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The transition to democracy in Bulgaria is commonly defined as a coup d'état carried out by the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) elites against the long-standing dictator Todor Zhivkov. The Bulgarian transition to democracy was a direct by-product of the economic and political collapse of the USSR. No contentious events had any important impact on the democratization process. In brief, Bulgaria was the USSR's closest ally, acting as a satellite state. The collapse of the USSR (signaled by the fall of the Berlin Wall) implied the end of Bulgarian communism. No other way out was possible at that point in time. The transition was peaceful and elite-led due to the 'positive' examples of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well as the wish to avoid entering into a cycle of violence similar to that suffered in Romania. ; The research project 'Mobilizing for Democracy: Democratization Processes and the Mobilization of Civil Society' is funded by European Research Council (ERC) Advanced Grant. (Grant Agreeement no: 269136.)

In this book, Yi Feng combines political and economic analyses to study the effects of political institutions on economic performance. Traditionally, political scientists disregard details of economic conditions, while economists may not take into consideration a systematic explanation of political regimes. The growing interest in the interplay of political and economic systems, spurred by the political democratization and economic liberalization evident in many countries over the last twenty years, merits this new perspective.The book examines the political determinants of economic growth, and, specifically, the controversial question of the relationship between democracy and quality of life. Feng systematically studies three variables of a political system--political freedom, political stability, and policy certainty--and relates them to economic development. He examines the political factors that may affect patterns of growth directly or indirectly.Combining theory and country-specific case studies, Democracy, Governance, and Economic Performance demonstrates that political institutions and conditions do matter in economic growth. After establishing a theoretical foundation, Feng tests it by examining the direct effects of the three key political variables on economic growth and the indirect effects of democracy in terms of other variables (political instability, inflation, investment, education, income distribution, property rights, and population growth). He concludes by considering the policy implications of these results.

This article explores how the governance of the City of London Corporation perpetuates the oxygenation of extraction, with a focus on oil frontiers and ecological impacts in Africa. It shows how this extractive system limits environmental justice through a spider's web of tax havens linked to the notoriously under-regulated Alternative Investment Market. The contemporary success of the City of London Corporation is supported by an archaic membership system drawn from financial services. This has also allowed it to support the establishment of the most successful network of secrecy jurisdictions of 'tax havens' on the planet, supporting flows for illicit business in commodity frontiers. As extractive operations are given life by the financial flows that circulate through the City and its offshore empire, and take control of land, the potential for local communities to utilise their local ecological knowledge is asphyxiated, limiting the protection of food systems and endangered species. The article explains how this system functions, and why it needs to be reformed to limit Earth's sixth mass extinction. It does so through case studies of the City of London, the Niger Delta and Turkana Kenya, using ethnography and semi structured interviews. A new system of ecological direct democracy is proposed, limiting global corruption flows into the City's tax havens, allowing instead for a flourishing globalisation of ecological democracy.

Multistakeholder governance is proposed as the way forward in global governance. For some leaders in civil society and government who are frustrated with the lack of power of the UN system and multilateralism it is seen as an attractive alternative; others, particularly in the corporate world, see multistakeholder governance as offering a more direct hand and potentially a legitimate role in national and global governance. This book examines how the development of multistakeholderism poses a challenge to multilateralism and democracy. Using a theoretical, historical perspective it describes how the debate on global governance evolved and what working principles of multilateralism are under threat. From a sociological perspective, the book identifies the organizational beliefs of multistakeholder groups and the likely change in the roles that leaders in government, civil society, and the private sector will face as they evolve into potential global governors. From a practical perspective, the book addresses the governance issues which organizations and individuals should assess before deciding to participate in or support a particular multistakeholder group. Given the current emphasis on the participation of multiple actors in the Sustainable Development Goals, this book will have wide appeal across policy-making and professional sectors involved in negotiations and governance at all levels. It will also be essential reading for students studying applied governance.

The article presents the vision of the development of countries and societies as seen in threeworks from the 1990s: Francis Fukuyama's End of History, Samuel Huntington's The Clash ofCivilisations and Benjamin Barber's Jihad vs McWorld. The author compares these visions to the contemporary world, together with their utopian and dystopian aspects, wondering whichof them more accurately predicted the directions of its development. Treating these works asan entry point, he considers the alternatives of the dominating liberal democracy, analysesthe features of the more and more popular neomedievalism and the flaws and advantages ofdirect democracy. Talking about direct democracy, he describes the only functioning exampleof such political system in Switzerland. Describing its details and specification, he wonders ifthe system analogous to the Swiss one could be useful somewhere else. By referring to thisproblem in the context of technological advancement, he considers the issue of developingdirect democracy with the use of electronic media. In the end, the again refers to the worksby Barber, Fukuyama and Huntington, expressing his regret for the lack of other, equally boldvisions of the world and political systems development in contemporary times.Key words: political system, liberalism, direct democracy, neomedievalism

The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy. In the noncooperative case, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.

AbstractThe origins of contemporary supra‐national power go back to the second British Empire, which, unlike the first, faced organized labor as a potential revolutionary force. The formation of the Rhodes–Milner Group was meant to better manage the formation of the public mood, and the Boer War in South Africa demanded close integration of imperial affairs. A central figure in the Rhodes–Milner Group, Lord Esher, was also the architect of the Committee of Imperial Defense, created to take up the latter task. Esher's idea of a secretariat confidentially preparing solutions to issues of the day before they emerged in the public domain was introduced into the structure of international organizations after World War I and the Russian Revolution. Escher also laid the foundations of today's model of transnational politics in which groups such as Bilderberg or the Trilateral Commission and many others, shape certain areas of consensus before the public is allowed to make its voice heard. In this process, the circumvention of democracy has assumed the nature of an outright assault on it. In the process the World Economic Forum, formally joining forces with the United Nations, has become the most visible supranational body applying direct rule.

There are many ideas to explain why democratic societies are more economically and politically stable and more competitive than other forms government. It was found in the article, that exist dependency between physiological factors of motivation of workforce for increase productivity and democracy (elections, freedom of speech, meetings, etc.). Democracy serves as link between motivation of workforce on level of production and access of workforce to production, distribution and consumption taxes on the level of state. This type of link represents direct dependency and may be considered as positive feedback in terms of the theory of control. ; IJSRED - International Journal of Scientific Research and Engineering Development

ABSTRACTThe use of veto points to block policy change has received significant attention in Latin America, but the different institutional venues have not been analyzed in a unified framework. Uruguay is exceptional in that political actors use both referendums and judicial review as effective ways to oppose public policies. While the activation of direct democracy mechanisms in Uruguay has been widely studied, the surge in the use of the judicial venue remains underexplored. This article argues that veto point use responds to the ideological content of policies adopted by different coalitions and the type of interest organization affected. It shows that policy opponents predominantly activate referendums when center-right coalitions rule and judicial review when center-left coalitions govern. It illustrates the causal argument by tracing the politics of court and referendum activation. This approach helps to bridge the gap between research on direct democracy and judicial politics, providing a unified framework.

This paper draws on Laclau's theory of discourse, hegemony, and populism to analyse competing forms of populism in the Czech Republic within the discursive context of 'post-November transformation' as well as in relation to hegemonic struggles over the construction of social order. It is argued that the discourses of Public Affairs (VV), ANO, Dawn of Direct Democracy, and Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) all feature a populist opposition between the 'people' or 'citizens' on the one hand and 'political dinosaurs', ('traditional') 'parties', or 'godfather party mafias' of both 'left' and 'right' on the other, while also radicalizing in different ways the exclusionary constructions of 'work' in the established discourses of the Civic Democrats (ODS) and Social Democrats (ČSSD). While ANO constructs 'hard work' in a populist manner against the ('traditional') 'parties', VV and Dawn/SPD articulate an exclusion of non-working 'unadaptables' that points to a notable interplay of hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism and anti-minorities illiberalism.

This paper draws on Laclau's theory of discourse, hegemony, and populism to analyse competing forms of populism in the Czech Republic within the discursive context of 'post-November transformation' as well as in relation to hegemonic struggles over the construction of social order. It is argued that the discourses of Public Affairs (VV), ANO, Dawn of Direct Democracy, and Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) all feature a populist opposition between the 'people' or 'citizens' on the one hand and 'political dinosaurs', ('traditional') 'parties', or 'godfather party mafias' of both 'left' and 'right' on the other, while also radicalizing in different ways the exclusionary constructions of 'work' in the established discourses of the Civic Democrats (ODS) and Social Democrats (ČSSD). While ANO constructs 'hard work' in a populist manner against the ('traditional') 'parties', VV and Dawn/SPD articulate an exclusion of non-working 'unadaptables' that points to a notable interplay of hyper-neoliberal welfare chauvinism and anti-minorities illiberalism.

AbstractBy placing lawmaking power directly in the hands of citizens, Progressive movement reformers hoped to undercut the ability of political parties to pursue their policy objectives. This article tests the expectations of reformers by examining whether direct democracy alters the ability of partisan legislative majorities and governors to shape the size of the U.S. state public sector. Using a large dataset, I estimate the determinants of state tax effort and compare across jurisdictions the effects of variables that measure the partisan control of government. The results demonstrate that while the partisanship of elected officials is an important predictor of tax effort in pure representative jurisdictions, the relationship between party and policy disappears among initiative states. This analysis not only adds to our understanding of U.S. state budgeting, but also suggests the widespread adoption of direct democracy as a possible explanation for the weak party effects observed in studies of state fiscal policy.

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives' potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the Euro¬pean Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU le¬vel. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competen¬cies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European fede¬ration should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.