Suchergebnisse

DIE GESCHICHTE DES JÜDISCHEN VOLKES IN DER NEUZEIT Weltgeschichte des jüdischen Volkes (-) Die Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes in der Neuzeit (7, Die Neuzeit ; Zweite Periode ; 1928) ( - ) Einband ( - ) Titelseite ([2]) Titelseite ([3]) Impressum ([4]) Inhaltsverzeichnis (5) Der Neuzeit zweite Periode. Die polnisch-deutsche Hegemonie in der Übergangsepoche (1648-1789) ([9]) § 1. Allgemeine Übersicht (11) Erstes Kapitel. Die Katastrophe in Polen und die allnationale messianische Bewegung (1648-1675) (16) § 2. Die wirtschaftlichen und nationalen Gegensätze in der Ukraine (16) § 3. Das Schreckensjahr des ukrainischen Gemetzels (1648) (21) § 4. Die Invasion der Moskowiter und Schweden und die Verheerung der großpolnischen Gemeinden (1654-1656) (31) § 5. Von den "vormessianischen Leiden" zum Reiche des Messias (40) § 6. Sabbatai Zewi und die messianische Gärung in der Türkeri (48) § 7. Die Anfänge der messianischen Bewegung in Europa (59) § 8. Das Messianische Jahr (1666) (64) § 9. Die Verwandlung des politischen Messianismus in einen mystischen (74) Zweites Kapitel. Das autonome Zentrum der polnischen Judenheit bis zu seinem Verfall (84) § 10. Die Verschlimmerung der sozialen Zustände in der Zeit des Wiederaufbaus (1658-1674) (84) § 11. Die "Tumulte" in den Städten und das Gespenst des Messias (89) § 12. Die Bekämpfung der "Tumulte" unter Jan Sobieski (1674-1696) (99) § 13. Die inneren Verhältnisse in der ersten Hälfte des XVII. Jahrhunderts (104) § 14. Die Wirren unter August II. (1697-1733) (111) § 15. Die Ritualmordaffären. Der Prozeß von Sandomierz (120) § 16. Der Niedergang Polens unter August III. (1734-1763) (127) § 17. Die Haidamakenplage bis um die Mitte des XVIII. Jahrhunderts (134) § 18. Der Triumpf der Blutlüge (1736-1753) (140) § 19. Schutz- und Kampfmaßnahmen gegen die Blutlüge (151) § 20. Die Zeit des Stanislaus August, der Haidamakengreuel und der ersten Teilung Polens (1764-1789) (157) § 21. Die Kahale und Waadim bis zum Jahre 1764 (170) § 22. Das rabbinische Schrifttum und die Volksliteratur (178) § 23. Die Mystiker und die geheimen Sabbatianer (189) § 24. Die Frankisten als "Kontratalmudisten" (194) § 25. Die Frankisten als christianisierende Sekte (202) § 26. Die Entstehung des Chassidismus: Israel Baal-schem-tow (213) § 27. Die Ausbreitung des Chassidismus und des Zaddikismus (221) § 28. Der Rabbinismus im Widerstreit mit dem Chassidismus und die Vorboten der Aufklärung (226) Drittes Kapitel. Die Entstehung des jüdischen Zentrums in Rußlanhd (232) § 29. Vom Moskowitischen Reiche zum Petrinischen Rußland (1654-1725) (232) § 30. Die Verfolgung der "Feinde Christi" unter den drei Kaiserinnen (1727-1761) (243) § 31. Katharina II. und die Annexion Weißrußlands (1762-1789) (253) Viertes Kapitel. Die Übergangszeit in Österreich und Deutschland (264) § 32. Die Ausweisung aus Wien und die Rückkehr der Finanzmänner (1670-1740) (264) § 33. Die Auswirkung des österreichischen Regimes in Böhmen, Mähren, Schlesien und Ungarn (bis 1740) (276) § 34. Die grausamen Launen Maria Theresias (1740-1780) (284) § 35. Das neue Zentrum in Preußen (1650-1740) (292) § 36. Das preußische Reglementierungssystem unter Friedrich dem Großen (1740-1786) (304) § 37. Die Sephardim und Aschkenasim in Hamburg (310) § 38. Das alte Ghetto in Frankfurt am Main (319) § 39. Die bevorrechteten Finanzmagnaten und das entrechtete Volk (Sachsen, Mecklenburg, die Pfalz und Württemberg) (325) § 40. Die Einmischung der Staatsgewalt in das autonome Gemeindeleben (339) § 41. Der Kampf des Rabbinismus gegen den Mystizismus (346) § 42. Die