For many years, Malta did not have a law which specifically dealt with whistleblowing. No law acknowledged or defended whistleblowers. As in other countries, whistleblowers in Malta have generally faced great difficulties and suffered retaliation for their deeds. A few years ago, whistleblowing was acknowledged in a few provisions in employment law but these were rather incomplete and were not supported by any proper structure. After a number of false starts, theMaltese Parliament finally passed a 'Protection of Whistleblowers Act' in 2013. This was the first ever comprehensive law on the subject; but is it good enough and do whistleblowers feel safe now? The writer argues that the law does not protect all disclosures and various onerous conditions have been imposed in the law. A prospective whistleblower should seriously consider his position before reporting wrong-doing or corruption in his work place. This chapter concludes that in Malta, despite the recent 2013 Act, whistleblowing remains a very risky and thankless decision. ; peer-reviewed
Leniency policies offering immunity to the first cartel member that blows the whistle and self-reports to the antitrust authority have become the main instrument in the fight against price-fixing conspiracies around the world. In public procurement markets, however, bid-rigging schemes are often accompanied by corruption of public officials. In the absence of coordinated forms of leniency (or rewards) for unveiling corruption, a policy offering immunity from antitrust sanctions may not be sufficient to encourage wrongdoers to blow the whistle, as the leniency recipient will then be exposed to the risk of conviction for corruption. This paper assesses the extent of this problem by describing and discussing the antitrust and anti-corruption provisions present in a few selected countries, from both common law and civil law regimes. For each of these countries, we try to evaluate whether the legal system presents any solution to limiting the risk that legal provisions against corruption undermine the effectiveness of leniency programs against bid rigging in public procurement. Legal harmonization, coordination and co-operation on procedural and substantive issues, and inter and intra jurisdictions, seem essential to solve this problem. Given the size of public procurement markets and their propensity for cartelization, specific improvements in legislation appear necessary in all the countries considered. Explicitly introducing leniency policies for corruption, as has been recently done in Brazil and Mexico, is only a first step. The antitrust experience has taught us these policies must be carefully designed and sufficiently generous, they should not be discretional, and they must be consistently implemented to achieve their goals of inducing whistleblowing. Hence, the road ahead appears a long one. To increase the effectiveness of leniency in multiple offense cases, we suggest, besides extending automatic leniency to individual criminal sanctions, the creation of a 'one-stop-point' enabling firms and individuals to report different crimes simultaneously and receive leniency for all of them at once if they are entitled to it. As long as individual criminal charges are not covered by a coordinated and non-discretional leniency program, there is little hope that these provision will induce any improvement in the fight against corrupting cartels. A more effective way to fight such cartels may then be offering Qui Tam rewards to non-accomplice whistleblowers, as is already done with apparent success by several law enforcement agencies in the US.
The federal government increasingly relies on whistleblowers to ferret out fraud, awarding over $4 billion to whistleblowers under the False Claims Act ("FCA") and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"). May lawyers ethically seek these whistleblower rewards? Several lawyers have tried unsuccessfully to serve as FCA whistleblowers. Additional lawyers may be seeking whistleblower rewards under Dodd-Frank, but the secrecy of the award process prevents us from knowing whether they have sought or received awards. This is the first Article to analyze in-depth the key questions for determining whether a lawyer may seek a federal whistleblower award: (1) When may a lawyer disclose a client's confidential information? (2) When does a lawyer's obligation of loyalty preclude seeking a personal benefit by disclosing a crime or fraud? (3) Do federal whistleblower laws preempt state ethics standards? (4) Which state's ethics law applies when several states have significant contacts with the matter? These questions are enormously complex. Confidentiality exceptions differ widely among states. Lawyers are bound not just by conflict of interest rules, but also by the common-law duty not to profit from a client's confidential information. While several federal courts have summarily rejected FCA preemption of state ethics standards, none of them confronted the fact that the FCA preempts state law fiduciary and contractual duties that would prevent nonlawyer insiders from serving as whistleblowers.
This article presents a network perspective on whistleblowing. It considers how whistleblowing affects, and is affected by, the preexisting distribution of power inside and outside an organization, where power is conceptualized as deriving from the network positions of the key actors. The article also highlights four characteristic features of whistleblowing: third‐party detriment, local subversion, appeal to central or external power, and reasonable expectation of concern. The feature of local subversion succinctly explains why whistleblowing is difficult. The feature of appeal to central or external power highlights that contrary to the perception of a democratizing phenomenon, whistleblowing tends to redistribute discretion away from local power toward more central power. This suggests a need for caution about institutional measures to promote whistleblowing in contexts where governance is already highly centralized.
