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The amended National Labor Relations Act (the Act) guarantees that "employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize under law one another's legitimate rights in their relations to each other."' In furtherance of this objective, the Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments substantially increased the Act's protection of individual employee rights and sharply restrained many union activities that were deemed economically and socially undesirable. Those amendments, however, left intact the basic structure of the original Wagner Act providing for establishment of collective bargaining whenever a majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit designate a bargaining agent to represent them. Once a bargaining agent is designated by certification or by selection through other legal means by a majority of the employees, the National Labor Relations Board (the Board) be-comes by statute the nation's chief overseer of the collective bar-gaining process. Thus, under the Act, union organizational activity, pre-election campaigns, and the elaborate legal proceedings ordinarily accompanying the election process are mere preludes to the main drama of collective bargaining. This Article will examine critically recent decisions of the Board and of the courts that attempt to effectuate the bargaining process. An examination is appropriate at this time because there are winds of change in the air far stronger than the gentle breezes that periodically have drifted from congressional hearings in recent years. In the foreseeable future Congress may act to improve some of the Board's procedures and remedies. Although this Article will not comment directly upon proposed legislation, its analysis of the manner in which the Act has recently been construed and enforced in the area of collective bargaining may suggest that some of the objectives, though not the precise methods, sought by legislative reformers could be achieved by the Board and approved by the courts even without additional statutory authority.

This article will discuss the scope and nature of constitutional protection to be afforded political party autonomy by the first and fourteenth amendments. The purpose of the present discussion is to review both legal and political sides of this question. Once this is done it will become clear that a party right to protected autonomy during the candidate selection process is not only founded upon solid constitutional ground but is also in keeping with sound political wisdom.

The arguments that may be raised in support of a claim of abuse of discretion must go to the legality, not just the wisdom or advisability, of administrative action. Though the judge is responsible for seeing to it that the government acts in conformity with law, he may not put himself in its place or interfere in its functioning. His job is not to determine whether in a given case a certain administrative official ought to have acted and, if so, in one particular way. He has neither the means nor the materials for judgments of this sort, nor does he have responsibility for administrative action. Should he undertake to control its wisdom or advisability, he would risk impairing the normal flow of government. These are nearly the words an American court might use in declining to rule on the merits of administrative action. To be more exact, the language has the ring of a dissenting opinion in which a judge accuses his brethren of venturing beyond the domain of the law into that of policy, where they have no business being. The words actually come from three members of the Conseil d'Etat, France's closest analogy to a supreme administrative court, attempting to describe one aspect of that institution's important, yet delicate, role in French public life.

This paper reports a seven-year study of cesarean section practices at the Queen of Angels Hospital, Los Angeles, California. Indications for this procedure are listed in detail and an attempt is made to explain its increasing frequency. Practicing physicians were interviewed and testimony seemed to indicate, as was suspected, that fear of malpractice suits was one of the reasons for cesarean section. The conventional wisdom of "once a section always a section" is questioned with regard to an increasing number of trials of labor and vaginal deliveries, when they are considered feasible and safe. The federal government is manifesting serious interest in this increased number of operative deliveries in the light of cost effectiveness.

"You can't legislate morality!"-so says someone, somewhere every day. It is our conventional wisdom. It is a truism that is often heard in crassly political advocacy, and yet it both antedates and transcends traditional American politics. It has often been used by both liberal and conservative advocates. One recalls its use by President Eisenhower in the Little Rock, Arkansas, school desegregation crisis in the 1950's, as well as its use by more recent advocates of change in anti-abortion laws. Today it is most often heard in contexts similar to the subject of this symposium: laws prohibiting the dissemination of obscene materials, homosexual acts, fornication, prostitution, and a host of others the reader can doubtless supply. What does the truism mean?

