Suchergebnisse

In 1942, proletarian writer, Takeda Rintarō, was sent from Japan to the Dutch East-Indies (Indonesia) as part of the Sendenbu (propaganda squad), where he led the literature section in the Keimin Bunka Shidōshō (cultural center) in Jakarta. Jawa sarasa documents Takeda Rintaro's activities and cultural experiences in Java, Indonesia, after he returned to Japan in 1944. Most Japanese literature and cultural writings about Nanyō or Nanpō ("South Islands" - South Asia and the Pacific, including Indonesia) from this era reference the concept of Imperialism in Asia. In the pre-war period, stereotypes such as dojin (local primitive) and tōmin (islander) defined South Island people as being lesser than or "other" than the Japanese people. Japanese literary depictions of tropical Eden's and exotic "uncivilized people" reflect similar perceptions and writings by Western authors towards Asia in the 19th century. This paper explores Takeda Rintarō's perspectives of "otherness" in prewar discourses about Indonesia. Through the influence of "The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" propaganda concept, the ideology of "sameness" was becoming a hegemonic cultural idea in Takeda's writings about Indonesia. Conversely, however, Takeda's depiction of the double-occupation of Java, with the political rule of Holland and economic domination of daily life by Chinese immigrants, implied criticism of Japan's administrative policies regarding economic exploitation in Java. Takeda's criticisms of Japanese policy are bedded in his emotion for the nature, culture and people of Indonesia.

The conflict environment is changing, and—after almost two decades of continuous COIN, stabilisation and counterterrorism missions—government and public opinion in western and allied countries are unlikely to support continued large-scale or long-duration missions of this type. Yet history demonstrates that such missions are, and are likely to remain, some of the most frequent and geographically widespread. Likewise, ground forces are critical for success in COIN and stabilisation missions, due to the need to interact closely with local government and populations, which implies the need to establish and maintain a physical presence in the area of operations, which in turn implies the need to survive and prevail in a close combat environment, which only ground forces can do. Thus, despite their unpopularity, ground forces can expect (and must be prepared) to continue engaging in these types of operations. However, the same factors that have enhanced the threat in recent decades—in particular, connectivity and the ability to conduct collaborative and remote engagement— also create opportunities for new operating methods for ground forces conducting COIN and stabilisation. These include the ability to deploy only a small element forward on the ground, conducting SFA and FID tasks, while supporting it with a QRF and other enablers that remain offshore in a sea-base or in regionally-deployed FOBs. In such a scenario the main force might be withheld from the theatre of operations and either deploy for a brief initial period only, or not at all. For a force operating in this manner, protected mobility and communications would remain essential, as would the ability to access and deliver precision fire support when required. Deployed forces would probably be modular to a very low level, operating in a mesh of multi-role, semi-autonomous small teams supporting each other and swapping roles as needed. Traditional intelligence, engineering, civil affairs, psychological operations and military governance capabilities would remain essential, but might be called forward as needed. Ultimately, however, while ground forces will almost certainly continue to play a central role in counterinsurgency and stabilisation operations, the way they perform this role, the organisation and equipment with which they do so, and the environment in which they conduct such missions is likely to change, and keep changing, into the foreseeable future.