Suchergebnisse

Regardless of the popular wisdom to make predictions in negotiations as if they always reflect the right according to the Bible -- that "to every one who has will more be given" -- this article starts with observation that weaker parties can & do sometimes successfully negotiate with stronger parties. Naturally this provokes questions: "Why can weak parties successfully negotiate with the stronger parties in asymmetric negotiations? How to explain this structural paradox?". The article argues that these questions would be old & answered if not for the long lasting tendency in the international relations discipline to analyze international negotiations from the point of view of the traditional power understanding, as well as systemic international relations theories. On another hand, difficulties objectively arise due to the fact that analysis of the structural paradox is connected to the problem of power -- one of the most complex & difficult to define categories of the social science. And although much has been done recently in the social science to improve our understanding of the concept of power, it is still unclear what is the best way to conceptualize it. Detaching the notion of power from resources, in this article power is associated to the structure of negotiation, comprising of number of parties, interests, resisting points & possible zone of agreements, thus leaving the concept of power open to much more detail & accurate analysis. Having said that the structural analysis does not renounce the importance of resources all in all since every negotiation begins with a certain distribution of actor characteristics that are given. However, important are only the issue related characteristics. Moreover, as the structural model of analysis demonstrates, power is not a constant. The structural characteristics can be "photographed" at the beginning but may change during the process. In addition, the structure may be manipulated that in turn indicates that power is also a matter of perception. Perception mediates objective negotiating structure, although reality imposes certain limits on the implication of perceptions. The structural model of analysis permits to make the following propositions about power. The lower value that a party to a negotiation assigns to its resistance point, the less power it will have, because: The more it will perceive a negotiated agreement primary in terms of the gains it offers over the non-agreement alternative as well as other factors that shape the resistance point; The more risk averse it will be to achieve those gains; The more willing it will be to make concessions. Conversely, the higher value that a party to a negotiation assigns to its resistance point, the more power it will have, because: The more it will perceive a negotiated agreement primary in terms of the loss it entails as compared to the non-agreement alternative and other factors that shape the resistance point; The more risk seeking it will be to avoid those losses; The more it will be to withhold concessions. Adapted from the source document.

It is widely assumed that effective functioning of democratic institutions depends on the political support & civic engagement of the public. Public support for authorities is especially important during the reform period in new democracies. Evidence from different Central & Eastern European countries including Lithuania demonstrates critically low level of political support, e.g. satisfaction with regime performance & trust in political institutions as well as comparatively low level of political engagement. However, systematic & comprehensive account of these trends & their implications for political stability & democratic performance in new democracies is lacking. Here, the results of qualitative research of political attitudes & political behavior in the Lithuanian countryside are presented, drawing on 30 in-depth interviews with ordinary citizens in Alarita & Naujasodis (district of Moletai) in July 2003. The aim of the research is to explore the dominating patterns of political support & political engagement of Lithuanian citizens. The political support was analyzed by using the theoretical framework of David Easton & Pippa Norris. Easton in his classic model distinguished among different objects of support, including support for the community, the regime & the authorities. Moreover, he made a distinction between the specific support, a quid pro quo for the fulfillment of demands, & diffuse support, unconditional attachment to political objects & a reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will. This conceptual framework was recently revisited by Norris, who expanded the classification into a five-fold framework distinguishing between political support for the community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, & political actors. Political engagement is defined here to include psychological as well as actual political involvement. In more concrete terms, it comprises the following dimensions: 1) interest in politics; 2) voting & propensity to vote in elections or referenda; 3) engagement in community politics; 4) partisanship, including both the party membership & party identification; 5) participation or propensity to engage in unconventional political activity. The analysis resulted in classification of ten types of political outlook: 'prosoviet radical', 'soviet system builder', 'moderate critic', 'rural wisdom optimist', 'apathetic youth', 'rational youth', 'disappointed activist', 'civic optimist', 'right1st democrat' & 'rightist radical'. These types can be expected to represent the dominant patterns of political attitudes & political behavior in rural Lithuania. The investigation reveals that political support for democracy is highly dependent on the attitudes towards the soviet past. Moreover, it is indirectly linked with the age & former social status of the respondent. The data shows that supporters of democratic regime are usually right-oriented or young persons. Surprisingly, the satisfaction with current regime performance is not linked with the support for current authorities. Finally, the results suggest that most disappointed persons are more skeptical toward conventional forms of political engagement & are likely to support unconventional political activities. The actual political behavior, however, is not dependent on the level of political support. 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.