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The author wishes to examine the nature and the method of Theology and he poses two questions: 1. Should Theology today be contemplative? 2. What benefits can the human sciences render to Theology? It appears, in fact, that the answer to these two questions can be found in the Encyclical of Leo XIII. Concerning the first question, you have to take into account that St. Anselm has already placed theological investigation inter fidem et speciem. More precisely, the rational investigation of Theology in not only placed inter fidem et speciem, but also that it is the same movement towards beatific vision. This is something proper to the selfsame nature of Theology, which is a science of revelation, that is a contemplative look the revealed mysteries. Hence appears also the insubstitutible mission of the Magisterium, which deals with the communication of revealed facts to the beheving community. In fact, however, there are some theological groups which deny this property to Theology. They are undercurrents of the anthropological school which make man a pseudo-absolute (the rationalism of Spinoza, modernist inmanentism, bultmanian existentialism) and they want to condition the whole of this theological task on a basis in the interest of man. It is certain, on the other hand, that the interest of man is indispensable for Theology, but the mystery of man can only be clarified in the light of Revelation and not the other way round. If you do not do it in this way, you fall into a curious anthropomorphism. Other currents, which are no more than variants of the previous ones, plead in favour of action. Efficacy is the first and the principal interest of Theology and centres on a concrete political and social task. Their mistake consists of forgetting that the praxis requires a previous theory and that all the efficacy of action comes from previous contemplation. If it is right that we should remove the social and political injustices, it is also certain only in God's plan of salvation where these requirements find their exact place and justification. Referring to the second question, the author is pointing out that the attitude of the theologian faced with positive scientific disciplines (psychology, sociology, etnology, science of religions, etc.) ought to be positive at the same time, that is to say he ought to take into account that human sciences help us to get to know man better, and are a stimulus for the search for a deeper, comprehensive and critical truth, because the human sciences can have some partial or equivocal philosophical presuppositions. The solution consists of an open and dialoguing attitude, so that the theologian can benefit from the contributions of the human sciences, and thus these very sciences can also necessarily and continuously ask for a philosophical and contemplative reflection properly.

[spa] La tesis se interroga por la función de los sistemas de representación en los lenguajes de las prácticas artísticas, más allá de una mera consideración estética, insuficiente a nuestro juicio que, separándose del kantismo -y aquélla su propia separación en los albores de la sociedad capitalista- retoma el concepto de imaginación productiva de Spinoza y la crisis postrenacentista de la que emerge, para efectuar un análisis extraestético de los signos siguiendo la viva recomendación del Adorno de la Teoría estética. La perspectiva es, pues, la de una ontología constitutiva que se extiende a todas las prácticas en cuanto interventivas y constitutivo-apropiativas de realidad, sin exclusión alguna del arte como práctica del "desinterés estético", en Kant. En efecto, con la misma dignidad y eficacia que las prácticas "duras" de la transformación técnica y el trabajo en general, la institución de lenguajes y sistemas de representación son producciones cualificadas de sentido lingüístico-comunicativo y simbólico que suscitan dinámicas en los cuerpos, transforman estados anímicos, generan afecciones y revolucionan el universo del ojo y del oído cuyas percepciones constituyen, no conocimiento degradado como en Kant, sino materia prima en cuanto percepciones -seres de razón y sensación indescirniblemente- constitutivas de un conocimiento de primer grado: ideas inadecuadas, ilusión verdadera, error necesario que la mens actualiza en "nociones comunes" (Spinoza), concordancias, formalizaciones, formulaciones racionales y comunicables en la dimensión colectiva a partir de la imaginación productiva y su monádica tarea diferencial. El arte es entonces la fuerza de seducción hacia lo que todo tiende en el orden de lo sensible, en tanto que expresión coparticipada de la comunicad en uno u otro grado. Coparticipada en la medida que manifiesta el grado de saber técnico-científico ( scientific power, en Marx) y el grado de liberación lingüístico-comunicativa y simbólica respecto de las formas sujetantes anteriores, readecuadas a la nueva composición de las subjetividades. No nos inclinamos hacia ello (lo bueno, lo verdadero, lo bello) por que sean tales, sino porque lo consideramos bueno, verdadero, bello. Revolución spinoziana por excelencia: no hay ninguna finalidad salvo la retorización de nuestra potencia como tal. El arte es sentido logicizador primero de la significación imaginaria histórico-social, indecible e irreferible, magmática; es figura sobre un fondo indistinto que contiene e irradia toda la fuerza seductora de la ilusión. Voz de un hacer que, en su atribuir qué pasa en la física del mundo, qué en los cuerpos, qué en caos-cosmos, sustancializa entidades, figuras -aquello que enla cosa no es- transgresores del mundo existente, el tedio y la muerte indiferentes. Sustancializa en una práctica del atribuir cuya dimensión simbólica y productora de sentido -la técnica no sólo es dialéctica del útil y de la mano sino extensión de un gesto eficaz, también el de la cara y el gesto facial emerge como ficción modélica que produce efectos de verdad en la perspectiva foucaultiana de una historia política de la verdad. Verdad de un sujeto histórico o clase en cuanto todo decir, se efectúa desde una estructura dada de la conciencia, es decir, de la composición técnico-científica y lingüístico-comunicativa del sujeto. Composición finalmente política. Todo ello implica una aporía entre significado y sentido que las tentativas de Rusell y Moore, entre otros, trataron de resolver realísticamente reivindicando prueba hacia la realidad. Wittgenstein reduce brutalmente el significado al dato: el significado en un juego lingüístico es el uso de la palabra. Ahora bien, uso en un contexto, es función. Y más allá de lo estrictamente funcional, mera tautología, lo místico es el mundo como un todo limitado. La crítica de la filosofía ordinaria del lenguaje se resuelve en pragmatismo puesto que la fuerza de la afirmado, aun si tautológico, es superior al mero límite de lo místico que, si límite real, es enfatizado como obstáculo insalvable y en consecuencia en absoluto generador de afecciones dinamizantes y dimensión colectiva. Después de Wittgenstein viene forzosamente Heidegger y el "ser-para-la-muerte" individualístico del sujeto vienés, fascista o socialista, es decir, siempre burgués. Sin embargo, no hay dato, sino construido. La significación social imaginaria es diseminación de potencialidad innovativo-productiva, enrancia anómica, acúmulo de vida y nuevos complejos interrelacionales o dispositivos actualizables por el cuerpo social en figuras (eidé) como diferencia de lo mismo (eidos). Diferencia tanto de la figura como de la subjetividad que la genera, que se limita resemantizar el mundo y a sí misma según su propia composición de fuerzas: por ello la retoriza como finalidad, proyecto, y la denomina bella. Los signos, cierto, son convencionales y arbitrarios, pero pensamos por imágenes y no las imágenes que Wittgenstein sitúa en un plano lógico igual que las palabras, sino imágenes-afección, movimiento, tensión, tormento de la materia en términos de Marx. Todo el pensamiento negativo, desde Schopenhauer y Nietzsche a Massimo Caccari olvida la relación de necesidad del sujeto con el mundo, concebido desde una abstracta libertad absoluta de autoposición que doma el mundo, pero el propio Wittgestein nos da la clave: la conexión entre significado y significante es, no inventable como asegura, sino necesaria y determinada por la imagen-afección que subyace en el lenguaje: imaginario/deseo del conatus spinoziano, intensidad y temporalidad del cuerpo y su capacidad de obrar y determinar para perseverar en el ser. La calidad del lenguaje y la del imaginario reobran entre sí según la composición política aludida. El lenguaje, todo régimen de signos es, también el de la práctica artística, intervención en la realidad-virtualidad del mundo, al que afecta y produce regímenes de producción de verdad y realidad. El viejo materialismo y su primacía explicativa de la técnica y una noción restringida del trabajo -útil y mano- quedan superados. Y puesto que las prácticas artísticas se erigen en constitutivo-apropiativas del mundo mediante su atribuir qué pasa en el mundo y qué cuerpos al generar figuras que producen efectos de verdad, aun si mera ilusión, toda la historiografía burguesa o marxista que prima la "estructura económica" queda obsoleta. Los regímenes de signos no son en absoluto convencionales, sino especificados por el ritmo-temporalidad-intensidad de la composición política co-participada, lo que el propio Saussure admite en un supuesto estructuralismo del que no habla. El signo es entonces signo de lo que falta, para que nada falte en el proceso de autopoiesis del ser social y su autoalteridad sin finalidad. En el trabajo se analizan obras menores -grabados y demás- de la Cataluña moderna a título de verificación. ; [eng] This is an inquire about function of representation systems in art languages and generally art practices included folk ones not merely in a aesthetic way under our consideration quite insufficient but from materialistic and ethic one. In fact, as a difference we are repeating the Kantian operation a about imagination as the basis of all knowledge but in a historiographic target. However we cannot accept the formal and dual -always this time and space to recognise- transcendental scheme of synthetics and "a priori" judgement's system and no knowledge theory by the other hand, in favour of sauvage and every time different experience "a posteriori" on the monadic mind, itself body's idea like in Spinoza. Just as Kant did face to the dawnlight of bourgeois-capitalistic society, we do face to what we call actual transition to communism, from a perspective that involves not a theory but a constitutive ontology where all practices -not only the called hard ones- are ways of "operari" (making as doing) and transformationality. Languages and all kinds of representation systems result qualified productions of sense just born from affections, passions, deep sensations of body historically determined. Molecular fluence of external microperceptions, beings of reason and sensation indiscernibly whose monadic labour of differenciation gets up as reason and form trough actualisation that govern "operari", that is, gives form to matter. Art so transform, encourage, put heart into someone, generate new affections and gets a revolution feeling inadequate idea, necessary error but expresses too the new and confused "ens fictum", the production of imaginary significations social-historic which form -figure- gets up form indifference of back and abyss of no sense. Seduction whose intensity and attraction is coparticipated by community because their similar political composition of subjectivity: a) technical-scientific power; b) linguistic communication and sociability. First logicisation of "ens fictum" against limit, tedious and death, production of verity and reality, is far away from Kant. If sign is conventional the regime of signs it is not as Nietzsche pretend like structuralism does. Nor Saussure pretends it as we demonstrate. Rythm, temporality, subjectivity, intensities guides the differential line that organizes the "gestalt-ideal" of every period and we find regimes of signs in struggle because they impute to bodies how they are and what happens with quite different sense. That is, different perspectives and structures of consciouness. Sign wants to complete what is lacking, voice of a classs making.

