Der vorliegende Report entwickelt Empfehlungen zur deutschen Außenpolitik nach dem Irakkrieg. Der Autor wirft dabei aus vier theoretischen Perspektiven Schlaglichter auf das transatlantische und europäische Verhältnis. Theorien hegemonialer Stabilität, Theorien (demokratischer) Sicherheitsgemeinschaften, Interdependenztheorien und liberalinstitutionalistische Kooperationstheorien werden daraufhin befragt, wie sich a) die langjährigen Kooperationsstrukturen sowohl innerhalb Europas als auch in der transatlantischen Region erklären, b) die aktuellen Krisensymptome interpretieren, und c) auf dieser Grundlage die Zukunft der transatlantischen und europäischen Beziehungen einschätzen lassen. Abschließend erfolgen einige Überlegungen zur Zukunft der europäisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. (ICD)
In: Informationsprojekt Naher und Mittlerer Osten: INAMO ; Berichte & Analysen zu Politik und Gesellschaft des Nahen und Mittleren Ostens, Band 19, Heft 76, S. 4-40
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The United States, Saudi Arabia, and Switzerland have been co-hosting peace talks in Geneva with the goal of ending the civil war in Sudan that has been raging between the government's Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023.The talks, which began on Thursday, initially provided hope that they could serve as a reset for broader peace negotiations and move the conflict one step closer to ending. However, news that neither the SAF nor the RSF are attending the talks has dimmed hope that the summit will result in much if any progress.No doubt, the peace process has struggled to gain steam. The Jeddah Process — as the on-again, off-again talks held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, are called — has failed to lead to any long-term peace deal. This is despite U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan Tom Perriello expressing hope that a breakthrough would soon occur in an interview he gave to Responsible Statecraft in April.In an interview with Responsible Statecraft, Shewit Woldemichael, a Senior Analyst for Sudan at the International Crisis Group, gave credit to Washington for its mediation efforts, but noted that "the U.S. should have exerted substantial pressure on the warring parties to cease hostilities much earlier."This is particularly true, according to Woldemichael, given that Perriello may not remain in his post following the swearing in of the new U.S. president in January. Depending on the results of the election, U.S. policy could further deprioritize Sudan, and reduce Washington's role as a mediator.The Jeddah Declaration released on May 11, 2023 and signed by the SAF and RSF committed both armies to protect civilians and abide by international humanitarian and human rights law — including guaranteeing access to affected civilians for humanitarian organizations — was honored far more in the breach than observed. A follow-up Jeddah Agreement on May 20, 2023, reaffirmed the importance of civilian protection while implementing a seven-day ceasefire. The ceasefire was broken less than a day after coming into force. Subsequent ceasefire efforts have also failed.On August 9, Sudan's Sovereignty Council, which is headed by SAF Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan sent a delegation to Jeddah to meet with U.S. mediators in preliminary discussions for this week's talks and to lay out the conditions it said must be met before it agreeing to attend the summit itself. The SAF's conditions, including its demand that the RSF hand back control over cities and towns seized during the war, proved wildly unrealistic. In the end, the SAF refused to attend the peace summit in Geneva. Alex de Waal, a Sudan expert and Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation, told Responsible Statecraft that the SAF is a fractious coalition whose members have not agreed on their war aims and therefore cannot trust their ostensible leader, Gen. Burhan, to negotiate any concessions. They thus have stuck to a maximalist position even though it damages them internationally.More surprising is the RSF's absence from the table. Despite showing up to Geneva days ahead of the scheduled start date for the talks, the group decided at the last minute to boycott the negotiations without providing a public explanation. This leaves the talks without either of the main belligerents present, further reducing hopes for a major breakthrough in Geneva.The broader geopolitics of this conflict are a further complicating factor. Egypt and Iran have both reportedly sent weapons and military equipment to the SAF while the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has reportedly provided substantial military support to the RSF. These outside influences have hurt peace efforts, with the SAF insisting that it will not attend any peace summit in which the UAE is present. (The UAE is attending the talks in Geneva as an "observer" this week in any event.)A recently released Amnesty International report provides extensive evidence suggesting that a 2004 U.N. arms embargo on the Darfur region of Sudan, much of which has come under the RSF's control, has been continuously breached over the course of the conflict. Turkish-made weapons are being used by fighters on both sides of the conflict, with Gen. Burhan and his main aides using rifles produced by Sarsilmaz, Turkey's "main small arms manufacturer and most important supplier," according to Amnesty.Amnesty's report also claims that weapons coming from Russia, Serbia, Yemen, and China have been used in the conflict, although in some cases it is unclear which party is using these weapons and how they entered Sudan.Ending these arms transfers is critical to ending the war, according to Woldemichael, who noted, however, that "these weapons are traveling through illicit channels, such as across the border with Libya. "There's no way to ensure weapons don't enter Sudan," she told RS.The struggle for power has ravaged the country, with both sides committing widespread human rights abuses, including rape, looting, arson, and summary executions.On August 1, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) released a report that found that inhabitants of the Zamzam Camp, which shelters the largest number of internally displaced people in North Darfur state are suffering from a Phase 5 level of food insecurity, or famine. The IPC defines famine as occurring when at least 20% of the population faces extreme lack of food, acute malnutrition exceeds 30%, and more than 2 per 10,000 people (or 4 children per 10,000) are dying each day from starvation or the interaction of malnutrition and disease.Overall, more than 10 million people have been displaced in the war, with 2.1 million having fled to neighboring states. Aid groups have faced steep challenges in accessing populations in need. Often, fighters refuse to open roads for aid groups leaving innocent Sudanese with little choice but to scavenge for food, at times resorting to eating leaves and soil to stay alive.The two sides are using the humanitarian situation to build arguments against their enemies. The Sudanese government denies that famine conditions exist in Sudan, but blames the RSF for creating a prolonged humanitarian crisis by, according to the SAF, blockading el-Fasher, the capital and largest city in North Darfur.The RSF, in contrast, has shown itself to be more cooperative to international actors. It has accepted the IPC's claim that some Sudanese are suffering from famine and has expressed interest in working with the UN to allow humanitarian aid to enter the country. De Waal said that the RSF "are doing their utmost to repair the reputational damage done by their relentless pillaging and atrocities against civilians. Therefore they are being extremely amenable to international proposals for negotiations, for humanitarian access and even for a ceasefire."Washington's chief interest is to ensure the war remains contained. To that end, reaching an agreement that at least reduces the conflict's severity and limits its spillover effect to neighboring countries would be a win. With refugees fleeing by the millions into neighboring states and key regional powers, such as Egypt, Iran, and the UAE, continuing to arm the warring factions, the war and its destabilizing impact is at risk of spreading.According to Woldemichael, the greatest regional spillover "has so far been in Chad," to which a large number of refugees are fleeing, particularly from Darfur. She also expressed "concern" over the possibility of "Eritrea and Ethiopia becoming engaged in the conflict," with local militant organizations in the area potentially complicating an already complex battlefield. In the end, however, both Eritrea and Ethiopia, according to Woldemichael, appear uninterested in getting entangled in the conflict. But the risk alone, however, should concern the United States.Despite neither of the two main warring sides appearing at the negotiating table in Geneva, Woldemichael holds out hope that the negotiations could still lead to progress. Even without the SAF and RSF present, "you still have important players at the table. As long as this is the case, there is an opportunity to put pressure on external parties to take the appropriate action to move the conflict closer to a peace deal."Moreover, pushing for humanitarian aid is not only a moral imperative, but serves U.S. interests as well. It limits the security and financial strain refugees cause to surrounding governments. The heavy flow of refugees into surrounding states could worsen instability in already unstable countries, thus risking that chaos and conflict spreads.This is particularly problematic if the Israel-Gaza war engulfs the region, given the Middle Eastern actors with stake in the Sudanese conflict."U.S. Envoy Tom Perriello has a sound appreciation of the challenge he faces," said de Waal. "His problem is that even though (U.S. Secretary of State) Blinken is now making a few phone calls, there just has not been enough high-level engagement with the key powerbrokers — UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt — to get them behind a peace plan. Until that happens, there's no chance of significant progress."Woldemichael argues that the principal focus for the United States should be "to continue to put pressure on the sides to participate in negotiations" and to work "to end the war."As the U.S. elections draw near and as pressure mounts on Perriello and the Biden administration to end the war, it is critical for the United States to remain the honest and neutral broker it has thus far been, and to work diligently to produce a lasting peace deal that serves both American and local interests.