Anfänge der Aufklärung. Mendelssohn (357) § 43. Mendelssohns Aufklärungswerk (364) § 44. Utilitäts- und Humanitätstoleranz: Josef II., Lessing, Dohm (372) Fünftes Kapitel. Die Restauration in Frankreich und England und die jüdischen Kolonien in Amerika (385) § 46. Die Sephardim in den südfranzösischen Provinzen (385) § 47. Die Aschkenasim im Elsaß und in Lothringen. (396) § 48. Die jüdische Frage in der französischen Literatur. Die Vorboten der Emanzipation (404) § 49. Die Rückkehr der Juden nach England (412) § 50. Der Kampf um die Naturalisationsbill (1753-1754) (423) § 51. Die Kolonien in Amerika bis zur Unabhängigkeitserklärung (429) Sechstes Kapitel. Die Juden in Italien, Holland und der Türkei und die Marranen in den Ländern der Inquisition (436) § 52. Das römische Ghetto (436) § 53. Die Republik Venedig, Toscana und das österreichische Italien (446) § 54. Die Marranen in Spanien (451) § 55. Die Marranen in Portugal und der Geist des XVIII. Jahrhunderts (456) § 56. Die Sephardim und Aschkenasim in Holland (462) § 57. Der verbannte Baruch Spinoza (468) § 58. Zwischen Mystik und Aufklärung (475) § 59. Die europäische Türkei und die Balkanländer (487) § 60. Palästina und die asiatische Türkei, Marokko und Persien (495) Anhang ([507]) Exkurse und Nachträge (509) Note 1. Zur Quellenkunde und Methodologie (509) Note 2. Das letzte Jahrhundert der Kahalverbände in Polen (1648-1764) (zu §§ 13 und 21) (516) Note 3. John Toland und der erste Aufruf zur Emanzipation (zu §§ 49-50) (520) Nachträge zu Band VII (523) Bibliographie. Quellen- und Literaturnachweise (525) § 2. (Die Gegensätze in der Ukraine) (525) § 3. (Das ukrainische Gemetzel vom Jahre 1648). § 4. (Die Moskowiter- und Schweden-Invasion). § 5. (Die vormessianischen Leiden). §§ 6-9. (Sabbatai Zewi) (526) §§ 10-11. (Die Restauration von 1657-1674) (526) § 12. (Die Zeit des Jan Sobieski, 1674-1696). § 13. (Die innere Organisation). § 14. (August IIl, 1697-1733). (527) § 15. (Der Prozeß von Sandomierz) (527) §§ 16-17. (Polen unter August III., 1734-1763). §§ 18-19. (Die Blutlüge) (528) § 20. (Die Zeit des Stanislaus August, 1764-1789) (528) § 21. (Die Kahale und Wandim bis 1764). § 22. (Die rabbinische und die Volksliteratur). § 23. (Die Mystiker und geheimen Sabbatianer). (529) §§ 24-25. (Die Frankisten) (529) §§ 26-27. (Chassidismus und Zaddikismus). § 28. (Rabbinismus, Chassidismus, Aufklärung). § 29. (Das Moskowitische und Petrinische Rußland) (530) § 30. (Die Verfolgungen unter den drei Kaiserinnen) (530) § 31. (Die Juden unter Katharina II.). § 32. (Österreich: Wien 1670-1740). § 33. (Böhmen, Mähren, Ungarn bis 1740) (531) § 34. (Maria Theresia, 1740-1780). §§ 35-36. (Das neue Zentrum in Preußen). § 37. (Die Sepharim und Aschkenasim in Hamburg) (532) § 38. (Das Frankfurter Ghetto) (532) § 39. (Sachsen, Mecklenburg, die Pfalz usw.) § 40. (Der Staat und die Gemeindeautonomie). § 41. (Der Kampf zwischen Rabbinismus und Mystizismus) (533) §§ 42-43. (Die Aufklärung, Moses Mendelssohn). § 44. (Joseph II., Lessing, Dohm) § 45. (Aufklärer und Obskuranten). § 46. (Die Sephardim in Südfrankreich) (534) § 47. (Die Aschkenasim im Elsaß) (534) § 48. (Die Vorläufer der Emanzipation). §§ 49-50. (Die Restauration und Naturalisation in England). § 51. (Die Kolonien in Amerika). § 52. (Das römische Ghetto) (535) § 53. (Venedig, Toscana und das österreichische Italien). §§ 54-55. (Die Marranen in Spanien und Portugal). § 56. (Die Sephardim und Aschkenasim in Holland). § 57. (Baruch Spinoza) (536) § 58. (Zwischen Mystik und Aufklärung) (536) § 59. (Die europäische Türkei). § 60. (Palästina, die Asiastische