Das moderne Recht wirft viele grundsätzliche Fragen auf: Ist Recht mit Gerechtigkeit notwendig verbunden? Was ist überhaupt Recht und was Gerechtigkeit? Wie verhalten sich Recht und Moral zueinander? Warum und unter welchen Bedingungen ist Recht verbindlich? Sind Willensfreiheit und Autonomie eine flüchtige Illusion? Was sind die rechtsphilosophischen und rechtstheoretischen Grundlagen von Demokratie und Menschenrechten? Diesen und zahlreichen anderen Fragen zu Recht, Ethik und ihrer Bedeutung für Staat und Gesellschaft geht Mahlmann in seinem Lehrbuch nach. Dabei schlägt er einen Bogen von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart und entwickelt vor diesem historischen Hintergrund Antworten auf zentrale systematische Fragen der Rechtsphilosophie und Rechtstheorie.

Der sogenannte affective turn, der in Medien- und Kulturwissenschaften bereits seit längerem zu verzeichnen ist und mittlerweile auch die Sozialwissenschaften erreicht hat, besitzt ganz offensichtlich politische Implikationen – insbesondere, aber nicht nur, für eine Kritik des Neoliberalismus. Diese sind auch von zahlreichen Forschern aufgegriffen und ausformuliert worden, etwa durch Michael Hardt und Antonio Negri, Lauren Berlant, Sara Ahmed oder Nigel Thrift. Der vorliegende Band, eine Sammlung von Interviews mit dem Philosophen und Affekttheoretiker Brian Massumi, verspricht zumindest in seinem Titel, diese Verbindung von Politik und Affekt auf eine systematische Grundlage zu stellen. Massumi gilt als Vorreiter eines vor allem von Deleuze und Spinoza inspirierten Strangs jüngerer Affekttheorie, der vornehmlich ontologisch argumentiert. In dieser Position ist er breit rezipiert und auch vielfach kritisiert worden. Die Interview-Sammlung dient dazu, seinen Ansatz ausführlich und gleichzeitig verhältnismäßig leicht zugänglich darzustellen. Die Form des Interviews begünstigt gewisse Vereinfachungen und tendiert zu einer Plakativität von Beispielen und Argumenten; gleichzeitig bürgt sie aber für eine Lebhaftigkeit und Nachvollziehbarkeit jenseits der Mühen der Ebene. Insofern kommt diese Form dem persuasiven, seinerseits deutlich auf Affizierung angelegten Stil Massumis entgegen. Wie konzeptualisiert Massumi nun das Verhältnis zwischen Affektivität und Politik? Diese Frage erweist sich schon zu Beginn als falsch gestellt, insofern Massumi zufolge dem Affekt die politische Dimension von vornherein inhärent ist: In beiden Fällen gehe es um Wandel und Veränderung – es gelte lediglich, diese Dimension zum Vorschein zu bringen (vgl. S. ix). Grundsätzlich ist das Programm sehr ambitioniert: Affekt wird einerseits als ontologisches Begründungskonzept eingeführt, das in letzter Konsequenz an die Stelle sowohl einer Medientheorie als auch einer Theorie des Politischen zu treten vermag – und zielt andererseits klar auf menschliche Erfahrung, die sich in Gefühlen wie Furcht und Stolz manifestiert. Was dabei als politisch verstanden wird, bleibt zunächst vage: es gehe um "the arena of social order and reorderings, of settlement and resistance, of clampdowns and uprisings" (S. viii–ix). Bestimmungen der jüngeren politischen Philosophie, etwa die Unterscheidung zwischen Politik und dem Politischen, spielen demzufolge kaum eine Rolle. Vielmehr leitet sich aus dieser Aufzählung eine Tendenz ab, Politik als Feld von Intensitäten und Energien und politisches Handeln als Aktivismus zu begreifen – eine Tendenz, die schon in der Verwendung des Affektbegriffs angelegt ist: "[…] I use the concept of 'affect' as a way of talking about that margin of manoeuvrability, the 'where we might be able to go and what we might be able to do' in every present situation." (S. 3) Die relationale Verschränkung von Körpern in Situationen, nicht das fühlende und denkende Individuum wird daher als primär gesetzt – Emotion sei dabei jener begrenzte Anteil affektiver Erfahrung, der aus persönlicher Perspektive Sinn ergibt. Damit legt Massumi eine einerseits elegante und andererseits etwas glatt erscheinende Begründung des Politischen vor: Die verkörperte Weise menschlichen Existierens "is never entirely personal […] it's not just about us, in isolation. In affect, we are never alone." (S. 6) Mit Körpern sind dabei im wesentlichen menschliche Körper gemeint – eine Fokussierung, die so weder bei Spinoza noch bei Deleuze zu finden ist, und die aus medientheoretischer Sicht nicht unmittelbar eingängig erscheint. Tatsächlich bringt Massumi seinen Ansatz explizit gegen Theorien medialer Vermittlung in Stellung (denen er vorwirft, den cartesianischen Dualismus zwischen Geist und Körper nur zu überbrücken, nicht aber aufzuheben; vgl. auch den Begriff der Immediation, S. 146–176). Daraus ergibt sich zwangsläufig die Frage nach der 'Natürlichkeit' des Affekts und nach dem Verhältnis zu Sprache und Diskurs. Hier weicht Massumi aus: "[Affect] includes very elaborated functions like language. There's an affect associated with every functioning of the body, from moving your foot to take a step to moving your lips to make words. Affect is simply a body movement looked at from the point of view of its potential […]." (S. 7) Man mag diese These als Versuch lesen, Medien- durch Affekttheorie zu ersetzen oder neu zu schreiben – und natürlich könnte man den Spieß umdrehen und kurzerhand Affekt als Medium konzipieren. Es erscheint jedoch nicht ausreichend, Sprache auf die Produktion von Wörtern, bzw. die Wortproduktion auf die Bewegung der Lippen zu reduzieren. Man ignoriert dabei zumindest eine historische Dimension der Bedeutungskonstitution, die nicht einfach aus der Akkumulation von Körperbewegungen besteht, sondern eine Dynamik eigenen Rechts entfaltet. Diese Blindheit auf dem Auge der Geschichte wird in der Auseinandersetzung mit medialen Phänomenen besonders deutlich. So eröffnet sich an einigen Stellen die überaus interessante Perspektive, das Konzept einer Politik des Affekts mit Jacques Rancières Konzept einer Politik des Ästhetischen zu verknüpfen (z.B. S. 36). Allerdings scheinen sowohl der Politikbegriff als auch jener des Ästhetischen zu eng – und diese enge Konzeption verbaut den Blick auf die historische Tiefendimension, etwa, wenn Massumi das Auftauchen der affektiven Kraft der Medien, bzw. ihres politischen Einflusses, an die Reifephase des Fernsehens bindet (vgl. S. 33) – als hätten Zeitungen, Kino und Theater stets nur sachliche Aufklärung betrieben, bzw. sich nicht