Summary:1. COMPETENT BODIES TO DECIDE THE PROCESS OF SINGLE READING. 1.1 The competences of the Table and the limits of the enabling circumstances. 1.2 The procedural conditions of the decision of the Full House. 2. THE PROCEDURAL MOMENT OF THE DECISION TO OPT FOR A SINGLE READING: AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL. 3. HOW TO MAKE THE DECISION TO PROCEED WITH SINGLE READING. 3.1 The value of parliamentary precedent. 3.2 The dichotomy simple majority vs reinforced majority. 4. CONCLUSIONS. 5. Bibliography.AbstractThe article 150 of the Rules of Congress of Deputies establishes that, if proposed by the Table of the House, and once heard by the all Party Assembly, the Full House can agree to process an initiative directly and in a single reading. We will also analyse, on one hand, whether the option to choose this abbreviated legal channel is simply a political judgement which the Full House should adopt, and thus comply or not with the task which the Parliamentary Rules has entrusted to the Table of the House. On the other hand we will study whether the Full House can finally decide to process a particular initiative through this legal channel or if the previous proposal to the Table of the House is necessary, and whether this governmental body should comply -with the production of a strictly techno/juridical judgement- to the proposals established by juridical order for the processing of a legislative initiative using the procedure of a single reading. For this reason we will study whether the proposal for process by single reading by the Table is obligatory or not, even in the case in which after being seen by the all Party Assembly it is verified that the Plenary will vote in majority in favour of implementing this abbreviated legislative procedure. Also, we will undertake a detailed analysis of the procedural moment in which the process of an initiative with a single reading should be decided, and thus present alternative solutions which, to our judgement, are more appropriate and compatible with the current Parliamentary Rules. Finally, we will undertake an exhaustive examination of the value acquired by the parliamentary precedent in this type of abbreviated legislative procedure and show the level of relevance reached by the existing dichotomy between simple and absolute parliamentary majorities with respect to decision making relative to the adoption of this legal channel. ; El artículo 150 del Reglamento del Congreso de los Diputados establece que, cuando la naturaleza de un proyecto o proposición de ley tomada en consideración lo aconseje o la simplicidad de su formulación lo permita, el Pleno de la Cámara, a propuesta de la Mesa, oída la Junta de Portavoces, podrá acordar que se tramite directamente y en lectura única. En este trabajo se analiza, de una parte, si la decisión de optar por este cauce procesal abreviado es un juicio meramente político que debe adoptar el órgano plenario y, si al hacerlo de ese modo, se está dando cumplimiento o no al cometido que el Reglamento Parlamentario encomienda a la Mesa de la Cámara. Concretamente, examinamos si para que el Pleno pueda finalmente decidir que la tramitación de una concreta iniciativa sea a través de esta vía procesal extraordinaria es inexcusable la propuesta previa de la Mesa de la Cámara y si este órgano de gobierno puede y debe revisar la concurrencia de los presupuestos habilitantes previstos por el Reglamento Parlamentario antes de hacer la propuesta. Proponemos al respecto una reinterpretación del alcance de esta facultad de la Mesa separándonos del criterio doctrinal mayoritario. Asimismo, acometemos un análisis detallado de la fase del procedimiento en la que se debe decidir la tramitación de una iniciativa por el procedimiento en lectura única para, seguidamente, plantear aquellas soluciones alternativas que, en nuestro criterio, resultan más oportunas y compatibles con la actual redacción del Reglamento Parlamentario. Finalmente se analiza si la decisión que adopta cada una de las Cámaras acerca de la tramitación de una iniciativa legislativa por esta vía procesal abreviada en un determinado momento y ante la concurrencia de unas concretas circunstancias vincula o no a la otra Cámara con respecto a esa misma iniciativa. Estudiaremos, asimismo, el valor que adquiere el precedente parlamentario en relación a otras iniciativas de similar condición y pondremos de manifiesto la relevancia que alcanza la dicotomía existente entre mayorías simples y reforzadas con respecto a la toma de decisiones relativas a la adopción de este cauce procesal extraordinario.