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The ongoing conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is a pivotal event in the modern history of Sudan. With hundreds, possibly thousands of civilians killed in the conflict, there has been a deep sense of horror particularly in Sudan's capital Khartoum, resulting in 2.5 million residents of the city fleeing to nearby regions of Sudan, or neighboring countries Chad and Egypt.For those remaining in Khartoum, fear and anxiety are constant, as gunfire, heavy artillery, and smoke rise above the city, fighter jets fly at low altitude over residential areas. The current war will have a devastating mental health impact, in addition to its many fatalities and physical injuries. Children in particular are more likely to suffer severe depression, flashback and post-traumatic events as a result of exposure to the horrific violence and abuses.Exacerbating these anxieties is the use by both the SAF and RSF of psychological warfare. Through social media, both sides have shared graphic content from the battlefield, intended to intimidate their opponents and influence public opinion in their favor. Much of this content has been impossible to verify independently. The SAF has struggled to gain legitimacy with the public, discredited for being part of the former regime of Omar al-Bashir, Sudan's long-time former dictator. The SAF leadership claims to be fighting for stability in Sudan, despite allowing the proliferation of former regime-backed militias since the ousting of Bashir in 2019.Meanwhile, the RSF leadership has used media outlets to claim they are fighting against the SAF for being part of the former regime. Their stated intention is to restart the process of handing power from the military to civilian politicians in the framework agreement signed with the Forces of Freedom and Change, which came to an end with the military takeover in October, 2021. However, the RSF's claim is grossly misleading, as the RSF has been accused of committing genocide in Darfur since 2003.In both cases, the message is clear. Each side wishes to give the perception that it is winning the war on the ground. But, neither has been strong enough to achieve outright control of Khartoum. Hence, they merely seek to mislead people who are not residents of the city.The current war in Sudan arguably represents a long power struggle between the RSF, currently led by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo or "Hemedti," and remnants of the Bashir regime that dominate the SAF, headed by Lieutenant-General Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan. Since the Bashir regime was toppled, its supporters have used the transition period to organize.The SAF has targeted activists, members of resistance committees and politicians with arbitrary arrests and accusing them of backing the RSF. Over the last four years, they have waged a war against Sudan's demand for democracy. Effectively blocking all political efforts to ensure a smooth post-2019 transition, they have sought to prevent the outcome of a credible civilian democratic government. They have instigated violence, attacked civilians, and portrayed the revolution as a project planned in the West to divide Sudan.Furthermore, the SAF's leadership has made use of Sudan's lucrative black market to sabotage any economic progress. They have done so through raising the foreign currency rate against the Sudanese pound and creating shortages in the country, prompting the Sudanese people to feel economic pressure and protest against the civilians in power, providing justification for the military counterparts to launch their takeover. The emergence of numerous militias was encouraged, and the security forces that once maintained the Bashir regime's security turned a blind eye to crimes such as robbery, burglary, and aggravated bodily harm.Historically, the SAF is the oldest security institution of the state, and civilian political parties have used it to capture power in 1958, 1969 and 1989. After al-Bashir's coup in 1989, the Sudanese Islamists Movement, precursor of the National Congress Party (NCP), stacked senior officer positions in the SAF with their supporters.Simultaneously, the regime created various security institutions and militias to counterbalance the threat of a further coup, and to crush rebellions in outlying areas of Sudan. One of these security forces was the RSF, which originated in the early 2000s as the Janjaweed, Arab militiamen used by Bashir to defeat insurgencies in Darfur. Most Janjaweed fighters were of the Rizigat tribe, which includes the Mahria branch of which Hemedti is a member. In 2017, Sudan's parliament passed the Rapid Support Forces Act legitimating the militia. When Bashir felt threatened by his competitors within the NCP, he summoned the RSF to Khartoum to protect him; ultimately, it was the RSF's desertion of Bashir which sealed his regime's fate.After Bashir was toppled in 2019, Burhan became the president of Sudan, appointing Hemedti as his deputy in August 2019. Burhan's focus was on staying in power and preventing the transition to civilian rule. Burhan feared that out of power, he may be prosecuted for his claimed role in the Darfur genocide alongside Hemedti. To reduce any possibility of being ousted, he empowered Hemedti by abolishing article 5 of the RSF Act, allowing the RSF to act independently of the SAF command structure, while establishing loose ties to Burhan. Hemedti was able to increase the number of his forces from 20,000 to over 100,000, most being trained in SAF camps in Khartoum. The RSF was tasked with protecting strategic sites in Khartoum, including the presidential palace, general command, Khartoum airport, and the building of Sudan's Television and Broadcast Corporation. Burhan also retired several SAF generals who had criticized the expansion and new roles of the RSF.Ironically, Burhan's focus on staying in power resulted in his clash with Hemedti, who had his own presidential ambitions. Over time, Burhan and Hemedti started to compete with one another, regionally and internationally. Hemedti cemented his ties with Russia through the Wagner Group, a relationship with its origins in Bashir's request for Russia's help in protecting his regime in 2017. In 2018, it emerged that Wagner was contracted to train the regime's security forces, including the RSF, in riot control.Hemedti's relationship with Wagner expanded through gold smuggling operations that helped Russia offset the sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine, and the RSF's support and Hemedti's influence for Wagner's extraction of resources in the Central African Republic (CAR). In January 2023, Hemedti used his forces to close the Sudanese-CAR border, to prevent CAR opposition forces from using Sudanese territory. Wagner has supplied the RSF with anti-aircraft missiles that have deterred the SAF from attacking its positions in Khartoum in the current conflict.The RSF-Wagner relationship has deepened as a result of both paramilitary groups' relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is a key destination of Sudan's mineral resources, for example receiving 40 percent of Sudan's gold exports. Geopolitically, Wagner, Hemedti and the UAE are all backers of Libya's Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar. Hemedti sent 1000 RSF fighters to support Haftar's attempt to take over Libya's capital Tripoli in 2019, when Egypt refused to send ground forces to support Haftar despite also being an ally. There are indications that, in return, the UAE has been supporting Hemedti and the RSF in Sudan's current conflict.Burhan has also developed close regional alliances. Burhan received military training in Egypt, and the Egyptian Armed Forces today sees the SAF as the only institution that can hold Sudan together, and represent Egypt's own interests in the country. The Egyptian leadership deeply distrusts Hemedti and the RSF, who they view as a mercenary group with no loyalty to the state. Egypt has accordingly provided the SAF with covert air defence aid in its current conflict with the RSF.Burhan also uses his position as the president of Sudan, and commander of the SAF, to win the backing of Saudi Arabia. Strategically, Saudi Arabia needs to ensure the security of its Red Sea investments that are part of its Vision 2030. Saudi Arabia has also proven to be interested in investing in and deepening trade relations with Sudan, putting it in competition with the UAE's influence represented in Hemedti and the RSF.The current conflict has militarily incapacitated the forces of both Burhan and Hemedti, with Khartoum becoming a graveyard for their soldiers. The fighting has shown that both sides are just interested in cementing their own regimes in a post-conflict scenario. It remains to be seen how civilians will be able to resist whichever party, with its regional backers, emerges victorious from the violence, and continue Sudan's long journey towards democracy.