MCR 21-42. ; Cover title. ; [1] Rights of the institutionalized elderly and the role of the volunteer -- [2] Legal services for the elderly. -- [3] Inter-relationship of government, private foundations, corporate grant-makers and unions. -- [4] American Indian/Alaskan native elderly. -- [5] Hispanic aging. -- [6] Environment and older Americans. -- [7] Alzheimer's disease. -- [8] Veterans. -- [9] "The national dialogue for the business sector" -- [10] Urban elderly. -- [11] Transportation for the aging. -- [12] Aging and alcoholism. -- [13] National health security. -- [14] Recreation, leisure and physical fitness. -- [15] Simplifying administrative procedures and regulations in programs affecting the elderly. -- [16] Public/voluntary collaboration: a partnership in contributing to independent living for the aging. -- [17] Gerontological nursing. -- [18] Pacific Islanders jurisdiction. -- [19] Senior centers. -- [20] Black aged. -- [21] Pacific/Asian elderly "Pacific/Asians the wisdom of age" ; Mode of access: Internet.

The population of Northern Ireland is probably unique in that it is composed of two groups of people each of which can be characterized as a 'minority'. Conventional wisdom has it that at present there is a dominant Protestant majority wishing to maintain political links with Great Britain, and a Catholic minority desirous of closer links with, i f not absorption by, the Irish Republic. The seeming paradox of two minorities is explained, on the one hand, by the existence of the current Catholic minority; and, on the other, by a Protestant group, in the majority at present, fearing that in time it will become a minority. As the recent Commission on Disturbances in Northern Ireland said '. . . among Protestants there are deep-rooted suspicions and fears of political and economic domination by a future Catholic majority in the population'. This fear is partly caused by the knowledge that the average size of Catholic families is significantly larger than average non-Catholic families. Out of this situation has sprung rumour and counter-rumour concerning the precise current population balance between the two communities.

Classical penology was conceived in France in the eighteenth century, and then eclipsed all over the world in the nineteenth, when Lombroso conjured up the picture of the born criminal. It was finally laid to rest in the United States in the twentieth century. Its basic tenet had been simple enough: the legislature in its infinite wisdom would seek and find the appropriate punishment for every crime.This can be accomplished if a crime is defined narrowly enough, perhaps by the creation of subcategories of that crime, so as to encompass all potential perpetrators who will each incur the same amount of criminal guilt. All perpetrators in the same subcategory are then entitled to the exact same amount of punishment in expiation of their criminal guilt. This system, so it was thought, ideally adjusts the punishment to achieve a balance between the crime and its harm and the criminal and his guilt, without going into undue subtleties of minute variations in the guilt of perpetrators in the same sub-category. Consequently the codes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could satisfy themselves with defining and categorizing crimes in terms of the harm created and the specific mens rea inquestion.

Authors of constitutional law casebooks traditionally have presented their subject through Supreme Court opinions arranged under the three general groupings of judicial review, distribution of powers (federalism and separation of powers), and individual liberties. This organizational consensus rests upon two widely held and deep beliefs: a basic course in constitutional law should (1) consist of a rigorous and sustained study of substantive doctrine and (2) be undertaken principally through a detailed examination of Supreme Court decisions, albeit supplemented in varying degrees by authors' questions and law review excerpts. Paul Brest's Processes of Constitutional Decisionmaking poses a formidable challenge to this standing wisdom. The book is divided into two parts. Part I concentrates on the process by which constitutional principles are derived by any decisionmaker, whether that person be judge, legislator, or executive official, and Part II addresses the special role of the judiciary in constitutional exegesis. In place of substantive doctrinal exposition, Professor Brest's focus is on questions of process and methodology which cut across the standard substantive topics. Indeed, six of his fifteen chapters are entirely process-oriented; while the remaining nine chapters center on substantive doctrinal exposition within the traditional three groupings, even here the emphasis is upon methodology.