This paper analyzes the legal status of the City of Buenos Aires according to the 1994 Constitutional Reform; the original competence of the Superior Justice Tribunal in electoral matters; and the cases this tribunal admitted and the ones it discarded. It also mentions some emblematic procedures, such as the inapplicability of the 3% minimum of the voter registry for the election of legislators; the vote of the constituents under arrest awaiting trial and those indicted. This paper studies the organizational achievements of the Superior Justice Tribunal, specially incorporating the judicial representatives. Finally, the conclusions concern the need to consider the judicial representatives in an electoral code; the break-down of the electoral competence; the need for teachers to act as authorities; amid other considerations. ; Fil: Casás, José Osvaldo. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Buenos Aires, Argentina ; Dossier Cultural Electoral. El trabajo se ocupa del status jurídico de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires según la Reforma Constitucional de 1994; de la competencia originaria del Tribunal Superior de Justicia en materia electoral y de partidos políticos; de los casos en que el Tribunal Superior de Justicia admitió su competencia en tal materia y de aquellos otros en que la descartó. Refiere algunos pronunciamientos emblemáticos del Tribunal: como la inaplicabilidad del piso del 3% del padrón electoral para elección de legisladores; la autorización de la emisión del sufragio por los electores que se encontraran detenidos preventivamente y sin condena firme; igual autorización, resuelta por mayoría, para los condenados con sentencia firme. Se ocupa de logros organizativos alcanzados por el Tribunal Superior de Justicia, principalmente, incorporando un nuevo actor en el proceso electoral, los "delegados judiciales". Se cierra el trabajo con algunas breves conclusiones: sobre la necesidad de contemplar expresamente en un Código Electoral local a los delegados judiciales; el mantener residenciado en el Tribunal Superior de Justicia de la Ciudad la competencia electoral, desdoblándola entre el Presidente y el Pleno; la recepción a texto expreso en el Código Electoral local de la utilización de la técnica de la impresión electrónica de las boletas; la previsión en igual ordenamiento de que actuarán como autoridades de comicio los docentes de la enseñanza estatal y del sector de gestión privada con subsidio estatal; la realización -dentro de tal orden de ideas- dentro de las jornadas de capacitación docente, de cursos formativos sobre la actuación de las autoridades electorales; y la modificación del régimen de la Ley Nº15.262 de Elecciones Simultáneas, contemplando que la integración de la Junta Electoral en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires esté compuesta, además del Juez Federal con competencia electoral y del Presidente de la Cámara Federal, por el Presidente de su Superior Tribunal de Justicia.
En la investigación sobre "Enfoques epistemológicos de la Corte Constitucional en los fallos de tutela –período 1992 a 2005– sobre el Derecho Fundamental a la Participación Política" encontramos que los derechos más invocados fueron el derecho a elegir y ser elegido1, el acceso a cargos públicos2, el derecho al voto3 y el derecho a participar en la conformación de partidos y movimientos políticos4.No encontramos que fueran invocados los derechos a revocar el mandato, a participar en plebiscitos o consultas populares. Colombia cuenta con una rica consagración constitucional que excede el simple derecho al sufragio y que otorga al ciudadano colombiano gran diversidad de competencias que le permiten una actuación más activa frente a los asuntos del Estado, no obstante el desarrollo jurisprudencial y doctrinal del derecho a la participación política se ha dado de manera tangencial. El método escogido fue de tipo comprensivo e interpretativo. ; In the investigation about "Epistemology focus of the Constitutional Court about the tutela fails in the period 1992-2005, on the Fundamental Right to the Political Participation" we found that the rights involved were the right to elect and the right to be elected, the access to public jobs, the right to the vote and the right to conform political parties and movements. We did not find that the rights to resign the mandate, to participle in plebiscites and popular consults were mentioned. Colombia counts with a rich constitutional consagration which exceeds the simple right to vote and concedes the Colombian citizen to a great diversity of competences which allows them to a very more active role before the State matters, thus the jurisprudential development and the doctrinal right to the right in the political participation has been happening in a tangible way.The method chosen was of the comprehensive and imperative kind.
En la investigación sobre "Enfoques epistemológicos de la Corte Constitucional en los fallos de tutela –período 1992 a 2005– sobre el Derecho Fundamental a la Participación Política" encontramos que los derechos más invocados fueron el derecho a elegir y ser elegido1 , el acceso a cargos públicos2 , el derecho al voto3 y el derecho a participar en la conformación de partidos y movimientos políticos4 . No encontramos que fueran invocados los derechos a revocar el mandato, a participar en plebiscitos o consultas populares. Colombia cuenta con una rica consagración constitucional que excede el simple derecho al sufragio y que otorga al ciudadano colombiano gran diversidad de competencias que le permiten una actuación más activa frente a los asuntos del Estado, no obstante el desarrollo jurisprudencial y doctrinal del derecho a la participación política se ha dado de manera tangencial. El método escogido fue de tipo comprensivo e interpretativo. ; n the investigation about "Epistemology focus of the Constitutional Court about the tutela fails in the period 1992-2005, on the Fundamental Right to the Political Participation" we found that the rights involved were the right to elect and the right to be elected, the access to public jobs, the right to the vote and the right to conform political parties and movements. We did not find that the rights to resign the mandate, to participle in plebiscites and popular consults were mentioned. Colombia counts with a rich constitutional consagration which exceeds the simple right to vote and concedes the Colombian citizen to a great diversity of competences which allows them to a very more active role before the State matters, thus the jurisprudential development and the doctrinal right to the right in the political participation has been happening in a tangible way. The method chosen was of the comprehensive and imperative kind.