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As Iran's president-elect Massoud Pezeshkian is sending messages about his readiness to reengage with the West, the newly elected European Parliament seems to be moving ever further in a hawkish direction. That can be concluded from the appointment of the German Green Party lawmaker Hannah Neumann to chair the EP's delegation to Iran in the assembly. Save for a major, and unlikely, upset, she'll be formally endorsed in that position when the body reconvenes after its summer recess.According to European Parliament rules, the task of inter-parliamentary delegations is to maintain and deepen relations with the parliaments of non-EU countries. Delegations are not the most influential bodies in the EU but they can offer a valuable channel of communication with third countries, particularly in cases when official relations are strained, as is the case with Iran. Or, alternatively, they can become a forum for ventilating grievances against those countries, thus contributing to shaping negative narratives and creating a political climate detrimental to productive diplomacy.Neumann is not a newcomer to the Iran file. It remains to be seen how she'll approach her new position, but if her past activities are any indication, we should expect a rather confrontational stance.A member of the German Greens, the same party to which German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock belongs, Neumann was outspoken in her criticisms of the Iranian government. She consistently campaigned for the inclusion of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) in the EU terrorist list — a step opposed by the EU's former high representative on foreign policy Josep Borrell on legal grounds. Politically, blacklisting an official security force of Iran will likely provoke more problems in the EU's relations with Tehran. When Borrell's successor, former Estonian prime minister Kaja Kallas, acceded to the post, Neumann urged her to take that step, even though unanimity among the all member states will be required to make it effective.In one particularly strident intervention on the heels of the "Woman. Life. Freedom" movement in Iran, Neumann last year disparaged Borrell's diplomatic engagement with Tehran by calling on him to "stop stabilizing the brutal regime while the people of Iran are prepared to die for its downfall." In a debate in April, following exchanges of strikes between Israel and Iran, she spoke of the need to build a regional security architecture to stop the cycle of escalation yet seemed to blame mostly Iran and its allies for that escalation — while she condemned, rightly, Iran's strike on Israel, she did not mention the Israeli deadly strike on the Tehran's diplomatic compound in Damascus, which provoked Iran's retaliation in the first place.While Neumann has chastised the Islamic Republic's lack of democratic representation, her pro-democracy zeal was markedly less pronounced in her role as the chair of the European Parliament's delegation for relations with the Arabian Peninsula (2019-2024) which covers ties with all the Persian Gulf countries. In 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution condemning human rights abuses in the United Arab Emirates that included a clause urging the EU to boycott the Expo 2020 in Dubai as a sign of disapproval of Abu Dhabi's repression. Nevertheless, Neumann visited the Expo in clear contravention of the parliament's position, which was overwhelmingly supported by her own political faction.Neumann praised the late president of the UAE Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan for ushering the UAE into "an unprecedented era of growth and modernization," without any reference to the country's human rights record, even as she lashed out at Borrell, EU Council President Charles Michel, and humanitarian aid commissioner Janez Lenarcic for following the standard diplomatic protocol of expressing condolences for the death in a helicopter crash of the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi two months ago.Neumann compared working with the Gulf's Arab countries to walking a diplomatic tightrope, suggesting the need to balance human rights concerns with other interests, such as climate change, women's rights, economic cooperation, etc. That is sensible. However, it doesn't appear as if she is prepared to embrace the same spirit in dealing with Iran. In fact, she greeted her appointment as the chair of the Iran delegation with a narrow focus on a "fight for a democratic and free Iran."If anything, such rhetoric risks turning the delegation into an echo chamber of constantly regurgitated talking points about how bad the Iranian regime is and the need to remove it. It may work well on social media and offer a sense of moral satisfaction, but it is unlikely to advance a more nuanced understanding of Iranian realities. The delegation, in concrete terms, would likely not be welcome in Tehran to meet with its counterparts in the Iranian Majles, which is one of the primary tasks of the body. In the past, such visits occurred with a certain regularity, and that did not preclude participating MEPs from expressing strong opinions on human rights and other aspects of the Iranian policies. Neumann, however, appeared to rule out any legitimacy for the current parliament which was elected this spring. As an organizer and participant of many such undertakings in the past, I can definitely affirm that mutual visits help to build trust, better understand the other side's perspectives — without necessarily agreeing with those perspectives — and ultimately widen the space for diplomacy. Contrary to Neumann and many other MEPs' criticisms of a diplomatic outreach to Iran, the truth is that in the past 45 years, there was never too much of it but rather too little. Shutting down one available channel, at a time when Tehran is showing more flexibility towards the West, especially Europe, would not be wise, and would work to reduce the EU's diplomatic relevance.
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On December 14 and 15, 2023 European Union leaders met for a summit in Brussels. Despite happening multiple times a year, this meeting was historic for the future of EU integration. The EU leaders gave a green light to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and grant candidacy status to Georgia. They also held discussions on several other vital issues, such as the EU's next Strategic Agenda, the ongoing concerning situation in Gaza, the Union's security and defense capabilities, and the mid-term review of the current EU budget (2024-2027), that includes the much need financial lifeline for Ukraine—in the end blocked by Hungary. Our experts share their insights on the results of the Summit and how they set the EU's course for the future.Merissa Khurma, Director at Middle East Program, The Wilson CenterThe ongoing Hamas-Israel war and the wider Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the top of agenda during last week's EU Summit. While more EU members voted for a ceasefire at the United Nations General Assembly last week, the EU failed to unify at the summit around ending hostilities. Those in favor of a ceasefire have indicated growing concerns over the surging number of innocent civilians killed by Israel's military operations in Gaza as well as the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the besieged strip. Their argument is that taking such a stance will empower the EU to play a more integral role in diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental efforts post war. The EU is one of the largest donors to the Palestinian people, through the Palestinian Authority that rules over the West Bank but has also long been a supporter of Israel and its right to defend itself against Hamas and other militant factions listed as terrorist organizations by the EU, the United States and other countries worldwide. Striking a balance during this war has proven challenging, precisely because different EU member governments have taken divergent positions. Countries such as Germany and Austria have held steadfast in their ironclad support of Israel, while others such as Ireland and Belgium have been critical of Israel's military campaign in Gaza and called on Israel, rather emphatically, to respect international law. Many member countries in the EU have also witnessed waves of protests calling for a ceasefire as well as the release of the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7th that have shaken the Palestinian-Israeli and wider regional arena, which remains to be integral for Europe's national security. The EU remains to be a critical market for Israel as well as other countries in the MENA region and up until this attack and the ensuing war, the EU was seen a lot more favorably than the United States in varying public opinion polls of the region. The EU remains to be a critical partner in any diplomatic efforts led by the United States or the international community to prioritize a political solution to the longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Both the EU and the United States have reiterated their commitment to the two-state solution that is adopted by the Palestinian Authority as well many other countries across the Arab and Muslim world. The ongoing war and the divides across the region as well as in Europe highlights the importance of the EU's pre-October 7th efforts on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September to resuscitates diplomatic peace process through a comprehensive peace package that results in an independent Palestinian state living side by side to Israel in peace and security. It is imperative that the EU stays on course to play that role even as the going gets tough. It is the only path to peace.Nicholas Lokker, Research Associate in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)The historic decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine is a very welcome signal of the European Union's willingness to respond strategically to the geopolitical shock of Russia's full-scale invasion. Yet as it moves forward with Kyiv's integration, the EU can no longer continue to ignore the elephant in the room when it comes to enlargement—namely, the ongoing stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine war.As long as active fighting continues, full EU membership will not be possible for Ukraine, given that the bloc's mutual defense clause would require other member states to become directly involved in the conflict. While EU leaders are well aware of this potential issue, the debate on enlargement has so far refrained from directly addressing it. Instead, they seem to be operating under the assumption of future peace in Ukraine. This is most obvious in European Council President Charles Michel's promise of membership by 2030—a date by which peace is by no means guaranteed.Rather than making promises it may be unable to keep, the EU should find pragmatic ways to integrate Ukraine even while fighting continues. This will mean pursuing forms of progressive or gradual accession, which while frequently proposed, have yet to make it on to the EU's high-level political agenda. Offering Kyiv (and other candidates) benefits of integration prior to full membership could help sustain the momentum of the enlargement process, even if it takes time to overcome the thornier barriers in its way (which, in addition to the war, also include the need for reform to the EU's institutional functioning).However, partial integration in the short-term cannot replace the ultimate goal of full integration in the long-term—an understandable fear that has so far prevented the concept from gaining enough support. The EU must therefore strike the right balance in its approach, making clear to Ukraine that although it remains committed to welcoming it as a full member once peace is reestablished, it will meanwhile work to bring Kyiv as close as possible to the bloc under current conditions.Iren Marinova, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Colorado