Suchergebnisse

"Necker's On Executive Power in Great States, written as the events of the French Revolution were still unfolding, sheds fresh light on timely topics of executive power, constitutionalism and the rule of law, federalism, balance of power, and the dependence of liberty on morality and religion"--

This book discusses the major issues currently affecting the accountability of executive power in Europe. The work is divided into three parts. The first examines the territorial dimension including unitary, regional and federal. It discusses how territorial actors participate in strengthening or weakening the implementation of accountability of executive power in modern democratic States. The second part explores the links between national traditions and European accountability of executive power to establish a common European culture. The third and final part focuses on how to build a truly multidisciplinary approach to accountability of executive power and draws on legal, historical and political approaches. The volume will be an invaluable resource for researchers, academics and policy-makers in constitutional law and politics, public law, comparative law, legal history and government.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- List of Tables -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- The State in Imperial Russia and the USSR -- The State and the Economy -- The State and Security -- The State and the Future -- Index -- Contributors -- 1 The Government in the Soviet Political System -- 2 Party-State Relations -- 3 Executive-Legislative Relations -- 4 The Rise of Presidential Power under Gorbachev -- 5 The Ministry of Finance -- 6 The Industrial Ministries -- 7 The Agricultural Ministries -- 8 The Ministry of Defense -- 9 The Ministry of Internal Affairs

AbstractIn the multilevel system of the European Union (EU), national governments have been empowered at the expense of parliaments. We study the executive power shift in EU politics in the formation of national preferences. This article shows that governments are more likely to integrate parliaments and external actors, such as other governments and EU institutions, when they advocate extreme bargaining positions in EU negotiations. We theoretically develop this argument and provide an empirical study of Eurozone politics, covering the preference formation of 27 EU member states. The analysis shows that the executives are overall the dominating power: most of the time, governments form national preferences on their own. When governments integrate additional actors, they mostly rely on external actors and do so to avoid blame and to shift responsibility. These findings question whether the integration of national parliaments in EU politics indeed addresses democratic accountability concerns.