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EC intellectual property law has now reached a significant level of harmonization, and the Community can take pride in its achievements in this respect. The need to report a wealth of new matters leaves little space for introduction. However, two issues may be highlighted here briefly. The first is that in May 2004 ten new Member States will join the EU. Although enlargement offers immense opportunities, it also presents a considerable practical challenge. The second is the Commission's plan for a directive to harmonize procedure and remedies for intellectual property infringement throughout the EU.1It seeks to go further than the ground rules on enforcement already laid down by TRIPs, and to lay down specific procedural codes for intellectual property infringement of all types—not merely piracy and counterfeiting. This enthusiasm for intervention in the procedural aspects of national law has raised serious concerns in some quarters.

Although intellectual property is just a sidelight of Roger Blair's work, he has published at least seven articles and coauthored a book on this subject. Blair's work sets out robust economic models that address nearly all of the significant economic issues in intellectual property. Moreover, by using the property rules framework, he has offered a useful counterweight to the reward-to-loss theory that dominates the literature.

This study attempts to experimentally capture the effects of democratic reform of intellectual property (IP) and measure how a vote "against IP" can disappoint the most talented innovators and reduce their creativity. Contrary to expectations, the results show that such a vote increases overall creativity. Actually, the most talented innovators do not vote in favor of IP. Rather, those who vote in favor of IP are those who benefit relatively more from royalties. Surprisingly, no correlation is found between these two populations: the IP in our experiment seems not to reward the best players, but the players choosing an 'autarkic' strategy of relying on their own creationsand forego cross-fertilization with other players. These are not particularly brilliant players thatopt for a rent-seeking strategy that maximises gainsfromthe IP systemitself. There are plausible arguments to argue that this result is at least partly valid in the real world, especially for complexand highly sequential innovations where it has been proven that patent trolls and anti-competitivestrategies are important. These findings lead us not to recommend IP constitutional protections,because there are no major "tyranny from the majority" concerns.

This study attempts to experimentally capture the effects of democratic reform of intellectual property (IP) and measure how a vote "against IP" can disappoint the most talented innovators and reduce their creativity. Contrary to expectations, the results show that such a vote increases overall creativity. Actually, the most talented innovators do not vote in favor of IP. Rather, those who vote in favor of IP are those who benefit relatively more from royalties. Surprisingly, no correlation is found between these two populations: the IP in our experiment seems not to reward the best players, but the players choosing an 'autarkic' strategy of relying on their own creationsand forego cross-fertilization with other players. These are not particularly brilliant players thatopt for a rent-seeking strategy that maximises gainsfromthe IP systemitself. There are plausible arguments to argue that this result is at least partly valid in the real world, especially for complexand highly sequential innovations where it has been proven that patent trolls and anti-competitivestrategies are important. These findings lead us not to recommend IP constitutional protections,because there are no major "tyranny from the majority" concerns.

Introduction to Economics -- Economics of Intellectual Property -- Patents -- Economics of copyright -- Trade Marks and Design Rights -- Trade Secrets and Other Rights -- Competition and Intellectual Property -- How Intellectual Property Delivers Value -- When Intellectual Property Delivers Value -- Determinants of Intellectual Property Value -- Intellectual Property and Intangibles Valuation Methodologies and Techniques -- Reporting and Accounting for Intellectual Property and Intangibles