in die Politik eingemischt. Der Sprung von der Ontologie in konkrete Beispiele wird an solchen Stellen nicht genügend durch Analyse vermittelt – so kann der grundlegende Zusammenhang zwischen Ästhetik und Politik nicht erkannt werden, sondern wird als Anomalie, bzw. als besondere aktivistische Haltung behandelt. Zudem wird die betonte Kontrastierung von Affekttheorie und kritischer Theorie (vgl. S. 14f.) durch die Kritik an der Rolle der Medien im gegenwärtigen Kapitalismus konterkariert. Andererseits finden sich erhellende Stellen und produktive Denkanstöße; so eröffnet z.B. Massumis Vorschlag, Sprache weniger als Korrespondenzverhältnis zwischen Signifikant und Signifikat zu verstehen, sondern eher als Weg, den Bedeutungsexzess affektiver Erfahrung ins Bewusstsein zu heben (vgl. S. 13), zahlreiche Anschlussmöglichkeiten an ästhetische Theorien, die diese historische Dimension betonen. Sprache hätte demnach die Doppelfunktion, Erfahrung sowohl zu erfassen als auch freizusetzen. Die Fokussierung des menschlichen Körpers gegenüber Körpern anderer Art wirft noch weitere Fragen auf: so erweckt die Rede vom Affekt als "Potential" an vielen Stellen den Anschein, als stehe es den Menschen frei, wie sehr sie dieses Potential zu nutzen gedenken: "Our degree of freedom at any one time corresponds to how much of our experiential depth we can access towards a next step – how intensely we are living and moving." (S. 6) Im Umkehrschluss heißt das: einige leben freier als andere. Und mehr noch: der politische Begriff der Freiheit läuft in dieser Bestimmung Gefahr, zum Merkmal eines privilegierten, weil irgendwie "intensiveren" Lebensgefühls zu verkümmern. Das auf das politische Gemeinwesen gerichtete Vermögen des Affekts zur Veränderung bliebe so zugunsten einer affirmativen Selbstfeier auf der Strecke – egal, wie sehr dieses Selbst sich mit anderen überschneidet ("Freedom always comes out of active embeddedness in a complex relational field […]", S. 161). Sobald Massumi die ontologische Ebene verlässt um konkret zu werden, gerät die Verbindung zwischen Affektivität und dem Politischen ins Wanken. So vermag z.B. seine Analyse des zeitgenössischen Kapitalismus (Anfang der 2000er formuliert) heute nicht mehr recht überzeugen – zu sehr bleibt sie den "buzzwords" (S. 22) der damaligen Zeit verpflichtet. Die von ihm diagnostizierte Tendenz des Warenverkehrs zum Immateriellen, einhergehend mit einem Verlust direkten zwischenmenschlichen Kontakts (vgl. S. 113) passt zwar sehr gut zu seiner theoretischen Agenda, ist jedoch mittlerweile ihrerseits als teleologisches Modell kritisiert worden. Immerhin ist diese diskursive Bewegung symptomatisch dafür, wie sehr ein Denken des Politischen unter dem Vorzeichen des Affekts zur ökonomischen Analyse wird (und vielleicht werden muss). In diesem Zusammenhang opfert Massumi gelegentlich theoretische Präzision zugunsten einer zu reibungslos anmutenden Beschreibung affektiver Ökonomien, etwa bezüglich des Ineinandergreifens von Patriotismus und Kapitalismus rund um 9/11 – hier wird nicht klar, wie die "affektive Umformung" ("affective conversion", S. 32) von Furcht vor Terror in Stolz auf das eigene Land vor sich gehen soll. Möglicherweise wird Massumis Projekt eher produktiv, wenn man es als Utopie begreift – Affekt als überschüssiges Potential selbst rigide kontrollierter Situationen (S. 58). Entsprechend müsste man Begriffe wie Mikropolitik (S. 47–82) als Grenzbegriffe verstehen, die sich zwar zeitphilosophisch herleiten, sich aber eben nicht ohne weiteres auf jene Phänomene übertragen lassen, die im Alltagsverständnis 'politisch' sind – etwa auf den Alarmismus der Bush-Regierung nach 9/11. Die Logik der Übertragung operiert hier kumulativ, im Sinne der Formung von Gewohnheiten und Tendenzen. Ein Ereignis ist jedoch mehr als die Summe einzelner Affizierungsakte; es unterbricht den linearen Verlauf der Zeit und öffnet die Sicht auf historische Zusammenhänge. Damit setzt es kritisches Potential frei, wobei 'kritisch' nicht zufällig auf den Konnex zwischen Krise und Kritik hinweist. Die pauschale Abgrenzung gegen die kritische Theorie, der Massumi vorwirft, sie objektiviere und fixiere ihren Gegenstand auf unzulässige Weise, erscheint so als fatale Beschneidung des affekttheoretischen Ansatzes. Massumi verkennt, dass wahre Kritik, wie etwa Jean-Luc Nancy betont, stets aus der Notlage, aus der Krise heraus operiert und sich daher den Standpunkt immer erst erarbeiten muss, von dem aus geurteilt werden kann. Ein solcher fester Standpunkt trägt für Massumi den Namen der Moral und vor allem den der Emotion, die als Gegenbegriff zum Affekt aufgebaut wird. Sie lenke die Energie des Affekts in konventionelle Bahnen, lasse das mit ihm verbundene Potential verkümmern. Hierin liegt schließlich die affekttheoretische Crux von Massumis Politikbegriff: ohne eine Instanz, die aus dem Affektgeschehen Sinn extrahiert, sich positioniert und zustimmt oder ablehnt, ist nicht ersichtlich, wie eine Intervention in die reibungslosen Kreisläufe der Affektökonomien – und damit politisches Handeln – möglich sein soll. Eine solche Instanz muss dazu mit dem Diskurs in Beziehung treten, ohne dass sie zwangsläufig rationalisierend wirken müsste (vgl. S. 115). Das transformative Potential des Affekts braucht Akte der Aneignung, braucht den Widerstand eines Urteils, soll es politisch wirksam werden. Keineswegs wäre es dazu erforderlich, das psychologische Individuum primär zu setzen. Erforderlich wäre aber eine Analyse der Handlungsweisen unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Hervorbringung des Neuen und der Konstitution historischer Erfahrungsräume. Massumis detaillierte Beschreibungen affektiver Vollzüge sind dazu ein erster Schritt. Der Wert des Buches bestünde, so gesehen, nicht darin, dass Massumi fertige Rezepte für die Formulierung einer Theorie des Politischen lieferte – darin liegt auch gewiss nicht seine Absicht. Ihre Produktivität entfalten könnten seine Überlegungen als radikaler Grenzanspruch, der beispielsweise keine simple Abgrenzung einer 'Sphäre' des Politischen oder der Öffentlichkeit mehr erlauben würde. Obwohl also der "turn to affect" keineswegs eine neue Erscheinung ist, und obwohl das vorliegende Buch Massumis durchaus kontroversen Ansatz erschöpfend zu behandeln scheint, wäre damit eher ein Anfang gemacht als das letzte Wort in Sachen "Politik des Affekts" gesprochen.