"October 1993"--1st prelim. p ; "A report to the President and the Congress of the United States by the U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board." ; Shipping list no.: 93-0612-P ; Cover title ; Includes bibliographical references ; Mode of access: Internet.
Given the crucial role unauthorized disclosures can play in uncovering grave government wrongdoing, it makes sense to search for a defense of justified cases of what I call "classified public whistleblowing." The question that concerns me is what form such a defense should take. The main claim will be a negative one, namely, that a defense of whistleblowing cannot be based on individual rights, be they legal or moral, though this is indeed the most commonly proposed defense. In closing, I will outline a more appealing alternative, namely, a justification defense.
The purpose of this study is to explore and develop a comprehensive model of internal whistleblowing intention. Specifically, this study examines the effect of authentic leadership on internal whistleblowing intention. Furthermore, this study aims to investigate the effect of authentic leadership on internal whistleblowing intention through personal identification and organizational commitment. To test the hypotheses, a partial least square analysis is applied to questionnaire survey data from 196 employees in Indonesia. As hypothesized, the result revealed that authentic leadership influences the internal whistleblowing intention. In addition, the result also indicates that authentic leadership has an indirect effect on internal whistleblowing intention through personal identification and organizational commitment. The implications of these findings are thoroughly discussed in this study.
This study aims to examine the effect of retaliation, status of wrongdoers, the level of wrongdoing seriousness, and organizational climate on whistleblowing intentions. The population in this study were Civil Servants (PNS) who work in the financial section of the Aceh Work Unit (SKPA) of 231 respondents. The data used in this study is primary data collected through a questionnaire survey. Statistical testing used in this study is multiple linear regression analysis with the help of the SPSS 20 application. The results of this study indicate that the retaliation and status of wrongdoers have a negative and significant effect on whistleblowing intentions, while the level of wrongdoing seriousness and organizational climate positively and significantly affect whistleblowing intentions. The contribution of this research is to provide an understanding to the entire State Civil Apparatus (ASN) to dare to report acts of fraud in the government environment, and to implement a whistleblowing system in order to reduce the level of fraud and corruption cases in Indonesia.
Presently, there is very limited federal legislation in Canada that will protect whistleblowers from retaliation when they expose unethical, illegal and illegitimate activities in organizations. The purpose of this thesis is to argue that Canada needs to adopt a modified form of the American whistleblowing legislation, in both the private and public sectors, in order to provide the whistleblower with an incentive towards reporting the unethical, illegal and/or illegitimate activities of a person or an organization. This thesis shows that there is a need for whistleblowing legislation in Canada. It is in the public's best interest for wrongdoing to be exposed and then terminated in both the public and private sectors. Ontario's legislative experience in proposing whistleblowing protection legislation based on the American legislation provides valuable insight into issues that must be addressed when proposing this legislation. It is argued that Canada should use the American whistleblowing protection legislation as a model for developing legislation within the Canadian context. A proposed modified form of the American whistleblowing protection legislation is developed for the public and private sectors. This proposed legislation supports and encourages the disclosure of wrongdoing through the process of whistleblowing by providing both protection and an incentive for whistleblowers. Furthermore, it is argued that a major media-laden political scandal will have to occur in the Canadian federal government for this legislation to be passed.
An Garda Síochána was established in 1922 as the national police force of the Irish state and has undergone organisational, developmental, growth and cultural change siical Unce inception in line with societal, legislative and governmental demands throughout the intervening 97 years. In more recent times and in tandem with this growth expansion and development, there has also grown a maleficent and damaging culture within the force where a culture of secrecy and lack of transparent function has emerged, whereby whistle-blowers of bad practice have been bullied and vilified for highlighting wrongdoing in the organisation. Following formal tribunals of enquiry and associated legislative change there has emerged considerable change in the approach taken by An Garda Síochána towards whistleblowing and the accommodation of whistle-blowers within its ranks. The aim of this study is to elicit the perceptions of members of An Garda Síochána and gain insight into their views and experiences of whistleblowing within the organisation.
