After 24 years in power, the CDU was replaced by a new coalition composed of The Left, the SPD and the Greens and led by Prime Minister Bodo Ramelow, a member of The Left party. This constellation is entirely new in Germany. Although the CDU remained the strongest party (33.5 percent) for several reasons (a non-polarized campaign, issues that had been reduced in salience, and a decline of the state Prime Minister Christiane Lieberknecht's reputation) the party failed to win the votes necessary to come into a position where no politically viable coalition could be formed without it. The Left's strategy of personalization, on the other hand, proved successful to moderately improve its good result of 2009. The SPD had made the wrong strategic decision of keeping all coalition options open before the election and thus experienced not only another debacle but, with 12.4 percent, an all time low. Yet, after the election the SPD found itself in a pivotal position and could decide which coalition would form the next government. In the face of electoral defeat it settled for the new coalition with The Left and the Greens who barely managed to pass the five-percent threshold. The SPD-party members voted to approve this choice. That the FDP failed to surmount the five-percent threshold can be attributed to Germany-wide trends. Adapted from the source document.
There has been repeated criticism of the political parties dominating the election of the Federal President as being detrimental to his reputation and dignity. Therefore, as an alternative to the election by the party-dominated Federal Assembly (Bundesversammlung), the critics propose to elect the President directly, to give him more independent legitimacy and to strengthen his position within the political system not least against the political parties. Today, reviewing 15 presidential elections, it can be found that though won by narrow margins, the outcomes were always determined by the majority-proportions prevailing in Parliament. However, this did not make Presidents to puppets on the strings of the majority-holding parties. Likewise, the presidential elections during the Weimar Republic give little reason to prefer a direct election. For while Friedrich Ebert, the democrat and republican, was legitimized with high consent by indirect vote, Paul von Hindenburg, the monarchist and anti-republican, secured only a very close majority by direct voting. Consequently, a direct election of the President of the Federal Republic of Germany was not an option to the Parliamentary Council (Parlamentarischer Rat). Based on their experiences during the Weimar-Republic and still guided by the ideas of the German Constitutionalism in the 19th century, the "mothers" and "fathers" of the Grundgesetz favoured the corrective power of a neutral, party-independent President as "pouvoir neutre". This ideal or rather caricature is shared by the present supporters of a direct election and it comes along with an anti-pluralistic, anti-parliamentary (mis)understanding of public choices and the democratic way of functioning. Adapted from the source document.
The paper initially explains some fundamentals of interactive decision-making ("game theory") and then applies different approaches of game theory to different aspects of Brexit. The first analysis perceives the 2016 referendum as a "simple voting game" and challenges the view that the observed outcome of about 52% percent in favor of Brexit have to be interpreted that the "vox populi" (and, thus, also the "vox dei") is in favor of a "no-deal" Brexit. Rather, there seem to have existed three camps among the voters, of whom 25% have actually opted for a no-deal Brexit, whereas 27% seem to have approved Brexit in the expectation of a sensible deal. Hence, the 48% who favored "remain" have been by far the largest homogeneous group, although they fall short of an absolute majority. Social choice theory shows that, in a situation without an option supported by a clear majority, no aggregation procedure – such as majority voting or pairwise binary voting – exists that guarantees collective rationality (Arrow theorem) or satisfies some desirable properties (Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem). The next analysis scrutinizes the hypothesis that the observed outcome of the referendum was due to the "remainers'" failure to participate. The economic theory of voter participation explains intermediate participation rates as a mixed strategy equilibrium. For the two or three groups mentioned above, the incentives to participate were different. The third model section takes a closer look at the negotiations between the UK and the EU, focusing on the transition from Theresa May to Boris Johnson. A simple Nash bargaining model demonstrates that the bargaining outcome may depend on the preferences of the delegate who negotiates on behalf of the represented party. Switching from one delegate to another, hence, may lead to a more favorable outcome. A final section discusses existing literature on game theoretic analysis of Brexit, which essentially deals with various non-cooperative bargaining models.
Ausgehend von den Wahlplakaten der österreichischen Nationalratswahl 2017 gibt die vorliegende Diplomarbeit einen Überblick über wichtige sprachliche Strategien, die im Wahlkampf auf Wahlplakaten realisiert werden. Es werden neben allgemeinen Funktionen der Sprachverwendung in der Politik auch die spezielle Kommunikationssituation beschrieben, die zwischen Rezipienten/Rezipientinnen und Wahlplakat entsteht. Zudem widmet sich die Diplomarbeit der intendierten Persuasion, die von Wahlplakaten ausgeht, sowie weiteren zentralen Aspekten politischer Werbung wie Wortwahl, Syntax, Zeichen und Text-Bild-Kombinationen. In der Diplomarbeit werden des Weiteren die Wahlplakate der sechs stimmenstärksten Parteien der Nationalratswahl 2017 (ÖVP, SPÖ, FPÖ, NEOS, die Grünen und Liste Pilz) mit Hilfe einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse analysiert. Hierfür wurde ein Kategoriensystem erstellt, das eine objektive Analyse leitet und eine Vergleichbarkeit der Ergebnisse sichern soll. Die Analyse der Wahlplakate erfolgt hinsichtlich der verwendeten Zeichen, des Thematisierens gegnerischer Parteien, der Syntax, des Adressierens von Rezipienten/Rezipientinnen, der Argumentation und der aktivierten Frames. Zudem werden die verschiedenen sprachlichen Strategien, die auf den jeweiligen Wahlplakaten eingesetzt wurden, beispielhaft aufgezeigt und wichtige sprachliche und werbestrategische Aspekte erläutert, die auf einem