ABSTRACT: In an interview with Pratiques Revue Barthes poses a question of profound relevance to legal education: how to reinscribe desire in the folds of a space of institutional knowledge? Most of the time we worry about the content in teaching. But the task is not only focused there, he warns. The real problem is to know how values or desires that are not foreseen by the institution can be put into the content, in the temporality of a class. How to make the university community a community of desire? How to forge a poetics of thinking that enhances the affirmation of the whole community? The present work aims to address these questions considering two references: the law & psychoanalysis movement, and a spinozian reading of education. In this framework, it is argued that, insofar as desire is built with law and not outside of it, as pre-Freudian political thought tends to argue, the articulation between law and psychoanalysis is precisely the appropriate space for its deployment and understanding. A legal education as the politics of desire is thus offered as a key to rethinking new practices that make it possible to displace instrumental rationalities, debureaucratize knowledge and open new temporalities that challenge the demands for immediacy of cognitive capitalism. Likewise, a Spinozian view of the educational field is proposed that renews the political imagination, teaches us to distrust closures and conceives the collective as a poetic force that generates the world. A Spinozian reading of teaching bets on a thought of the educational field far from technocracies and close, instead, to the political as poiesis, as a collective construction of the freedom to think. This implies, first of all, reading the encounter between concept and affection. Because, in short, as Spinoza well teaches: nobody knows what a body is capable of. ; Fil: Gorali, Marina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Cátedra Filosofía del Derecho, Lecturas Contemporáneas Acerca del Derecho. Buenos Aires, Argentina ; Fil: Gorali, Marina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Derecho. Cátedra Filosofía del Derecho, El conocimiento del Derecho. Buenos Aires, Argentina ; Fil: Gorali, Marina. Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda (UNDAV). Cátedra Sociología Jurídica. Avellaneda, Argentina ; Facultad de Derecho ; RESUMEN: En una entrevista realizada en la revista Pratiques, Barthes plantea una pregunta de profunda relevancia para la enseñanza jurídica: ¿cómo reinscribir el deseo en los pliegues de un espacio de saber institucional? La mayoría de las veces nos preocupamos por los contenidos en la enseñanza. Pero la tarea no se centra solamente allí, advierte. El verdadero problema es saber cómo se puede poner en el contenido, en la temporalidad de una clase valores o deseos que no están previstos por la institución. ¿Cómo hacer de la comunidad universitaria una comunidad de deseo? ¿Cómo forjar una poética del pensar que potencie la afirmación de la comunidad política toda? El presente trabajo pretende abordar estos interrogantes a partir de dos referencias: el movimiento derecho y psicoanálisis, y una lectura spinoziana de la educación. Una enseñanza jurídica como política del deseo se ofrece así como una clave para repensar nuevas prácticas que posibiliten desplazar racionalidades instrumentales, desburocratizar los saberes y abrir nuevas temporalidades que problematicen la demandas de inmediatez del capitalismo cognitivo. Asimismo se propone una mirada spinoziana del campo educativo que renueve la imaginación política, enseñe a desconfiar de las clausuras y conciba a lo colectivo como una fuerza poética generadora de mundo. Una lectura spinoziana de la enseñanza apuesta a un pensamiento del campo educativo lejos de las tecnocracias y cerca, en cambio, de lo político como poiesis, como construcción colectiva de la libertad de pensar.

