Suchergebnisse

Durch die Förderung von Whistleblowing erhofft man sich eine erhöhte Aufdeckung und Verhinderung von Manipulationshandlungen. In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass (mehr) Whistleblowing nicht unbedingt zu Letzterem führt. Dazu wird ein Spiel modelliert, in dem ein Manager seine Manipulationswahrscheinlichkeit und ein Prüfer seine mit Kosten verbundenen Aufdeckungsbemühungen bestimmt. Es zeigt sich, dass eine wahrscheinlichere Nachprüfungsaufdeckung einen reduzierenden Effekt auf die Manipulationswahrscheinlichkeit besitzt. Eine wahrscheinlichere Aufdeckung vor der eigentlichen Prüfung kann allerdings je nach Kostenfunktion des Prüfers unterschiedliche Auswirkungen haben. Selbst wenn mehr Whistleblowing nicht zu einer Verringerung der Manipulationswahrscheinlichkeit führt, kann es dennoch die Gesamtwohlfahrt steigern.

eingereicht von Alina Stockinger ; Universität Linz, Diplomarbeit, 2020 ; (VLID)5270560

"Whistleblowing" has entered the scholarly and the publicdebate as a way of describing the exposure by the memberof an organization of episodes of corruption, fraud, or generalabuses of power within the organization. We offer acritical survey of the main normative theories ofwhistleblowing in the current debate in political philosophy,with the illustrative aid of one of the epitomic figures of awhistleblower of our time: Edward Snowden. After conceptuallyseparating whistleblowing from other forms ofwrongdoing disclosures, we introduce and discuss two familiesof normative views of this practice: the "Extrema Ratio"and the "Deontic" views. We show how the two views canbe usefully considered in tandem to offer an all-roundassessment of the moral justification of whistleblowingeither as an extraordinary individual conscientious act ofindictment or as an ordinary dutiful organizational practiceof answerability that enables the capacity of self-correctionof an organization.

his article attempts to bring coherence to the confusion of state whistleblower causation standards by: (1) explaining the causation standards presently used in federal whistleblower protection statutes; (2) identifying the proliferating causation standards used in whistleblower claims brought under state law; (3) assessing the most commonly used causation standards, including exploring the tort causation doctrine and theory that underlie some of these standards; and (4) proposing a uniform standard for causation in state whistle- blower litigation.

Penultimate version accepted for publication ; Whistleblowing is the act of disclosing information from a public or private organization in order to reveal cases of corruption that are of immediate or potential danger to the public. Blowing the whistle involves personal risk, especially when legal protection is absent, and charges of betrayal, which often come in the form of legal prosecution under treason laws. In this article we argue that whistleblowing is justified when disclosures are made with the proper intent and fulfill specific communicative constraints in addressing issues of public interest. Three communicative constraints of informativeness, truthfulness and evidence are discussed in this regard. We develop a 'harm test' to assess the intent for disclosures, concluding that it is not sufficient for justification. Along with the proper intent, a successful act of whistleblowing should provide information that serves the public interest. Taking cognizance of the varied conceptions of public interest, we present an account of public interest that fits the framework of whistleblowing disclosures. In particular, we argue that whistleblowing is justified inter alia when the information it conveys is of a presumptive interest for a public insofar as it reveals an instance of injustice or violation of a civil or political right done against and unbeknown to some members of a polity. ; Project: 'Change of Direction. Fostering Whistleblowing in the Fight against Corruption' co-funded by the Internal Security Fund of the European Union (Grant Agreement Number: HOME/2014/ISFP/AG/EFCE/7233); SFRH/BPD/108669/2015 ...