Türkei usw.) (537) Namen- und Sachregister (538) Abbas I. und II. (Persien) - Ayllon, Salomo (538) Baalschem (Wundertäter) - Bychow (538) Cardoso, Abraham Michael - Dunajewzi (Dunaigorod) (539) Edoms Religion - Fürth (540) Gaden, Daniel von - Gumperz (540) Haag - Judensavanna (Amerika) (541) Kaballa, Kabbalisten - Kurpfalz ( Baden) (541) Lacosta, Jan (Hofnarr) - Luzatto, Moses Chaim (542) "Maaminim" - Mystizismus (543) Nancy - Przemysl (544) Rabbiner - Rußland (544) Sabbatai Zewi - Syrien (545) Talmudstudium - Voltaire (546) Waad von Litauen - Württemberg (546) Zabludowski, Gabriel - Zünfte, christliche ( - ) Einband ( - ) Einband ( - )

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. The Demythification of Gold in the Spanish Enlightenment: Money, Commerce, and Market -- Chapter 3. Locke, Money, and America -- Chapter 4. Spinoza on Money and Social Desire -- Chapter 5. J'ai fort medité autresfois sur cette matière: Philosophy and Money in Leibniz -- Chapter 6. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange and the Metaphysics of Capitalism: A Reading of Joseph de la Vega's Confusión de confusions -- Chapter 7. Marriage, Money, and Women's Independence in the Modern Era -- Chapter 8. Exciting the Industry of the Irish: Bishop Berkeley's Philosophy of Money -- Chapter 9. Hume's Philosophy of Money -- Chapter 10. Rousseau and Money -- Chapter 11. Adam Smith on Money: A Condemnation of Mercantilism -- Chapter 12. "Tickets of Despotism": Edmund Burke on the Assignats, Abstract Theory, and the French Revolution -- Chapter 13. Kant, Innes, and the Copernican Turn in Monetary Theory -- Chapter 14. Money in Fichte's The Closed Commercial State -- Chapter 15. Money in Hegel's Philosophy -- Chapter 16. Adam Müller on Money -- Chapter 17. Philosophy, Money and Emancipation: The Women Philosophers of German Romanticism -- Chapter 18. The Materialist God: Marx's Critique of Money -- Chapter 19. Nietzsche on Transcending Money -- Chapter 20. Suspect Paper: Money in Romanticism -- Chapter 21. Georg Simmel: The Analytics of Money -- Chapter 22. Cash Rules Everything Around Me: Georg Simmel's The Philosophy of Money -- Chapter 23. Max Weber on Money -- Chapter 24. Money and Philosophy in Vienna: Otto Neurath and Ludwig Wittgenstein -- Chapter 25. Spontaneity as a Concept of General Significance: The Austrian School on Money and Economic Order -- Chapter 26. Anscombe on Money, Debt, and Usury -- Chapter 27. On the Sociality of Money According to Emmanuel Levinas -- Chapter 28. Psychoanalytic Currency: Money, Commensurability, and Clinical Economies from Freud to Lacan -- Chapter 29. Money, Women, and Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Living Currencies and the Gender of Capital -- Chapter 30. Money in Critical Theory: Pollock, Adorno, Habermas -- Chapter 31. Alfred Sohn-Rethel and Rudolf-Wolfgang Müller: The Idea of Money and Money as Idea -- Chapter 32. Liberation and Monetary Policy in Cabral and Pan-African Materialism -- Chapter 33. In Debt to Derrida: Deconstruction and Monetary Criticism -- Chapter 34. Michel Foucault and Money -- Chapter 35.John Searle's Ontology of Money and Its Critics.