Frontmatter --Contents --Acknowledgements --1. Urban Europe and the European Union /Mamadouh, Virginie / Wageningen, Anne van --Part 1: Citizenship --2. At home in the city? /Duyvendak, Jan Willem / Wekker, Fenneke --3. A tolerant social climate? /Sunier, Thijl --4. Sex and the city /Hekma, Gert --5. The city as integration mechanism? /Klaver, Jeanine / Odé, Arend --6. Undocumented immigrants /Garcés-Mascareñas, Blanca / Chauvin, Sébastien --7. From Mokum to Damsko and back again? /Mamadouh, Virginie / El Ayadi, Nesrin --8. Schools in the multilingual city /Agirdag, Orhan --9. City kids and citizenship /Karsten, Lia --10. Those who feel left behind /Pinkster, Fenne M. --11. Exiles in the city: A triptych /Snel, Guido / Eckenhaussen, Sepp / Ruiter, Fien de --Part 2: Urban nodes --12. Hub Cities 2.0 for the 21st century /Arbonés Aran, Núria --13. Competing cities and urban networks in medieval Europa /Steensel, Arie van --14. Beyond anti-urban sentiments /Hemel, Zef --15. Trendy coffee shops and urban sociability /Rath, Jan / Gelmers, Wietze --16. A quiet transfer /Geltner, G. --17. Build something different for a change! /Verlaan, Tim --18. Big is beautiful? /Majoor, Stan --19. Creative cities and shrinking cities: False opposites? /Bontje, Marco --Part 3: Creative cities --20. The creative destruction and recovery of cities /Jonker, Joost --21. Visions and symbols of the creative city /Rasterhoff, Claartje --22. Smart cities value their smart citizens /Kresin, Frank --23. The dangers of a tamed city /Kloosterman, Robert C. --24. Cities and creative unpredictability /Föllmer, Moritz --25. Cultural Incubators: The squats of the 21st century? /Draaisma, Jaap --26. New cities as testing grounds for a new urbanity /Reijndorp, Arnold --Part 4: Sustainable cities --27. The social sustainability of European cities /Musterd, Sako / Nijman, Jan --28. Bothersome and besotted /Blok, Gemma --29. ProefGroen (Taste Green / Test Green) /Dijkstra, Coosje / Halberstadt, Jutka / Seidell, Jaap / Verhoeff, Arnoud --30. Cycling is an acquired skill /Brömmelstroet, Marco te --31. Growing socio-spatial segregation in European capitals: Different government, less mitigation /Musterd, Sako --32. The future of the city /Slot, Jeroen / Michon, Laure --33. Welcome to Amsterdam! Well, not really /Wijngaarden, Arie van --34. More than just housing /Veer, Jeroen van der / Schuiling, Dick --35. The energetic city: Between dreams and deeds /Hisschemöller, Matthijs --Part 5: Urban representation --36. The dreamed European city (urbo kune) /Laan, Eberhard van der --37. Interlocking identities /Wintle, Michael --38. An eye for freedom: Spinoza and Terstall in Amsterdam /Pisters, Patricia --39. An urban geopolitics /Bialasiewicz, Luiza --40. Decor and decorum in diplomacy /Wusten, Herman van der --41. Urban diplomacy in Europe /Vos, Claske --42. Town twinning /Mamadouh, Virginie --Part 6: Cities in administrative and policy networks --43. The city as a tool to promote European integration: Napoleonic Amsterdam /Burg, Martijn van der / Wageningen, Anne van --44. The European city as a bulwark of resistance against neoliberalisation /Zuidhof, P.W. --45. About bed, bath and bread /Versteegh, Lia --46. Safe cities in Europe: Making the leap to sustainable connections /Boer, Monica den --47. URBAN Bijlmermeer /Dukes, Thea --48. A Europe of peripheries /Savini, Federico --49. An Urban Agenda for the European Union: About cities or with cities? /Heijde, Wouter van der --50. 2031: The year the city disbanded the state /Wageningen, Anne van

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- 1. Urban Europe and the European Union / Mamadouh, Virginie / Wageningen, Anne van -- Part 1: Citizenship -- 2. At home in the city? / Duyvendak, Jan Willem / Wekker, Fenneke -- 3. A tolerant social climate? / Sunier, Thijl -- 4. Sex and the city / Hekma, Gert -- 5. The city as integration mechanism? / Klaver, Jeanine / Odé, Arend -- 6. Undocumented immigrants / Garcés-Mascareñas, Blanca / Chauvin, Sébastien -- 7. From Mokum to Damsko and back again? / Mamadouh, Virginie / El Ayadi, Nesrin -- 8. Schools in the multilingual city / Agirdag, Orhan -- 9. City kids and citizenship / Karsten, Lia -- 10. Those who feel left behind / Pinkster, Fenne M. -- 11. Exiles in the city: A triptych / Snel, Guido / Eckenhaussen, Sepp / Ruiter, Fien de -- Part 2: Urban nodes -- 12. Hub Cities 2.0 for the 21st century / Arbonés Aran, Núria -- 13. Competing cities and urban networks in medieval Europa / Steensel, Arie van -- 14. Beyond anti-urban sentiments / Hemel, Zef -- 15. Trendy coffee shops and urban sociability / Rath, Jan / Gelmers, Wietze -- 16. A quiet transfer / Geltner, G. -- 17. Build something different for a change! / Verlaan, Tim -- 18. Big is beautiful? / Majoor, Stan -- 19. Creative cities and shrinking cities: False opposites? / Bontje, Marco -- Part 3: Creative cities -- 20. The creative destruction and recovery of cities / Jonker, Joost -- 21. Visions and symbols of the creative city / Rasterhoff, Claartje -- 22. Smart cities value their smart citizens / Kresin, Frank -- 23. The dangers of a tamed city / Kloosterman, Robert C. -- 24. Cities and creative unpredictability / Föllmer, Moritz -- 25. Cultural Incubators: The squats of the 21st century? / Draaisma, Jaap -- 26. New cities as testing grounds for a new urbanity / Reijndorp, Arnold -- Part 4: Sustainable cities -- 27. The social sustainability of European cities / Musterd, Sako / Nijman, Jan -- 28. Bothersome and besotted / Blok, Gemma -- 29. ProefGroen (Taste Green / Test Green) / Dijkstra, Coosje / Halberstadt, Jutka / Seidell, Jaap / Verhoeff, Arnoud -- 30. Cycling is an acquired skill / Brömmelstroet, Marco te -- 31. Growing socio-spatial segregation in European capitals: Different government, less mitigation / Musterd, Sako -- 32. The future of the city / Slot, Jeroen / Michon, Laure -- 33. Welcome to Amsterdam! Well, not really / Wijngaarden, Arie van -- 34. More than just housing / Veer, Jeroen van der / Schuiling, Dick -- 35. The energetic city: Between dreams and deeds / Hisschemöller, Matthijs -- Part 5: Urban representation -- 36. The dreamed European city (urbo kune) / Laan, Eberhard van der -- 37. Interlocking identities / Wintle, Michael -- 38. An eye for freedom: Spinoza and Terstall in Amsterdam / Pisters, Patricia -- 39. An urban geopolitics / Bialasiewicz, Luiza -- 40. Decor and decorum in diplomacy / Wusten, Herman van der -- 41. Urban diplomacy in Europe / Vos, Claske -- 42. Town twinning / Mamadouh, Virginie -- Part 6: Cities in administrative and policy networks -- 43. The city as a tool to promote European integration: Napoleonic Amsterdam / Burg, Martijn van der / Wageningen, Anne van -- 44. The European city as a bulwark of resistance against neoliberalisation / Zuidhof, P.W. -- 45. About bed, bath and bread / Versteegh, Lia -- 46. Safe cities in Europe: Making the leap to sustainable connections / Boer, Monica den -- 47. URBAN Bijlmermeer / Dukes, Thea -- 48. A Europe of peripheries / Savini, Federico -- 49. An Urban Agenda for the European Union: About cities or with cities? / Heijde, Wouter van der -- 50. 2031: The year the city disbanded the state / Wageningen, Anne van