State UniversityAmong several strategic topics that were discussed at the European Council Summit on December 14 and 15 in Brussels, one of them was the EU's Strategic Agenda over the next 5 years. With the upcoming European Parliament elections and the change of the Commission in 2024, a question that will undoubtedly be asked relates to the geopolitical role and ambitions of the EU and whether they will persist or change over the next five years. In a period of continuous crises, security threats, and global order shifts, the Summit outcomes on some critical foreign policy issues hold important clues to this matter.First of all, the idea of a "geopolitical" EU remains murky. Attempts have been made to provide clarity by addressing some scholarly concerns about the nature and implementation of the concept. Specifically, it has been presented as a more "realistic" vision of the world by the EU that relatively moves away from previous rather "naïve" over-reliance on the power of economic interdependence and towards a sobering realization of the true nature of the international system based on competition and conflict. It also means being ready to take risks and face the consequences. A question that is rarely asked, however, concerns the perceptions and visions of EU member states and their leadership on what "geopolitical" EU should and could look like.The historic achievement from the Summit is undoubtedly the agreement to open membership talks with Ukraine. Simultaneously, the highly anticipated €50 billion aid package meant to support Ukraine could not pass. In both situations, the deciding common denominator was one and the same— Hungary's Viktor Orbán—who continues to play the role of the rogue European leader in high-stakes matters. In the first case, he had to exit the room for the decision to pass, while he decided to block the financial package in the second. Whether Orbán will be persuaded to lift his veto in the next round of talks in January, or whether the EU will find other ways to circumvent him will be a key issue to observe in the coming weeks. With the uncertainty surrounding the United States' commitment to the Ukrainian war effort and the country's upcoming tumultuous election year, the EU's ability to find ways to continue its support for Ukraine would be important not just for Kyiv, but for the EU's "geopolitical" vision and its long-term security.Another concerning outcome of the Summit was the inability to achieve consensus on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in light of several member states' call for ceasefire. The lack of a decision on the matter demonstrates a persistent division among member states that continues to call into question the EU's vision for being a key geopolitical player on a regional and a global stage.Whether the EU has become more "geopolitical" or whether it will transform itself into a "geopolitical power" and what that means is still open to interpretation and remains to be seen. A question that deserves attention is what the concept means in theory and practice to the member states and if a common vision on the matter can be achieved.European Council President talking to journalist immediately after the approval to open the accession negotiation with Ukraine and Moldova, December 14, 2023.Image CreditMaša Ocvirk, Program Coordinator at Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterLast week's meeting of European Union leaders in Brussels was historic. The decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova is a high water mark for EU enlargement. However, as uncertainty on this and other decisions prevailed until the last moment, it also—more than ever before—showed a clear need for internal EU reforms. While the Council conclusions do recognize this need, it is only in the context of welcoming new member states into the Union. In the current geopolitical context, the need for EU institutions to function effectively should be reason enough on its own terms, the enlargement momentum only adding to the urgency of internal EU reform. The future of enlargement as well as the EU's capability to act might otherwise be at stake. Prime Minister Orban walking out amid the vote on the future of Ukraine's path toward EU membership cannot be a sustainable solution to reach decisions. Hungary's later decision to block the approval of the Ukraine Facility—a crucial financial lifeline for Ukraine—and with that postponing the adoption of the revised EU budget to February 1, 2024, is a case in point.The EU is beginning to run out of symbolic options to show support for Ukraine. By opening the negotiations, where each further step needs unanimity from member states, progress becomes increasingly more intertwined. The latest EU Summit should therefore be a wake-up call, if the EU wants to continue having EU enlargement as its most important and successful geopolitical tool. 2024 will be a defining year for the EU in many ways, let's hope one of them is getting closer to answering the call of history.Robin S. Quinville, Director of Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterIn September's "State of the Union" speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen challenged Europeans to "answer the call of history." European Union enlargement, she emphasized, was the future–for Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans, and Georgia. History demanded that the EU "work on completing our Union.And the EU has been working. November's Enlargement report set the stage for the December Summit; it recommended opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. The recommendation was a powerful recognition of the tough reform decisions both Ukraine and Moldova have taken, specifically to convince the EU they are also ready to tackle the demanding accession process.Despite the report's strong recommendation, the December 14-15 Summit meeting was a nail-biter. Hungary signaled early it could play the spoiler, stalling negotiations. But in the end, Hungary split its decision–allowing the EU to open negotiations but blocking much-needed funding for besieged Ukraine. Individual EU countries have indicated they will step up bilateral efforts, and the EU will revisit this issue in January. The process is a strong reminder to both EU institutions and the member states: they can no longer paper over the long-standing divergence between Hungary's government and the EU's values. Managing Hungary is the EU's new challenge. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas, Research Director at Center for EU and Transatlantic Studies, Virginia Tech and Adjunct Professor at Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown UniversityLast week's European Council was a vital demonstration of Europe's steadfast support to Ukraine's cause. Opening accession talks with Ukraine (and Moldova) and awarding Georgia the candidate country status was far from a foregone conclusion, given well-documented objections by Hungary's Prime Minister Orban, the inherent complexity that each enlargement entails, and the war-related fatigue that has settled in the west as we approached the conflict's second anniversary. By use of a highly creative and rarely used formula ten years after the Euromaidan, 26 EU leaders circumvented Hungarian objections and sent out a powerful message: the future of Ukraine and Moldova lies irrevocably in Europe. President Zelensky's enthusiastic reaction to the decision indicates that, for Ukrainians, the decision is far from only symbolic: Europe has embraced them and their search for belonging in a community of values they can call their own is over.Of course, this isn't to suggest all is done and dusted: accession talks will last unpredictably long, admission remains subject to veto players obstructing progress, and EU public opinion is wary of admitting more net "takers" from the EU budget. However, Ukraine's heroic pushback since February 2022 and its application for membership have revived enlargement as a geopolitical tool. Most EU leaders now recognize that admitting new, vulnerable members in the post-Soviet space and the western Balkans is first and foremost in Europe's own interest.The challenge now facing the Union is twofold: first, to convince Western Balkan states to return to a reformist path to move their EU admission prospects meaningfully forward. The decision to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina soon reflects the realization that too much precious time has already been lost, but the lack of progress regarding Albania and North Macedonia indicates that the current stalemate has yet to be overcome. Second, to prepare the ground for enlargement through internal reform that will enhance EU absorption capacity but also apply strict yet fair conditionality. Given the continued controversy around Hungary and its access to EU money, the Union needs to apply technical criteria that fulfill set milestones whilst mindful of the political repercussions of its actions, and the message this sends to friends and foes alike.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
On December 14 and 15, 2023 European Union leaders met for a summit in Brussels. Despite happening multiple times a year, this meeting was historic for the future of EU integration. The EU leaders gave a green light to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and grant candidacy status to Georgia. They also held discussions on several other vital issues, such as the EU's next Strategic Agenda, the ongoing concerning situation in Gaza, the Union's security and defense capabilities, and the mid-term review of the current EU budget (2024-2027), that includes the much need financial lifeline for Ukraine—in the end blocked by Hungary. Our experts share their insights on the results of the Summit and how they set the EU's course for the future.Merissa Khurma, Director at Middle East Program, The Wilson CenterThe ongoing Hamas-Israel war and the wider Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the top of agenda during last week's EU Summit. While more EU members voted for a ceasefire at the United Nations General Assembly last week, the EU failed to unify at the summit around ending hostilities. Those in favor of a ceasefire have indicated growing concerns over the surging number of innocent civilians killed by Israel's military operations in Gaza as well as the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the besieged strip. Their argument is that taking such a stance will empower the EU to play a more integral role in diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental efforts post war. The EU is one of the largest donors to the Palestinian people, through the Palestinian Authority that rules over the West Bank but has also long been a supporter of Israel and its right to defend itself against Hamas and other militant factions listed as terrorist organizations by the EU, the United States and other countries worldwide. Striking a balance during this war has proven challenging, precisely because different EU member governments have taken divergent positions. Countries such as Germany and Austria have held steadfast in their ironclad support of Israel, while others such as Ireland and Belgium have been critical of Israel's military campaign in Gaza and called on Israel, rather emphatically, to respect international law. Many member countries in the EU have also witnessed waves of protests calling for a ceasefire as well as the release of the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7th that have shaken the Palestinian-Israeli and wider regional arena, which remains to be integral for Europe's national security. The EU remains to be a critical market for Israel as well as other countries in the MENA region and up until this attack and the ensuing war, the EU was seen a lot more favorably than the United States in varying public opinion polls of the region. The EU remains to be a critical partner in any diplomatic efforts led by the United States or the international community to prioritize a political solution