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THE 1960 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WAS THE CLOSEST OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY WHEN MEASURED BY THE POPULAR VOTE. JOHN F KENNEDY MANAGED NARROW MARGINS IN A NUMBER OF CRITICAL STATES TO CARRY HIM TO VICTORY OVER RICHARD M. NIXON. BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE CALL IN ILLINOIS (KENNEDY WON BY AN OFFICIAL COUNT OF 8,858 VOTES), THE UNSAVORY REPUTATION OF THE CHICAGO DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION, AND CERTAIN NEWSPAPER REPORTS, REPUBLICANS AND NIXON BECAME CONVINCED THAT THEY HAD BEEN CHEATED OUT OF ENOUGH VOTES TO HAVE SWUNG THE STATE INTO THE REPUBLICAN COLUMN. THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES THESE REPUBLICAN ALLEGATIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN WIDELY ACCEPTED, ON THE BASIS OF TWO PARTIAL RECOUNTS OF PAPER BALLOT PRECINCTS WHICH WERE CONDUCTED IN COOK COUNTY (CHICAGO) IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1960 ELECTIONS. THIS ANALYSIS SHOWS THAT THERE WAS A PATTERN OF MISCOUNTING VOTES WHICH WORKED TO THE ADVANTAGE OF ALL DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES INVOLVED IN THE RECOUNT. THE ANALYSIS ALSO SHOWS, HOWEVER, THAT OF THE REPUBLICAN CANDIDATES DEPRIVED OF VOTES, RICHARD M. NIXON SUFFERED THE LEAST. BY COMPARING THE TWO RECOUNTS AND BY MAKING ESTIMATES BASED UPON THEM IT IS POSSIBLE TO APPROXIMATE A MINIMUM NUMBER OF VOTES NIXON LOST AS THE RESULT OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES IN CHICAGO. THIS FIGURE OF SLIGHTLY LESS THAN 8,000 VOTES IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO MAKE A CONVINCING CASE THAT NIXON WAS CHEATED OUT OF ILLINOIS' ELECTORAL VOTES.

Most European parliaments use the successive procedure to reach decisions. This means that a parliament votes feasible alternatives one-by-one in a pre-determined order until one of them obtains a majority of votes. The paper has two objectives. First, I sketch a simple method making it easy to uncover instances of successful insincere voting under the successive procedure. Second, by focusing on data from one national assembly consistently using this procedure, I demonstrate that insincere or strategic voting is very rare. The finding does not indicate that politicians necessarily behave in a non-strategic or unsophisticated manner. It means only that strategic maneuvers may take place at earlier stages of the decision-making process, for example, in designing the voting agenda. Adapted from the source document.

Politicians bias public policies to favor particular election districts. According to the traditional common pool model, districts facing low tax shares should receive relatively large government projects. We suggest a swing-voter model where the number of voters on the ideological cut point, lack of party identification and number of district representatives per voter determine project sizes. We analyze the allocation of state road investments in Norway from 1973--1997 exploiting unique data on characteristics of voters, legislative representation and tax prices in 19 election districts. Geographical representation to parliament is biased, mostly due to an ancient constitution. Shares of swing voters and legislative over-representation lead to higher levels of road investments, while high levels of party identification reduce investments. Adapted from the source document.

We extend the basic model of spatial competition in two directions. First, political parties & voters do not have complete information but behave adaptively. Political parties use polls to search for policy platforms that maximize the probability of winning an election & the voting decision of voters is influenced by social interaction. Second, we allow for the emergence of interest groups. These interest groups transmit information about voter preferences to the political parties, & they coordinate voting behavior. We use simulation methods to investigate the convergence properties of this model. We find that the introduction of social dynamics & interest groups increases the separation between parties platforms, prohibits convergence to the center of the distribution of voter preferences, & increases the size of the winning set. Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

"With this book, Clarissa Peterson and Emmitt Y. Riley, III dive into how racial attitudes change and inform political decisions. Peterson and Riley use racial resentment, black blame, and racial identity to investigate the extent to which racial attitudes influence vote choice, evaluations of Black Lives Matter, and attitudes toward public policies. Moving the conversation beyond the study of Blacks and Whites, the authors unpack the potency of racial attitudes among Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites. In doing so, they challenge our understanding of how racial attitudes are central to political decision-making in an environment that is inundated with anti-Blackness. The book reframes discussions of racial attitudes to propose that, like white people, some racial minorities in the U.S. harbor negative attitudes toward Black people. The authors suggest that while white political attitudes are significantly explained by racial resentment, the overall influence of racial resentment on political decision-making among some racial groups, may be mitigated by racial identity. At a time when white supremacists walk unhooded in the streets of America, Racial Attitudes in America Today is essential reading for educators wanting to fully engage with and understand racial resentment in America and undergraduate students in the fields of political science, sociology, history, and psychology"--

