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Research shows that most citizens are shockingly uninformed about public affairs, liberal-conservative ideologies, and the issues of the day. This has led most scholars to condemn typical American voters as politically brainless and to conclude that policy voting lies beyond their reach. 'On Voter Competence' breaks sharply from this view. According to Paul Goren, people vote based on abstract policy principles, a practice that has escaped scholars because they have searched for evidence of policy voting in the wrong places

Institutions are common predictors of voter turnout. Most research in this field focuses on cross-country comparisons of voting systems, like the impact of compulsory voting or registration systems. Fewer efforts have been devoted to understand the role of local institutions and their impact on political participation. Especially the impact of divided competences in relation to public good provision and its impact on voter turnout has been widely ignored. In the present paper, we analyze the effects of different institutional settings for inter-municipal cooperation on voter turnout. We use data from local elections in Germany, held in 2003 and 2004. Overall, we analyze aggregate voter turnout of 1661 municipalities and find strong evidence for our hypothesis that local institutional settings are influential in this context. Further, our results indicate that the better competences correspond to the spatial dimension of local public goods, the higher should be the voter turnout. -- Voter turnout ; local institutions ; inter-municipal cooperation

Conceptual problems and solutions -- Concepts of issue competence -- Explaining issue ownership change -- Government performance and oppositions -- Generalised competence and the costs of governing -- Ownership, performance, generalised competence and the vote.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Figures -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1 Voting over History -- 2 Competence -- 3 Knowledge -- 4 Power -- 5 Outcomes for Children -- 6 Outcomes for Societies -- 7 The Proxy-Claim Vote -- Manifesto -- Notes -- References -- Index.

What matters most to voters when they choose their leaders? This book suggests that performance politics is at the heart of contemporary democracy, with voters forming judgments about how well competing parties and leaders perform on important issues. Given the high stakes and uncertainty involved, voters rely heavily on partisan cues and party leader images as guides to electoral choice. However, the authors argue that the issue agenda of British politics has changed markedly in recent years. A cluster of concerns about crime, immigration and terrorism now mix with perennial economic and public service issues. Since voters and parties often share the same positions on these issues, political competition focuses on who can do the best job. This book shows that a model emphasizing flexible partisan attachments, party leader images and judgments of party competence on key issues can explain electoral choice in contemporary Britain

Social networking lies at the heart of a number of fascinating political questions and social concerns, including citizen competence, social movements, and voter mobilization. In The Social Basis of the Rational Citizen, Sean Richey provides an empirical analysis of the most important hypothesized effect of social network influence on politics: social cognition.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Foreword -- PREFACE -- Introduction -- CHAPTER 1. To Govern Ourselves Wisely -- CHAPTER 2. Representative Democracy -- CHAPTER 3. Direct Democracy -- CHAPTER 4. The Question of Voter Competence -- CHAPTER 5. Minority Rights, Money, and the Media -- CHAPTER 6. The Recall Device -- CHAPTER 7. A National Initiative and Referendum? -- CHAPTER 8. Direct Democracy and Its Problems -- CHAPTER 9. Sound and Sensible Democracy -- NOTES -- SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY -- Index

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Series Foreword -- Chapter 1: The Gender Gap throughout History -- Women Voters: The Beginning -- The 1980s Gender Gap -- The Gap in Party Identification -- Causes of the Gender Gap -- The Issue Gap -- The 1990s and Soccer Moms -- The Bush Years: Soccer Moms to Security Moms -- The Obama Years: Gender in the 2008 Election -- The Obama Years: Women Reelect Obama in 2012 -- 2016: The Woman Card and Locker Room Talk -- Chapter 2: Women's Group Connectedness and Political Behavior -- The Influence of Candidate Gender -- Gender Group Identification in the 21st Century -- Identification and Demographics -- Identification to Consciousness -- Demographics and Consciousness -- Gender Consciousness or Feminist Consciousness? -- Chapter 3: Gender Identity, Gender-Role Beliefs, and Politics -- Gender and Modern Campaigning -- Measuring Gender-Role Ideology -- Women's Gender-Role Beliefs and Demographic Characteristics -- Gender-Role Ideology, Group Identification, and Consciousness -- Grouping Women Based on Group Identification -- Identified versus Individualist Women -- Grouping Women Based on Ideology and Identification -- Demographics of Ideology-Identification Groups -- Egalitarian-Identified, Traditional-Identified, and Individualist Women -- Conclusion -- Chapter 4: Mobilizing Women Voters -- Gender Differences in Political Engagement -- Women's Political Engagement over Time -- Women Candidates Mobilizing Women Voters -- Engaging Women Voters Through Group Identification -- Competence to Discuss Politics -- Political Efficacy -- Conclusion -- Chapter 5: The Issues Women Care About -- Economic Issues -- Government Services -- Government Regulations -- Equality and Rights -- Foreign Policy and Military Affairs -- The Importance of Gender Group Identification and Gender-Role Ideology -- Conclusion

