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The National Front's claim to be populist makes it part of very widespread movement in Europe, which could be characterized by the refusal of mediation, the call to the people against the elite. But mistrust towards a political personnel considered as corrupt is, for example, also widespread in the electorate of extreme left. The voter of the FN is characterized rather by his ethnocentrism, his rejection of the others. And populist is not necessarily synonymous with "popular". The most disadvantaged social category, that of the workmen, is more represented in the electorate of the PC or the Hunters that in the FN, which makes better scores by the craftsmen, the industrialists and the liberal professions. The popular classes are distinguished initially by their abstentionism. The extreme right is thus at the same time less "populist" and less "popular" than it does appear. ; Le Front national, en se revendiquant du populisme, s'inscrit dans une mouvance très répandue en Europe, qui pourrait se caractériser par le refus de la médiation, l'appel au peuple contre les élites. Mais la méfiance envers un personnel politique considéré comme corrompu est, par exemple, aussi fréquente dans l'électorat d'extrême gauche. L'électeur du FN se distingue plutôt par son ethnocentrisme, son rejet des autres. Et populiste n'est pas nécessairement synonyme de « populaire ». La catégorie sociale la plus défavorisée, celle des ouvriers, est plus représentée dans l'électorat du PC ou des Chasseurs que dans celui du FN, qui fait de meilleurs scores chez les artisans, les industriels et les professions libérales. Les milieux populaires se singularisent d'abord par leur abstentionnisme. L'extrême droite est donc à la fois moins «populiste» et moins «populaire» qu'il n'y paraît.

The National Front's claim to be populist makes it part of very widespread movement in Europe, which could be characterized by the refusal of mediation, the call to the people against the elite. But mistrust towards a political personnel considered as corrupt is, for example, also widespread in the electorate of extreme left. The voter of the FN is characterized rather by his ethnocentrism, his rejection of the others. And populist is not necessarily synonymous with "popular". The most disadvantaged social category, that of the workmen, is more represented in the electorate of the PC or the Hunters that in the FN, which makes better scores by the craftsmen, the industrialists and the liberal professions. The popular classes are distinguished initially by their abstentionism. The extreme right is thus at the same time less "populist" and less "popular" than it does appear. ; Le Front national, en se revendiquant du populisme, s'inscrit dans une mouvance très répandue en Europe, qui pourrait se caractériser par le refus de la médiation, l'appel au peuple contre les élites. Mais la méfiance envers un personnel politique considéré comme corrompu est, par exemple, aussi fréquente dans l'électorat d'extrême gauche. L'électeur du FN se distingue plutôt par son ethnocentrisme, son rejet des autres. Et populiste n'est pas nécessairement synonyme de « populaire ». La catégorie sociale la plus défavorisée, celle des ouvriers, est plus représentée dans l'électorat du PC ou des Chasseurs que dans celui du FN, qui fait de meilleurs scores chez les artisans, les industriels et les professions libérales. Les milieux populaires se singularisent d'abord par leur abstentionnisme. L'extrême droite est donc à la fois moins «populiste» et moins «populaire» qu'il n'y paraît.

Dans le dossier thématique "Les dynamiques territoriales" ; International audience ; A democracia brasileira têm obviamente uma dimensão espacial. Pode-se observar a criação de um espaço político em uma escala nacional, mas isto implica em diferenças regionais e sobretudo em contrastes entre áreas urbanas e rurais. Os votos urbanos exprimem um certo tipo de modernidade política? Pode-se estabelecer uma relação entre o grau de urbanização e esta modernidade? Tanto o texto como os mapas que nos mostram os resultados eleitorais em várias escalas nos dão material a refletir. *** The brazilian democracy obviously has a spatial dimension. On a national scale, one can observe the creation of a political space, but that goes along with regional differences, and even more clearly with contrasts between urban and rural areas. Do the urban votes express some kind of political modernity? Can we establish a link between the degree of urbanisation and that modernity ? Both the text and the maps showing electoral results on various scales give us food for thought. ; La démocratie brésilienne a une dimension spatiale incontestable. On observe au Brésil la création d'un espace politique à l'échelle nationale qui ne gomme cependant pas les différences régionales et qui accentue surtout les différences entre zones urbaines et rurales. Les votes urbains expriment-ils un certain type de modernité politiue ? Peut-on établir une relation entre le degré de modernisation et cette modernité ?