to the longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Both the EU and the United States have reiterated their commitment to the two-state solution that is adopted by the Palestinian Authority as well many other countries across the Arab and Muslim world. The ongoing war and the divides across the region as well as in Europe highlights the importance of the EU's pre-October 7th efforts on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September to resuscitates diplomatic peace process through a comprehensive peace package that results in an independent Palestinian state living side by side to Israel in peace and security. It is imperative that the EU stays on course to play that role even as the going gets tough. It is the only path to peace.Nicholas Lokker, Research Associate in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)The historic decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine is a very welcome signal of the European Union's willingness to respond strategically to the geopolitical shock of Russia's full-scale invasion. Yet as it moves forward with Kyiv's integration, the EU can no longer continue to ignore the elephant in the room when it comes to enlargement—namely, the ongoing stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine war.As long as active fighting continues, full EU membership will not be possible for Ukraine, given that the bloc's mutual defense clause would require other member states to become directly involved in the conflict. While EU leaders are well aware of this potential issue, the debate on enlargement has so far refrained from directly addressing it. Instead, they seem to be operating under the assumption of future peace in Ukraine. This is most obvious in European Council President Charles Michel's promise of membership by 2030—a date by which peace is by no means guaranteed.Rather than making promises it may be unable to keep, the EU should find pragmatic ways to integrate Ukraine even while fighting continues. This will mean pursuing forms of progressive or gradual accession, which while frequently proposed, have yet to make it on to the EU's high-level political agenda. Offering Kyiv (and other candidates) benefits of integration prior to full membership could help sustain the momentum of the enlargement process, even if it takes time to overcome the thornier barriers in its way (which, in addition to the war, also include the need for reform to the EU's institutional functioning).However, partial integration in the short-term cannot replace the ultimate goal of full integration in the long-term—an understandable fear that has so far prevented the concept from gaining enough support. The EU must therefore strike the right balance in its approach, making clear to Ukraine that although it remains committed to welcoming it as a full member once peace is reestablished, it will meanwhile work to bring Kyiv as close as possible to the bloc under current conditions.Iren Marinova, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Colorado State UniversityAmong several strategic topics that were discussed at the European Council Summit on December 14 and 15 in Brussels, one of them was the EU's Strategic Agenda over the next 5 years. With the upcoming European Parliament elections and the change of the Commission in 2024, a question that will undoubtedly be asked relates to the geopolitical role and ambitions of the EU and whether they will persist or change over the next five years. In a period of continuous crises, security threats, and global order shifts, the Summit outcomes on some critical foreign policy issues hold important clues to this matter.First of all, the idea of a "geopolitical" EU remains murky. Attempts have been made to provide clarity by addressing some scholarly concerns about the nature and implementation of the concept. Specifically, it has been presented as a more "realistic" vision of the world by the EU that relatively moves away from previous rather "naïve" over-reliance on the power of economic interdependence and towards a sobering realization of the true nature of the international system based on competition and conflict. It also means being ready to take risks and face the consequences. A question that is rarely asked, however, concerns the perceptions and visions of EU member states and their leadership on what "geopolitical" EU should and could look like.The historic achievement from the Summit is undoubtedly the agreement to open membership talks with Ukraine. Simultaneously, the highly anticipated €50 billion aid package meant to support Ukraine could not pass. In both situations, the deciding common denominator was one and the same— Hungary's Viktor Orbán—who continues to play the role of the rogue European leader in high-stakes matters. In the first case, he had to exit the room for the decision to pass, while he decided to block the financial package in the second. Whether Orbán will be persuaded to lift his veto in the next round of talks in January, or whether the EU will find other ways to circumvent him will be a key issue to observe in the coming weeks. With the uncertainty surrounding the United States' commitment to the Ukrainian war effort and the country's upcoming tumultuous election year, the EU's ability to find ways to continue its support for Ukraine would be important not just for Kyiv, but for the EU's "geopolitical" vision and its long-term security.Another concerning outcome of the Summit was the inability to achieve consensus on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in light of several member states' call for ceasefire. The lack of a decision on the matter demonstrates a persistent division among member states that continues to call into question the EU's vision for being a key geopolitical player on a regional and a global stage.Whether the EU has become more "geopolitical" or whether it will transform itself into a "geopolitical power" and what that means is still open to interpretation and remains to be seen. A question that deserves attention is what the concept means in theory and practice to the member states and if a common vision on the matter can be achieved.European Council President talking to journalist immediately after the approval to open the accession negotiation with Ukraine and Moldova, December 14, 2023.Image CreditMaša Ocvirk, Program Coordinator at Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterLast week's meeting of European Union leaders in Brussels was historic. The decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova is a high water mark for EU enlargement. However, as uncertainty on this and other decisions prevailed until the last moment, it also—more than ever before—showed a clear need for internal EU reforms. While the Council conclusions do recognize this need, it is only in the context of welcoming new member states into the Union. In the current geopolitical context, the need for EU institutions to function effectively should be reason enough on its own terms, the enlargement momentum only adding to the urgency of internal EU reform. The future of enlargement as well as the EU's capability to act might otherwise be at stake. Prime Minister Orban walking out amid the vote on the future of Ukraine's path toward EU membership cannot be a sustainable solution to reach decisions. Hungary's later decision to block the approval of the Ukraine Facility—a crucial financial lifeline for Ukraine—and with that postponing the adoption of the revised EU budget to February 1, 2024, is a case in point.The EU is beginning to run out of symbolic options to show support for Ukraine. By opening the negotiations, where each further step needs unanimity from member states, progress becomes increasingly more intertwined. The latest EU Summit should therefore be a wake-up call, if the EU wants to continue having EU enlargement as its most important and successful geopolitical tool. 2024 will be a defining year for the EU in many ways, let's hope one of them is getting closer to answering the call of history.Robin S. Quinville, Director of Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterIn September's "State of the Union" speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen challenged Europeans to "answer the call of history." European Union enlargement, she emphasized, was the future–for Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans, and Georgia. History demanded that the EU "work on completing our Union.And the EU has been working. November's Enlargement report set the stage for the December Summit; it recommended opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. The recommendation was a powerful recognition of the tough reform decisions both Ukraine and Moldova have taken, specifically to convince the EU they are also ready to tackle the demanding accession process.Despite the report's strong recommendation, the December 14-15 Summit meeting was a nail-biter. Hungary signaled early it could play the spoiler, stalling negotiations. But in the end, Hungary split its decision–allowing the EU to open negotiations but blocking much-needed funding for besieged Ukraine. Individual EU countries have indicated they will step up bilateral efforts, and the EU will revisit this issue in January. The process is a strong reminder to both EU institutions and the member states: they can no longer paper over the long-standing divergence between Hungary's government and the EU's values. Managing Hungary is the EU's new challenge. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas, Research Director at Center for EU and Transatlantic Studies, Virginia Tech and Adjunct Professor at Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown UniversityLast week's European Council was a vital demonstration of Europe's steadfast support to Ukraine's cause. Opening accession talks with Ukraine (and Moldova) and awarding Georgia the candidate country status was far from a foregone conclusion, given well-documented objections by Hungary's Prime Minister Orban, the inherent complexity that each enlargement entails, and the war-related fatigue that has settled in the west as we approached the conflict's second anniversary. By use of a highly creative and rarely used formula ten years after the Euromaidan, 26 EU leaders circumvented Hungarian objections and sent out a powerful message: the future of Ukraine and Moldova lies irrevocably in Europe. President Zelensky's enthusiastic reaction to the decision indicates that, for Ukrainians, the decision is far from only symbolic: Europe has embraced them and their search for belonging in a community of values they can call their own is over.Of course, this isn't to suggest all is done and dusted: accession talks will last unpredictably long, admission remains subject to veto players obstructing progress, and EU public opinion is wary of admitting more net "takers" from the EU budget. However, Ukraine's heroic pushback since February 2022 and its application for membership have revived enlargement as a geopolitical tool. Most EU leaders now recognize that admitting new, vulnerable members in the post-Soviet space and the western Balkans is first and foremost in Europe's own interest.The challenge now facing the Union is twofold: first, to convince Western Balkan states to return to a reformist path to move their EU admission prospects meaningfully forward. The decision to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina soon reflects the realization that too much precious time has already been lost, but the lack of progress regarding Albania and North Macedonia indicates that the current stalemate has yet to be overcome. Second, to prepare the ground for enlargement through internal reform that will enhance EU absorption capacity but also apply strict yet fair conditionality. Given the continued controversy around Hungary and its access to EU money, the Union needs to apply technical criteria that fulfill set milestones whilst mindful of the political repercussions of its actions, and the message this sends to friends and foes alike.
