Elections are the most important pillar of democracy. A voter's behaviour is influenced by many parameters that can turn the outcome of the election. Many constituencies follow a certain voting pattern. The voters of the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, have often been categorized as having an anti-incumbency sentiment, where the ruling party has often switched in every consecutive election. However, there seems to be a gradual shift in this sentiment. This paper presents a case on the relaxation of the anti-incumbency sentiment by analyzing the voting data across the constituencies in the five elections of the last two decades. Some aspects which could have contributed to this voting behaviour are also discussed.
Given knowledge of the circumstances of a large Ur minority group (Negroes) in a metropolitan area, & given knowledge of the leadership techniques used by pol'al candidates in an election, 'what kind of leadership can achieve maximum impact under the circumstances of the situation?' The study compares the election techniques of a Republican of the 'rational-manager' type & a Democrat of the 'head-chief' or city-boss type. Data are derived from participant observation & statistics from a series of pre-election surveys. From knowledge of the actual voting patterns, the author indicates some reasons for the success of the Democratic candidate. The successful leader won due to his success among the Negro people (1 in 5 of all persons of voting age) & due to the following voting patterns: Negroes voted along Democratic party lines, in terms of 'their people' rather than for the 'general community welfare'; they were visited personally by precinct captains, & spoke about the candidate in personal terms. These 'interests' were manipulated successfully by the winner despite the fact that his record was less formidable than his Republican opponent. Some tentative hypo's about the voting behavior of Ur Negroes are formulated, & some questions are raised about the relationship between the 'social act of voting' & bribery, & what kinds of Negro leadership used in an advisory capacity lead to what effects. T. L. Blair.
AbstractThe New Development Bank (NDB) and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) were built by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS countries) in response to the 'disappointing' Bretton Woods Institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The main difference between the Bretton Woods Institutions and the BRICS institutions is that the latter adopts an equal‐weight system instead of a weighted voting system in the NDB (all five BRICS countries have equal shares and voting weights regardless of the major differences in their economic weights) and uses consensus instead of majority voting rules to make decisions regarding critical issues in the CRA. In fact, both the equal‐weight system and consensus rule are unprecedented in the history of multilateral financial institutions. The World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank and even the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) all adopt weighted voting systems and majority voting rules. We explain why the BRICS countries adopt these unprecedented designs through precise power measurements and carefully designed experiments. First, we measure the voting power of each member of the BRICS' NDB and CRA under the current decision‐making systems, using this information as a control group. Then, we remeasure the voting power of each member of the NDB under the assumption that their shares and voting weights are allocated according to their economic weights; additionally, we remeasure the voting power of each country of the CRA under the assumption that majority rules are adopted when decisions are being made on critical issues. Moreover, we establish evaluation indices of power equality and power equity based on classic and variant Gini coefficients and Lorenz curves and use them to assess and compare the power structures of the BRICS' NDB and CRA in the contexts of different voting weight reallocations and different voting rules redesigns. We use these indices to precisely analyse whether the power structures of the BRICS institutions become more equable or equitable in the examined contexts and to investigate the relationship between equality and equity in this setting.
In most democracies, members of parliament are either elected over a party list or by a district. We use a discontinuity in the German parliamentary system to investigate the causal effect of a district-election on an MP's conformity with her party-line. A district-election does not affect roll call voting behavior causally, possibly due to overall high adherence to party voting. Analyzing the parliamentary speeches of each MP allows us to overcome the high party discipline with regard to parliamentary voting. Using textual analysis and machine learning techniques, we create two measures of closeness of an MP's speeches to her party. We find that district-elected members of parliament do not differ, in terms of speeches, from those of their party-peers who have been elected through closed party lists. However, both speeches and voting correlate with district characteristics suggesting that district-elections allow districts to select more similar politicians.
AbstractManuscript TypeEmpiricalResearch Question/IssueDoes the smaller blockholder monitor or collude with a larger counterpart in a two‐blockholder firm? Does the larger blockholder prefer not to share private benefits with the smaller blockholder or partially yield control to the smaller counterpart in a coalition? What are the contingent factors that influence the conflict of interest among large shareholders?Research Findings/InsightsIn two‐blockholder firms, the voting power of the larger blockholder negatively impacts the presence of the cumulative voting rule, even if the rule is positively associated with firm value and provides the smaller blockholder a better opportunity to elect directors despite the competition from the larger blockholder. Voting power concentration negatively impacts the adoption of the cumulative voting rule in two‐blockholder firms. The more voting power a smaller blockholder can employ to contest the largest blockholder, the more likely the two‐blockholder firm will observe the cumulative voting rule. Two‐blockholder firms are more likely to observe the cumulative voting rule when a coalition of blockholders has voting power that falls far below a threshold that warrants control of the firm.Theoretical/Academic ImplicationsThe empirical analysis of the paper suggests that the larger blockholder is willing to defend the control of the firm and the ability to pursue private benefits at the cost of firm value. The smaller blockholder is more likely to yield to the power of the larger blockholder and choose to collude rather than compete with the largest blockholder. The motivation and ability of a smaller blockholder to monitor the larger blockholder is contingent upon the voting power balance of the two blockholders.Practitioner/Policy ImplicationsMinority investors should be alert to potential collusion among large shareholders. Regulators should consider enforcing the cumulative voting rule more widely to facilitate shareholder democracy and improve firm value.