This article explains the causes and effects of institutional change in political contexts where there is no guarantee of strict compliance with the rules. Analyzing the political reform of 2005 that made it possible for prefects or governors to be elected for the first time in Bolivia by popular vote, evidence was found that when there is a crisis of legitimacy, declining coalitions push for inclussive changes that reduce future electoral losses and cannot be reversed by the rising coalitions that come to power. These coalitions, nonetheless, attempt to limit the degree of inclusion of rules through lowerlevel policy changes that reduce political competition. ; El presente artículo explica las causas y efectos del cambio institucional en contextos políticos en los que no hay garantía sobre el cumplimiento estricto de las reglas. Analizando la reforma política de 2005 que posibilitó (por primera vez) que en Bolivia los prefectos o gobernadores puedan ser elegidos por voto popular, se halla evidencia que indica que cuando hay crisis de legitimidad, las coaliciones declinantes impulsan cambios incluyentes que reducen sus futuras pérdidas electorales y no pueden ser revertidos por las coaliciones ascendentes que llegan al poder. No obstante, éstas intentan limitar el grado de inclusión de las reglas a través de cambios normativos de menor nivel que disminuyen la competencia política.
This article presents and discusses certain aspects of the judgments of the Constitutional Court, in which it is declared the inapplicability for unconstitutionality of Article 5 No. 3 of the Code of Military Justice. This provision allocates competence to the Military Courts regarding common crimes committed by military officials against civilians or other military officers. This article specifically analyzes the reasoning behind the majority vote of the judgments that refer to the question on whether the provision of the Code of Military Justice is compatible with the Constitution, the American Convention on Human Rights and the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Additionally, the article aims to determine if the Constitutional Court ought to play a role in the enforcement of the judgment of the Palamara Iribane case through the conventionality control mechanism, in relation to the adaptation of the Military Justice to the standards set by the Inter-American Human Rights System. ; El presente artículo tiene por objetivo exponer y comentar algunos aspectos de las sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional, en las que se resolvió declarar la inaplicabilidad por inconstitucionalidad del artículo 5 Nº 3 del Código de Justicia Militar. Este último precepto entrega competencia a los tribunales militares, respecto de delitos comunes cometidos por funcionarios militares en contra de personas civiles e incluso militares. Específicamente, en el artículo se analiza el razonamiento del voto de mayoría de las sentencias, el que se pronuncia acerca de la compatibilidad del artículo impugnado respecto de la Constitución, de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos y de la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Asimismo, se busca determinar si corresponde al Tribunal Constitucional por medio de la figura del control de convencionalidad, desempeñar un rol en el cumplimiento de la sentencia del caso Palamara Iribarne, en relación con la adecuación de la justicia militar a los ...
La Ley 2/2016 de Instituciones Locales de Euskadi (LILE) culmina el
proceso de institucionalización interna de la Comunidad Autónoma de Euskadi articulando
un modelo de gobierno local que debe vertebrarse de manera armónica
con los otros dos niveles dos niveles institucionales (foral y autonómico).
Es una ley que, sin perjuicio de las importantes atribuciones que en este ámbito
tienen las instituciones forales, integra los dos aspectos sustantivos de la autonomía
local: competencias y financiación. Carácter integral que va a determinar
la configuración de un sistema competencial propio y singular que no puede disociarse
de su financiación.
La suficiencia y autonomía financiera, junto con la estabilidad presupuestaria y
la sostenibilidad financiera, constituyen los principios de actuación básicos de las
haciendas locales que la LILE trata de garantizar.
La garantía de financiación adecuada se proyecta tanto sobre las competencias
propias que vienen ejerciendo los municipios vascos como sobre las nuevas competencias
que les puedan ser atribuidas por ley o norma foral o que les puedan
ser transferidas o delegadas.
El sistema institucional, en materia de financiación local, que se deriva de la
LILE, viene definido fundamentalmente por el modelo de participación de los representantes municipales en la toma de decisiones del Consejo Vasco de Finanzas
Públicas. A este respecto, con la consiguiente modificación de la Ley de Territorios
Históricos, se incorporan los representantes municipales, como miembros
de pleno derecho (voz y voto) en la toma de decisiones acerca de un significativo
número de materias de gran trascendencia para la financiación local, dentro de un
modelo de participación institucional que podemos calificar de dual. Modelo conforme
al cual se diferencia entre aquellas materias cuyos acuerdos precisan de la
participación de los tres niveles institucionales y aquellas otras, de especial importancia
(nivel de participación o modelo horizontal en leyes de aportaciones), cuyos
acuerdos solamente competen a los niveles foral y municipal. Euskadiko Toki Erakundeei buruzko 2/2016 Legearekin batera
Euskal Autonomia Erkidegoko barne instituzionalizazio-prozesua bukatu da, erakundeen
beste bi mailekin (foru maila eta erkidego maila) modu harmonikoan egituratu
behar den toki-gobernu eredua artikulatuz.
Legeak toki-autonomiaren funtsezko bi alderdiak uztartzen ditu: eskumenak eta
finantzaketa. Nolanahi ere, foru-erakundeek arlo honetan ekarpen garrantzitsuak
egin ditzakete. Legeak izaera integrala dauka, eskumen sistema propio eta berezia
osatzea eragingo duena; ezin da finantzaketatik banandu.