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
On December 14 and 15, 2023 European Union leaders met for a summit in Brussels. Despite happening multiple times a year, this meeting was historic for the future of EU integration. The EU leaders gave a green light to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and grant candidacy status to Georgia. They also held discussions on several other vital issues, such as the EU's next Strategic Agenda, the ongoing concerning situation in Gaza, the Union's security and defense capabilities, and the mid-term review of the current EU budget (2024-2027), that includes the much need financial lifeline for Ukraine—in the end blocked by Hungary. Our experts share their insights on the results of the Summit and how they set the EU's course for the future.Merissa Khurma, Director at Middle East Program, The Wilson CenterThe ongoing Hamas-Israel war and the wider Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the top of agenda during last week's EU Summit. While more EU members voted for a ceasefire at the United Nations General Assembly last week, the EU failed to unify at the summit around ending hostilities. Those in favor of a ceasefire have indicated growing concerns over the surging number of innocent civilians killed by Israel's military operations in Gaza as well as the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian crisis in the besieged strip. Their argument is that taking such a stance will empower the EU to play a more integral role in diplomatic, humanitarian, and developmental efforts post war. The EU is one of the largest donors to the Palestinian people, through the Palestinian Authority that rules over the West Bank but has also long been a supporter of Israel and its right to defend itself against Hamas and other militant factions listed as terrorist organizations by the EU, the United States and other countries worldwide. Striking a balance during this war has proven challenging, precisely because different EU member governments have taken divergent positions. Countries such as Germany and Austria have held steadfast in their ironclad support of Israel, while others such as Ireland and Belgium have been critical of Israel's military campaign in Gaza and called on Israel, rather emphatically, to respect international law. Many member countries in the EU have also witnessed waves of protests calling for a ceasefire as well as the release of the hostages taken by Hamas on October 7th that have shaken the Palestinian-Israeli and wider regional arena, which remains to be integral for Europe's national security. The EU remains to be a critical market for Israel as well as other countries in the MENA region and up until this attack and the ensuing war, the EU was seen a lot more favorably than the United States in varying public opinion polls of the region. The EU remains to be a critical partner in any diplomatic efforts led by the United States or the international community to prioritize a political solution to the longstanding Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Both the EU and the United States have reiterated their commitment to the two-state solution that is adopted by the Palestinian Authority as well many other countries across the Arab and Muslim world. The ongoing war and the divides across the region as well as in Europe highlights the importance of the EU's pre-October 7th efforts on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September to resuscitates diplomatic peace process through a comprehensive peace package that results in an independent Palestinian state living side by side to Israel in peace and security. It is imperative that the EU stays on course to play that role even as the going gets tough. It is the only path to peace.Nicholas Lokker, Research Associate in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS)The historic decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine is a very welcome signal of the European Union's willingness to respond strategically to the geopolitical shock of Russia's full-scale invasion. Yet as it moves forward with Kyiv's integration, the EU can no longer continue to ignore the elephant in the room when it comes to enlargement—namely, the ongoing stalemate in the Russia-Ukraine war.As long as active fighting continues, full EU membership will not be possible for Ukraine, given that the bloc's mutual defense clause would require other member states to become directly involved in the conflict. While EU leaders are well aware of this potential issue, the debate on enlargement has so far refrained from directly addressing it. Instead, they seem to be operating under the assumption of future peace in Ukraine. This is most obvious in European Council President Charles Michel's promise of membership by 2030—a date by which peace is by no means guaranteed.Rather than making promises it may be unable to keep, the EU should find pragmatic ways to integrate Ukraine even while fighting continues. This will mean pursuing forms of progressive or gradual accession, which while frequently proposed, have yet to make it on to the EU's high-level political agenda. Offering Kyiv (and other candidates) benefits of integration prior to full membership could help sustain the momentum of the enlargement process, even if it takes time to overcome the thornier barriers in its way (which, in addition to the war, also include the need for reform to the EU's institutional functioning).However, partial integration in the short-term cannot replace the ultimate goal of full integration in the long-term—an understandable fear that has so far prevented the concept from gaining enough support. The EU must therefore strike the right balance in its approach, making clear to Ukraine that although it remains committed to welcoming it as a full member once peace is reestablished, it will meanwhile work to bring Kyiv as close as possible to the bloc under current conditions.Iren Marinova, PhD Candidate in Political Science, Colorado State UniversityAmong several strategic topics that were discussed at the European Council Summit on December 14 and 15 in Brussels, one of them was the EU's Strategic Agenda over the next 5 years. With the upcoming European Parliament elections and the change of the Commission in 2024, a question that will undoubtedly be asked relates to the geopolitical role and ambitions of the EU and whether they will persist or change over the next five years. In a period of continuous crises, security threats, and global order shifts, the Summit outcomes on some critical foreign policy issues hold important clues to this matter.First of all, the idea of a "geopolitical" EU remains murky. Attempts have been made to provide clarity by addressing some scholarly concerns about the nature and implementation of the concept. Specifically, it has been presented as a more "realistic" vision of the world by the EU that relatively moves away from previous rather "naïve" over-reliance on the power of economic interdependence and towards a sobering realization of the true nature of the international system based on competition and conflict. It also means being ready to take risks and face the consequences. A question that is rarely asked, however, concerns the perceptions and visions of EU member states and their leadership on what "geopolitical" EU should and could look like.The historic achievement from the Summit is undoubtedly the agreement to open membership talks with Ukraine. Simultaneously, the highly anticipated €50 billion aid package meant to support Ukraine could not pass. In both situations, the deciding common denominator was one and the same— Hungary's Viktor Orbán—who continues to play the role of the rogue European leader in high-stakes matters. In the first case, he had to exit the room for the decision to pass, while he decided to block the financial package in the second. Whether Orbán will be persuaded to lift his veto in the next round of talks in January, or whether the EU will find other ways to circumvent him will be a key issue to observe in the coming weeks. With the uncertainty surrounding the United States' commitment to the Ukrainian war effort and the country's upcoming tumultuous election year, the EU's ability to find ways to continue its support for Ukraine would be important not just for Kyiv, but for the EU's "geopolitical" vision and its long-term security.Another concerning outcome of the Summit was the inability to achieve consensus on the humanitarian crisis in Gaza in light of several member states' call for ceasefire. The lack of a decision on the matter demonstrates a persistent division among member states that continues to call into question the EU's vision for being a key geopolitical player on a regional and a global stage.Whether the EU has become more "geopolitical" or whether it will transform itself into a "geopolitical power" and what that means is still open to interpretation and remains to be seen. A question that deserves attention is what the concept means in theory and practice to the member states and if a common vision on the matter can be achieved.European Council President talking to journalist immediately after the approval to open the accession negotiation with Ukraine and Moldova, December 14, 2023.Image CreditMaša Ocvirk, Program Coordinator at Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterLast week's meeting of European Union leaders in Brussels was historic. The decision to open accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova is a high water mark for EU enlargement. However, as uncertainty on this and other decisions prevailed until the last moment, it also—more than ever before—showed a clear need for internal EU reforms. While the Council conclusions do recognize this need, it is only in the context of welcoming new member states into the Union. In the current geopolitical context, the need for EU institutions to function effectively should be reason enough on its own terms, the enlargement momentum only adding to the urgency of internal EU reform. The future of enlargement as well as the EU's capability to act might otherwise be at stake. Prime Minister Orban walking out amid the vote on the future of Ukraine's path toward EU membership cannot be a sustainable solution to reach decisions. Hungary's later decision to block the approval of the Ukraine Facility—a crucial financial lifeline for Ukraine—and with that postponing the adoption of the revised EU budget to February 1, 2024, is a case in point.The EU is beginning to run out of symbolic options to show support for Ukraine. By opening the negotiations, where each further step needs unanimity from member states, progress becomes increasingly more intertwined. The latest EU Summit should therefore be a wake-up call, if the EU wants to continue having EU enlargement as its most important and successful geopolitical tool. 2024 will be a defining year for the EU in many ways, let's hope one of them is getting closer to answering the call of history.Robin S. Quinville, Director of Global Europe Program, the Wilson CenterIn September's "State of the Union" speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen challenged Europeans to "answer the call of history." European Union enlargement, she emphasized, was the future–for Ukraine, Moldova, the Western Balkans, and Georgia. History demanded that the EU "work on completing our Union.And the EU has been working. November's Enlargement report set the stage for the December Summit; it recommended opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova. The recommendation was a powerful recognition of the tough reform decisions both Ukraine and Moldova have taken, specifically to convince the EU they are also ready to tackle the demanding accession process.Despite the report's strong recommendation, the December 14-15 Summit meeting was a nail-biter. Hungary signaled early it could play the spoiler, stalling negotiations. But in the end, Hungary split its decision–allowing the EU to open negotiations but blocking much-needed funding for besieged Ukraine. Individual EU countries have indicated they will step up bilateral efforts, and the EU will revisit this issue in January. The process is a strong reminder to both EU institutions and the member states: they can no longer paper over the long-standing divergence between Hungary's government and the EU's values. Managing Hungary is the EU's new challenge. Dr. Dimitris Tsarouhas, Research Director at Center for EU and Transatlantic Studies, Virginia Tech and Adjunct Professor at Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown UniversityLast week's European Council was a vital demonstration of Europe's steadfast support to Ukraine's cause. Opening accession talks with Ukraine (and Moldova) and awarding Georgia the candidate country status was far from a foregone conclusion, given well-documented objections by Hungary's Prime Minister Orban, the inherent complexity that each enlargement entails, and the war-related fatigue that has settled in the west as we approached the conflict's second anniversary. By use of a highly creative and rarely used formula ten years after the Euromaidan, 26 EU leaders circumvented Hungarian objections and sent out a powerful message: the future of Ukraine and Moldova lies irrevocably in Europe. President Zelensky's enthusiastic reaction to the decision indicates that, for Ukrainians, the decision is far from only symbolic: Europe has embraced them and their search for belonging in a community of values they can call their own is over.Of course, this isn't to suggest all is done and dusted: accession talks will last unpredictably long, admission remains subject to veto players obstructing progress, and EU public opinion is wary of admitting more net "takers" from the EU budget. However, Ukraine's heroic pushback since February 2022 and its application for membership have revived enlargement as a geopolitical tool. Most EU leaders now recognize that admitting new, vulnerable members in the post-Soviet space and the western Balkans is first and foremost in Europe's own interest.The challenge now facing the Union is twofold: first, to convince Western Balkan states to return to a reformist path to move their EU admission prospects meaningfully forward. The decision to open accession talks with Bosnia and Herzegovina soon reflects the realization that too much precious time has already been lost, but the lack of progress regarding Albania and North Macedonia indicates that the current stalemate has yet to be overcome. Second, to prepare the ground for enlargement through internal reform that will enhance EU absorption capacity but also apply strict yet fair conditionality. Given the continued controversy around Hungary and its access to EU money, the Union needs to apply technical criteria that fulfill set milestones whilst mindful of the political repercussions of its actions, and the message this sends to friends and foes alike.