Introduction. Deleuze and Guattari's concept of affects found its further development in the works of the Canadian philosopher Brian Massoumi, who was engaged in popularizing the heritage of the French tandem of philosophers in the English- speaking environment. Massumi continues to explore society and man, based on the concepts of rhizome and the dominance of affective flows in forming social and political dimensions of people's lives, as well as the coherence of the emergence of affect and the digital environment. Massumi argues that the influence of the affective on human behavior is extremely strong; it takes revenge on consciousness, the sensory-emotional sphere and the rationality of the individual. Breaking a single field of consciousness into many streams, Massumi postulates the initial splitting of the human psyche, in which he continues the schizoanalytic line of Deleuze and Guattari, who set this discourse in the latest Western philosophy. The purpose of the article is to answer the question: "Can a person become transparent in the world of numerical relations?" In the answers to this question, two main positions can be identified: a scientific view of a person as an incalculable and observable object and the idea of a person as an expression of unobservable subjectivity, his inner world, trans- gressed by imagination in self–cognition. Methods. The article analyzes Brian Massumi's work from the view point of singular anthropology, which asserts the unity of consciousness, and also examines the genesis of affect from its description by Spinoza to the complexity theory of post-non- classical scientific discourse, a special place in which belongs to the phenomenon of an observer of complex processes. Scientific novelty of the research. The discovery of new optics, expressed in an appeal to subjectiv- ity and showing the insufficiency of describing a person exclusively with an objectified view of digital reality, constitutes the scientific novelty of this work. Results. On the basis of the thesis that it is impos- sible to identify a person by attributing his essence to a digital structure, there is a special attitude to anthropological reality as a unique event that is not included in the frames of the digital paradigm. Conclusions. Anthropological reality is based on affect, this is its territory, but there is no single definition of affect that would unite the often polar directions of philosophical thought. In this article, the author comes to the conclusion that Massumi's attempt to fix affect on the EEG and present these results as a fact of finding affect in space reduces the concept of affect to the manifested electro- magnetic signals of the brain. While the affective field includes the non-objectifiable phenomena of dreams, emotions, and the supersensible. On the other hand, complexity theory does not exclude working with the latest phenomena, but still chooses flat ontologies and digital languages for describing anthropological reality as a philosophical guideline, which, in general, develops Massumi's idea of human readability and transparency. But, unlike the above-mentioned approaches, Rus- sian philosophical thought asserts the reality of a person not in space, but in time, thereby offering to expand the range of optics to the very concept of affect.