Finantzaketa nahikoa eta autonomia izatea, finantza-iraunkortasuna eta aurrekontu-
egonkortasuna dira Euskadiko Toki Erakundeei buruzko Legeak bermatu nahi
dituen toki-ogasunen oinarrizko jarduketa-printzipioen osagaiak.
Finantzaketa egokiaren bermea eskumen propioetan zein EAEko udalerriek baliatu
dituzten beste eskumen batzuetan proiektatu da ¿legez edo foru-arauz eman
ahal zaizkien eskumen berriak barne¿ baita transferitu edo eskuordetu daitezkeen
eskumenetan ere.
Toki-finantzaketaren arloan Euskadiko Toki Erakundeei buruzko Legetik eratorritako
sistema instituzionala, oro har, Finantza Publikoen Euskal Kontseiluko erabakiak
hartzean udal-ordezkariek daukaten parte hartzeak definitzen du. Horri dagokionez,
Lurralde Historikoen Legea aldatzearen ondorioz, toki-finantzaketarako
oso garrantzitsuak diren arlo askotako erabakiak hartzean udal-ordezkariak gehituko
dira, eskubide osoko kide gisa (ahotsa eta botoa), dualtzat har daitekeen parte-
hartze instituzionaleko eredu baten barruan. Eredu horren arabera gaiak banatu
egiten dira: batetik, hiru maila instituzionalen parte hartzea behar duten akordioak,
eta, bestetik, garrantzitsuak izanik soilik foru eta udal mailakoei dagozkienak (parte-
-hartze maila edo eredu horizontala ekarpenen legeetan). Act 2/2016 on Local Entities of Euskadi (LILE) brings to an end the
process of internal institutionalization of the Autonomous Community of Euskadi
by articulating a local government model that has harmoniously to be built upon
the other two levels of institutions (foral and autonomous).
It is an act that, with no prejudice to the important attributions foral institutions
have in this area, comprehends two substantive features of local autonomy:
competences and funding. That comprehensive character is going to determine
the configuration of an own and singular system of competences which cannot
be dissociated from its funding. The financial sufficiency and autonomy, together
with the budgetary stability are the basic principles of action of local government
finances that LILE tries to guarantee.
The guarantee for an adequate funding is projected both to own competences
that Basque municipalities are already exercising and to new competences that
can be attributed either by act or by foral rule or that can be transferred or delegated.
The institutional system, in the field of local funding, that results from LILE is
mainly defined by the model of participation by the municipal representatives in
the decision-making process of the Basque Committee for Public Finances. In this
regard, with the consequential amendment of the Act on Historic Territories, the
municipal representatives will be incorporated as full members (with voice and
vote) in the decision-making process in a significant amount of very important issues
for the local funding within the model of institutional participation which can
be qualified as twofold. A model according to whom those issues whose agreement
requires the participation of the three institutional levels and those others,
with particular relevance (level of participation or horizontal model in act of contributions)
whose agreement does only affect the foral and municipal levels.
Currently, the jurisdictional model of constitutional justice has been universalized and, at the same time, an increase in its functions has been taking place. This has generated the «counter-majority difficulty» of some doctrinal sectors that question an alleged lack of democratic legitimacy of the constitutional justice bodies. Despite the fact that our Constitutional Court originally enjoyed a high degree of acceptance by all (largely due to the fact that it had been established, like the Tribunal of Guarantees of the Second Republic, after a period of dictatorship) in The last decade has had to face the discredit campaign orchestrated against him by the Catalan independence political class, the lack of prudence (also in the writing of private votes) that some magistrates have recently shown, the denaturation that supposed the functions to he attributed by LO 15/2015, the aggravation of some configuration problems that dragged from its origin (among which stands out the collapse that, from his personal and material means, generates the treatment of all the protection resources that, even after of the approval of LO 6/2007, continue to be registered every year at the headquarters of the Court), and the political-legal problems caused by l way of renewal of magistrates. This paper aims to offer a theoretical and comparative perspective of the challenges of constitutional justice at a global level that serves as a basis for reflection on our Constitutional Court and the possible improvements that, after forty years of operation, it might be advisable to bring finished. Specifically, the political function that, in the sense of protection of political minorities and arbitrator of territorial conflicts, corresponds to the supreme constitutional custodian has been emphasized, since the dominant legal positivism in the constitutional sciences of our country has impeded development of constitutional justice or Constitutional Procedural Law as a scientific discipline, causing the absence of a theoretical body that could serve as a legitimating shield for the Constitutional Court against the attacks recently received. Resolving the most internal issues mentioned above is essential to, a posteriori, face the two most important supranational challenges that our constitutional justice system must face: on the one hand, its insertion into a European system of protection of rights , for which he will have to be more favorable to the dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union than he has done in the past; on the other, redefine its position as guarantor of rights before the new roles (including control of conventionality) assumed by ordinary judges and courts. Summary: I. INTRODUCTION. II. THE PERMANENT DEBATE ABOUT CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE. III. THE TRIUMPH OF THE JURISDICTIONAL MODEL AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE COMPETENCES OF THE SPANISH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. IV. THE (OFTEN FORGOTTEN) POLITICAL FUNCTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE. V. THE NEED TO DEVELOP AN AUTHENTIC CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL LAW IN OUR COUNTRY. VI. CRITICS AND RECELS (INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS) TO THE COURT' ACTIONS. VII. THE PENDING IMPROVEMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. VIII SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERMANENT PROBLEM OF AMPARO. IX. CONCLUSIONS ; Actualmente se ha universalizado el modelo jurisdiccional de justicia constitucional y, al mismo tiempo, se ha venido produciendo un incremento de sus funciones. Ello ha generado la «objeción contramayoritaria» de algunos sectores doctrinales que cuestionan una supuesta falta de legitimidad democrática de los órganos de justicia constitucional. A pesar de que nuestro Tribunal Constitucional gozó en origen de un alto grado de aceptación por parte de todos (en buena medida por el hecho de haberse establecido, al igual que el Tribunal de Garantías de la II República, tras un periodo de dictadura) en la última década ha tenido que enfrentar la campaña de descredito orquestada contra él por parte de la clase política independentista catalana, la falta de prudencia (también en la redacción de votos particulares) que recientemente han mostrado algunos magistrados, la desnaturalización que supuso las funciones a él atribuidas por la L.O 15/2015, el agravamiento de algunos problemas de configuración que arrastra desde su origen (entre los que destaca el colapso que, de sus medios personales y materiales, genera el tratamiento de todos los recursos de amparo que, incluso después de la aprobación de la L.O 6/2007, siguen registrándose cada año en la sede del Tribunal), y los problemas político-jurídicos que provoca el modo de renovación de los magistrados. En este trabajo se pretende ofrecer una perspectiva teórica y comparada de los retos de la justicia constitucional a nivel global que sirva como base a una reflexión acerca de nuestro Tribunal Constitucional y de las eventuales mejoras que, tras cuarenta años de funcionamiento, podría ser recomendable llevar a cabo. En concreto, se ha enfatizado la función política que, en el sentido de protección de las minorías políticas y árbitro de los conflictos territoriales le corresponde al supremo custodio constitucional, ya que el positivismo jurídico dominante en las ciencias constitucionales de nuestro país ha impedido el desarrollo de la justicia constitucional o Derecho Procesal Constitucional como disciplina científica, provocando la ausencia de un corpus teórico que pudiera servir de escudo legitimador al Tribunal Constitucional frente a los ataques recientemente recibidos. Resolver las cuestiones de carácter más interno mencionadas resulta imprescindible para, a posteriori, enfrentar los dos retos más importantes de carácter supranacional a los que debe hacer frente nuestro sistema de justicia constitucional: por un lado, su inserción en un sistema europeo de protección de derechos, para lo que deberá mostrarse más favorable al diálogo con el Tribunal de Justicia de la Unión Europea de lo que lo ha hecho en el pasado; por otro, redefinir su posición como garante de derechos ante los nuevos roles (incluido el control de convencionalidad) asumido por los jueces y tribunales ordinarios.
On Tuesday night, speaking to an audience of Army cadets at West Point Academy in a much anticipated response to his general's request for additional troops, President Obama announced a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan. It was a somber speech, delivered with his usual trademark of logic, rhetorical skill and assertiveness, but also with a certain emotion. At crucial moments in it, Obama looked straight into the camera, making direct eye-contact with the individual spectator, summoning his support in an effort he seems to be taking up somewhat reluctantly. He outlined a new strategy for the eight-year old war that will include immediate deployment of 30,000 new US troops to protect civilians, clear and defeat the insurgents and train Afghan forces in order to be able to begin the draw down in eighteen months. This new surge will be supplemented by additional NATO troops and Afghan national forces to meet the original 40,000 troops demanded by General McCrystal. After three months of deliberation, the President has decided to heed the advice of his generals and his Defense Secretary, and proceed with a military escalation of the conflict. In so doing, he rejected the logic of Vice President Biden who rhetorically asked earlier this year why the US spent 30 times as much in Afghanistan as it did in Pakistan, when it was well-known that Al Qaeda or what is left of it, is in the tribal regions of Pakistan. Lately he had argued against more troops (because the central government was an unreliable, weak and corrupt partner) and in favor of shifting the mission to killing or capturing main insurgency leaders, establishing more ties with local tribal leaders and giving more support to Pakistan. On Wednesday morning, however, Biden appeared in the morning news shows to defend the President's decision unequivocally.The next morning, in hearings before the Senate's Armed Forces Committee, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton fleshed out the main objectives of the surge more fully: training Afghan forces, eliminating safe havens, stabilizing a region fundamental to American national security. She also emphasized the importance of the parallel "civilian surge" which the President had also mentioned in passing and whose job will be to develop the agricultural base away from opium and to further strengthen institutions at every level of Afghan society, so as "not to leave chaos behind" when troops are drawn down and responsibility is transferred to the Afghan government. Finally, she stressed the need to develop long-term relations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. Indeed, Obama's three-pronged strategy includes not only military and civilian components for counter insurgence and institution-building, but also a strategic partnership with Pakistan, whose government can help contain the Taliban, destroy Al Qaeda and prevent it from gaining access to nuclear material. Unfortunately, during his speech the President did not spend much time explaining the importance of that relationship. Another important omission was the