This paper examines the whistleblowing in the Italian legal system. In the lack ofproper rules on such a phenomenon (quite uncommon in the Italian social reality, also due to cultural reasons) except for the civil servants, the paper goes on analysing, on the one hand, the provision applicable to the civil servants (i.e. art. 54 of the Legislative Decree no. 165/2001), and on the other hand, the instruments provided for by the Italian legal system as general principles, which can be applied by the judge in order to protect the whistleblowers in the private sector (in particular the rules against retaliatory and discriminatory acts and mobbing). The Author stresses that the recalled protection, although effective (also after the so-called 'Monti's reform', id est the Law No. 92/2012), could be not sufficient both because of the allocation of the burden of proof, and because it is applicable to the employees and only partially (as the Author explains in the last paragraph) to the whistleblowing in the context of self-employment. Then the paper analyses the balancing performed by the Italian caselaw between the right to information and the right of criticism, on one side, and the right to secrecy set forth by law in respect of business facts and information, and the personality rights granted to the employer by the Constitution,on the other side. Finally the paper deals with the applicable procedures, introduced by disciplinary codes, also according to the Legislative Decree No. 231/2001, and the problems related to internal reporting systems, in particular the balancing between the needs for the whistleblower's protection and the positive law in the matter of protection of the privacy of the person to whom the complaint relates according to the Legislative Decree No. 196/2003.
Digital Government whistleblower initiative has been applied in governmental organizations of Ethiopia to tackle unlawful activities in public services. This study explores how the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) and Digital Government whistleblower initiative would positively impact the Ethiopian government, despite the cultural differences within the country. This study developed a successful model of the Ethiopian Digital Government whistleblower system to assist Ethiopians with more efficient and cost-effective whistleblowing operations. Data was collected using a survey applied to a sample of 554 citizens and data analysis involved linear regression statistical technique (SPSS). The results showed that the core constructs of the TAM have strong influences on user-intention towards Digital Government whistleblowing system. Also, information quality and whistleblowing system quality were the significant determinants of the perceived usefulness of whistleblowing services. In addition, findings suggest that whistleblowing system quality is a factor that influences their behavior toward the use of Digital Government whistleblower system
Whistleblowing is a powerful and rather inexpensive instrument to deter tax evasion. Despite the deterrent effects on tax evasion, whistleblowing can reduce trust and undermine agents' attitude to cooperate with group members. Yet, no study has investigated the potential spillover effects of whistleblowing on ingroup cooperation. This paper reports results of a laboratory experiment in which subjects participate in two consecutive phases in unchanging groups: a tax evasion game, followed by a generalized gift exchange game. Two dimensions are manipulated in our experiment: the inclusion of a whistleblowing stage in which, after observing others' declared incomes, subjects can signal other group members to the tax authority, and the provision of information about the content of the second phase before the tax evasion game is played. Our results show that whistleblowing is effective in both curbing tax evasion and improving the precision of tax auditing. Moreover, we detect no statistically significant spillover effects of whistleblowing on ingroup cooperation in the subsequent generalized gift exchange game, with this result being unaffected by the provision of information about the experimental task in the second phase. Finally, the provision of information does not significantly alter subjects' (tax and whistleblowing) choices in the tax evasion game: thus, knowledge about perspective ingroup cooperation did not alter attitude toward whistleblowing.
This study aims to determine the factors that influence the intentions of government employees to do withlowing. This research examines Effect of personal cost of reporting, level of seriousness of fraud, organizational commitment and professional commitment on the intention to do whistleblowing. The population in this study were all staff / employees at OPD Kuantan Singingi. The sampling method used in this study was the purposive sampling and using the sample of 72 civil servants from 24 different OPD. The results of regression analysis show that personal cost affects the intention to do whistleblowing. 2) the level of seriousness of fraud affects the intention to do whistleblowing. 3) organizational commitment affects the intention to do whistleblowing. 4) professional commitment affects the intention to do whistleblowing. This research has a contribution in reducing fraud in government
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of collectivism culture on the relationship between moral reasoning and whistleblowing in government organizations in Kebumen District. The sample in this study were 80 treasurers and village financial staff in Kebumen Regency who met the established criteria. This study uses structural equation modeling (SEM) with WarpPls software version 6. The results of hypothesis testing in this study indicate that a high level of moral reasoning has been proven empirically to increase one's tendency to do whistleblowing, however, collectivism has been proven to empirically reduce whistleblowing tendencies; the latest finding is that collectivism has proven to weaken the relations of moral reasoning and whistleblowing.