Dans le dossier thématique "Les dynamiques territoriales" ; International audience ; A democracia brasileira têm obviamente uma dimensão espacial. Pode-se observar a criação de um espaço político em uma escala nacional, mas isto implica em diferenças regionais e sobretudo em contrastes entre áreas urbanas e rurais. Os votos urbanos exprimem um certo tipo de modernidade política? Pode-se estabelecer uma relação entre o grau de urbanização e esta modernidade? Tanto o texto como os mapas que nos mostram os resultados eleitorais em várias escalas nos dão material a refletir. *** The brazilian democracy obviously has a spatial dimension. On a national scale, one can observe the creation of a political space, but that goes along with regional differences, and even more clearly with contrasts between urban and rural areas. Do the urban votes express some kind of political modernity? Can we establish a link between the degree of urbanisation and that modernity ? Both the text and the maps showing electoral results on various scales give us food for thought. ; La démocratie brésilienne a une dimension spatiale incontestable. On observe au Brésil la création d'un espace politique à l'échelle nationale qui ne gomme cependant pas les différences régionales et qui accentue surtout les différences entre zones urbaines et rurales. Les votes urbains expriment-ils un certain type de modernité politiue ? Peut-on établir une relation entre le degré de modernisation et cette modernité ?

L'élection présidentielle de 2012, derrière sa « normalité »¹, est porteused'enjeux cachés. L'un d'entre eux tient à l'évolution des rapports que lescitoyens entretiennent avec la politique et notamment avec le vote. Ce derniers'organise désormais bien plus autour des intérêts privés que des intérêtscollectifs. On pourra sans doute y déceler le visage de l'électeur stratège, censéhiérarchiser des choix en fonction de l'offre politique, mais cette stratégie resteindéchiffrable, tout comme l'est de plus en plus la société française. On pourraencore évoquer la personnalisation du pouvoir et le jeu des affects autour de lafigure charismatique ou médiatique des leaders nationaux mais celui-ci n'estguère récent depuis l'acclamation des chefs de tribus gauloises. La nouveautétient désormais à tout autre chose, à savoir le repliement du vote sur desdimensions relevant autant, si ce n'est plus, de la vie privée et familiale que dela situation sociale objective. Il devient difficile voire impossible de comprendrele vote en termes collectifs et encore moins en termes de classes sociales.¹ PERRINEAU (Pascal) (dir.), Le Vote normal : les élections présidentielle et législatives d'avril-mai-juin 2, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, Chroniques électorales, 2013, 429 p.

L'élection présidentielle de 2012, derrière sa « normalité »¹, est porteused'enjeux cachés. L'un d'entre eux tient à l'évolution des rapports que lescitoyens entretiennent avec la politique et notamment avec le vote. Ce derniers'organise désormais bien plus autour des intérêts privés que des intérêtscollectifs. On pourra sans doute y déceler le visage de l'électeur stratège, censéhiérarchiser des choix en fonction de l'offre politique, mais cette stratégie resteindéchiffrable, tout comme l'est de plus en plus la société française. On pourraencore évoquer la personnalisation du pouvoir et le jeu des affects autour de lafigure charismatique ou médiatique des leaders nationaux mais celui-ci n'estguère récent depuis l'acclamation des chefs de tribus gauloises. La nouveautétient désormais à tout autre chose, à savoir le repliement du vote sur desdimensions relevant autant, si ce n'est plus, de la vie privée et familiale que dela situation sociale objective. Il devient difficile voire impossible de comprendrele vote en termes collectifs et encore moins en termes de classes sociales.¹ PERRINEAU (Pascal) (dir.), Le Vote normal : les élections présidentielle et législatives d'avril-mai-juin 2, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, Chroniques électorales, 2013, 429 p.

Results from a new experiment shed light on the effects of voter information on vote buying and incumbent advantage. The treatment provided voters with information about a major spending program and the proposed allocations and promises of mayoral candidates just prior to municipal elections. It left voters more knowledgeable about candidates' proposed policies and increased the salience of spending, but did not affect vote shares and turnout. Treated voters were more likely to be targeted for vote buying. We develop a model of vote buying that accounts for these results. The information raised voter expectations regarding incumbent performance, especially in incumbent strongholds. Incumbents increased vote buying in response. Consistent with this explanation, both knowledge and vote buying impacts were higher in mu-nicipalities with dominant incumbents. Our findings show that, in a political environment where vote buying is the currency of electoral mobilization, incumbent efforts to increase voter welfare may take the form of greater vote buying.

The 2012 presidential election behind its 'normality' ¹ carries hidden stakes. One of these concerns the evolution of citizens' relations with politics and in particular with the vote. The latter is now organised much more around private interests than collective interests. It may be possible to detect the face of the stratum elector, which is supposed to prioritise choices according to the political offer, but this strategy remains innumerable, as is French society. The personalisation of power and the play of influence around the charismatic or media figure of national leaders could also be mentioned, but this has hardly been recent since the acclamation of the leaders of the gauloise tribes. The novelty is now new to anything else, namely the reversal of the vote to the extent that it is, if no longer, private and family life as well as the objective social situation. It becomes difficult if not impossible to understand the vote in collective terms, let alone in terms of social classes. ¹ PERRINEAU (Pascal) (dir.), Le Vote Normal: the Presidential and Legislative Elections in April-May-June 2, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, Electoral Chronics, 2013, 429 p. ; L'élection présidentielle de 2012, derrière sa « normalité »¹, est porteused'enjeux cachés. L'un d'entre eux tient à l'évolution des rapports que lescitoyens entretiennent avec la politique et notamment avec le vote. Ce derniers'organise désormais bien plus autour des intérêts privés que des intérêtscollectifs. On pourra sans doute y déceler le visage de l'électeur stratège, censéhiérarchiser des choix en fonction de l'offre politique, mais cette stratégie resteindéchiffrable, tout comme l'est de plus en plus la société française. On pourraencore évoquer la personnalisation du pouvoir et le jeu des affects autour de lafigure charismatique ou médiatique des leaders nationaux mais celui-ci n'estguère récent depuis l'acclamation des chefs de tribus gauloises. La nouveautétient désormais à tout autre chose, à savoir le repliement du vote sur desdimensions ...

