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When a group of people with identical preferences but different abilities in identifying the best alternative (e.g., a jury) takes a vote to decide between two alternatives, the question of strategic voting arises. That is, depending on the voting rule used to determine the collective decision, it may or may not be rational for group members to always vote for the alternative believe to be their private information indicates is better (i.e., vote informatively). In fact, we show in this paper that, if a qualified majority rule is used, then informative voting is rational only if the rule is optimal in the class of all qualified majority rules, in the sense the sense that, when everybody votes informatively, none of the other rules in this class would yield a higher expected utility. However, this necessary condition is not sufficient for informative voting to be rational. Specifically, even if the qualified majority rule used is optimal in the above sense, some of those who are least competent in correctly identifying the better alternative may increase the expected utility by sometimes voting for the alternative they believe to be inferior. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for informative, non-strategic, voting to be rational is that the voting rule is optimal among the class of all qualified weighted majority rules, i.e., rules assigning (potentially) unequal weights to different individuals, this cannot happen: informative, non-strategic voting is rational.

An analysis of the 1999 elections in Peoria, IL, sheds additional light on cumulative voting, the increasingly popular solution in voting rights litigation. First, the chief beneficiary of cumulative voting was not a descriptive minority candidate (eg, representative of a demographic group), rather it was an individual who might best be called a substantive minority (eg, representative of a political view or policy option). Second, the elections created a "quasi" experiment for comparing voting behavior under cumulative & traditional straight voting systems. This is important not only because there are few empirical studies that compare the hypothesized effects of cumulative voting with actual voting behavior, but also because there are no real-world comparisons of voting behavior under straight voting in a multimember district, the system cumulative voting usually replaces. After providing background material, a series of hypotheses are tested relying heavily on the actual election ballots. First, hypotheses about aggregate differences are advanced & empirically tested. Second, the rationales for these aggregate hypotheses contain assumptions about how particular voters respond to cumulative voting. These assumptions are advanced as separate hypotheses & tested. The analysis reveals that voter behavior under cumulative voting clearly differs from that under a traditional straight election. With a cumulative voting system, participants vote for fewer candidates, voting is more racially polarized, & majority voters appear to alter their voting behavior more than minority voters. Very unexpected was the form of white flight produced by cumulative voting. White voters, who voted for only African-American candidates under straight voting, voted for only white candidates under cumulative voting. In sum, voters appear to understand the rules of both systems, & they adjust their behavior as they move down the ballot shifting from one system to another. 7 Tables, 13 References. Adapted from the source document.

Examines social and demographic characteristics of early voters, candidate traits and issues that matter most to them, and determinants of vote choice, comparing their voting to that of election-day voters; based on exit polls, Nov. 1994; Texas.

An examination of the effects of different definitions of the Wc on the measurement of class voting & left voting in Denmark, Norway, & Sweden. The operationalization of the Wc in the three countries is compared, & Swedish election survey data are recoded to conform more closely to the classification procedures used in Danish & Norwegian studies. The analysis shows that if a similar operationalization is used, the level of Left voting in both the Swedish Wcs & Mcs increases & the Alford index of class voting (see SA 14:5/66C1227) declines. Class voting & Left voting in the younger & older generations & among women & men are also discussed. It is concluded that dissimilar patterns of class voting & Left voting among women in the three countries are largely a product of different classification schemes. Problems in using the Alford index as a summary statistic in cross-national comparisons are identified. 7 Tables, 2 Figures, 32 References. Modified HA

Book Cover; Title; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; List of contributors; Series editor's preface; Preface; Acknowledgments; The context of economic voting: an introduction; Political institutions and economic voting; The cost of ruling: a foundation stone for two theories; The economy as context: indirect links between the economy and voters; Economics, politics, and the cost of ruling in advanced industrial democracies: how much does context matter?; Group economic voting: a comparison of the Netherlands and Germany; On a short leash: term limits and the economic voter.

The implications of Internet voting are explored with attention given to the meaning of voting & whether it is important for people to enter a physical, public space to vote. AZ's recent experiment with Internet voting raised questions as to whether it could be accomplished without fear of fraud & whether it increased voter participation, & these questions as well as arguments for & against Internet voting are discussed. It is concluded that the US is experiencing a shift from citizen participation in the public sphere to citizen existence within a "private world of culture consumption" (Habermas 1989 [1962]). The majority of the population unquestioningly accepts the news & products of the mass media, while elites make decisions behind closed doors. 13 References. L. A. Hoffman

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Pareto-dominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.