Suchergebnisse

This article examines the factors that shape parties' motivation to invest time and other resources in scrutinizing European Union policy proposals. We distinguish between two different motivations to engage in scrutiny activities. First, parties use such mechanisms to influence the national position directly. Second, parties play a two-level game and use scrutiny to manipulate their negotiator's domestic constraints. Both arguments depend on a set of conditions, namely the government's relative strength in Brussels, the transparency of the European Union decision-making process as well as the government's relative strength and cohesion in the domestic arena. On the empirical side, we study scrutiny at the level of committees in the national parliaments of Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, and the United Kingdom over a 13-year period, during which 32 governments are covered. Our findings suggest that parties deploy scrutiny to shift the domestic constraint strategically, but only if such a shift can be communicated convincingly to the international bargaining partners. Moreover, our findings suggest that opposition parties employ such measures to influence the position of a weak government.

Informal trilogue meetings are the main legislative bargaining forum in the European Union, yet their dynamics remain largely understudied in a quantitative context. This article builds on the assumption that the negotiating delegations of the European Parliament and the Council play a two-level game whereby these actors can use their intra-institutional constraint to extract inter-institutional bargaining success. Negotiators can credibly claim that their hands are tied if the members of their parent institutions hold similar preferences and do not accept alternative proposals or if their institution is divided and negotiators need to defend a fragile compromise. Employing a measure of document similarity (minimum edit distance) between an institution's negotiation mandate and the trilogue outcome to measure bargaining success, the analysis supports the hypothesis for the European Parliament, but not for the Council.

Large variation exists in the extent to which national interest groups focus on European Union (EU) legislation and carry out their political activities in Brussels and Strasbourg. What explains this variation? We propose a series of hypotheses that suggest that business groups, and groups active in policy areas with high EU competence, are more Europeanized than other groups. The effect of group type, moreover, is conditional on the material resources a group possesses: we expect the difference between business and non-business groups to be largest for actors that are well endowed with material resources. Using novel data on 880 national associations, gained from a survey of interest groups in five European countries, we find support for these hypotheses. The article has implications for the literatures on lobbying, Europeanization, and theories of European integration.

Does income inequality increase political backlash against European and global integration? This paper reports research suggesting that it can. The article analyses party opposition to and support for trade openness, European Union integration and general internationalism of political party platforms in advanced industrial democracies between 1960 and 2008. It finds that inequality tends to increase anti-globalization positions of parties, net of pro-globalization positions, an effect that does not significantly differ across party families or levels of actual globalization. This effect, however, does depend on, and is diminished by, generous redistributive policies. These findings clarify socio-economic conditions underlying the backlash against political and economic globalization.

The second part of the second ordinary session of the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) was held in Strasbourg from October 11 to 13, 1956, under the chairmanship of Mr. J. S. Maclay (United Kingdom). Following examination of a report presented by its General Affairs Committee, the Assembly adopted three recommendations to the WEU Council, concerning, respectively, cultural matters, WEU's activities in the Saar, and social questions. On October 12, the Assembly discussed the state of European defense, on the basis of a report presented by Mr. J. J. Fens (Netherlands, Popular Catholic). Following its debate, the Assembly adopted two further recommendations. The first called upon the Council to take an immediate decision concerning the nature of the reorganization of western defensive forces, and to give a clear lead to public opinion in the matter; it continued that it must be accepted that substantial conventional forces be retained in order to meet all eventualities, and that the west German contribution to European defense should be made effective as soon as possible. In the second recommendation, the Assembly expressed its belief that it could not hold an informed debate unless, with due regard to the requirements of security, all the documentation necessary was made available, and recommended that the Council urgently review its interpretation of the Brussels Treaty as regarded WEU's function in that field. The latter resolution, according to press reports, followed a debate marked by a sense of frustration, with nearly all the speakers complaining that the Council had not given the Assembly's defense committee sufficient information on which to base recommendations. A majority of the continental deputies were reported to favor the Council's becoming responsible to the Assembly, rather than to member governments, for its decisions, but they were reported to realize that the United Kingdom parliament would never accept the consequent limitation of sovereignty. However, in the meantime, the feeling was reported to be that governments could still do much to strengthen WEU.