This book proposes a selection model for explaining cross-national variation in economic voting: Rational voters condition the economic vote on whether incumbents are responsible for economic outcomes, because this is the optimal way to identify and elect competent economic managers under conditions of uncertainty. This model explores how political and economic institutions alter the quality of the signal that the previous economy provides about the competence of candidates. The rational economic voter is also attentive to strategic cues regarding the responsibility of parties for economic outcomes and their electoral competitiveness. Theoretical propositions are derived, linking variation in economic and political institutions to variability in economic voting. The authors demonstrate that there is economic voting, and that it varies significantly across political contexts. The data consist of 165 election studies conducted in 19 different countries over a 20-year time period

Formal Models of Domestic Politics offers a unified and accessible approach to canonical and important new models of politics. Intended for political science and economics students who have already taken a course in game theory, this new edition retains the widely appreciated pedagogic approach of the first edition. Coverage has been expanded to include a new chapter on nondemocracy; new material on valance and issue ownership, dynamic veto and legislative bargaining, delegation to leaders by imperfectly informed politicians, and voter competence; and numerous additional exercises. Political economists, comparativists, and Americanists will all find models in the text central to their research interests. This leading graduate textbook assumes no mathematical knowledge beyond basic calculus, with an emphasis placed on clarity of presentation. Political scientists will appreciate the simplification of economic environments to focus on the political logic of models; economists will discover many important models published outside of their discipline; and both instructors and students will value the classroom-tested exercises. This is a vital update to a classic text.

In a democracy, we generally assume that voters know the policies they prefer and elect like-minded officials who are responsible for carrying them out. We also assume that voters consider candidates' competence, honesty, and other performance-related traits. But does this actually happen? Do voters consider candidates' policy positions when deciding for whom to vote? And how do politicians' performances in office factor into the voting decision? In Follow the Leader?, Gabriel S. Lenz sheds light on these central questions of democratic thought. Lenz looks at citizens' views.

Preface -- Contents -- Part I Contractual Democracy -- 1 Introduction to Part I -- 1.1 A Metaphor? -- 1.2 Political Contract: Definition -- 1.3 Does Any Campaign Promise Qualify as Contract Matter? -- 1.4 Punishment and Rewards -- 1.5 Renegotiation -- Negative Effects -- 1.6 Retrospect and New Developments -- 1.7 Background -- References -- 2 Retrospect -- Competition of Politicians for Incentive Contracts -- 2.1 Background -- 2.2 Introduction -- 2.3 Model and Assumptions -- 2.4 Elections -- 2.5 Competition for the Incentive Contracts -- 2.6 Competition Without Commitment -- 2.7 Asymmetric Information -- 2.8 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- 3 Vote-share Contracts Without Signaling of Competence -- 3.1 Background -- 3.2 Introduction -- 3.3 The Model -- 3.3.1 Agents -- 3.3.2 Policies -- 3.3.3 Utilities -- 3.3.4 Parameter Assumptions -- 3.3.5 The Overall Game -- 3.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept -- 3.4 Elections Alone -- 3.4.1 The Second Period -- 3.4.2 The First Period -- 3.5 Vote-share Contracts -- 3.5.1 Vote-shares as Political Contracts -- 3.5.2 The Second and First Period -- 3.5.3 Competition for Vote-share Contracts and Welfare -- 3.6 Extensions and Ramifications -- 3.6.1 Incumbency Advantages -- 3.6.2 Ramifications and Applications -- 3.7 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Vote Thresholds With Signaling of Competence -- 4.1 Background -- 4.2 Introduction -- 4.3 The Model -- 4.3.1 Agents -- 4.3.2 Policies -- 4.3.3 Utilities -- 4.3.4 Parameter Assumptions -- 4.3.5 The Overall Game -- 4.3.6 Assumptions and Equilibrium Concept -- 4.4 Elections Alone -- 4.4.1 The Second Period -- 4.4.2 The First Period -- 4.5 Vote-share Thresholds -- 4.5.1 The First Period -- 4.5.2 Welfare Properties -- 4.5.3 Welfare Impact of Higher Vote Thresholds -- 4.5.4 Competition for Vote Thresholds -- 4.6 Extensions, Applications and Generalizations

We develop a formal model in which the government provides public goods in different policy fields for its citizens. We start from the basic premise that two office-motivated candidates have differential capabilities in different policy fields, and compete by proposing how to allocate government resources to those fields. The model has a unique equilibrium that differs substantially from the standard median-voter model. While candidates compete for the support of a moderate voter type, this cutoff voter differs from the expected median voter. Moreover, no voter type except the cutoff voter is indifferent between the candidates in equilibrium. The model also predicts that candidates respond to changes in the preferences of voters in a very rigid way. We also analyze under which conditions candidates choose to strengthen the issue in which they have a competence advantage, and when they rather compensate for their weakness.

Voter ignorance is notorious and well-documented, but merely throwing more facts at voters is not enough. In this capstone work, eminent political scientist Arthur Lupia synthesizes years of work with scientists and educators in all arenas to figure out how to increase issue competence among voters.

We study Downsian competition in a Mirrleesian model of income taxation. The competing politicians may differ in competence. If politicians engage in vote-share maximization, the less competent politician's policy proposals are attractive to the minority of rich agents, whereas those of the competent politician are attractive to the majority of poor agents. The less competent politician wins with positive probability, which gives rise to a political failure in the sense of Besley and Coate (1998). Political failures are avoided if politicians maximize winning probabilities. Nevertheless, the two equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked, the minority may be better off under vote-share maximization