In contrast to the private sector, public services in the United States are organized monopolistically. the structure of public sector monopoly has been bolstered by the conventional wisdom in public administration, which has traditionally maintained that functional duplication is wasteful. This position has recently been challenged by a small group of political scientists and economists who suggest that a redundant organizational structure can make the execution of a given program more reliable and make the design of new programs more innovative. This study examines urban transit planning and operations, subjecting these two opposing perspectives to empirical scrutiny. It was hypothesized that, during transit planning, redundant planning would increase the intensity of search for transit alternatives, and that during operations, redundant modes would increase service reliability in the face of a variety of disturbances. These propositions were examined in three case studies: (1) a study of interorganizational, redundant, transit operations in the San Francisco Bay Area; (2) a study of modally integrated, monopolistic transit operations in Washington, D.C.; and (3) a study of interorganizational competitive transit planning in Minneapolis-St. Paul. The findings follow below. The redundant transit system composed of overlapping operators proved more reliable than either of its parts. The bus agency was plagued by two long strikes; the rapid rail district, by mechanical difficulties and labor disputes. Because the two organizations are (nearly) completely independent, failures in one agency did not impair the other's functioning. The nonredundant, monopolistic system in Washington, D.C. performed more reliably than expected, largely because of the system's conservative technical design. However, there were internal management difficulties associated with efforts at modal integration. The old and ailing bus system received insufficient managerial support and attention for several years, as top management apparently perceived the organizational mission to be the completion of the rail system. This orientation resulted in a neglect of transit patrons who rode buses. There was no clear evidence that organizational merger per se saved money, although eliminating bus routes paralleling rail has saved several million dollars annually. In the case of competitive planning, in Minneapolis-St. Paul rivalry between two regional agencies presenting alternative transit designs focused public attention on fundamental choices and gave the state Legislature time for reflection and studied consideration of the issues. The competition also reduced the danger that the conclusion of system planning would be predetermined from the beginning of the process. The arguments between advocates made planning genuinely iterative; the final system design had not been envisaged by any participant. However, the competition did have certain negative effects, most importantly an excessive personalizing of transit planning. Institutionalizing rules of due process in competitive planning would decrease this problem. In sum, it seems that far more subjective confidence has been placed in the conventional wisdom of nonredundant, monopolistic public organizations than evidence warrants. the study concludes by extrapolating the findings from urban transit to evaluate the general desirability and feasibility of redundancy in government.

Draw a line down the Shannon, bend and extend it to the north east to include Longford and the Ulster counties, add Kerry and perhaps West Cork, and one obtains the traditional dividing line of Ireland. 'The West', the counties to the west and north of the line, are poor, if one is thinking in social terms, or underdeveloped, if one is thinking in economic terms. By implication, the counties to the south and east of the line are relatively rich, and relatively developed. This division is part of the received wisdom of the country. Many economic and social analysts, including one of the authors of this note, have worked within its framework. The line, with or without slight modifications, is even embodied in legislation. Work recently published by the other of the present authors, however, joins with commonsense observation to cast doubt on whether this division is still valid. It therefore seems an appropriate time to study the available evidence to see how far the traditional division of counties holds good, in what way the situation has changed in recent years, and, if there has been a change, what are its implications in terms of analytical approaches to regional problems and policy decisions on regional matters.

Much has been written about the change in the Supreme Court's judicial philosophy, as a new, ascendant majority has been able successfully to implement its emerging notions of judicial reticence and self-abnegation. This fundamental turnabout in judicial perspective is hardly coincidental, since it reflects the fulfillment of an oft-repeated campaign pledge of Richard Nixon, who in 1968 promised, if elected, to appoint so-called strict constructionists to the Court.' In a basic way his appointees have succeeded in modifying the activist stance that prevailed on the Court during much of the tenure of Earl Warren as Chief Justice. With notable exceptions in some areas, the new majority has a much more modest view of the judicial function within our democratic society.' Elements of his philosophy have emerged and been acted upon in such fields as individual rights (especially equal protection), access to the federal courts (for example, standing), and federal-state relations (for example, revivification of the eleventh amendment and resurrection of the doctrine of comity as limitations on federal judicial activity)." The overriding themes appear to include judicial self-restraint, reliance on and faith in the democratic process, skepticism about the wisdom and effectiveness of active judicial intervention in the resolution of basic societal disagreements," and a certain nervousness about continual confrontations between the Court--an institution perceived by many as undemocratic and counter-majoritarian-and popularly elected, and therefore politically accountable, legislative and executive officials.