"With this book, Clarissa Peterson and Emmitt Y. Riley, III dive into how racial attitudes change and inform political decisions. Peterson and Riley use racial resentment, black blame, and racial identity to investigate the extent to which racial attitudes influence vote choice, evaluations of Black Lives Matter, and attitudes toward public policies. Moving the conversation beyond the study of Blacks and Whites, the authors unpack the potency of racial attitudes among Asians, Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites. In doing so, they challenge our understanding of how racial attitudes are central to political decision-making in an environment that is inundated with anti-Blackness. The book reframes discussions of racial attitudes to propose that, like white people, some racial minorities in the U.S. harbor negative attitudes toward Black people. The authors suggest that while white political attitudes are significantly explained by racial resentment, the overall influence of racial resentment on political decision-making among some racial groups, may be mitigated by racial identity. At a time when white supremacists walk unhooded in the streets of America, Racial Attitudes in America Today is essential reading for educators wanting to fully engage with and understand racial resentment in America and undergraduate students in the fields of political science, sociology, history, and psychology"--

Abstract
Relatively little is known about the performance of open questions in self-administered questionnaires compared to interviewer-administered ones. We examined this issue using the responses to the 2016 American National Election Study's Web self-administered questionnaires and face-to-face computer-assisted personal interviews (CAPI) from independently drawn samples that asked three sets of open questions: most important problem(s) facing the country; candidate for and against reasons; and political party likes and dislikes. Although Web respondents gave shorter answers with fewer codeable ideas than face-to-face respondents, the two modes produced similar distributions of substantive answers. Despite our expectation that open answers to interviewers would be more civil than those expressed on the Web, there was no difference in civility between the modes. However, the construct validity of the four candidate for and against items (predicting vote choice of Clinton vs. Trump) was higher on the Web than in the interviewer-administered CAPI. These findings call into question the conventional wisdom that open questions are not well suited for self-administration and suggest that researchers should consider more frequent use of open questions in Web surveys.

Scholarship on women voters using an intersectional lens has shown feminists and women of color within the Democratic Party to be a powerful force in electoral politics—specifically, Black and Latina women—are the most reliable voters. Combined, they represent the majority of women voters in the Democratic Party, and they have shown themselves to be a sizeable voting bloc in the last two American presidential election cycles. Using data from the 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES), we demonstrate important differences in support for the Democratic candidate (Hillary Clinton) between feminists and women of color—Black and Latina—underscoring the need to study gender, race, and ethnicity simultaneously (versus independently) when they are co-constitutive identity categories. By examining women and the groups the Clinton campaign appealed most to—feminists, Black, and Latina women—we add to the scholarship in political science that followed this unique election and demonstrate the importance of feminist identity for vote choice and various modes of political behavior for women voters. Knowing and understanding how women respond through affect and how this affect can result in political behaviors will help determine what it takes for future historic first candidates to emerge successful.

The decision by a narrow majority of British voters to leave the European Union (EU) in 2016 was a political earthquake that few had seen coming. It produced new political divisions, not only between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe but also within the United Kingdom. In particular, the referendum campaign and the outcome generated two new political identities: "Leavers" and "Remainers." These Brexit identities crosscut partisan identities and voters formed deep emotional attachments to them (Curtice 2018; Evans and Schaffner 2019). Moreover, this Brexit divide led to affective polarization in the form of out-group animosity and discrimination (Hobolt, Leeper, and Tilley 2021). It also shaped perceptions of the economy (Sorace and Hobolt 2021), attitudes toward immigration (Pickup et al. 2021), vote choices (Hobolt and Rodon 2020), and losers' consent (Schaffner 2021; Tilley and Hobolt 2023a). Brexit identities have been shown to be salient and politically consequential. Yet, we know much less about whether these new identities are rooted in policy norms that go beyond preferences about the desirability of leaving the EU. In this article, we thus explore the nature of Brexit identities and how they relate to policy norms.

Even though previous research connected personality traits and support for radical-right populist parties (RRP), the question of which mechanisms connect these concepts is still underexplored. In particular, we focus on narcissistic rivalry, a maladaptive path of grandiose narcissism. Drawing on the affective intelligence framework and the narcissistic admiration and rivalry concept, we propose that the effect of rival narcissism on vote choice for the German Alternative für Deutschland is mediated by reactionary political orientations and activated by anger. Drawing on 2017 data from the mixed-mode representative GESIS panel (N = 2,552 & 1,901), we employ moderated mediation analyses. We show that reactionary political orientations mediate the relationship between narcissistic rivalry and RRP support. However, high levels of generalised anger are needed to activate the relationship between personality, reactionary values, and RRP support, whereas the mediating role of anti-immigrant sentiment is not affected by anger. Our study emphasises the role of anger in RRP support, thus showing that anger might explain why only some people with a specific predisposition support RRPs. The study also stresses the complexity of the relationship between personality, value orientations, and political behaviour.

