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In typical crisis bargaining models, strong actors must convince the opponent that they are not bluffing and the only way to do so is through costly signaling. However, in a war, strong actors can benefit from tactical surprise when their opponent mistakenly believes that they are weak. This creates contradictory incentives during the pre-war crisis: actors want to persuade the opponent of their strength to gain a better deal but, should war break out, they would rather have the opponent believe they are weak. I present an ultimatum crisis bargaining model that incorporates this dilemma and show that a strong actor may feign weakness during the bargaining phase. This implies that (1) absence of a costly signal is not an unambiguous revelation of weakness, (2) the problem of uncertainty is worse because the only actor with incentives to overcome it may be unwilling to do so, and (3) because of the difficulty with concealing resolve, democracies might be seriously disadvantaged in a crisis. Copyright © 2010 The IO Foundation.

AbstractIn typical crisis bargaining models, strong actors must convince the opponent that they are not bluffing and the only way to do so is through costly signaling. However, in a war, strong actors can benefit from tactical surprise when their opponent mistakenly believes that they are weak. This creates contradictory incentives during the pre-war crisis: actors want to persuade the opponent of their strength to gain a better deal but, should war break out, they would rather have the opponent believe they are weak. I present an ultimatum crisis bargaining model that incorporates this dilemma and show that a strong actor may feign weakness during the bargaining phase. This implies that (1) absence of a costly signal is not an unambiguous revelation of weakness, (2) the problem of uncertainty is worse because the only actor with incentives to overcome it may be unwilling to do so, and (3) because of the difficulty with concealing resolve, democracies might be seriously disadvantaged in a crisis.

In typical crisis bargaining models, strong actors must convince the opponent that they are not bluffing and the only way to do so is through costly signaling. However, in a war strong actors can benefit from tactical surprise when their opponent mistakenly believes that they are weak. This creates contradictory incentives during the pre-war crisis: actors want to persuade the opponent of their strength to gain a better deal but, should war break out, they would rather have the opponent believe they are weak. I present an ultimatum crisis bargaining model that incorporates this dilemma and show that a strong actor may feign weakness during the bargaining phase. This implies that (a) absence of a costly signal is not an unambiguous revelation of weakness,(b) the problem of uncertainty is worse because the only actor with incentives to overcome it may be unwilling to do so, and (c) because of the difficulty with concealing resolve, democracies might be seriously disadvantaged in a crisis.

Too many somersaults -- The strange creature that I am -- Giving meaning to reality -- The sincerity of true kindness -- Embracing our condition -- Drawing strength from our weakness -- Pity anesthetizes -- The other's gaze -- The joy of being alive -- They talked and analyzed -- Culture shock -- Conditional happiness -- A man of God -- A craving for learning -- Genuine friends -- Marginal

Russian leadership faces internal political, economic, societal, & defense challenges that will preclude Russia from achieving great-power status in the near future. What is notable is not Russia's power but its weakness. Adapted from the source document.

After Easternisation - War and Peace in the Asian Century (2016) comes the next extensive political analysis by Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for Financial Times and, for ten years, a prominent commentator on the political and geostrategic aspects of globalization. In Easternisation, Rachman gave a poignant portrayal of China's growing economic, political and military power as Asia's unchallenged hegemon. He clearly indicated a power and culture shift from the transatlantic to the Indo-pacific hemisphere.

Arguing that the US & Europe are fundamentally different, their distinct strategic cultures are discussed. It is contended that in addition to a transatlantic power gap -- with the US more powerful -- there is an ideological gap as well; these differences reinforce each other. How the transatlantic power gap generates a difference in strategic perception is considered before looking at the underlying psychology. In addition to the power gap, Europe is said to have developed a distinct perspective on the role of power in international relations springing from its post-WWII experience, which is different from the formative historical experience of the US for that period. The evolution of Europe's foreign policy in that time is examined in this light. Noting the irony, it is asserted that US power allows for the existence of Europes new Kantian order, wherein the latter now believes US military power & its strategic culture is outmoded & dangerous. Thus, it is stated that in the postmodern world, there will be a double standard: Europe can only keep its new pacific system if it has some means of protecting itself. This also means that while the US has played a key role in fostering Europe's post-historical Kantian paradise, it cannot have access & must remain stuck in history. Some remarks on how Europe & the US can make this paradox work are offered in closing. D. Edelman