Balibar print from All Grim Prints An ongoing albeit sporadic project of mine is trying to understand the systematic nature underlying the conjunctural interventions of Etienne Balibar. This semester this investigation dovetailed with a reexamination of his writings on race for a seminar on Race, Class, and Gender. With respect to the latter it seems that there are two elements that are central to Balibar's thinking of race. First, as I have already stressed in a previous post, racism has to be understood as an entire way of thinking, a mode of thought, and not, as is often the case a bias or stereotype, an aberration in thought. As Balibar writes in "Racism and Universalism, ""I think that racism is a genuine mode of thought, that is to say, a mode of connecting not only words with objects, but more profoundly words with images, in order to create concepts. Therefore to overcome racism in one's personal experience or in collective experience is not simply a matter of abandoning prejudices or opening one's eyes to reality with the possible help of science; it has to do with changing one's mode of thinking, something much more difficult." As a mode of thought racism not only defines a particular way of thinking, but one that is indexed to the immediate demands of living. When Balibar writes that racism combines misrecognition with a "will to know,' a violent desire for immediate knowledge of social relations," I understand that violent desire to have something to do with the fundamental questions of social life, who should I trust? who should I fear? who can I desire? etc. Racism promises an answer to all of these questions, one that is immediately legible, written on the body and skin. Racism is as much a way of thinking and a way of living. This is why all challenges to it threaten not just what counts as knowledge, but also what counts as politics, as collectivity, even if the collectivity in question is not divided or demarcated by race. "As feminism has progressively started to demonstrate, the issue with sexism is not, or not merely, to resist male chauvinism or to struggle against male domination: it is to have the male community destroyed from the inside. Similarly, the issue with racism, in the long run and in everyday situations, is to destroy the racist community from within, a community which is both institutional and spontaneous, based on collective privileges (many of them—but not all—imaginary) and the individual desire for knowledge."The connection between a mode of thinking and a mode of living, the order and connection of ideas and the order and connection of things, is a profoundly Spinozist. As André Tosel argues, Spinoza's thought has as its center not a hierarchy between praxis, poiesis, and theoria, as in classical thought, but their mutual implication, a way of thinking is a way of living and producing. As Tosel writes, While the ancient tradition interrogates the nature proper to humanity from the triplet poiesis, praxis, theoria, supposed to represent the hierarchy of distinctly human kinds of life, Spinoza recomposes poiesis, praxis, theoria in the unity of the same form of life. Every form of life, every bios is a specific unity of poiesis, of praxis, and theoria. Or rather, in each kind of life, in each individual body, there is a relation to other bodies in nature (poiesis), and to other bodies of the same human essence (praxis), corresponding to a modality of the existence of the mind or spirit of knowledge (theoria). (That is from Du Materialisme de Spinoza, and I still have plans to work out how Balibar and Tosel arrive at their understandings of race and citizen from Spinoza). For his part, and as I have argued before, Balibar draws a great deal of support for his thought on race from his reading of the dual foundations of the city in Proposition Thirty Seven of Part Four of the Ethics. Here is a long passage on that point from The Politics of Transindividuality. (pg. 92-93 of that book). "While Spinoza's dual foundations of the city cannot be immediately connected to base and superstructure, economics and politics, it does, however, prove useful for understanding politics, the state. Its constitutive ambiguity is not that of the tension between economics and politics, but within political belonging and individuation itself. The state, especially the modern state, which has inherited the ideal of the citizen, of a universal dimension, is always split between nation and state, between an imagined identity and a legal or institutional unity. The imagined identity, 'what makes a people a people,' crosses the same terrain as Spinoza's ingenium, in other words every nation, every nationality, is formed by an organization of the aspects that constitute collective and individual identity. Language and memory play a central role in the formation of nations. In the attempt to constitute a people, to generate a fictive identity, the nation intersects with race as the quintessential fictive ethnicity. Race and nation constantly traverse each other: modern racist organizations consider themselves to be first and foremost national organizations, protecting the purity of the nation, and the national unit and belonging is impossible without the fantasy of a common language and heritage. However, the nation is not synonymous with the state, the modern state, the state that begins with the democratic revolutions, also have an irreducible universalistic dimension, an ideal of the citizen that is not tied to national belonging. Balibar goes so far as to see this division, a division not between bourgeois man and political citizen, but between nation and state, as constitutive of modern political conflict. As Balibar writes, For my part, I consider the demarcation between democratic and liberal policies and conservative or reactionary policies today to depend essentially (if not exclusively) on attitudes towards ethnic discriminations and differences of nationality on whether pride of place is given to national belonging or emancipatory goals (the rights of man or citizen). The dual foundation constitutes two different subjects, two different transindividual individuations. The first is that of homo nationalis, the human individual defined not just through his or her specific language, but most of all, through shared customs, habits and memories. The second is the citizen defined by an open transindividual process, by rights and obligations, which exist only as a collective project that is by definition universal. These individuations coexist, constituting the conflictual basis for different individuations and different politics. National belonging, national identity, especially as it is connected to shared language, history and memory, comes close to racial identity and race, which it can never fully extricate itself from. For Balibar, race is not just a matter of a fictive unity, as a definition of belonging, but is also integral to the manner in which modern democratic societies deal with, or represent, the persistence of hierarchy and division. Hierarchy and division are always a scandal to a society organized according to the citizen, to an individuation of the citizen. There is thus also a proximity of race to class; class can always be racialized, not in the sense that it is ascribed to different races, but becomes attached to a rigid and permanent division in society. The division of mental and manual labour is inseparable from a division of society into 'mind men' and 'body men,' with all of the expected ambiguous connections to animality. Race reinscribes social divisions on divisions of the body, making social hierarchies justified and visible at the same time. Race (and the racialization of class difference) resolves the incomplete nature of the democratic revolution; it is the revival of anthropological difference in societies that have declared such differences to be null and void. As much as race plays a fundamental role as an alibi, explaining the persistence of inequality in a society that claims to be otherwise, it also plays an important role in the social imaginary, a term that is justified in terms of the Spinozist idea of the imaginary. Race is an inadequate idea of social belonging and social division. Racism is an imaginary, an inadequate idea in the full Spinozist sense of the term, it is both immediate, combining affect and imagination and fails to comprehend its causes. It offers an immediate understanding of society, a transparent account of the social divisions and conflicts mapped onto the most superficial signs of bodily or cultural difference."It seems to me that two conclusions follow from thinking about racism as an articulation of thinking and living, of knowledge and politics. First, such politics should not shy a way from the radical nature of what is at stake. Anti-racism is not just a challenge to a few lingering prejudices or biases, but to a whole way of thinking, a way of thinking that is integral to our society. (this is too long to go into here, but I am thinking also of Sylvia Wynter's "Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom" and the connection she makes between knowledge and politics, between what can be known and lived). Second, this way of thinking is also a way of living. Which is to say that the reactionaries that have perceived in anti-racism an assault on their way of living, as in the case of Florida, they are right. It benefits no one to pretend that such is not the case. Although I do think that there is work to be done on this issue, to imagine what a post-racial society would look like beyond the image of integration (which was always integration to a community defined by racial exclusion). Lastly, such a society would also entail not just a transformation of race, but of national belonging, and with it, in a longer point that I cannot make now, the class basis of modern society. 

Kollidieren Höchstgüter, sind gewichtige Einschränkungen unvermeidbar. Es stellt sich dann die Frage, welche Güter der Staat als Grundrechtsgarant priorisieren soll. Wesentliche Erkenntnisse hierzu bieten neben der Grundrechtsdogmatik insbesondere eine vertiefte Auseinandersetzung mit Gerechtigkeitstheorien und die Besprechung konkreter Fallbeispiele (betr. Zwangsernährung, «Rettungsfolter», Flugzeugabschuss, postmortale Organspende). Im Ergebnis vertritt der Autor ein folgenethisches Grundrechtsverständnis und diskutiert Kriterien, die bei Lösung von Grundrechtskollisionen, insbesondere von Rettungsdilemmata, zu berücksichtigen sind. (Gebiete: Grundrechtsdogmatik, Rechtstheorie, Rechtsethik.)

Sammlung mit theoriegeschichtlich zentralen Texten zur Philosophie der Gerechtigkeit von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart. Die Auswahl der Texte von Platon, Aristoteles und Epikur über Augustinus, Kant und Hegel bis zu Derrida, Habermas und Höffe gibt einen Überblick über die verschiedenen inhaltlichen Bestimmungen des Gerechtigkeitsbegriffs und über die unterschiedlichen Gerechtigkeitskonzentrationen. Im Anhang Bibliographie, Textnachweise und Personenregister. - Neben den entsprechenden Monographien, wie z.B. der von J. Rawls (BA 4/95) oder der von O. Höffe (BA 4/02) als Quellentextsammlung zum Thema. (3) (LK/MA: Altmeyer)

