Voucher Wars
In: Cato policy report: publ. bimonthly by the Cato Institute, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 3-7
ISSN: 0743-605X
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In: Cato policy report: publ. bimonthly by the Cato Institute, Band 25, Heft 3, S. 3-7
ISSN: 0743-605X
In: Communist economies and economic transformation: journal of the Centre for Research into Communist Economies, Band 7, Heft 3, S. 385-408
In: Comparative economic studies, Band 35, Heft 3, S. 19-37
ISSN: 1478-3320
In: Europäische Hochschulschriften
In: Reihe 5, Volks- und Betriebswirtschaft Bd. 2834
In: Economic affairs: journal of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Band 6, Heft 1
ISSN: 1468-0270
Education forms another arm of the welfare state. The school. voucher was dropped in 1983 partly because of the argument that it would be impossible to create the wide‐range of schools necessary to redeem it in primary and secondary education. John Pardoe (right), former Liberal MP, who runs courses for the Youth Training Scheme of the Manpower Services Commission, has found that 4,000 sources of supply emerged, from 'Nowhere' to honour the YTS grants to young people. His evidence confirms the Austrian argument that suppliers would soon emerge in response to the new, voucher‐stim ulaied demand.
In: Housing Issues, Laws and Programs
Intro -- HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM -- HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1 SECTION 8 HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM: ISSUES AND REFORM PROPOSALS -- SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- CURRENT PROGRAM FEATURES AND ISSUES -- Administration -- Local Discretion -- Eligible Uses of Funds -- Homeownership Vouchers -- Rent Structure -- Calculation of Income -- Eligibility -- Work Requirements and Time Limits -- Inspections -- Portability -- Mobility -- Funding Allocation -- RECENT REFORM PROPOSALS -- Moving to Work Expansion -- Voucher Reform Legislation -- 111th Congress -- 112th Congress -- SEVRA -- SESA and AHSSIA -- Appropriations Proposals -- End Notes -- Chapter 2 THE USE OF DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY IN THE HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM: A CRS STUDY -- SUMMARY -- Major Findings -- INTRODUCTION -- Evolution of PHA Discretionary Authority -- CRS Study of PHA Discretion -- Data Sources and the Data Collection Process -- Administrative Plans -- Interviews -- Limitations -- Prior Research -- RESEARCH FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS -- Tenant Selection Policies -- Local Preferences -- Findings -- Managing Local Preferences -- Issues of Fairness -- "Other" Local Preferences -- Implications -- Special Admissions -- Findings -- Implications -- Screening and Denial of Assistance -- Findings -- Financial Obligations -- Criminal Background -- Implications -- Termination of Assistance -- Findings -- Implications -- Income and Rent Policies -- Minimum Rent -- Findings -- Implications -- Interim Recertification Policy -- Findings -- Implications -- Administrative Policies -- Waiting List Administration -- Findings -- Implications -- Search Time and Extensions -- Findings -- Implications -- CONSIDERATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS -- The Achievement of Federal Goals -- Benefits and Drawbacks of Discretionary Authority for PHAs
In: Forced migration review, Heft 36
ISSN: 1460-9819
Cash vouchers offer flexibility, enabling payment for school fees as well as for basic necessities. They also empower people who, in displacement, have been deprived of choice. Adapted from the source document.
In: Osteuropa, Band 48, Heft 8-9, S. 893
ISSN: 0030-6428
In: Families in society: the journal of contemporary human services, Band 89, S. 1-3
ISSN: 1945-1350
In: Economics of transition, Band 8, Heft 1, S. 37-57
ISSN: 1468-0351
The paper analyses the implementation of voucher privatization in Russia in the framework of incentive theory. The central government needs the support of local privatization agencies. These agencies possess private knowledge concerning: a) their personal reform attitude; b) local privatization conditions. According to the trade‐off between rent extraction and efficiency, the speed of privatization (the efficiency goal) is constrained by the informational rents that the government must pay to local agents. Through voucher privatization, the government learns about local privatization conditions. Surprisingly, this additional information does not necessarily lead to more privatization. In fact, the government may even slow down reforms in order to save on bureaucrats' rents. This result of the model matches with the facts of Russian privatization in the period 1992–93.
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 13, Heft 1, S. 349-394
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
This article compares two alternative voucher designs implemented in the U.S. The Milwaukee program was a "voucher shock" program that made low-income students eligible for vouchers. The Florida program was an accountability-tied voucher program that faced failing schools with "threat of vouchers" and stigma. In the context of a formal theoretical model, the study argues that the threatened schools will improve under the Florida-type program and this improvement will exceed that of the corresponding treated schools under the Milwaukee-type program. Using school-level scores from Florida and Wisconsin, and a difference-in-differences estimation strategy in trends, it then finds strong support in favor of these predictions.
In: Affilia: journal of women and social work, Band 6, Heft 2, S. 110-112
ISSN: 1552-3020
In: Policy sciences: integrating knowledge and practice to advance human dignity, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 309-315
ISSN: 1573-0891