Suchergebnisse

The article provides an analysis of youth values in Croatia in the socialist and post-socialist periods, comparing them with values of older citizens and of the political elite. The comparative analysis is based on data obtained through four empirical investigations conducted in 1986, 1999 and 2004. The results show that the predominant youth values remain stable, with minor oscillations in rank. The aspects in which the young are different from the older citizens are a broader variety of interests, a greater acceptance of post-materialistic values, and a lesser acceptance of traditional and political values. It is also shown that the optimism of youth is constantly on a high level, as well as their satisfaction with life, which is more pronounced than with older citizens. In all analyzed segments the political elite is noticeably different from both above-mentioned groups. The overall findings confirm that the acceptance of observed values varies depending on the social-political context, and the age and social status of the respondents. Since the scope of the variations is limited, the author concludes that this analysis gives one more confirmation of the relative stability of values, and of the fact that they are transmitted from generation to generation in a way which does not endanger social continuity. Adapted from the source document.

The article provides an analysis of youth values in Croatia in the socialist and post-socialist periods, comparing them with values of older citizens and of the political elite. The comparative analysis is based on data obtained through four empirical investigations conducted in 1986, 1999 and 2004. The results show that the predominant youth values remain stable, with minor oscillations in rank. The aspects in which the young are different from the older citizens are a broader variety of interests, a greater acceptance of post-materialistic values, and a lesser acceptance of traditional and political values. It is also shown that the optimism of youth is constantly on a high level, as well as their satisfaction with life, which is more pronounced than with older citizens. In all analyzed segments the political elite is noticeably different from both above-mentioned groups. The overall findings confirm that the acceptance of observed values varies depending on the social-political context, and the age and social status of the respondents. Since the scope of the variations is limited, the author concludes that this analysis gives one more confirmation of the relative stability of values, and of the fact that they are transmitted from generation to generation in a way which does not endanger social continuity. Adapted from the source document.

The aim of the research was to find out whether the recent socio-economic changes in Croatia generated the corresponding change in the religiosity of Croatian youth and if so, what was the nature of this change. To this end, the results of the studies of Croatian youth of 1986 and 1999 are compared. Several indicators of religious devotion are included: confessional and religious self-identification, beliefs, and religious practice. Since all four indicators have increased significantly, this means that in the mentioned period religiosity registered a marked increase, which signifies a massive shift from the non-religious to the religious orientation of Croatian youth. This is an indirect confirmation of the claim that this shift in the religious devotion of Croatian outh and its remarkable increase is due to the social changes such as the fall of communism, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, the creation of the independent Croatian state, and the Serbian aggression against Croatia. (SOI : PM: S. 160)

The Vrhbosnian Archbishop dr. Josip Stadler was one of the ecclesiastical prelates who was most vigorously disputed and attacked. One group, which was particularly bitter toward Archbishop Stadler, was the Progressive youth. Trough their weekly and later daily Hrvatski pokret, published in Zagreb, they constantly attacked the archbishop, sometimes approaching the limit of insult. Upon a closer analysis of their writing, however, it is clear their attack was motivated primarily, almost exclusively, by the fact that the archbishop of Sarajevo espoused a diametrically opposite political vision of the future of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Furthermore, due to the fact that the Progressives, as they were called, adhered to an ideology impregnated with anti-Catholicism, the Archbishop, who was an ardent protector of the interests of his Catholic flock in a land where they were a minority, their bitterness toward archbishop can also be understood from that standpoint. Politically, Stadler agreed with the ideas of dr. Josip Frank, the head of the Pure Party of the State Right, who supported first the annexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and then her incorporation to Croatia-Slavonia and Dalmatia, so that all Croatian lands can be unified in a single body within the confines of the Habsburg domain. The Progressives, on the other hand, who were members of the Croatian-Serbian Coalition in Croatia, advocated a complete independence of Bosnia and Hercegovina. Since the Serbs were majority population in that region, their opponents accused them of promoting and advocating Serbian interests. In any event, the accusations against Archbishop Stadler by the Progressives should be looked upon with the awareness of their ideological and political presuppositions, and, in that sense, considerably modified. The same applies to the former Yugoslav historiography, for it uncritically appropriated both the ideology and political assessments of the Progressives and other "liberal", anti-Catholic groups. (SOI : CSP: S. 49f.)