Großteil der Wahlplakate berücksichtigt wurden. Das Ergebnis der Analyse bildet sprachliche Trends und Tendenzen auf Wahlplakaten des Wahlkampfs zur österreichischen Nationalratswahl 2017 ab und vergleicht diese hinsichtlich der analysierten Kategorien. ; Taking a close look at election posters of the National Council elections in Austria in 2017, this thesis provides an overview of important linguistic strategies that have been used. The general functions of language use in a political context will be examined closely, as well as the communicative situation between the recipients and the election poster. In addition to that, this thesis deals with the intended persuasion, which is immanent to every election poster. Further important aspects of political advertisement that are addressed in this thesis are the choice of words, syntax, signs and different combinations of text and image.In this thesis, the election posters of the six parties that received the most votes in the Austrian National Council election 2017 (ÖVP, SPÖ, FPÖ, NEOS, die Grünen and Liste Peter Pilz) will be analysed. The method that is used is the qualitative content analysis. In accordance with this method, a system of categories is developed in order to conduct an objective analysis and to ensure comparability of the results. The analysis takes a close look at signs, the addressing of opposing parties, the addressing of recipients, the methods of argumentation and frames that are evoked. Furthermore, the linguistic strategies that are used on the election posters are illustrated and important advertising strategies that are relevant for the election posters are explained. The result of the analysis shows linguistic trends and tendencies on election posters of the Austrian National Council election 2017 and compares them in regard with the categories of the analysis. ; vorgelegt von Maria Rössler ; Zusammenfassungen in Deutsch und Englisch ; Abweichender Titel laut Übersetzung des Verfassers/der Verfasserin ; Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Diplomarbeit, 2018 ; (VLID)3290446
Legitimationsbedürftig ist herrschaftliches Handeln, das die Präferenzen oder Interessen der Betroffenen verletzt. In demokratischen politischen Systemen kann solches Handeln entweder inputorientiert durch Bezug auf die kollektiven Präferenzen oder output-orientiert durch Bezug auf die gemeinsamen Interessen der Regierten legitimiert werden. Im Nationalstaat ergänzen und verstärken sich beide Arten von Argumenten; und beide finden ihre Grundlage in politischen Institutionen, welche die direkte oder indirekte Abhängigkeit der Regierenden von den Regierten sichern, effektives politisches Handeln ermöglichen und den Mißbrauch der Regierungsmacht verhindern sollen. Jenseits des Nationalstaats fehlen nicht nur wesentliche institutionelle Voraussetzungen der inputorientierten Legitimation, sondern es fehlt auch die Voraussetzung einer starken kollektiven Identität, die erst die Ausbildung kollektiver Präferenzen ermöglicht, die auch unfreiwillige Umverteilung und zugemutete Sonderopfer legitimieren könnten. Die dann allein verfügbare Output-Legitimation ist jedoch in ihrer Reichweite begrenzt. Sie kann nicht die Verletzung gravierender Interessen der Regierten rechtfertigen. In der Europäischen Union ist die Beachtung dieser normativen Beschränkung zwar durch die Veto-Struktur ihrer "politischen" Institutionen gewährleistet. Wenn hier dennoch Legitimationsdefizite auftreten können, dann deshalb, weil anders als im Nationalstaat in der EU das unmittelbar rechtswirksame Handeln der "unpolitischen" Institutionen (der Europäischen Zentralbank, des Europäischen Gerichtshofs und der EU-Kommission bei Vertragsverletzungsverfahren) nicht der letztlichen Kontrolle politisch verantwortlicher Instanzen unterliegt. Außerhalb der EU fehlt dem Regieren auf der internationalen Ebene die unmittelbare Rechtswirksamkeit. Die Legitimationsgrundlage der Zustimmung der (ihren Wählern gegenüber politisch verantwortlichen) nationalen Regierungen bleibt also unangetastet. Anders als in der EU können hier internationale Umverteilung und solidarisches Handeln nicht durch supranationale Instanzen oder durch Mehrheitsbeschluß oktroyiert werden. Sie sind freilich auch nicht ausgeschlossen. Aber ihre Legitimation kann nur input-orientiert durch Diskurse in den nationalen politischen Systemen begründet werden, deren Bürger ja frei sind, die eigenen Präferenzen solidarisch oder auch altruistisch zu definieren. ; Governing acts violating the preferences or interests of the governed require legitimation. In democratic political systems, such acts may be legitimated either by the "input-oriented" reference to the collective preferences of the governed, or by the output-oriented reference to their interests. In the nation state, both types of legitimating arguments will complement and reinforce each other; and both are supported by political institutions which are meant to ensure the dependence of governors on the governed, to enable effective political action, and to prevent the abuse of governing powers. Beyond the nation state, the institutional prerequisites of input-oriented legitimacy are weak or lacking. Even more important is the lack of a "thick" collective identity that could support collective preferences legitimating involuntary redistribution and uncompensated sacrifices. What is possible is output legitimacy, but its normative reach is limited. It could not justify the violation of salient interests of the governed. In the European Union, these normative constraints are fully reflected in the multiple-veto structure of its "political" institutions. If legitimacy deficits may nevertheless arise, they are due to the fact that the directly effective actions of the EU's "non-political" institutions (the European Central Bank, the European Court of Justice, and the EU Commission when prosecuting Treaty infringements) are not under the ultimate control of politically accountable actors. Outside of the EU, governing at the international level lacks direct effectiveness. Hence the legitimacy base of agreement by politically accountable national governments remains intact. As a consequence, international redistribution and uncompensated sacrifices cannot be simply imposed, either by supranational authorities or by majority votes. That does not mean that such policy choices are categorically excluded. But their legitimacy can only be grounded in national political discourses - where citizens remain free to define their preferences in solidaristic or altruistic fashion.