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Warnung zur Verfügbarkeit
Eine dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit ist nicht garantiert und liegt vollumfänglich in den Händen der Herausgeber:innen. Bitte erstellen Sie sich selbständig eine Kopie falls Sie diese Quelle zitieren möchten.
Tomorrow night, we settle in for a much anticipated show-down between President Joe Biden and former President Trump. Foreign policy rarely plays a huge role in presidential debates, but with two live conflicts (Ukraine and Middle East) and escalating tensions with China, the Quincy Institute has anticipated questions that could be asked on the key issues of the day and offered these suggestions on how the candidates should respond tonight. How long should the U.S. continue to send aid to Ukraine?Battlefield conditions have turned against Ukraine recently, as Russia has made its first territorial gains since early in the war. Despite its advantages in manpower and military, Russia has shown little capacity for conquering, let alone governing, the vast majority of Ukrainian territory. The Biden administration has pushed for sending aid to Ukraine, and continues to say that it will do "'nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine." At the same time, Biden has maintained that the U.S. will not get directly involved in a war with Russia.However, as conditions have gotten increasingly more dire on the Ukrainian frontlines, leadership in Kyiv has urged Washington and its other Western allies to grow their involvement in the conflict. If Ukraine's partners go down that path, it could invite a more aggressive response from Russia and perhaps nuclear escalation.To avoid such an outcome, Washington should push Kyiv to pursue a negotiated settlement. Continuing U.S. aid is critical to provide Ukraine with leverage at the negotiating table. "U.S. aid to Ukraine should continue as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to orchestrate a negotiated settlement of the war," says George Beebe, director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute. "Absent a negotiating strategy, continued aid will only prolong Ukraine's suffering, deepen its destruction, and increase the chances the United States and Russia stumble into a direct military confrontation."Already the war has had a destructive impact on Ukraine. Its economy has cratered, and Ukraine is now thoroughly dependent on Western assistance to sustain it. The country has suffered a massive population decline. And the longer the war continues, the more strained Ukrainian democracy and civil rights will likely become.The Middle East: Is a defense pact with Saudi Arabia in the U.S. interest? In the midst of Israel's war on Gaza, which has now killed more than 37,000 Palestinians, including at least 15,000 children, the Biden administration has gone full steam ahead in its pursuit of a defense pact with Saudi Arabia that it views as the pathway to peace between Israel and Palestine and the broader Middle East. The looming agreement would offer Riyadh a security guarantee in exchange for the normalization of relations with Israel.Such an agreement could exacerbate regional tensions and introduce more arms, potentially including nuclear weapons, into the Middle East. Washington would be further implicated in a Saudi Arabian foreign policy that has proven reckless without gaining much in return."It is not in U.S. interests to extend a security guarantee to Saudi Arabia, which could potentially require the US to send American troops to fight and die to defend the House of Saud," Annelle Sheline, Middle East research fellow at the Quincy Institute, told RS. "The U.S. is no longer dependent on Saudi oil and therefore should reduce its military commitments to the Kingdom, not super-size them."In addition to risking American lives, a defense commitment for Riyadh would further tie Washington to a regime that has a concerning human rights record, carried out a war on Yemen that killed nearly 400,000 Yemenis, and who recent court documents show were complicit in the 9/11 attacks.Biden ran pledging to turn Saudi Arabia into a "pariah," but quickly reversed course and has made the potential defense pact a top foreign policy priority. Trump, for his part, also cultivated close ties with Riyadh, launching the first normalization agreements under the Abraham Accords, between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain during his presidency. How do we compete with China and avoid conflict?Both the Biden and Trump administrations pinpointed China as their primary national security threat and foreign policy priority. Though tensions have not yet bubbled over into outright conflict, the Biden administration has largely followed his predecessor's lead with aggressive rhetoric and economic policies."U.S.–China relations have been quiet recently, but dangerous pressures are building under the surface. If we stay the present course, we're likely to see major conflict in the next presidential term, no matter who wins in November," Jake Werner, acting director of the East Asia Program at the Quincy Institute, told RS. "To change U.S.–China competition from toxic to healthy, we need fewer provocations on both sides, particularly on the most sensitive issue, Taiwan. Even as we implement prudent safeguards, America should stop trying to exclude China from important markets, technologies, and the life of our country."An escalation of conflict with China could have devastating consequences for the United States. Estimates suggest that a war over Taiwan cost the worldeconomy $10 trillion — around 10% of global GDP, and the U.S. and its regional allies would likely lose thousands of service members, dozens of ships, and hundreds of aircraft. One war game concluded that in the first three weeks of war, the United States would suffer roughly half as many casualties as it did in 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan."We need to recognize that the US and China share interests on the most important issues to regular Americans, including climate change, public health, peaceful world politics, and expanding opportunity in the global economy," says Werner. "If each side stops regarding the other as an inevitable enemy, we could begin serious talks on the reforms that would make space for both countries to thrive."Are we spending enough on our military?The U.S. Congress is currently debating a military budget of nearly $900 billion, and some experts say that the real number has already surpassed $1 trillion. Some prominent Senators want the budget to grow even more, citing the threats posed by China and Russia as the reason. But Washington spends more than the next ten countries combined. And that total is far higher than is required to keep Americans safe. "We can mount a robust defense of America and its allies for far less than we are spending now if we adopt a less interventionist posture and take a more realistic view of the challenge posed by China," Bill Hartung, senior research fellow at the Quincy Institute, tells RS. Neither Trump nor Biden has shown much appetite for cutting the Pentagon budget, but pursuing a strategy could allow the next president to put diplomatic, economic, and cultural engagement, as opposed to militarism, at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. Pursuing such a strategy might push allies to stop free-riding on U.S. military largesse and begin to invest in their own defense and would free up funds that could be invested back into the urgent challenges facing Americans at home.
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The United States is bombing Yemen, and according to the news coverage the reason is a string of recent attacks by Houthi militants on commercial ships in the Gulf of Aden. A New York Times headline from last week is typical: "After Red Sea Barrage by Houthis, U.S. and Allies Weigh Retaliation."This is technically true. Since November, the Houthis, who receive weapons and aid from Iran, have launched dozens of missiles at vessels in international shipping lanes, leading some ships to avoid the Red Sea entirely and sail all the way around Africa. But contra the headlines, the Houthis didn't suddenly become aggressive last year nor did American meddling in Yemen begin yesterday.The U.S. has been trying to dislodge the Houthis for almost a decade now. It's failed, and there's little reason to think the current effort will succeed either.American involvement in Yemen began in 2015 after the Houthis invaded and captured the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. In response, Yemen's neighbor Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab nations and began bombing Houthi targets, with the U.S. providing arms, logistical support, and other assistance like midair refueling for Saudi jets. It was seen as reluctant realpolitik on Washington's part: The Saudis felt cold-shouldered by the West's nuclear deal with their hated rival Iran, so the Obama administration reassured them by backing their war.From the beginning, Yemen's conflict was a strange fit for American involvement. At stake were largely local issues: The Houthis were Zaydi Muslims, an idiosyncratic sect of Shiite Islam, who had historically complained of discrimination. They were allied with a former president of Yemen who was trying to depose a then-current president of Yemen. There was also a sectarian overlay: The Houthis were Shias backed by Iran while the Saudis and its allies were Sunnis.You'd think Washington would have learned from the failure of the Iraq war to stay out of Islamic sectarian battles. If the United States had any interests in Yemen at all, it was in keeping a Sunni group and an enemy of the Houthis, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), at bay. Instead as the Saudis further destabilized Yemen, into the chaos stepped AQAP. They fanned out across the eastern part of the country, establishing a foothold as never before, with many analysts suggesting they were the most dangerous al-Qaeda franchise on Earth.Here was another lesson from Iraq: Instability is a terrorist's best friend. The Houthis in a sense were an echo of Iraq too. As Bruce Riedel has written, "The American invasion of Iraq in 2003 deeply radicalized the Houthi movement, like it did many other Arabs. …It was a turning point largely unrecognized outside Yemen, another unanticipated consequence of George Bush's Iraq adventures." Now, the American intervention in Yemen was yielding horrific civilian casualties and humanitarian strife, driving locals into the arms of both al-Qaeda and the Houthis, the very groups we were trying to stop.This is the Yemen into which America is hurling fresh ordnance today, one emaciated by war and bloodshed. It's the poorest country in the Middle East. The U.N. says it's home to the world's worst humanitarian crisis. The Houthis have survived the Saudi coalition and are increasingly confident they can outlast any challenger. The American-recognized Yemeni government is still banished from Sanaa and holed up in the country's south.Meanwhile the United States is once again finding that dislodging the Houthis is more complicated than it seems. Dropping bombs is easy; influencing events on the ground less so. So it was that, as the New York Times reports, while recent U.S. airstrikes in Yemen "damaged or destroyed about 90 percent of the targets struck, [Houthi forces] retained about three-quarters of its ability to fire missiles and drones at ships transiting the Red Sea." The Houthis have since vowed to retaliate against the U.S. while Sanaa recently hosted a large anti-American rally.It's a pattern that's played out time and again: The U.S. intervenes somewhere; this empowers our putative enemies who take advantage of the chaos and win hearts and minds; those enemies launch an attack; the U.S. uses the attack as a pretext for another military action; rinse and repeat sans any historical memory. Remember this the next time you hear that our hand was forced by the Houthis.