SUMMARY: I. The technique of double or multiple/II votes. Benefits/A. Institutional listening/B. Institutional dialogue/III. Disadvantages/A. The presumptive institutional/B. institutional effectiveness/IV. Some special arrangements/A. Overall or partial representation? /B. Exclusive or multiple representation? /V. Electoral context/A. Electoral/B. Methods of voting/VI. Other institutional mechanisms/A. Election techniques/B. Appointment techniques ; SOMMAIRE : I. La technique du double vote ou du vote multiple / II. Les avantages / A. L'écoute institutionnelle / B. Le dialogue institutionnel / III. Les inconvénients / A. Les présupposés institutionnels / B. L 'effectivité institutionnelle / IV. Quelques modalités particulières / A. Une représentation globale ou partielle ? / B. Une représentation exclusive ou multiple ? / V. Le contexte électoral / A. Le sectionnement électoral / B. Les modes de scrutin / VI. D'autres mécanismes institutionnels / A. Les techniques d'élection / B. Les techniques de désignation

We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences. For instance, if only campaign promises are allowed, then the winning party depends not only on the relative size of the budgets, but also on the excess support of the party with the a priori majority, where the excess support is measured in terms of the (minimal) total utility of supporting voters who are in excess of the majority needed to win. If up front vote buying is permitted, and voters care directly about how they vote (as a legislator would), then the determination of the winning party depends on a weighted comparison of the two parties' budgets plus half of the total utility of their supporting voters. These results suggest that vote buying can lead to an inefficient party winning in equilibrium. We find that under some circumstances, if parties budgets are raised through donations, then vote buying can be efficient. Finally, we provide some results on vote buying in the face of uncertainty.

Motivated by the need for more flexible decision-making mechanisms in the European Union, the paper proposes a simple but novel voting scheme for binary decisions taken by committees that meet regularly over time. At each meeting, committee members are allowed to store their vote for future use; the decision is then taken according to the majority of votes cast. The possibility of shifting votes intertemporally allows agents to concentrate their votes when preferences are more intense, and although the scheme will not in general achieve full efficiency, making votes storable typically leads to ex ante welfare gains. The analysis in the paper suggests that the result will hold if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) the number of voters is above a minimum threshold; (ii) preferences are not too polarized; (iii) the horizon is long enough.

ABSTRACT: Proof-of-vote is a third generation of the Nakamoto consensus. With proof-of-vote, validators compete for people-votes, using proof-of-suffrage given by proof-of-person, and authorize transactions based on authority delegated by the consensus mechanism, just like proof-of-work or proof-of-stake. This logical conclusion of the Nakamoto consensus allows a "nation" of people to secure their own ledger, the equivalent of representative democracy for distributed ledger technology.

ABSTRACT: Proof-of-vote is a third generation of the Nakamoto consensus. With proof-of-vote, validators compete for people-votes, using proof-of-suffrage given by proof-of-person, and authorize transactions based on authority delegated by the consensus mechanism, just like proof-of-work or proof-of-stake. This logical conclusion of the Nakamoto consensus allows a "nation" of people to secure their own ledger, the equivalent of representative democracy for distributed ledger technology.

ABSTRACT: Proof-of-vote is a third generation of the Nakamoto consensus. With proof-of-vote, validators compete for people-votes, using proof-of-suffrage given by proof-of-person, and authorize transactions based on authority delegated by the consensus mechanism, just like proof-of-work or proof-of-stake. This logical conclusion of the Nakamoto consensus allows a "nation" of people to secure their own ledger, the equivalent of representative democracy for distributed ledger technology.

ABSTRACT: Proof-of-vote is a third generation of the Nakamoto consensus. With proof-of-vote, validators compete for people-votes, using proof-of-suffrage given by proof-of-person, and authorize transactions based on authority delegated by the consensus mechanism, just like proof-of-work or proof-of-stake. This logical conclusion of the Nakamoto consensus allows a "nation" of people to secure their own ledger, the equivalent of representative democracy for distributed ledger technology.