Social media has an undeniable role in presidential campaigns. Starting with Barack Obama's first presidential campaign in 2008, on one hand, scholars and practitioners have embraced the potential and importance of these platforms. The 2016 presidential elections, on the other hand, raised concerns about social media's role in democratic processes as debates about how the platforms can sow misinformation have become mainstream. I argue that there has been a positive outcome of such debates: new data sources. Understanding their role—and their probable potential to do "harm"—social media platforms have worked toward increasing transparency in the political advertisements they carry. From Snapchat to Facebook, transparency reports share detailed information on how political groups, including presidential nominees, have utilized their platforms, targeted audiences, and disseminated calls-to-action. In this article, I argue that these transparency attempts will be invaluable data resources for political communication scholars to better explain how voter choice and candidate positioning work within digital media ecology. I answer four sample research questions about 2020 Presidential Elections in the United States to demonstrate the potential of these data sets in shedding light on how issues, identities, and time-relevant variables change political advertising in presidential campaigns.

AbstractIdeal point models have become a powerful tool for defining and measuring the ideology of many kinds of political actors, including legislators, judges, campaign donors, and members of the general public. We extend the application of ideal point models to the public using a novel data source: real-time reactions to statements by candidates in the 2012 presidential debates. Using these reactions as inputs to an ideal point model, we estimate individual-level ideology and evaluate the quality of the measure. Debate reaction ideal points provide a method for estimating a continuous, individual-level measure of ideology that avoids survey response biases, provides better estimates for moderates and the politically unengaged, and reflects the content of salient political discourse relevant to viewers' attitudes and vote choices. As expected, we find that debate reaction ideal points are more extreme among respondents who strongly identify with a political party, but retain substantial within-party variation. Ideal points are also more extreme among respondents who are more politically interested. Using topical subsets of the debate statements, we find that ideal points in the sample are more moderate for foreign policy than for economic or domestic policy.

Working conditions and workers' rights have long been indicators of broader societal power, yet it is unclear whether candidates who take explicit stands on such issues can expect to find electoral support among voters. This study draws on cross-sectional and panel data to examine the relationship between attitudes toward such issues and candidate preference in the 2016 Democratic primary. Although research on vote choice suggests issue attitudes are typically remote considerations, the findings indicate that Democrats who were more concerned about workers' working conditions and the exploitation of workers were significantly more likely to prefer Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic primary. Moreover, findings from panel data suggest such attitudes were latent, rather than adopted, as Democrats who expressed support for stronger regulation of business in 2011 were significantly more likely to prefer Bernie Sanders five years later in 2016. The findings suggest that issue attitudes can be meaningful considerations when there are distinct options for voters, and that the unanticipated Democratic support enjoyed by Bernie Sanders in the 2016 Democratic primary is at least partially attributable to his strong and explicit stands on working conditions and workers' rights.

This article analyses the 2017 UK General Election from the perspective of the campaign and results in Wales, a nation which had the most interesting election campaign of all the different nations. The election saw a stark contrast between the way the two principal UK-wide parties fought their campaigns and how the campaign impacted on results. Drawing on data from a post-election survey conducted in June 2017, we consider factors that shape voter choice, which affected the outcome of the election in Wales. We argue that the election internalised and reflected a new pattern of party politics that is likely to stimulate differential election outcomes across the UK; this requires a different approach to understanding election campaigns, one that differentiates between the nations and how every political party operates in each territory. This will help distinguish different political and electoral fault lines, as well as constructing a more granular analysis of the campaign's impact on electoral outcomes. We conclude first that, to better and more comprehensively explain UK-wide elections, there is a need to provide distinctive national and regional analyses, and secondly, it is mistaken to assume that the same electoral patterns will always exist in Wales as in England.

One of the focal points of social networks research has been the process by which individuals utilize information and cues from their social networks and communities to form political attitudes and make decisions about how and when to participate in politics. Not all individuals, however, have large social networks or are strongly connected to their local social environments. Furthermore, despite concerns about rising social isolation in American society, the role that relatively socially disconnected individuals play in politics is not well understood. Using a nationally representative data set with information about communities, social networks, and individual-level variables, this paper examines social connectedness and political behavior. Those who are more socially isolated, it is found, are neither more conservative nor liberal on any particular political issues, but clearly participate in politics less than individuals who are well connected to those around them. Finally, while individual political ideology is not correlated with isolation, the contextual influence of the local environment on individual preferences is correlated with social connectedness. When compared with well connected citizens, individuals who are more isolated are less likely to have their vote choices influenced by those around them. Individual social connectedness conditions the effect of contextual social influence.