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National audience ; This article assesses the potential contribution of economic experiments to evidence-based policy making in the field of agriculture, with a special focus on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP evaluation mostly relies on standard evaluation tools such as farm and market simulation models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical data, statistical and econometric analysis of survey data, and a range of qualitative methods such as interviews with stakeholders, focus group or internet-based public consultation. Yet, the CAP has changed considerably over the past decades, requiring adaptations of its evaluation toolbox. A detailed review of existing studies using economic experiments for designing and evaluating agricultural policies provides the backbone for a comprehensive assessment of the complementarity of experimental approaches with standard evaluation tools. The article also provides recommendations aiming at facilitating inclusion of economic experiments into the CAP evaluation toolbox based on conclusions drawn from a workshop organized with experts, academics and policy makers of Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission.

This article assesses the potential contribution of economic experiments to evidence-based policy making in the field of agriculture, with a special focus on the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). CAP evaluation mostly relies on standard evaluation tools such as farm and market simulation models, calibrated with EU-wide statistical data, statistical and econometric analysis of survey data, and a range of qualitative methods such as interviews with stakeholders, focus group or internet-based public consultation. Yet, the CAP has changed considerably over the past decades, requiring adaptations of its evaluation toolbox. A detailed review of existing studies using economic experiments for designing and evaluating agricultural policies provides the backbone for a comprehensive assessment of the complementarity of experimental approaches with standard evaluation tools. The article also provides recommendations aiming at facilitating inclusion of economic experiments into the CAP evaluation toolbox based on conclusions drawn from a workshop organized with experts, academics and policy makers of Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Commission.

What is the significance of Supplementary Childcare (FEB) for the employment decisions of women and men in Switzerland? This question has been addressed by the research and consulting firm INFRAS and the Swiss Institute for Empirical Research in Economics (SEW) of the University of St. Gallen in the framework of the NRP60 "Gender Equality".
For this purpose, a nationwide database for the Supplementary Childcare offer (year 2009/2010) was created in a first step. Since national statistics on Supplementary Childcare offers are still missing, the research project provides an overview of the supply of Supplementary Childcare in the cantons and municipalities for the first time. In a second step, the data on Supplementary Childcare offers were collated with microdata about the job offer and the family structure. On the basis of this new dataset, an econometric analysis of the influence of Supplementary Childcare on mother and father earning capacity was carried out. In addition, 31 in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with mothers and fathers.

The comparative political economy of developed countries has often neglected the growing interest in producing well-being indicators that go beyond GDP. This was largely due to lack of reliable and comparable data. In spite of this, Osberg and Sharpe have recently provided a time-series cross-section data set of the Index of Economic Well-Being (IEWB) for selected OECD countries. Accordingly, this article tries to plug the current gap between the comparative political economy and well-being literature by presenting an empirical study about the impact of partisanship and state intervention on the IEWB and its four domains (that is, consumption flows, stocks of wealth, economic equality, economic security). A main lesson can be drawn from the econometric analysis: left cabinets and their favorite policies increase stocks of wealth, economic equality and economic security, rather than consumption flows. This means that leftist governments do not promote the current prosperity of a typical citizen but the future and widespread well-being of most population. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractA U.S. county workplace‐to‐workplace or latent migration data set is generated from overlapping migration and commuting networks. The latent migration network is the estimated number of movers between places of work, which is then compared with the actual number of migrants between places of residence. This allows both employment‐related and amenity‐related migration and pull/push factors as causes of migration flows to be identified and contrasted. Certain counties and cities that are not important migration destinations (e.g., with <200,000 net in‐migrants between 1995 and 2000) according to official data are in fact important targets when additional in‐migrants who commute into surrounding counties also are considered. An econometric analysis is then used to examine whether different regressors have different effects on the residence‐ versus employment‐based migration patterns. This is a first assessment of whether or not the proposed approach has merit. Results are consistent with prior expectations regarding the factors that would motivate latent versus actual migration.