inclusion of other regional actors in the process of conflict resolution. But the truth is Obama was performing an extremely difficult balancing act, trying to simultaneously gain the support of disparate groups at home and abroad for a last-ditch effort to win an eight year old war in a context of war fatigue, massive debt and a weak economy. That also explains why in his speech he denied any intentions of nation-building (public opinion in the US is strongly against it mainly because of the cost and the long-term commitment it implies) and instead focused on transferring responsibility to the Afghans themselves for their own defense.In articulating both an escalation and an exit strategy at the same time, the President opened himself to criticism from both the Right and the Left. While the Right was very supportive of the surge itself, it was quite critical of his timeline for withdrawal, which they say, will only embolden insurgents to wait the troops out. The Left of his party, led by Moveon.org, responded negatively to the increase of troops, which they regard as "deepening (US) involvement in a quagmire." Meanwhile, and in spite of much commentary to the contrary, the White House insists that the President made this decision because he feels it is the right one, and that electoral considerations played no role in the process (although the withdrawal in the summer of 2011 conveniently coincides with the beginning of his presidential campaign for re-election!) Instead, pundits favorable to the President were quick to point out that a time frame was absolutely needed to provide a sense of urgency to the Afghan government itself so that it will clean up its act and take advantage of this "new window of opportunity" as Secretary Clinton put it. However, it is obvious to the same pundits that the pace and time of withdrawal will most likely be dictated by the conditions on the ground in the summer of 2011 and not by the pre-established timetable. Whether it is for political or strategic reasons, the fact is, the President has made speed, (that is, a quick deployment of new forces followed by quick withdrawal), the central tenet of his new strategy, and while providing for a civilian surge, he has underplayed the nation-building aspects of the mission for the obvious reason: that they undermine the credibility of a speedy exit strategy.Whether or not this strategy works, his decision on Afghanistan has gained Obama some time free from the crushing criticism of the opposition whom he has silenced for the moment; he has pleased Independents (66% of whom trusted the generals over Obama in planning the war strategy; 48% were in favor of more troops, as opposed to only 30% of Democrats); and he can now turn to the two other major challenges facing his administration: public discontent with the economic situation and the battle for health care reform. The latter won a major victory two weeks ago when the Senate voted to bring the bill to the floor for discussion. Still, between the Thanksgiving break last week and the end- of -the -year holidays it is very unlikely this discussion will bear fruit within this calendar year, as was the President's goal. And the more the bill gets delayed the more the public option gets diluted to the point that it will all but disappear from a final version. Since April the President's plan has lost Independent support steadily (only 25% of Independents opposed it in April, now 50% are against it, while among Democrats it has wide support, with only 22% opposing the public option).On the economic front, five times more Independents than Democrats hold Obama responsible for what has gone wrong. They blame him for salvaging the banks but not their jobs. In light of this, Obama has summoned a job creation "summit" to be held later this week in the White House. While most see it as a public relations tactic, with unemployment having surpassed 10%the public is demanding action, and job recovery is key to getting the Independent vote back. With his approval rate hovering at 50%, the President is in dire need of striking some points and delivering some victories before the end of the year. Amid a rising wave of populism that is both anti-Wall Street and anti-government, he needs to show that he can make government work. After a seamless campaign and after months of relying on his own personal charisma and his gifted oratory to coax and persuade the public, the magic seems to be wearing off: he now needs to find other ways to reach the voters. Of course, performance will be the safest one: Independent voters want competence and results: they want him to show them that he can govern. This has proven elusive for many reasons beyond his control, but lately some mistakes were made that could have been prevented. This is a young White House and in spite of their mastery of the new technologies to connect with young voters and their ability to establish their own narrative about the President, in the last few weeks Obama and his close advisers seem to have lost some of their attention to details insofar as his public image is concerned, for example the importance of certain visual and other non-verbal signals. The trip to Asia provides myriad examples of this: the "unforced error" of bowing too deep to the Emperor of Japan, which was ridiculed by the media on all sides of the political spectrum; his tense press conference in China during which both he and Hu Jintao stiffly read prepared statements, after which neither took questions; the town-hall style meeting with students in Shanghai, in which he said "the Internet should be free and all should have access to it" but which was only shown by local TV and in a very slow live feed on the internet, and later all references to it were deleted from all websites. Even a picture of Obama alone by the Great Wall of China was interpreted as a bad visual that suggested isolation, and while this may be an over-interpretation, there is a reason why commentators made that association. Obama is having a very hard time keeping his coalition of independents, moderates and liberals together. The unraveling of his coalition is constraining every policy choice he makes, as he has to measure at every step not only the costs of each decision but also the opposition he is likely to face from within his own party. He thus feels limited in his choices and picks a middle of the road solution that does not fully satisfy his purposes and makes him a target from the two extremes of the political spectrum. In many cases, as in the Afghan war,there are no good choices but this is hard to confess to a public to whom he promised change and that is expecting him to deliver.With his new Afghan decision President Obama may have swayed many hawkish independents to his side but the question is for how long. Soon Obama may find that while nation-building abroad may be difficult, nation-building at home is a task he cannot postpone any longer. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