While small-scale industries have not gone unnoticed in India's Industrial Policy Resolutions, in practice it is largely the large and medium-scale industries which have set the pace of industrialization in the country. Recently, the wisdom of the prevailing pattern of industrial growth has come increasingly under criticism. The reasons for dissatisfaction with large and medium-sized industries are many, the principal ones being the very limited impact these industries have had on the serious problems of unemployment, income distribution and regional disparities. It is being felt, in other words, that the prevailing approach towards industrialization is not truly development oriented when seen in the perspective of both economic growth and the general unemployment situation of the country. It seems, however, the pendulum is now swinging in the opposite direction; according to the current thinking of the Indian government - if the sporadic proclamations are any guide to it - the emphasis in industrial policy ought now to shift away from the large towards small-scale and rural industries. It must be stressed that this paper is purely exploratory in nature, its main purpose being to illustrate, apart from the orders of magnitude involved, a) whether, in some sense, a conflict exists between the goal of maximising employment and that of maximising the growth of output in Indian manufacturing when seen in a three sectoral framework; and, b) in which sector the potentials for economic growth and employment are likely to be the greatest.

This article asserts that Captain David Graham, writing in this issue of the Washington and Lee Law Review, savages amended Article 1 of draft Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Specifically, he attacks the Article on the following grounds: (1) it is politically motivated by third-worlders determined to remake international law according to their own preferences; (2) it is poorly drafted and therefore cannot be implemented effectively; and (3) it would legitimize wars of national liberation and lead to discriminatory treatment of combatants. These are serious charges, raised by a serious scholar, whose closeness to the subject and to several members of the United States delegation to the Geneva Conference strongly suggest that his views reflect those of his government; and they merit an equally serious answer. Dean Bond details his answer in the following pages. Briefly summarized, it is this. The political motivation behind Article 1 is irrelevant in assessing its wisdom. Its drafting defects, while egregious, are not irremediable. Moreover, fears that Article 1 will compromise the effectiveness of the law of war are exaggerated: adoption of the amended Article will neither legitimize wars of national liberation nor lead to discriminatory treatment of combatants. Article 1, for all its weaknesses, represents a positive development in the- evolution of the law of war from a body of law applicable only to international armed conflict to a cohesive legal regime regulating serious armed conflict of all kinds.

The Indian Civil Rights Act, Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, extended portions of the Bill of Rights to individual Indians as against their tribal governments and provided federal habeas corpus relief to review alleged violations of these rights. The Indian Bill of Rights marked the culmination of a complete reversal in federal recognition of Indian constitutional rights. Until 1965 federal courts had recognized Indian tribes as quasi-sovereign entities. Individual Indians were guaranteed their constitutional rights in relations with federal and state governments, but not with their tribal governments. The only rights Indian governments recognized when dealing with Indians were those guaranteed by tribal custom and tradition. In 1965 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Colliflower v. Garland, held that federal courts may issue a writ of habeas corpus to determine the legality of detention of an Indian jailed by a tribal court without benefit of constitutional due process. Colliflower was reaffirmed and expanded in 1969 by Settler v. Yakima Tribal Court. The wisdom of Congress in adopting habeas corpus as a means of review must be examined. Habeas was the only means available to the courts, but not the only means available to Congress. This note will examine: (1) the inconsistency of Congress's adoption of habeas corpus relief; (2) the Indian tribal justice system; (3) the impact of traditional habeas corpus review on that system; (4) alternatives to habeas corpus review.