engagement with the concept of democracy increasingly explores its links to the chaotic commodification of electors' votes. Political transactions can trigger several problems, such as political structures, citizenship awareness, or cultural relations issues that form a democratic structure of the country. Political transactions are processes of negotiation that take place between elites. This paper explores the contestation of social positions to gain electors' votes in the context of the legislative election conducted in Banyuwangi. The strategies used by legislative candidates to obtain votes through transactional relationships demonstrates the various actors involved in general elections. First, the researcher argues that democratization has transformed the sacred position of the elites, especially the religious elite. Second, the complexity of relations between elites presents the position of a broker, which emphasizes the character of democracy in Indonesia, which is marked by issues of clientelism. Thus, it is essential to observe Indonesia's political praxis from the institutional practice point of view and its social problems that distort democratic values. Keywords: Clientelism, Transaction Cost Politic, Money Politics

This paper investigates the prevalence of vote-buying in democratic elections where stringent restrictions on corporate donations to political parties exist. We combine data from state assembly elections in India with household-level consumer expenditure surveys (conducted by NSSO) over the period 2004-11. Exploiting a difference-in-differences methodology, we estimate the effects elections have on the consumption of various household items: food, clothes, education-related, etc. Moreover, there is heterogeneity in such consumption adjustments across households. Our estimates suggest that legal sources of funds are not sufficient for generating such "spikes" in consumption and indicate the role of the hidden economy in politics.

The logic of corruption has seemingly been accepted as a normal part of democratic practices. This article challenges this logic, referring to the successful example of Panggungharjo, a village on the outskirts of Yogyakarta.[1]Without romanticising this village and its experiences, this article seeks to show the decisions and steps necessary for realising change and breaking the chains of transactionalism. Change is only possible if both the supply of and demand for money politics are cut off. Transformation is only possible when changes occur in supply and demand. In other words, transactionalism can only be avoided in electoral politics when a shift in demand coincides with the stigmatisation of transactional practices.[1] Administratively, Panggungharjo is part of Bantul Regency. However, it is sociologically a sub-urban part of Yogyakarta City.

We develop a model of legislative lobbying where policy proposals are endogenous. We show that a policy proposer with preferences tilted towards one lobby may be induced by an increase in that interest group's size to propose policies geared towards the opposing lobby. Hence, a larger lobby size can have adverse effects on policy outcomes for this same lobby. This provides another rationale as to why some interests do not organize. Moreover, we find that a second-mover advantage in Groseclose and Snyder (1996)-type lobbying models with exogenous policy proposals can turn into a second-mover disadvantage when the proposal is endogenous.

A constitutional referendum was held in Armenia on 6 December 2015. The amendments to the constitution changed the country from having a semi-presidential system to a parliamentary republic, with the changes planned to take place during the 2017-18 electoral cycle. The results of the referendum determine not only the current changes in the electoral code, but also the necessity and effectiveness of the new electoral system. Particularly, by replacing the majoritarian system to the proportional system and by increasing the representativeness of the parliament for some groups, we can create basis for the further development of the country. Above all in the article we discussed the main factors that have a big impact on the voting behavior of the citizens.

The democratisation process in Nigeria has been seriously hampered by endemic corruption. The blatant buying and selling of votes at polling booths during elections in Nigeria further dims the hope of democratic consolidation. Known and referred to comically in the Yoruba language as 'E dibo, ke se obe', literally interpreted as 'vote and cook soup', that is 'vote for cash/cash for vote', in apparent reference to the money that voters get if they vote in a particular direction; the phenomenon is fast emerging as the new face of commercialization of Nigeria's electoral process. The decline of participatory democracy and fizzling of the euphoria that accompanied Nigeria's return to civilian rule in 1999 informed this conversation. To explain the details of this discourse, this chapter relied on the understanding of the relationship of poverty and political participation as provided for by the political economy approach. Guided by the class analysis of poverty, this chapter interpreted vote buying and selling, a current emblem of Nigeria's democratization process, as a creation of the ruling class. Money has become a dominant factor in Nigeria's electoral process and the masses are increasingly made to exchange their votes for money just as they buy and sell goods and services. If unchecked, it poses a risk of further engendering electoral corruption and the inevitable collapse of the democratization process. Thus, this chapter utilized secondary sources of data to interrogate the corruptive effect of direct vote buying/selling on elections in Nigeria with specific reference(s) to the Edo State and Ondo State Gubernatorial elections conducted in 2016, as the phenomenon gives cause for concern given the fact of the threat it poses. The chapter concludes with some recommendations on the way forward.Keywords: Corruption, Vote Buying/Selling, Poverty, Elections, Democratisation

Following the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now common in low-income societies. However, frequently elections are not peaceful. We investigate the Nigerian presidential election of 2007, which is to date the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by violence. Through a large randomized experiment we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter turnout, and that the violence was systematically associated with the weakest party. Whereas the incumbent party may have an absolute advantage in violence, we suggest that it has a comparative advantage in two other techniques, vote buying and ballot fraud. Voter intimidation may be a strategy of the weak analogous to terrorism.

We examine lobby influence on policy outcomes in a legislative vote-buying model with two competing lobbyists and endogenous policy proposals. We compare two polar cases: (1) the committee or (2) the lobbyist seeking policy change writes the bill. Surprisingly we find that if the salience of the issue is low, the committee proposes more extreme policy changes than the pro-policy-change lobbyist even though the policy preferences of the committee are more moderate. The opposite is true if salience is high. We also show that the extreme proposals when salience is low do not necessarily involve lower welfare relative to the lobbyist's proposal.

Vote buying is abnormal politic but is massive practice in Indonesian General Election. Curriculum vitae and professional popularity was substitute with money and goods. With observation, interview, and documentary technique this article assumed there are not something new in vote buying practices in Indonesian politics.Keywords : General Election, Vote buying

Why are the poor susceptible to clientelism, and what factors shield them from the influence of vote buying? We explore the role of both formal and informal social networks in shaping the likelihood of being targeted with private inducements. We argue that when the poor lack access to formal social networks, they become increasingly reliant on vote buying channelled through informal networks. To test our theory, we build the informal, family-based network linkages between voters and local politicians spanning a city in the Philippines. We then collect survey data on formal network connections, electoral handouts, and voting behaviour of 900 voters randomly drawn from these family networks. We show first that campaigns disproportionately target poorer voters. We then show that familial ties further influence targeting among poor voters. Finally, we show that access to formal networks such as workers' associations mitigate voter fears of punishment for failing to reciprocate.

Following the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now common in low-income societies. However, these elections are frequently flawed. We investigate the Nigerian general election of 2007, which is to date the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by violence. We designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on randomized anti-violence grassroots campaigning. We find direct effects on violence outcomes from exploring both subject-surveying and independent data sources. Crucially, we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter turnout, and that the violence was systematically dissociated from incumbents. We suggest that incumbents have a comparative advantage in alternative strategies, vote buying and ballot fraud. Voter intimidation may be a strategy of the weak analogous to terrorism.

Following the wave of democratization during the 1990s, elections are now common in low-income societies. However, these elections are frequently flawed. We investigate the Nigerian general election of 2007, which is to date the largest election held in Africa and one seriously marred by violence. We designed and conducted a nationwide field experiment based on randomized anti-violence grassroots campaigning. We find direct effects on violence outcomes from exploring both subject-surveying and independent data sources. Crucially, we establish that voter intimidation is effective in reducing voter turnout, and that the violence was systematically dissociated from incumbents. We suggest that incumbents have a comparative advantage in alternative strategies, vote buying and ballot fraud. Voter intimidation may be a strategy of the weak analogous to terrorism.