Suchergebnisse

One of the gravest problems of modern democracies is undoubtedly low electoral turnout. Numerous states try to prevent low turnout in different ways. One method to increase it may involve the introduction of compulsory voting, which is a legally regulated prescript to participate in an election. The principal goal of this paper is to attempt to answer the question of whether imposing compulsory voting, and thus obtaining a higher voter turnout, increases the legitimization of representative bodies. The issue of imposing compulsory voting is controversial and does not necessarily have to provide an effective solution to diminishing voter turnout. This is particularly valid for Central and Eastern European states, where imposing an obligation to vote on citizens can be contrary to saving democracy and the legitimization of public authorities. There is a risk that the citizens of countries that found themselves in the orbit of the Soviet Union after WWII may associate compulsory voting with their undemocratic past and as another attack on their rights. ; One of the gravest problems of modern democracies is undoubtedly low electoral turnout. Numerous states try to prevent low turnout in different ways. One method to increase it may involve the introduction of compulsory voting, which is a legally regulated prescript to participate in an election. The principal goal of this paper is to attempt to answer the question of whether imposing compulsory voting, and thus obtaining a higher voter turnout, increases the legitimization of representative bodies. The issue of imposing compulsory voting is controversial and does not necessarily have to provide an effective solution to diminishing voter turnout. This is particularly valid for Central and Eastern European states, where imposing an obligation to vote on citizens can be contrary to saving democracy and the legitimization of public authorities. There is a risk that the citizens of countries that found themselves in the orbit of the Soviet Union after WWII may associate compulsory voting with their undemocratic past and as another attack on their rights.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are one of the indicators in the assessment of whether the state operates on the principles of a civic society. NGOs are also a crucial element of public life as they cover an extensive area of activity. At the level of local communities they effectively promote their development as organizations that are close to the citizens. In the European Union they are an expression of public opinion. After WWII both the political and legal circumstances in Poland did not favor their development. An observable improvement began during the transition period at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. The number of NGOs considerably increased at that time. Although the number of newly registered NGOs has been consistently decreasing since 2003, as has Poles' interest in voluntary work, Polish NGOs are in quite good condition compared to their counterparts in other states of Central and Eastern Europe.

One of the gravest problems of modern democracies is undoubtedly low electoral turnout. Numerous states try to prevent low turnout in different ways. One method to increase it may involve the introduction of compulsory voting, which is a legally regulated prescript to participate in an election. The principal goal of this paper is to attempt to answer the question of whether imposing compulsory voting, and thus obtaining a higher voter turnout, increases the legitimization of representative bodies. The issue of imposing compulsory voting is controversial and does not necessarily have to provide an effective solution to diminishing voter turnout. This is particularly valid for Central and Eastern European states, where imposing an obligation to vote on citizens can be contrary to saving democracy and the legitimization of public authorities. There is a risk that the citizens of countries that found themselves in the orbit of the Soviet Union after WWII may associate compulsory voting with their undemocratic past and as another attack on their rights.

The Poles and the Ukrainians in the 20th century history had several political and ethnical conflicts, confrontations (Polish-Ukrainian war in Galicia in 1918–1919, massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia carried out by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during WWII, forced displacement of the Ukrainian minority in Poland in 1947), but reconciliation processes determined the events of the last quarter century. After gaining independence, the bloody conflicts of the last century could not be tools in politics in both Poland and Ukraine. Moreover, many common projects have been started since 1991. The Poles in the post-independence period showed appropriate empathy to their eastern neighbours' problems (development of national identity and state-building) and were proactive during this period in improving Polish-Ukrainian relations. The article intends to show that in the Central European region it is possible to conduct dialogue, achieve reconciliation between two neighbouring countries, show openness to this dialogue (with ourselves and with our neighbours), and manage the potential conflicts during these process. What is more, consistent behaviour of decision-makers (in political and civil sphere) was present in the past quarter century in the Polish-Ukrainian relations and was largely absent from Hungarian-Slovak, Hungarian-Romanian, Hungarian-Serbian, or Hungarian-Ukrainian relations.

The Poles and the Ukrainians in the 20th century history had several political and ethnical conflicts, confrontations (Polish-Ukrainian war in Galicia in 1918–1919, massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia carried out by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army during WWII, forced displacement of the Ukrainian minority in Poland in 1947), but reconciliation processes determined the events of the last quarter century. After gaining independence, the bloody conflicts of the last century could not be tools in politics in both Poland and Ukraine. Moreover, many common projects have been started since 1991. The Poles in the post-independence period showed appropriate empathy to their eastern neighbours' problems (development of national identity and state-building) and were proactive during this period in improving Polish-Ukrainian relations. The article intends to show that in the Central European region it is possible to conduct dialogue, achieve reconciliation between two neighbouring countries, show openness to this dialogue (with ourselves and with our neighbours), and manage the potential conflicts during these process. What is more, consistent behaviour of decision-makers (in political and civil sphere) was present in the past quarter century in the Polish-Ukrainian relations and was largely absent from Hungarian-Slovak, Hungarian-Romanian, Hungarian-Serbian, or Hungarian-Ukrainian relations.

