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AbstractWe review research on eye movements in decision making and show that decision makers are subject to several visual biases such as the size, salience, position, emotional valence, predictability, and number of information elements. These biases lead decision makers to allocate their attention in ways that are arbitrary to their goals and sometimes bias their choices. We show that while some visual biases can be minimized, others are unavoidable. Consequently, it is impossible to present information in a completely neutral way. Any presentation format will bias decision makers to attend or ignore different information and thereby influence their choices.

We discuss the development of fundamentally new theoretical ideas stated by V. L. Makarov in his article "The calculus of institutions". Some of them have already been implemented for different applied issues. Other ideas have a more debatable nature and require further development and testing on empirical data. In this paper, we pay the main attention to the institutional context, as well as to the formulation and analysis of decision-making procedures under coalition formation surroundings.

Enthält Rezensionen von: ‡‡Changing rules of delegation : a contest for power in comitology / Adrienne Heritier ... - Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013‡‡Controlling comitology : accountability in a multi-level system / Gijs Jan Brandsma. - Houndmills : Palgrave Macmillan, 2013‡‡

Due to a lack of time and expertise, policy makers often rely on others, such as bureaucrats, experts, or advisers, when policy decisions have to be made. A nontrivial problem is that those who possess information have a vested interest in the policy outcome; this gives them an incentive to manipulate or conceal information. In this book, we examine a penalty for lying and the power to replace an advisor as a means of restraining information providers from information manipulation. We argue that these two institutional arrangements may not always help a policy maker to attain a better decision (Chapters 2 and 3). Inasmuch as consequences of policies are complicated and difficult to foresee, small groups like committees often assist policy makers to collect information, deliberate over policies, and devise policy recommendations. As information is not for free, committee members must be motivated to collect it. We shed some light on how deliberation affects committee members' incentives to gather the costly information, and thus the quality of collective decision-making (Chapter 4). Outside the political arena, agency problems between politicians and voters also exist. In Chapter 5, we examine how elections play their role of disciplining and selecting politicians and how policy choices are made when politicians differ in their motivations in running for political office.

"Equivalency Framing in Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

This e-book is concerned with decision-making and management applications. Articles are written by scholars in Turkey, Belgium, Australia, China and Malaysia, and cover data models, case studies and numerical analysis in logistics information technologies

"Evolution and Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Process Tracing in Crisis Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.

Front Matter -- Acknowledgments -- Preface -- Contents -- Executive Summary -- Introduction -- 1 Concept of Livability and Indicators -- 2 The Importance of Place and Connectedness -- 3 Measurement and Analysis of Livability -- 4 The Decision-Support Process -- 5 Data and Analysis Tools -- Appendix A Federal Data Provision -- Appendix C Identifying Data for Place-Based Decision Making -- Acronyms -- Index.

"Competitive Framing in Political Decision Making" published on by Oxford University Press.