Suchergebnisse

A landmark of the law of naturalization in the United States, established by the Supreme Court after a tortuous course of decision, has now found legislative confirmation in a provision in the Internal Security Act of 1950.The oath of petitioners for naturalization provided for in §4 (3) of the Act of 1906 required a declaration of willingness "to support the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same"; and the Act provided that the naturalization court must be satisfied that during his residence the petitioner has behaved as a man "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same."For some years the question was put to petitioners, "If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?" A negative answer to this question led to a denial of the petition in U. S. v. Schwimmer (1929), 279 U. S. 644. This was followed in U. S. v. Macintosh (1931), 283 U. S. 589, and U. S. v. Bland (1931), 283 U. S. 636. Despite these decisions, no change was made in the required oath when the Nationality Act was revised in 1940. Yet the three earlier decisions were overruled in U. S. v. Girouard (1946), 328 U. S. 61, on the ground that the required oath might properly be taken by a person unwilling on religious grounds to bear arms.

A study directed at learning the effect of type of sponsorship on choice of programming by TV viewers, & more specifically: (1) to determine if knowledge that a TV program was being sponsored by a Protestant religious group affected willingness of TV viewers to tune in, & (2) to find out which groups responded most positively & which most negatively to such religious sponsorship. Prior res has indicated that the least religious viewers were least interested in watching a program sponsored by a religious group. A quota sample of 351 TV viewers were interviewed personally & asked to read several program descriptions including an indication of program sponsorship. The analysis was based upon a comparison of responses by viewers to the same descriptions, the critical variable being change in sponsorship of a program from a commercial sponsor to a Protestant religious org. Other questions were asked to provide an indication of religious interest. It was found that for the sample as a whole, the mention of sponsorship of a program by the 'Nat'l Protestant Churches' had very definite influence on willingness to watch. No longer were the 3 programs of approximately equal appeal, but the one so sponsored was ranked 3rd. Re the religious background of the viewers, the degree of interest in their own church was found to influence their willingness to watch the Protestant-sponsored program. A supplementary study was conducted by telephone to find out what religious sponsorship means to viewers. The findings suggest that followers of popular programs would at least try them again if ever sold to a religious group for sponsorship, but viewers would be predisposed to expect some kind of religious message or story angle. E. Weiman.

An experiment was performed to measure the influence of possible noncooperation bias on the ratings of TV programs of an educ'al, cultural, or informational nature. Analysis of data from 288 telephone interviews conducted in the Boston, Mass area, indicates that R's who watch educ'al TV express greater willingness to cooperate with an interviewer than those who do not. Also, younger & more educated people are more likely to cooperate. Further analysis shows that the diff in cooperation rates between the 2 samples (R's who watch educ'al TV vs those who do not), was not related to variation in age & educ characteristics. AA.

On October 23, 1951, it was announced that, following informal discussions regarding the North Pacific Fisheries, Canada, Japan and the United States had agreed to participate in negotiations for a North Pacific fisheries convention. The conference was held at Tokyo from November 4 to December 14, 1951. All three countries had expressed desires to conclude a fisheries convention: the United States, to safeguard its major conservation programs in the North Pacific, to provide the facilities for cooperative research and management of joint fisheries not yet covered by treaties, and to avoid friction between United States fishermen and those of other countries which threatened to increase with the expansion of Japanese fishing operations; Canada, to safeguard its conservation programs without complicating or restricting its participation in the exploitation of stocks of fish along the adjacent coasts of the United States or complicating its past fishery relations with the United States; Japan, to satisfy the terms of article 9 of the Treaty of Peace, to show its willingness to cooperate with other countries in fishery conservative programs, and to reiterate its claim to the right of Japanese fishermen to exploit stocks of fish anywhere on the high seas. The delegations, which were composed of representatives of industry in each of the three states as well as governmental representatives, spent most of the first week in explaining and answering questions with respect to certain conservation proposals which the United States had offered as a basis for the talks. The conference then turned to a consideration of the Japanese counterproposals and, on December 14, representatives of the three countries signed a document entitled "Resolutions and Request of the Tripartite Fisheries Conference" which expressed their mutual concern in the development and proper utilization of fish stocks in the North Pacific, recommended the adoption of a convention conforming to the draft agreed to by the conference, and recommended that, in negotiating with other governments in respect to problems similar to those covered by the convention, the contracting parties should give full consideration to the spirit and intent of the convention.

Statesmen, politicians, political scientists, journalists, and radio commentators seem to agree on one thing about the United Nations: success or failure depends upon the spirit animating its members. As Eagleton says, "The system [embodied in the United Nations Charter] does not automatically guarantee security to anyone, and whether it will provide peace and human advancement will depend entirely upon the willingness of its Members to coöperate toward these ends."