In 2004, Polish women took part in the elections to the European Parliament for the first time. It was a long road that led them to take seats there. The beginnings of the Polish women's movement date back to the 19th century when it was closely connected with the struggle for the independence of Poland. It was then that the stereotype of the Polish Mother emerged, the guardian of the hearth and home, and promoter of patriotism. These, among other things, were the social, cultural and political stereotypes that women seeking to increase their presence in public life needed to face up to. Polish women obtained voting rights rela- tively early on, in 1918. Despite their political rights, they did not participate in the political life of interwar Poland on a larger scale. The women's organizations that emerged after WWII implemented the ideology that was officially propagated in those times, and strictly followed the policies of the authorities. Significant changes in the women's movement occurred in the 1980s when authentic women's initiatives formed around the Solidarity movement. At pres- ent, approximately 300 women's organizations operate in Poland. Polish accession to the European Union has given Polish women an opportunity to intensify their activities in supra- national politics. Polish women took seats in the European Parliament, although their numbers thus far have been relatively low. During the 6th parliamentary term, out of 54 Polish Members of the European Parliament, 7 were women. In the EP elections held in 2009, 11 Polish women were elected as MEPs. Regardless of this low level of representation, Polish women are very active and resilient and seriously committed to working in European Parlia- mentary structures. ; In 2004, Polish women took part in the elections to the European Parliament for the first time. It was a long road that led them to take seats there. The beginnings of the Polish women's movement date back to the 19th century when it was closely connected with the struggle for the independence of Poland. It was then that the stereotype of the Polish Mother emerged, the guardian of the hearth and home, and promoter of patriotism. These, among other things, were the social, cultural and political stereotypes that women seeking to increase their presence in public life needed to face up to. Polish women obtained voting rights rela- tively early on, in 1918. Despite their political rights, they did not participate in the political life of interwar Poland on a larger scale. The women's organizations that emerged after WWII implemented the ideology that was officially propagated in those times, and strictly followed the policies of the authorities. Significant changes in the women's movement occurred in the 1980s when authentic women's initiatives formed around the Solidarity movement. At pres- ent, approximately 300 women's organizations operate in Poland. Polish accession to the European Union has given Polish women an opportunity to intensify their activities in supra- national politics. Polish women took seats in the European Parliament, although their numbers thus far have been relatively low. During the 6th parliamentary term, out of 54 Polish Members of the European Parliament, 7 were women. In the EP elections held in 2009, 11 Polish women were elected as MEPs. Regardless of this low level of representation, Polish women are very active and resilient and seriously committed to working in European Parlia- mentary structures.

French-American relations certainly are among the most complex and at the same time most controversial in French foreign policy. The main factors that determine the nature of relations between France and the US include culture. A few features can be pointed out here to demonstrate their unique nature. Firstly, the importance of anti-American sentiments and Francophobia (anti-French sentiments) should be emphasized. The roots of these broadly shared attitudes may be sought both in the past (the experiences ofWWIand WWII) as well as in the present political relations between the two countries. The French nation is generally critical of American foreign policy, the US social and economic system. In the USA, in turn, we come across a similar attitude of Francophobia. This mainly stems from the commonly shared image of France as a difficult, chaotic and unpredictable ally. While anti-American sentiments and Francophobia do not translate into political decisions made either in Washington or Paris, they still influence the atmosphere of mutual relations, as became apparent when American restaurant owners boycotted French wines during the Iraqi crisis. At the same time, though, both nations recognize each other's achievements in such fields as culture, art or human rights. Secondly, the "conflict of universalism" described by Stanley Hoffman is worth noting. As both countries deem themselves to be the cradle of such universal values as liberty, equality, justice and human rights, they both assign themselves with a unique status among other countries. It is true that the repertoire of values France and the US represent is nearly identical, yet they are frequently understood differently on both sides of the Atlantic. Thirdly, the French-American relations are also profoundly influenced by the common French belief in France being an exceptional and powerful country. The national perspective and the manifestation of France's privileged position in the international arena are to a significant degree present in their relations with the US. Ezra Suleiman, among others, observed that the French political elite were allergic to any forms of political, economic or cultural domination. Other issues that influence the state of French-American relations concern differences in the economic or social system, or the role of religion in the life of the state.

French-American relations certainly are among the most complex and at the same time most controversial in French foreign policy. The main factors that determine the nature of relations between France and the US include culture. A few features can be pointed out here to demonstrate their unique nature. Firstly, the importance of anti-American sentiments and Francophobia (anti-French sentiments) should be emphasized. The roots of these broadly shared attitudes may be sought both in the past (the experiences ofWWIand WWII) as well as in the present political relations between the two countries. The French nation is generally critical of American foreign policy, the US social and economic system. In the USA, in turn, we come across a similar attitude of Francophobia. This mainly stems from the commonly shared image of France as a difficult, chaotic and unpredictable ally. While anti-American sentiments and Francophobia do not translate into political decisions made either in Washington or Paris, they still influence the atmosphere of mutual relations, as became apparent when American restaurant owners boycotted French wines during the Iraqi crisis. At the same time, though, both nations recognize each other's achievements in such fields as culture, art or human rights. Secondly, the "conflict of universalism" described by Stanley Hoffman is worth noting. As both countries deem themselves to be the cradle of such universal values as liberty, equality, justice and human rights, they both assign themselves with a unique status among other countries. It is true that the repertoire of values France and the US represent is nearly identical, yet they are frequently understood differently on both sides of the Atlantic. Thirdly, the French-American relations are also profoundly influenced by the common French belief in France being an exceptional and powerful country. The national perspective and the manifestation of France's privileged position in the international arena are to a significant degree present in their relations with the US. Ezra Suleiman, among others, observed that the French political elite were allergic to any forms of political, economic or cultural domination. Other issues that influence the state of French-American relations concern differences in the economic or social system, or the role of religion in the life of the state.