The study is composed of 2 main parts, in which both behavior & att's are examined. Men & women are described in relation to their pol'al participation & as pol'al representatives. Apart from the obvious effects of Ur'ization, of a rise in the SE level, & of a decrease in religious & conservative traditionalism, other factors also help to explain diff's in the voting turnout of men & women. Eg, in some areas, notably in the Swedish-speaking Ru communes, ED increases sex diff's by bringing with it social disorg & cross-pressu res. The ecological analysis shows that all over the country past class-conflicts & traditions of inequality of SC's are reflected in present inequality or diff in sex roles in voting participation. Socialist traditions are unable to decrease sex diff's when the soc structure is characterized by class conflicts. The soc & pol'al climates in eastern & western Finland differ remarkably from each other. In eastern Finland women's voting activity is low but a high proportion of women is elected. This is due to a lack of uniform norms as to whether & for whom to vote. Pressure towards conformity in western Finland brings women to the polls but to vote for men. This shows that women's voting & voting for women are not one dimension. Ur'ization increases both women's voting & voting for women. The influence of sex role ideologies can be seen primarily in voting for women, not that of women. The Marxian principle of the equality of the sexes is reflected in the larger proportion of women among candidates & those elected in the socialist parties. Voting for women candidates in bourgeois parties has increased, probably due to the growing number of women working in Mc occup's & to the radical sex role discussion which began in 1965 & which may have influenced the voting in the elections of 1968 & 1970. IPSA.
The administration of elections in the United States—including elections for federal office – is highly decentralized. Fundamental election law decisions – such as registration and voter identification requirements, and early in-person voting and vote-by-mail rules – are made by the state legislature, but the actual conduct of elections is handled almost entirely by local governments. Local officials register voters, process absentee ballot applications, design ballots, recruit and train poll workers, manage early voting and election day operations, acquire, maintain and secure voting equipment, and count, canvass, and report the results. In most states, local officials also pay for most of the costs.
The subprime crisis led to a wave of government interventions in the private sector that has been particularly strong in Europe and Latin America, where several governments are large shareholders in a variety of public firms. In a sense, the subprime crisis induced these governments to behave as active large shareholders. This paper uses a sample of public firms in Brazil to show that government activism lowers the value of minority shareholders' voting rights. While the corporate governance literature usually associates lower voting premia with stronger protection of minority shareholders, we provide evidence that the government-induced decline in the value of voting rights harmed minority shareholders in Brazil.
Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- Part I -- Contents -- Part II -- Networks, Communities, and Groups -- How Well Do Doodle Polls Do? -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Related Work -- 2 Theoretical Framework -- 2.1 Formalizing a Yes-No Doodle Poll -- 2.2 Valuations and Voter Types -- 2.3 Analysis Model -- 3 Ordinary Voting -- 4 Restrictive Voting -- 4.1 Restrictive Voting Can Improve Social Welfare -- 4.2 Restrictive Voting Can Harm Social Welfare -- 5 Cooperative Voting -- 5.1 Cooperative Voting Can Improve Social Welfare -- 5.2 Cooperative Voting Can Harm Social Welfare -- 6 Conclusion -- A Appendix -- A.1 Restrictive Voting -- A.2 Cooperative Voting -- References -- Bring on Board New Enthusiasts! A Case Study of Impact of Wikipedia Art + Feminism Edit-A-Thon Events on Newcomers -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Socialization of Newcomers in Online Communities -- 3 Wikipedia Art+Feminism Edit-A-Thon -- 4 Research Questions -- 5 Research Methods and Data Collection -- 5.1 Wikipedia Dataset -- 5.2 Twitter Dataset -- 6 Results -- 6.1 RQ1: Impact of Edit-A-Thons on Subsequnet Participation of Newcomers -- 6.2 RQ2: Impact of Edit-A-Thons on Newcomers' Community Connections -- 6.3 RQ3: Predicting Subsequent Participation -- 7 Conclusion and Discussion -- References -- The Social Dynamics of Language Change in Online Networks -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Data -- 2.1 Linguistic Markers -- 2.2 Social Network -- 2.3 Geography -- 3 Language Change as Social Influence -- 4 Social Evaluation of Language Variation -- 4.1 Tie Strength -- 4.2 Geographic Locality -- 5 Language Change as a Self-exciting Point Process -- 5.1 Parametric Hawkes Process -- 5.2 Objective Function -- 5.3 Gradients -- 5.4 Coordinate Ascent -- 6 Results -- 7 Discussion -- References -- On URL Changes and Handovers in Social Media -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 Data Collection.
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As much as we might like to think we're capable of objectively evaluating the political candidates we vote for, factors like income, ethnicity, and gender strongly affect political preferences. And now a wave of psychological research into voting behavior is bringing to light other, much less obvious predilections. Adapted from the source document.
The following issue brief will focus on the differences in voting patterns among Latinos and European-Americans -- whites, as they are indicated on the 2000 U.S. census form -- and the issues that are hallmark of the Latino population as opposed to the European-American population. In addition, the demographics of both ethno-racial populations will be discussed.