Introduction -- 1. Ho Peng-Yoke, Chinese Number Mysticism -- 2. Kim Plofker, Derivation and Revelation: the Legitimacy of Mathematical Models in Indian Cosmology -- 3. Reviel Netz, The Pythagoreans -- 4. Ian Mueller, Mathematics and the Divine in Plato -- 5. Jean-Fraṅois Matťi, Nicomachus of Gerasa and the Divine Arithmetical Ladder -- 6. Dominic J. O'Meara, Geometry and the Divine in Proclus -- 7. Marie-Pierre Terrien, Religious Architecture and Mathematics during Late Antiquity -- 8. David A. King, The Sacred Geography of Islam -- 9. Faith Wallis, 'Number Mystique' in early medieval computus texts -- 10. Maurice-Ruben Hayoun, Is the Divine Universe Divisible -- 11. Charles Lohr, Mathematics and the Divine: Ramon Lull -- 12. Hugue Garcia, Christian Gnosis -- 13. Edith Dudley Sylla, Swester Katrei and Gregory of Rimini: Angels, God and Mathematics in the Fourteenth Century -- 14. Jean-Michel Counet, Mathematics and the Divine in Nicholas of Cusa -- 15. Teun Koetsier and Karin Reich, Michael Stifel and his Numerology -- 16. Ivo Schneider, Between Rosicrucians and Kabbala -- the Mathematics of the Biblical Numbers of Johannes Faulhaber -- 17. Eberhard Knobloch, Mathematics and the Divine: Athanasius Kircher -- 18. Volker R. Remmert, Galileo, God and Mathematics -- 19. Andř Charrak, The Mathematical Model of Creation According to Kepler -- 20. Jean-Marie Nicolle, The Mathematical Analogy in the Proof of God's Existence by Descartes -- 21. Donald Adamson, Pascal's Views on Mathematics and the Divine -- 22. Ger Harmsen, Spinoza and the Geometrical Method of Proof -- 23. Philip Beeley and Siegmund Probst, John Wallis (1616-1703): Mathematician and Divine -- 24. Kees de Pater, Newton and the Ocean of Truth -- 25. Herbert Breger, Leibniz: Mathematics and the Divine -- 26. Wolfgang Breidert, Berkeley's Defence of the Infinite God in Contrast to the Infinite in Mathematics -- 27. Ruediger Thiele, Leonhard Euler and the Divine -- 28. Ruediger Thiele, Georg Cantor and the Divine -- 29. Luc Bergmans, Gerrit Mannoury and his Fellow Significians on Mathematics and Mysticism -- 30. Teun Koetsier, Arthur Schopenhauer and L.E.J. Brouwer: A Comparison -- 31. Sergei S. Demidov and Charles E. Ford, On the Road to a Unified View: Priest Pavel Florensky -- Theologian, Philosopher and Scientist -- 32. Fraṅois De Gandt, Husserl and Impossible Numbers: a Sceptical Experience -- 33. Bruno Pinchard, Symbol and Space According to Reň Gǔnon -- 34. Teun Koetsier, Eddington: Science and the Unseen World -- 35. Albert van der Schoot, The Divined Proportion

The main purpose of the article is to reconstruct the development of a socialized interpretation of shame in the Western philosophical tradition from antiquity up to the 17th century. Along with the standard methods of conducting research in the history of philosophy (critical, comparative, hermeneutical, etc.), the author resorts to a strategy of identifying the historical sources and rudimentary forms of contemporary theoretical approaches to understanding moral phenomena. With regard to shame, there are three such approaches, or three interpretations: socialized (identifying shame with negative feelings about a real or imagined loss of face), anthropological (identifying shame with a painful reaction to the generic imperfection of a person in the sphere of corporeality) and desocialized (identifying shame with negative feelings of an individual generated by the awareness of the worthlessness of his own moral character). Studying the development of each of them requires an understanding of how they historically interacted with each other. The first detailed description of shame from the socialized perspective was proposed by Aristotle. In it, shame appears as a fear of disrepute or suffering from it, that is, a negative feeling that presupposes that other people know that an individual has committed an objectively vicious act or that he does not have some objectively valuable quality. Aristotle viewed shame as a less perfect moral trait than virtue (in contemporary socialized conceptions of shame, guilt is usually its more perfect alternative). Thomas Aquinas relies on the Aristotelian understanding of shame, but: a) connects it with the anthropological interpretation proposed by Augustine, b) makes a special emphasis on the fact that shame is appropriate only in the case of the sinfulness of the act. The early modern socialized conceptions of shame are characterized by a movement from doubt about the reasonableness of this feeling to its partial or complete rehabilitation. At the same time, R. Descartes, B. Spinoza and J. Locke, unlike Aristotle and Thomas, approve of shame not only because it is an imperfect counterpart of virtue, but also in connection with its positive social role (as a means of social discipline and an expression of sociability). Although early modern thinkers discuss moral emotions of self-assessment that are not mediated by the "eye of others" (repentance, remorse), they do not oppose them to shame

Purpose of the paper is to highlight the methodological role of social philosophy in the processes of optimizing the democratic system, modernizing the content of the category of freedom and responsibility ‑ through the philosophical analysis of definitions by representatives of various political forces and the humanities. The task is to reveal the causes of the ambiguity of the concept of democracy through the analysis of the polysemy of the notions of freedom and responsibility and to prevent the danger of the transformation of democracy into a dictatorship or ochlocracy. Theoretical basis is the fundamental research of prominent philosophers such as B. Spinoza, G. F. F. Hegel, G.-V. Leibniz, F. Nietzsche, J.-J. Russo, J.-P. Sartre, E. Fromm, M. Berdyaev and others; the basic principles of social philosophy ‑ social determinism, the concreteness of truth, rationality, interconnection and development, the requirements of comprehensiveness and criticism. Originality of the research is: in substantiating the significance of contemporary philosophical analysis of the content of key concepts of democracy ‑ «freedom» and «responsibility»; in revealing the mechanism of the functioning of concepts of freedom and responsibility in different ideologies and various spheres of public life; in conducting a philosophical analysis of the notion of responsibility, in revealing the reasons for the paradoxical nature of its manifestations; in outlining the scientific and didactic potential of the philosophical research of categories of freedom and responsibility in the practice of democratic processes; in posing the question of the need to take into account the hierarchy of the content of freedom (delineation of the word, concept, category). Conclusions. As a result of the study, it was found that the philosophical understanding of the basic principles and concepts of democracy, especially freedom and responsibility, must precede the optimization of the democratic system, and the results of philosophical analysis must be taken into account in the practice of everyday life of the state. The model of the constant reproduction of the existing state of spiritual differentiation of a person's worldview should be contrasted with the model of harmonization of the democratic system (which is an ideal), only reducing its internal contradiction to the non-antagonistic and the formation on this basis of self-limitation, self-determination of personalities ‑ as a consequence of understanding the relativity of freedom, full awareness and acceptance responsibility for their intentions and decisions.