After two weeks of drama and excitement, the Democratic and the Republican National Conventions have drawn to an end, and an exhausted American public will now have to focus on the home stretch of the presidential campaign. There is general agreement that both candidates achieved their most important convention objectives. Obama re-introduced himself to America as an ordinary man, a down-to-earth candidate who understands their problems and proposes solutions, while McCain moved away from George W. Bush and re-emerged as his party's maverick: the independent, likable and trustworthy reformer that puts "the country first". In spite of the truncated schedule of the Republican National Convention due to the hurricane that hit the Gulf Coast, McCain's surprise announcement of his running mate, and his acknowledgement of his own party's mistakes in the last eight years, appear to have taken some of the wind from under Obama's wings.The most recent Gallup poll has Obama leading 44% to 40 % in voters' approval ratings, while a CBS poll has them at 40% each. It is clear that the race is now in a dead heat and that McCain has been on the rebound, narrowing down the eight percent margin that Obama had before the Conventions. Taking into account that Obama has already had his post-convention bounce, the direction of this change favoring McCain will continue. Historically, after Labor Day and the end of the two conventions, poll numbers appear to hold pretty steadily all the way up to the election, which means that, barring an "October surprise", the outcome of this election will again be too close to predict.This is an enormous accomplishment for McCain, whose candidacy was given up for dead by pundits mid-way trough the primary last year. Americans love survivors, and both his life story and his political narrative fit this characterization perfectly. Credit is given of course to the candidate himself, but also to his campaign director Rick Davis, who had the audacity to take a 180-degree turn and recast him as the candidate of change. How he did it will be a textbook example for campaign strategists in years to come.First, McCain came into the Republican Primary as too independent, too secular and too much of a critic of George W. Bush, to be chosen as the Grand Old Party's nominee. In the course of the primary campaign, he moved closer to the President, repeatedly reminding voters that in the Senate, he had voted in favor of the President's initiatives 90% of the time. A clip of this acknowledgement is being used by the Obama campaign with glee in a TV commercial that plays several times an hour in the network stations. After a terrible start, and after firing several top advisers and restructuring his whole campaign plan, he regained the confidence of the Republican voters, mainly because he was the most credible, experienced and likable of the Republican presidential candidates. These may be the same attributes that put him today in a dead heat with Obama, in spite of the lowest numbers of approval ever for the Republican Party he represents.Second, serious campaign strategic thinking went into in his choice of Vice-president and in planning the timing of this announcement. Sources close to the campaign have confirmed that, to counterbalance the perfectly choreographed Democratic Convention, the choice of Joe Biden for Vice- presidential candidate, and Obama's acceptance speech, McCain wanted to recast himself as the bipartisan candidate that reaches across the isle, and regardless of the disapproval of Republican Party stalwarts, pick Democrat Joe Lieberman, his very close friend, as his running mate. It took some serious coaxing by his staff for him to pick Sarah Palin, the little-known governor of Alaska, instead. This has so far proved to have been a very shrewd decision. With the announcement made on the next morning after Obama's acceptance speech, McCain's campaign was able to take away the momentum and the headlines from the Democrats. It was all about the Republican ticket from then on, with the Obama campaign having been unable so far, to regain the initiative. Palin's speech on the convention floor was watched by almost as many people as Obama's. She came out swinging and directly attacked Obama for his lack of experience. Her delivery was flawless, she was relaxed and funny, and the public loved her. She electrified the Republican base and injected new imagery into the Republican tableau: that of a young working mother with a family of five that enamored the pro-life voters by having knowingly had a baby with Down syndrome. The case for family values was somewhat blurred twenty-four hours later when her campaign confirmed rumors that her seventeen-year old daughter was pregnant. But Palin was able to turn this in her favor by presenting herself as a no-exceptions pro-life candidate, and thus pre-empted the avalanche of criticism that would have surely come her way from all sides. Asked for his reaction, a circumspect Obama said that the candidates' private lives should not be a topic for the presidential race and asked reporters to "back off". Finally, there was John McCain's acceptance speech that rounded up what turned out to be a positive, yet odd, week for the Republican Convention. This was the first time that an incumbent President did not attend his party's convention since Lyndon B. Johnson skipped the violence-ridden 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago. Indeed, George W Bush made only a short appearance via satellite on the second day of the convention. His parents were there the first two days, but were