Strategic planning has the potential to enable cities to weather the effects of fiscal crises. City officials can use the information gathered though internal and external scanning to implement fiscal policy changes that can minimize their governments' exposure to external fiscal shocks, and to experiment with alternative service delivery arrangements that generate cost savings. Linking strategic plans to budgets allows cities to focus on core services, and reduce expenditures for nonessential programs. Strategic plans can also provide a framework for operations, facilitating closer cooperation and coordination among managers and workers in preventing the further deterioration in the fiscal condition of their organization. Can cities that implement comprehensive strategic planning adjust better to the current fiscal crisis and minimize their budget deficits? The results of advanced econometric analysis are inconclusive. Adjusting for selection bias and endogeneity, strategic planning is associated with the perception of improving city government fiscal health. Planning, however, has no effect on actual deficits.

This article contributes to the political economic literature regarding the effects of industrial relations institutions on national economic outcomes. Based on an econometric analysis of the determinants of wage moderation in sixteen industrialized countries between 1974 and 2000, it argues that the organizational characteristics of trade unions have a significant impact on wage dynamics. Controlling for a number of institutional and economic factors, the countries in which trade union confederations directly involve workers in the process of collective bargaining ratification have on average lower wage growth relative to productivity than others. The authors also find that collective bargaining coordination and contract ratification magnify each other's wage-dampening effect. Through case studies of Ireland and Italy, the article examines the causal mechanisms underlying the uncovered statistical regularities and concludes that, particularly at a time in which classic political exchange is waning, worker involvement in contract ratification allows confederation leaders to resolve conflicting claims inside their organizations at lower wage levels than are achieved by a less participatory governance process.

This paper aims at examining wage compression in Europe, defined as a relatively small wage differentials compared with productivity differences. Using the publicly available data on wages drawn from the Structure of Earnings Survey 2002, it considers the existence of wage compression both across occupations and levels of education by means of cross-sectional econometric analysis. Looking at wage compression across occupations, robust evidence gives some support to the conventional view that there is a compressed wage distribution in Europe. While the estimated wage compression is even higher across the levels of education, the evidence appears much less robust. Wage compression seems to be higher in the euro area and the EU15 than in the twelve New Member States, which is in line with their more flexible wage bargaining setting. Likewise, wage compression with the EU15 mainly occurs in continental and southern countries. Moreover, the compression of wages is not uniform across wage levels and more pronounced at the lower end of the earning distribution. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to contribute further on the twin deficits debate in a developing economy.Design/methodology/approachThe data for Thailand over three decades are used as a case study.FindingsThe major findings are: first, a stable, long‐run equilibrium relationship between fiscal deficit, interest rate, exchange rate, and current account was found. Second, the causal relationship between the two deficits runs from fiscal deficit to current account deficit. This evidence is supportive of the twin deficits hypothesis. Further econometric analysis reveals that the two financial variables (interest rate and exchange rate) act as intermediating variables – that is an increased fiscal deficit causes interest rate to rise, and this in turn puts pressure on the exchange rate. The appreciation of the domestic currency causes a current account deficit.Originality/valueThe paper is of value by showing both direct and indirect channels to uncover the twin deficits phenomena. Based on a persistent profile response, it was found that the adjustment process may take as long as a year to complete.

PurposeThe purpose of the paper is to explore the theoretical underpinnings and practical implications of responsible competitiveness, where responsible business practices become a driver of national and regional competitiveness.Design/methodology/approachThe paper is based on extensive international consultations in association with the United Nations, detailed case studies, and econometric analysis of country level competitiveness and corporate responsibility related data.FindingsThe paper concluded that responsible business practices can contribute to national and regional competitiveness, and that without such links corporate responsibility impacts are likely to remain limited.Research limitations/implicationsFurther sector and issue‐based and country‐level research is needed exploring the potential and practice of responsible competitiveness.Practical implicationsProposes that national and regional strategies for enhancing competitiveness and so also social/environmental outcomes can be grounded in responsible competitiveness. Furthermore, offers insights into how global markets can internalise key costs and benefits.Originality/valueThe paper authors the notion of responsible competitiveness, and provides original definitions, methodology and data previously unpublished in any academic journal.

This article proposes a decision-theoretic model to explain how cabinets help presidents implement their policy-making strategies. Presidents are assumed to have two policy-making strategies: a strategy based on the use of statutes or a strategy based on executive prerogatives. If the president's preferences and the institutional incentives and economic conditions faced favor a statutory strategy, the president is more likely to appoint a majority cabinet, select more partisan ministers, and distribute portfolios to parties on a proportional basis. Econometric analysis of 106 cabinets appointed in 13 countries of the Americas demonstrates that the determinants of cabinet legislative status are the size of the president's party, extremist presidents, and economic crises. The share of partisan ministers and proportionality in portfolio allocation are affected by the size of the president's party, extremist presidents holding decree powers, the extension of the president's veto powers, and the elapsing of the president's term.

This paper analyzes the economic foundations of a non-democratic political regime, where the ruling bureaucracy captures rents through collective control over state property and job assignment. The model developed here yields the equilibrium in the 'political labor market,' where the ruling bureaucracy buys services and political support of activists recruited from the working population. The underlying implicit contract requires that the incumbent bureaucrats retire after a certain time to allow for deferred promotion of activists into rent-paying positions. The major implications are that the stability of a non-democratic regime is consistent with high-income gap between the rulers and the rest of the population, strengthened when government pursues an active investment policy, and is not directly affected by public goods provision or the rate of economic growth. The results of econometric analysis of panel data from former Soviet states for the period of 1956-1968 confirm the predictions of the model.

Comparative theories of legislatures have generally focused on the impact of electoral system-generated incentives on party discipline. While hypotheses advanced by this literature can explain cross-national variation in discipline, they fail to explain variation within one & the same country. This work explains the impressive cross-party & within-party variation in discipline observed in Brazil's first democracy (1946-64). We argue that party discipline was above all a function of presidents' legislative coalition-building strategies based on the dispensation of patronage to parties. One main consequence of these strategies was the creation of two factions within each party: one pro-presidential, the other anti-presidential. The relative size of each faction is assumed to affect discipline. Econometric analysis of 982 roll calls demonstrates that the key determinants of the discipline of the largest parties were the extent of budgetary resources channeled to them by presidents & the lapsing of the president's term. 5 Tables, 2 Figures, 54 References. Adapted from the source document.

Public services & goods provide necessary inputs into private productive activities. Modern states finance these inputs through taxes collected from the community. When this process is influenced by bureaucratic corruption, the efficiency of public expenditure decreases. In this paper, we investigate the long-run consequences of this form of corruption. In a model of economic growth with public inputs used in private production, government bureaucrats purchase inputs from the private sector with some degree of discretion. Illegal agreements allow personal profit, & governments fight corruption through costly monitoring of public purchases. The extent of corruption is a decision variable in the maximization of expected revenue. The model is supported by econometric analysis of the Italian case. A dynamic panel data approach to economic growth based on data of 20 regions allows us to estimate the effect of corruption on the productivity of expenditure on public investment. The effect is significant & distinct from a direct negative effect of corruption on the growth rate. 4 Tables, 1 Figure, 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

Asymmetric information between lender and borrower is made responsible for financing constraints at the firm level which may influence real activity. In this paper a standard model of credit rationing due to adverse selection and adverse incentive effects is used to derive hypotheses on causes of financing constraints. Firms' age and size are among the factors which should influence availability of information and hence the probability of financing constraints. Furthermore, changing business prospects might strengthen the degree of informational asymmetry between firms and banks. The main contribution of this paper is an econometric analysis of the derived hypotheses using German firm panel data. Both, hypotheses on the causes of limited access to the loan market and its effects on investment and innovative activities are tested. The estimation is based on microdata of the ifo institute for economic research, Munich. Neither the influence of asymmetric information on financing constraints nor their real effects can be rejected by the data.