Suchergebnisse

AbstractUsing propensity score matching, we provide new evidence of a nonmonotonic relation between the number of anti‐takeover provisions (ATPs) a firm adopts, relative to peer‐matched firms, and takeover likelihood. Firms with either a relatively low or high number of ATPs are significantly less likely to be a takeover target. We argue that this outcome is a result of the expected benefits versus costs of targeting firms in the left and right tails of the peer‐matched ATP distribution. In particular, firms in the left tail with a relatively small number of ATPs tend to have high market valuations, indicative of management optimizing shareholder welfare and hence being less concerned about the threat of a takeover. Overall, our findings have important implications for both corporate and regulatory policy.

ABSTRACT
This study examines the effect of tax haven utilization on the implied cost of equity capital (ICOE) based on a sample of publicly listed U.S. multinational firms over the 2006–2014 period. Our regression results show that tax haven utilization is significantly positively associated with the ICOE. In terms of economic significance, we find that, on average, a one-standard deviation increase in tax haven utilization leads to an increase in the ICOE for our sample firms by approximately 0.30 percent or 30 basis points. We also observe that our regression results are robust to a number of endogeneity checks. In additional analysis, we find that high agency costs are likely to magnify the positive association between tax haven utilization and the ICOE, while high independent director monitoring could moderate this association. Overall, this study provides unique insights into the effect of tax haven utilization on the ICOE.