Suchergebnisse

Do citizens legislate different tax policies than parliaments? We provide quasi-experimental evidence for causal effects of direct democracy. Town meetings (popular assemblies) replace local councils in small German municipalities below a specific population threshold. Difference-in-differences, RD and event study estimates consistently show that direct democracy comes with sizable but selective tax cuts. Property tax rates, which apply to all residents, decrease by some 10 to 15% under direct democracy. We do not find that business tax rates change. Direct democracy allows citizens to design tax policies more individually than voting for a high-tax or low-tax party in elections.

Direct democracy in Switzerland provides a particularly valuable site for the study of the direct policy consequences of low turnout. The analysis of the outcomes of 144 popular votes between 1981 and 1999 shows that the level of information held by voters matters slightly more for the outcome of a popular vote than does the level of turnout, controlling for the levels of information. About 35 percent of votes would have had a different approval rate if all citizens had voted, but even more results would have changed had voters had been much better informed. Counter to the conventional wisdom, in those cases where turnout and information did matter higher levels of turnout tended to work in favour of right-wing parties, whereas higher levels of information tended to work to favour outcomes supported by left-wing parties. Further, the findings suggest that the outcomes of popular votes are most likely to be biased when voters think an issue is unimportant and both levels of turnout and information are low. [Copyright 2006 Elsevier Ltd.]

This paper investigates on the demographic, economic, political and cultural determinants of direct democracy in 87 countries using an index of direct democracy. The test is interesting since there are important variations across these countries in the referendum and initiative use. We apply a number of estimation techniques. We find that per capita income, education and a larger share of Catholic population are positive determinants, whereas ethnic fractionalization is depending on the estimation technique. Political rights and stability also work as prerequisites to direct democracy. Direct democracy seems independent from the institutional structure.

The merits of direct democracy through referendums were somewhat timidly promoted by the Canadian Alliance during the 2000 federal election campaign, but received little consideration at the time. This paper seeks to initiate more serious discussion of whether & how direct democracy could benefit Canada. Referendums are increasingly used in many liberal-democratic societies in Western Europe, primarily to vote on such issues as membership in the European Union & ratifications of EU treaties, changes to electoral systems, & legalization of abortion & divorce. In Switzerland, Italy, & the US, citizens can have issues placed on the ballot & can vote directly for the passage of some laws. However, support in Canada is weak; only 37% of Canadians surveyed by the IRRP could think of an issue they would want to be decided by referendum, though the percentage varied widely by province. Nonetheless, it is argued that this enhancement of democracy would do more than increase opportunities to vote; it would engage citizens in political deliberation with each other & with their elected representatives; & it would give the public a more meaningful say in decision-making. Figures. J. Stanton

The purpose of the Guidebook to Direct Democracy is to offer scholars and practitioners a reference book which accurately defines the concept of direct democracy as well as its main tools. knowing how direct democracy procedures work helps the reader to understand how to analyze their relationship to representative government.

Proponents of direct legislation maintain that the initiative and popular referendum empower ordinary citizens to set the agenda of politics. Some argue it shifts "ultimate authority from representatives in state legislatures, city councils, and even Congress to the people themselves" (Schmidt 1989, vii). Such elections, so the argument goes, produce greater voter interest in elections and higher voter turnout. Those in favor of the process also contend that it is an important check on special interests which exert too much control over elected politicians (Magleby 1984, chap. 2; Cronin 1989).Critics of direct democracy raise concerns about the quality of deliberation voters give to issues. Voters can be confused by ballot question wording or respond negatively to the length of the ballots. Moreover, because voters lack the simplifying devices of partisanship and candidate appeal, they may be more susceptible to the manipulations of campaign consultants.How well do these longstanding arguments for and against direct legislation reflect our actual experience with the process in the 1990s? Arguments for direct democracy depend largely on how the process is conducted. If the process can be manipulated by special interests or relies on questionable tactics, then many of the advantages claimed for the process disappear. In this article, we argue that political consultants play a significant role in the conduct of direct democracy. These consultants normally work directly for organized interests without the constraints imposed by candidates or parties.

Move to a new constitutional blend of parliamentary principles and national traditions. Electoral reforms recommended by the Tinkhundla Review Commission.