conspicuously absent during McCain's speech. Vice-president Cheney was also absent throughout the three days. Senator McCain is a good communicator for smaller, town hall settings where he can speak directly to supporters, but strongly dislikes reading prepared speeches from the teleprompter to big audiences. The Convention hall was thus rearranged for his speech, to give the impression of a smaller venue, with the Republican delegates closer to him. But it was a fifty-minute long speech so he did have to read it. Although not a magnificent speaker, he came across as sincere and credible. Some have acclaimed it as the best Republican speech since Reagan's at the 1984 Convention. It drew the strongest interest of all speeches so far this election year: it was watched by 38.9 million people, more than Obama's (38.4 million) and Palin's (37 million). It was well-structured and aimed at delivering a convincing yet circumvoluted message of change. It started with a long narrative of his life experiences as a Navy pilot and prisoner of war, then went on to offer a candid confession of his party's long list of mistakes in the last eight years, and culminated with his re-introduction to the American public as the bipartisan candidate that can find solutions, bring about change and lead the country into a more secure and prosperous future. He presented in detail a forceful narrative of his life: the son and grandson of admirals and an Annapolis graduate, he became a fighter pilot and fell prisoner of war in Vietnam. He survived the "Hanoi-Hilton", was rescued, married an Arizona heiress and became Senator for that state for thirty years. Even if nothing new, this biographical portrait reminded the audience of his patriotism, his commitment to the country, his all-American upbringing and his strength, all of which makes him a fully vetted, trustworthy, and, by implication, a better candidate than his counterpart.What surprised many observers was what an NBC analyst called his "Declaration of Independence" and later "McCain's divorce" from the Republican Party and from George Bush. The latter was mentioned only once during the speech, and even then not directly by name, when McCain thanked "the president" for his leadership after the September 11 attacks. After that came a litany of mistakes the Republicans have made in the last few years, delivered in a contrite tone and followed by very weak applause by the audience. ("We were elected to change Washington and we let Washington change us. We lost the trust of the American people when some Republicans gave in to temptations of corruption."). It was as if he had directly responded to the beckoning of the British journal The Economist who had him on its cover a week ago with the title: "Bring the Real McCain back", an allusion to the fact that during the Primary season, many of his economic and national security policies looked like another term of George Bush. The Economist preferred an earlier version of McCain that was much more independent and acceptable to their point of view. In acknowledging the errors and missed opportunities of the previous years, the "real" McCain, the maverick, was back. He recognized the corruption and the hubris of his party, and, taking a page from the Democrats' platform, promised to govern for the American people and not for private interests or lobbies: "And let me just offer an advance warning to the old, big-spending, do-nothing, me-first, country-second crowd: change is coming… to Washington."McCain had a tactical tightrope to walk: during the whole primary season, his campaign had been aggressively courting the support of the conservative, Evangelical Republican base. Having cemented that support with the choice of ultra-religious Palin, he used the opportunity of his acceptance speech to appeal to a broader audience. He broke free of the Bush legacy of budget deficits and a failed foreign policy, recast himself as the candidate of change and made his pitch for the center of the political spectrum, the independent voters and disgruntled Reagan Democrats. In the most arousing part of his address, he presented himself as the Republican leader that will bring the Grand Old Party back to its original path and restore its unity, its pride and its principles. He also stressed his bipartisanship and delivered a strong blow to Obama's claim to that same mantel, by saying," Again and again I have worked with members of both parties to fix problems…and I have the record, and the scars, to prove it. Senator Obama does not." He ended by stressing his national security experience and courage to confront enemies: "We face many dangerous threats but I am not afraid.I am prepared for them."This speech may not have been the most dynamic of the Republican Convention (Sarah Palin took the kudos for that), and it was by no means a policy speech. Instead, its greatest value was the tone in which it was delivered and the level of comfort McCain awakened in the voting public. He focused on patriotism and on reforming Washington's bad habits; he communicated a sense of confidence, credibility and competence that may have reassured many undecided voters and that made him look almost Reaganesque. While Barack Obama insists that this election will be decided based on the issues (the economy, the unpopular war), McCain contends it will be decided on which candidate has the better judgment to move the country forward. In the fifty-some days left before the election, both campaigns will focus on the "battleground states" (Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania and Michigan), so their messages will be narrowly tailored to those constituencies. But all voters will have another chance to take a new look at the candidates side by side on three upcoming debates, and then decide on who is better suited to lead the country in such difficult times. They will vote based on their pocketbooks and on gut feelings, on rational interests and on irrational emotions. Considering the closeness of the race, the complexity that the Electoral College injects into the process, and the fact that all political thinking is biased toward the thinker's own wishes and emotions, it is only fair for this writer to abstain from predicting the outcome. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia
