Provision of a Public Good with Altruistic Overlapping Generations and Many Tribes
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3895
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3895
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2761
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Working paper
In: Economica, Band 60, Heft 237, S. 1
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 16, Heft 1, S. 117-138
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Journal of international economics, Band 23, Heft 3-4, S. 369-376
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 41-54
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: Dynamic games and applications: DGA, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 929-953
ISSN: 2153-0793
AbstractTrade changes incentives to protect an open-access natural resource independently of its effect on the resource price. General equilibrium linkages cause resource policy to affect the price of privately owned assets regardless of whether they are used in the resource sector. In the closed economy, the asset market in our overlapping generations setting creates incentives for currently living agents to protect the natural resource. The interplay of the asset market and general equilibrium effects causes trade to reverse these incentives. Trade liberalization and the establishment of formal property rights are policy complements: the former makes the latter more important.
In: Environment and development economics, Band 24, Heft 6, S. 624-642
ISSN: 1469-4395
AbstractIn familiar models, a decrease in the friction facing mobile factors (e.g., lowering their adjustment costs) increases a coordination problem, leading to more circumstances where there are multiple equilibria. We show that a decrease in friction can decrease coordination problems when a production externality arises from a changing stock, e.g. of pollution or knowledge. In general, the relation between the amount of friction that mobile factors face and the likelihood of multiple equilibria is non-monotonic.
In: Journal of public economics, Band 96, Heft 9-10, S. 685-697
ISSN: 1879-2316
A two-sector OLG model illuminates previously unexamined intergenerationaleffects of a tax that protects an environmental stock. A traded asset capitalizes the economic returns to future tax-induced environmental improvements, benefiting the current asset owners, the old generation. Absent a transfer, the tax harms the young generation by decreasing their real wage. Future generations benefit fromthe tax-induced improvement in environmental stock. The principalintergenerational conflict arising from public policy is between generationsalive at the time society imposes the policy, not between generations alive at different times. A Pareto-improving policy can be implemented under various political economy settings.
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In: Revue économique, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 153-182
ISSN: 1950-6694
In: Structural change and economic dynamics, Band 18, Heft 1, S. 100-119
ISSN: 1873-6017
In: Environmental and resource economics, Band 32, Heft 2, S. 273-300
ISSN: 1573-1502
In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 28, Heft 8, S. 1661-1680
ISSN: 0165-1889