Poverty and democracy keep complex relationships studied enough by social scientists. This article does not turn on these approaches and won't emphasize governance problems arising from poverty; it will present the philosophical and political criticism to the democratic ideal that results when considering poverty as a deprivation of individual liberty, as Amartya Sen does. Interpreting the poverty in this way, it is faced direct and problematically with a system of government that just makes freedoms and human freedom in general, its nerve center. This article argues that the presence of poverty casts doubts on living in very democratic societies, because it questions the purpose and essence of these, while challenging them to think how they can become just societies. The text begins with a philosophical interpretation of poverty from some Sen's ideas. Then the analysis focuses on the relationship could be established between lack of freedom and the political community, according to Aristotle, Baruch Spinoza and John Locke. The text ends with three challenges poverty makes to democracies ; La pobreza y la democracia guardan relaciones complejas bastante estudiadas por los científicos sociales. En este artículo no se vuelve sobre estos enfoques ni se insistirá en los problemas de gobernabilidad que nacen de la pobreza; se presentará la crítica filosófico-política al ideal democrático que resulta cuando se considera a la pobreza como privación de libertad individual, tal como lo hace Amartya Sen. Al interpretar a la pobreza de esta manera, se la pone en relación directa y problemática con un sistema de gobierno que precisamente hace de las libertades y de la libertad humana, en general, su nervio central. El artículo sostiene que la presencia de la pobreza pone en duda que se viva en sociedades democráticas, porque cuestiona la finalidad y la esencia de éstas, a la vez que las desafía a pensar cómo pueden convertirse en sociedades justas. El escrito comienza con una interpretación filosófica de la pobreza a partir de algunas ideas de Sen. Luego, el análisis se centra en la relación que se podría establecer entre la privación de libertad y la comunidad política, según Aristóteles, Baruch de Espinosa y John Locke. El texto se cierra con la exposición de tres desafíos que la pobreza presenta a las democracias

In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom division. Criticism is introduced in the context of the political theories of the XXth century. There are pertinacious controversy between the proponents of negative (individualists) and positive (communals) freedom. I maintain that the division of two freedoms is criticised from the tradition of individualists or communals. Individuals maintain that individual is upper value than the community and communals maintain that individual always belong to the community. I'm investigating two well-known paradigms, which denies the Berlin's division between freedoms – the proponents of "One freedom" and the proponents of "late Republicanism". I'm arguing that the theories of late republicans doesn't introduce "the third way", whereas they stay in the tradition of negative freedom. The criticism of the proponents of "One freedom" isn't motivated, because they judge about validity of division by researching everyday relations, not the history of philosophy.

In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom division. Criticism is introduced in the context of the political theories of the XXth century. There are pertinacious controversy between the proponents of negative (individualists) and positive (communals) freedom. I maintain that the division of two freedoms is criticised from the tradition of individualists or communals. Individuals maintain that individual is upper value than the community and communals maintain that individual always belong to the community. I'm investigating two well-known paradigms, which denies the Berlin's division between freedoms – the proponents of "One freedom" and the proponents of "late Republicanism". I'm arguing that the theories of late republicans doesn't introduce "the third way", whereas they stay in the tradition of negative freedom. The criticism of the proponents of "One freedom" isn't motivated, because they judge about validity of division by researching everyday relations, not the history of philosophy.