The first part of the fourth session of the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) was held July 2–5, 1958, in Paris, under the presidency of Sir James Hutchison (United Kingdom, Conservative). In the course of its discussion of military questions, the Assembly debated three reports and took note of a communication by M. Etienne de la Vallée Poussin (Belgium, Social Christian) on the responsibility of WEU in military policy. After its consideration of the request for an opinion from the Consultative Assembly on the military implications of regional or limited disarmament or of the policy of disengagement in central Europe, the Assembly adopted a resolution rejecting the Rapacki Plan and stating that disengagement which implied a withdrawal of United States and Soviet troops would be highly dangerous to the west unless it took place under certain express conditions, one of these being that neutralization of western Germany could not form part of such a policy. The Assembly also adopted a resolution and a recommendation on WEU's contribution to the production of armaments within the Atlantic alliance; the resolution allowed for the creation of a committee of investigation of five members, to be nominated by the Presidential Committee. In connection with the state of European security the Council approved by 50 votes to 6, with 8 abstentions, a recommendation from its defense committee calling for a minimum land force in central Europe of 30 divisions, with tactical nuclear weapons. There was to be no reduction in the contribution of member states, according to the recommendation, and they were to bring their contingents up to the agreed level.

Some defenders of democratic rights and the rule of law are becoming increasingly frustrated by the European Union's inadequate response to democratic backsliding in countries like Poland and Hungary. This study focuses on Poland and introduces the concept of 'Eurodisappointment' to describe this new group, which is conceptually and empirically distinct from Euroscepticism. Rather than being Eurosceptic, the Eurodisappointed self-limit their Euroenthusiasm without opposing integration. Drawing on original survey data, we demonstrate that Eurodisappointment is particularly prevalent among women, opposition party voters, and those dissatisfied with the state of democracy in Poland. It is yet to be seen whether and how the concept of Eurodisappointment can be applied to studies of attitudes towards the European Union in other member states.

Since the publication of the OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), scholarly interest in analysing the effectiveness and performance of education policy has risen again. The present article follows this path and presents the first empirical evaluation of the influence of national education policies on educational inequality in the European Union member states. We examine whether the availability of preschool education, an all-day school tradition, tracking during secondary education, a large private school sector, average class size and education expenditures moderate the relationship between individual social background and educational success. As a main finding, our multi-level analyses show that education policy affects educational inequality very differently, an outcome that is most visible when comparing West European and post-communist countries.

There is a lively academic debate over whether political cleavages in the European Union (EU) follow mainly territorial (national) or non-territorial (ideological) patterns. This article analyses the cleavages that structure the conflict over European chemicals policy, the so-called REACH system. Taking positions on this major policy as an empirical example, we test these competing theories on the nature of cleavages on environmental policy issues in the EU. We use data from an expert survey of more than 600 individuals to fulfil this aim. The results show that neither of the hypotheses is unequivocally supported. But the data indicate that cleavages based on non-territorial interests are much more important than territorial interests in explaining positions on REACH.

The introduction of the euro and closer coordination of economic policies in the European Union are fuelling a debate on Europe's representation in the international financial institutions. A single EU representation at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would affect the balance of power in the institution through a fundamental reallocation of quotas and executive directors among its membership. A reduction in the number of European executive directors, and in the total voting power of Europe and in its contribution to the Fund's general resources, could go hand in hand with an increase in the Union's impact on IMF decision-making. Such a change would also weaken the cooperative nature of the Fund through a reduction in the number and impact of mixed constituencies.

As opposition to globalization grows, many governments seek policy responses. One response – the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund – provides support to workers in European Union member states who are made redundant as a result of globalization. Proponents argue that by offsetting some of the costs of globalization, the programme may bolster public support for international economic integration and the political parties that support it. I investigate the impact of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund on voters' support for protectionist political parties using a difference-in-differences research design and official election results at the district and commune level. I also examine individual-level voting data. I find that in regions exposed to rising imports, assistance from the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund generates a small decrease in the vote share of one of Europe's most prominent anti-globalization parties, which ranges in magnitude from 0 to 1.5 percentage points. While consistent with the logic of embedded liberalism, the finding suggests that the theorized connection between compensation and support for globalization may be conditional rather than categorical.

This article analyses how economic intervention affects individuals' political behaviour by assessing the impact of intervention on aggregate and individual turnout. The intervention of the European Union in a selection of member states is viewed as having negative consequences for democratic choice, reducing the ability of voters to select between distinct policy alternatives, resulting in the absence of the primary benefit of voting: choice. It is argued that when voters are faced with electoral choices without the ability to shape policy alternatives, they are less likely to vote. Moreover, the negative effect of intervention is found to be conditioned by both individuals' level of education and ideological identification. Voters on the centre and the left who feel abandoned by left-leaning parties, who have prioritised being responsible to their European paymasters, are significantly more likely to abstain when exposed to intervention. Empirical support for the argument is found via the analysis of aggregate turnout as well as individual level data from the European Social Survey from across fifteen Western European states.