16 pags., 11 figs., 5 tabs. ; Context. The [C II] 158 μm fine-structure line is one of the dominant coolants of the neutral interstellar medium. It is hence one of the brightest far-infrared (FIR) emission lines and can be observed not only in star-forming regions throughout the Galaxy, but also in the diffuse interstellar medium and in distant galaxies. [C II] line emission has been suggested to be a powerful tracer of star formation. Aims. We aim to understand the origin of [C II] emission and its relation to other tracers of interstellar gas and dust. This includes a study of the heating efficiency of interstellar gas as traced by the [C II] line to test models of gas heating. Methods. We made use of a one-square-degree map of velocity-resolved [C II] line emission toward the Orion Nebula complex, including M 43 and NGC 1977. We employed Herschel FIR photometric images to determine dust properties. Moreover, we compared with Hα emission from the ionized gas, Spitzer mid-infrared photometry to trace hot dust and large polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and velocity-resolved IRAM 30m CO(2-1) observations of the molecular gas. Results. The [C II] intensity is tightly correlated with PAH emission in the IRAC 8 μm band and FIR emission from warm dust. However, the [C II] intensity depends less than linearly on the 8 μm and FIR intensity, while 8 μm and FIR intensities are approximately linearly correlated. The correlation between [C II] and CO(2-1) does not show a clear trend and is affected by the detailed geometry of the region. We find particularly low [C II]-over-FIR intensity ratios toward large columns of (warm and cold) dust, which suggest the interpretation of the "[C II] deficit"in terms of a "FIR excess". Conclusions. In terms of the [C II] deficit, we find clear evidence in our data for the importance of [O I] 63 μm emission in the photodissociation regions (PDRs) associated with the Huygens region. A smaller contribution is made by a decreased heating efficiency in regions of high UV irradiation. FIR emission from deeply embedded protostars leads to palpably deficient [C II]/FIR intensity ratios. The [C II] directly associated with the M 42, M 43, and NGC 1977 regions underestimates the star formation rate derived from extragalactic scaling relations. We ascribe this to the importance of [C II] emission from low surface brightness PDR surfaces of molecular clouds which are not included in our survey. Future studies of more active regions of massive star formation will be instrumental in validating the general applicability of these conclusions. ; This work is based on observations made with the NASA/DLR Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA). SOFIA is jointly operated by the Universities Space Research Association, Inc. (USRA), under NASA contract NNA17BF53C, and the Deutsches SOFIA Institut (DSI) under DLR contract 50 OK 0901 to the University of Stuttgart. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (grant agreement No. 851435). JRG thanks the Spanish MCIU for funding support under grants AYA2017-85111-P and PID2019-106110GB-I00. Research on the interstellar medium at Leiden Observatory is supported through a Spinoza award of the Dutch Science Organisation (NWO).

Artists and creative workers have long been attracted to urban environments. Yet the 'creative city 'of the 21st century comes with its own pitfalls. From precarity at the level of the worker to gentrification at the level of the city: the creative engine starts to sputter. Therefore, after or even against the creative city, this book highlights the 'common city'. The Rise of the Common City explores the value of commoning for cultural practices in urban contexts. The volume defends the hypothesis that a common culture offers better guarantees of urban sustainability than a purely market- or government-driven culture. After all, cultural dynamics are only possible by sharing.

We understand culture in a broad anthropological sense, as a socially shared sign and meaning system through which urbanites can give meaning to their environment and their lives. Creative labour and artistic practices keep cultural dynamics alive by intervening in such processes of meaning. They can question, redraw or simply confirm meaning-making processes, habits, values and norms. That is why culture is too important to be left to the market and the government alone. Culture belongs to everyone.

The Rise of the Common City examines the value of commoning for culture, but also the value of culture for commoning. What is the culture of the commons? And vice versa, what strategies, norms and rituals do commoners use to define a common space between government and market? The book sketches answers to these questions through conceptual and empirical work, ranging from sociology and philosophy over urban and cultural studies to law and policy science.

The volume includes contributions by Walter van Andel, Iolanda Bianchi, Gideon Boie, Giuliana Ciancio, Lara García Díaz, Pascal Gielen, Arne Herman, Gökhan Kodalak, Thijs Lijster, Lara van Meeteren, Hanka Otte, Ching Lin Pang, Tian Shi, Stavros Stavrides, Maria Francesca De Tullio, Louis Volont and Bart Wissink.
If there is any conclusion to be drawn, it might be this: the future of culture will have to be common, or there will be no culture at all.

Throughout the course of the 16th – 17th centuries, a new epoch begins in the history of European civilization – the epoch of the New Age. A revolutionary formation and, subsequently, the establishment of a new state system based on political democracy, legal freedom and civil equality are taking place. As in other European countries, significant socio-political transformations in Ukraine were also due to the national revolution of 1648–1676.Analyzing the events in Ukraine in the mid-seventeenth century as a component of the pan-European revolutionary movement, the author considers the attitudinal and ideological origins of the Ukrainian revolution. Their common European features, as well as specific features are clarified and characterized. In general, the change in the worldview system in Ukraine is associated with the renaissance-humanist and reformation ideas that began to spread in the Ukrainian lands without losing its original meaning, but acquiring here a kind of national color, aimed at understanding the urgent problems of Ukrainian society.In the field of political and legal doctrine, the assertion of the legal worldview takes place, replacing the theological. Its classic embodiment became the theory of natural law with its concept of inalienable natural human rights as well as the concept of social contract. These ideas became, to a greater or lesser extent, the basis of the Ukrainian revolution of the seventeenth century. Their embodiment can be found in the works of Ukrainian «Renaissance humanists» of the 16th – early 17th centuries: S. Orikhovsky, J. Vereshchynsky, I. Dombrovsky, S. Klenovych, S. Pekalid, J. Shchasny-Herburt, K. Sakovych.It is found that in the seventeenth century, the works of such prominent political thinkers, theorists of natural law as J. Lipsius, G. Grotius, later B. Spinoza, T. Hobbes, S. Pufendorf were becoming widespread in Ukraine. They found a favorable ground in Ukraine and directly influenced the Ukrainian revolution, as the state and legal ideas of these thinkers became especially popular not only among the intellectual elite, but also among the Cossacks – the main driving force of the revolution.A number of Ukrainian thinkers, despite the fact that until 1649 Ukraine did not have its own state, were considering the future path of its political development. Specific plans of forming own state are embodied, in particular, in the works of J. Vereshchynsky, P. Mohyla, Y. Nemyrych, and others. They became a logical continuation and development of the state approaches of Ukrainian Renaissance humanists and reflected the tendency to combine the understanding of the history of their own state-building tradition with the study of Western experience. The analysis of political and legal ideas of Ukrainian authors, real historical events of the seventeenth century testify to the emergence among the Ukrainian population of clear tendencies to build their own state. Since then, the idea of the Ukrainian nation-state became fundamental to the Cossack state-building and leading in the liberation struggles of the Ukrainian people of all subsequent centuries. ; Аналізуючи події в Україні середини ХVІІ ст. як складову загальноєвропейського революційного руху, автор розглядає світоглядні, ідеологічні та ідейні витоки української революції. З'ясовано і охарактеризовано їх спільні зі загальноєвропейськими, а також специфічні риси. Загалом, зміна світоглядної системи в Україні пов'язується з ренесансно-гуманістичними та реформаційними ідеями, які почали поширюватися на українських землях. З одного боку – вони не втрачали тут свого первісного змісту, а з іншого – набу­вали національного виразу, зумовленого осмисленням актуальних проблем українсь­кого суспільства.З'ясовано, що підґрунтям української революції ХVІІ ст. стала теорія природного права з її концепцією невід'ємних природних прав людини та концепцією суспільного дого­вору. Дехто з українських мислителів, незважаючи на те, що до 1649 р. Україна не мала власної держави, обмірковував майбутній шлях її політичного розвитку. Конкретні плани побудови власної держави втілені, зокрема, у працях Й. Верещинського, П. Могили, Ю. Немирича тощо. Вони відображали тенденцію до поєднання осмислення історії власної державотворчої традиції з вивченням західного досвіду. Аналіз політико-правових ідей українських авторів, реальні історичні події ХVІІ ст. засвідчують появу серед українського населення виразних тенденцій до побудови власної держави.