In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom division. Criticism is introduced in the context of the political theories of the XXth century. There are pertinacious controversy between the proponents of negative (individualists) and positive (communals) freedom. I maintain that the division of two freedoms is criticised from the tradition of individualists or communals. Individuals maintain that individual is upper value than the community and communals maintain that individual always belong to the community. I'm investigating two well-known paradigms, which denies the Berlin's division between freedoms – the proponents of "One freedom" and the proponents of "late Republicanism". I'm arguing that the theories of late republicans doesn't introduce "the third way", whereas they stay in the tradition of negative freedom. The criticism of the proponents of "One freedom" isn't motivated, because they judge about validity of division by researching everyday relations, not the history of philosophy.

In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom division. Criticism is introduced in the context of the political theories of the XXth century. There are pertinacious controversy between the proponents of negative (individualists) and positive (communals) freedom. I maintain that the division of two freedoms is criticised from the tradition of individualists or communals. Individuals maintain that individual is upper value than the community and communals maintain that individual always belong to the community. I'm investigating two well-known paradigms, which denies the Berlin's division between freedoms – the proponents of "One freedom" and the proponents of "late Republicanism". I'm arguing that the theories of late republicans doesn't introduce "the third way", whereas they stay in the tradition of negative freedom. The criticism of the proponents of "One freedom" isn't motivated, because they judge about validity of division by researching everyday relations, not the history of philosophy.

Δεν παρατίθεται περίληψη στα ελληνικά. ; Nassia Yakovaki, The «Traité des trois imposteurs)) and the European Enlightenment The aim of this article is to present the obscure but fascinating story of the production and diffusion of the Traité des trois imposteurs, the best seller of the clandestine literature in Europe during the first half of the 18th century and to discuss the new and to some extent controversial interpretations that the study of this text has provoked as far as the understanding of the European Enlightenment is concerned. The importance of this text derives, first of all, from its subversive ideas: it offers a bold and straightforward attack on all three monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) by rejecting the principle of revelation and by pronouncing their founders as «impostors», while attributing the appearance of organized religions to political interests. Yet, the significance of this text goes beyond its content: the conditions of its production as well as of its circulation offer to modern historical research the chance to explore an «underground universe», peopled by relatively unknown figures, working among the middlemen of the publishing world. These circles —as it seems— had the readiness to respond creatively to a turbulent religious and political environment, to adopt rigid philosophical stands and to step into radical politics. Historical research has recently succeeded in investigating the complicated issues of the origin, dating, authorship and circulation of this notorious text and in disentangling the thread connecting this late 17th century production with the medieval legend of the «imposture». Crucial among these findings is on the one hand the bond that links the Traité with the works of Spinoza and on the other the connection between the production of the text and a group of people in late 17th and early 18th century Holland. The interesting questions concerning the general understanding of the era of «the crisis of the European consciousness» that the historical scholarship about the Traité has raised have already led to the formation of a new, stimulating, yet controversial historiographical trend which elaborates a new interpretation of the Enlightenment, around the idea of an early and radical Enlightenment (Margaret Jacob, 1981 and 2003, Jonathan Israel, 2001).

"This entertaining and enlightening graphic narrative tells the exciting story of the seventeenth-century thinkers who challenged authority--sometimes risking excommunication, prison, and even death--to lay the foundations of modern philosophy and science and help usher in a new world ... Heretics! tells the story of their ideas, lives, and times in a vivid new way. Crisscrossing Europe as it follows them in their travels and exiles, the narrative describes their meetings and clashes with each other--as well as their confrontations with religious and royal authority. It recounts key moments in the history of modern philosophy, including the burning of Giordano Bruno for heresy, Galileo's house arrest for defending Copernicanism, Descartes's proclaiming cogito ergo sum, Hobbes's vision of the "nasty and brutish" state of nature, and Spinoza's shocking Theological-Political Treatise."--Publisher's description