Die Arbeit diskutiert zunächst das Ausblenden grüner Themen in der Syrien-Forschung und die geringe Bedeutung von Großschutzgebieten. Diese Beobachtung führt zum Ausgangspunkt und ersten Schwerpunkt der Arbeit, dem Nachweis von zwei wichtigen Defiziten: Zum einen fehlt bisher im zentralistisch organisierten Staat Syrien die Region als Ebene von Politik und Planung, zum anderen gibt es noch keine ernst zu nehmende Umweltpolitik. Aber der globale Klimawandel, der demographische Wandel (Bevölkerungszuwachs, Urbanisierung),die sich verschärfende Wasserkrise und der wachsende Mangel an fossilen Energieträgern erzwingen eine Behebung dieser Defizite.(Kap. 1) Die Arbeit verfolgt diese Mängel auf der nationalen, regionalen und kommunalen Ebene, indem sie für jede dieser Ebenen die historisch-kulturellen und natürlichen Aspekte der gegenwärtigen Situation herausarbeitet.(Kap. 2, 3, 4). Sie stützt sich auf die Auswertung der amtlichen Quellen sowie der wissenschaftlichen Literatur (arabisch, deutsch, französisch, englisch), auf persönliche Kontakte und Gespräche sowie auf Vorort-Untersuchungen am Orontes-Mittellauf und innerhalb von Hama. Den zweiten Arbeitsschwerpunkt bildet die Begründung des "Nationalparks" als eines neuen Typus regionaler und kommunaler Entwicklung. Dabei wird Syrien als Nationalstaat verstanden mit fünf hydrographisch-kulturell abgrenzbaren Regionen: Küste (Latakkia/Tartus), Nord (Aleppo/ Idlep, mit Qwiq), Mitte (Homs/Hama mit Orontes) Süd (Damaskus/ Umland mit Barada, incl.Alsweida/Dara), Ost (Alraqqa, AlHasaka, Deir Alzor mit Euphrat). In jeder dieser Regionen bzw. ihrer Nationalparks geht es sowohl um den Schutz der verbliebenen Naturgüter und des jeweiligen kulturellen Erbes wie auch um deren Erneuerung und Entwicklung. Am Beispiel der Region Mitte mit Hama und seinem Umland wird gezeigt, dass das "grüne kulturelle Erbe" der islamisch-arabischen Länder nicht nur auf wenige berühmte Gärten zu beschränken ist, sondern auch vielfältige andere Grünräume mit einschließt (z.B. die historische Hydrotechnik und Gartenkultur am Orontes/Al Asi), deren Erhalt und Erneuerung für die zukünftige Stadt- und Regionalentwicklung von großer ökonomischer, ökologischer, kultureller und sozialer Bedeutung ist. Der Nationalpark ist gedacht als repräsentativer Teilraum einer Region, in dem Erfahrungen gesammelt werden im sozialverträglichen Umgang mit dem natürlichen und kulturellen Erbe, die dann auf die anderen Räume der Region oder ggf.auch landesweit übertragen werden können. Die Diskussion möglicher Vorgehensweisen zur Einrichtung und Praxis eines Nationalparks sind Gegenstand des abschließenden Kapitels. Die Untersuchung war abgeschlossen vor Beginn der gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen im März 2011. Diese bestätigen die Bedeutung des hier vorgeschlagenen Konzepts der Regionen und Nationalparks für den Wiederaufbau und die Erneuerung des Landes. ; Why are "green" questions so irrelevant in Syria-related research? Beginning with this initial question the author identifies two deficits in Syria's highly centralized national politics: the lack of regions and of a regional development policy as well as the absence of any environmental protection policy which deserves this title. However global warming, demographic change (ongoing population growth combined with further urbanization), sharpening water crisis and increasing shortage of fossil fuels are urgently pressing for a correction of these shortcomings (Chapter 1). The thesis looks into these deficits at the national, regional and local level by elaborating the historic-cultural and physical aspects of the present situation (chapters 2, 3, 4). In order to correct them the author introduces the concept of National Parks as a new type of regional and local development. Syria is perceived as a nation state with five distinctly unique regions characterized by specific hydrological and cultural conditions: Coastal Region (Latakkia/Tartus), North (Aleppo/ Idlep, with Qwiq River), Central (Homs/Hama with Orontes River), South (Damascus and periphery with Barada River, incl. Alsweida/Dara), East (Alraqqa, AlHasaka, Deir Alzor with Euphrates River). A National Park is proposed for each of these regions, however with functions different from those in other states: Here the conservation of comparatively undisturbed biotopes and species and cultural heritage sites has to be combined with their renovation and development. Analysis is based on official documents, academic research (Arab, German, French, and English publications), personal exchanges, on spot investigations in the middle reaches of the Orontes River and within Hama City. Taking these spaces of the Central Region as an example for the regional and local level, it will be documented, that "green cultural heritage" in Islamic/Arab societies should not be seen restricted to a small number of famous gardens, but rather includes a broad range of other green spaces, such as traditional horticulture land use and historical hydro-technology along the middle reaches of the Orontes River. Conservation and redevelopment of these neglected spaces would be of great economic, ecological, cultural and social importance. The tool to achieve this goal would be a representative area of the region eventually to be designated as a National Park. It would serve as an experimental and model area, within which socially acceptable procedures to deal with the conservation and rehabilitation of natural and cultural heritage can be developed. The final chapter is devoted to the discussion of potential options aiming at the establishment and management of a National Park. Field work and writing for this thesis were terminated before the outbreak of open violence in spring 2011. These militant conflicts underline the importance of the proposed concept of regions and national parks for the reconstruction and renovation of Syria.
The crucial position that Saudi Arabia has in global oil markets cannot be overstated. In 2019 its proven crude oil reserves stood at 297.6 billion barrels, representing 17 per cent of the world's total. In the same year Saudi Arabia produced 11.8 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude, blended, and unblended condensates, and natural gas liquids. The country produces a wide array of crudes, ranging from Arab Super Light all the way to Arabian Heavy. Despite rising domestic demand in the past few decades, Saudi Arabia exports the bulk of its crude production and thus has a dominant position in international trade. It is the only country that has an official policy of maintaining spare capacity that can be utilized within a relatively short time at a low cost. Saudi Arabia's reserves are also among the cheapest in the world to find, develop, and produce. In contrast to some neighbouring countries and other OPEC members, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela, Saudi Arabia has not experienced conflict or political instability and has not been subject to international sanctions. It has thus been able to invest heavily in its energy sector and integrate the upstream sector with refining and downstream assets, both in the kingdom and overseas. The oil and gas sectors are also heavily integrated, given the large volumes of associated gas produced. Saudi Arabia also has also a dominant position in OPEC and historically the organization's key decisions have been shaped by the kingdom, either those related to cutting output to balance the market or increasing output to offset output disruption within OPEC and elsewhere. Although Saudi Arabia's output has not been impacted by political or military shocks it has nonetheless been highly variable reflecting the kingdom's flexibility to increase and decrease output in response to shocks. Given its size and large margins, the oil sector also plays a key role in the Saudi economy. Despite new revenue sources, the government remains highly reliant on oil revenues for its current and capital spending. Also, government spending is a key driver of growth in non-oil and private-sector activity through infrastructure investment, public sector wage bills, and social transfers. All the aforementioned features, from the size of the kingdom's reserve base and production to the high reliance of government finances on oil revenues, have shaped Saudi oil policy choices and its relations with other producers over the years. The main purpose of this paper is to analyse a range of these policy choices and relations, their determinants, and the evolving role of the oil sector in the context of an energy transition, the speed of which remains highly uncertain and its impact uneven across the globe.
