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On March 1, Iranians voted for a 290-seat Majles (the parliament) and an 88-seat Assembly of Experts, a clerical body tasked with overseeing the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and selecting the new one. The elections, the first after the widespread protests in 2022-2023 sparked by the death in custody of a young woman, Mahsa Amini, due to flouting the country's strict dress code, were heavily marred by boycott from the moderate and reformist-leaning segments of society.The Guardians Council, the hardline-dominated body that vets the candidates, compounded the resentment by disqualifying most of the few moderate and reformist candidates who bothered to apply. The extent of disqualifications reached truly farcical dimensions: the former two term president (2013-2021) and member of the Assembly of Experts for 24 years, the centrist Hassan Rouhani was barred from running for the Assembly of Experts.As a result, the elections registered the lowest turnout in the history of the Islamic Republic: 40% according to official data, and closer to 30% according to unofficial observers. For a system that traditionally places a high premium on participation as means of its legitimation, these numbers represent an unmitigated fiasco.The new parliament will thus be dominated by hardline factions. The moderates who made it to the parliament will be reduced to a marginal minority of around 20 MPs. That, however, does not necessarily augur an era of a rubber-stamping chamber. The different conservative and hardline factions are bound to try to out-hawk each other on a host of domestic and foreign policies, such as enforcing rigid veiling on women or defying the U.S. and boosting the "Axis of Resistance," as a network of the Iranian allies in the Middle East is known.The declining fortunes of the outgoing speaker of the parliament Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf illustrate the taste of things of come: a traditional conservative and IRGC veteran who occasionally displayed a pragmatist streak, Qalibaf came only fourth in Tehran out of 30 Tehran MPs, tallying 409,808 votes as opposed to 1,260,000 he gathered in 2020. The main beneficiary of his decline seems to have been an ultra-radical firebrand Mahmoud Nabavian who came first in Tehran with 535,000 votes and is reportedly strongly opposed to Qalibaf.Nabavian made himself famous by categorically stating the ex-president Rouhani and his foreign minister Javad Zarif purposely signed to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international watchdog against money laundering and terrorist financing, to hand over Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the IRGC elite Al-Quds Force, to the U.S. in exchange for getting the banking sanctions released. Soleimani was assassinated in a U.S. drone strike in Iraq in early 2020.It wasn't always like this. In February 2018, as a foreign affairs staffer, I was part of the visiting European Parliament delegation to Iran, during which we met with our counterparts in the Iranian parliament. Then our delegation witnessed a fair degree of pluralism running from hardline conservatives, through pragmatic principlists to outright reformists. The assembly was chaired by Ali Larijani, a pragmatic conservative who in his later years moved increasingly to the center — to the point of being excluded from running in presidential elections in 2021. That parliament was elected in 2016 with a participation rate of 61.4%, reflecting the optimistic mood in the country following the signature of the nuclear deal in 2015.This correlation between higher participation and reformist pulsations is not lost on the guardians of the "nezam" (or, the system). Yet the 2024 elections took place in a particularly sensitive context, and, more than with the parliament, it had to do with the simultaneous elections to the Assembly of Experts. That body is elected once every 8 years and is tasked with selecting the new supreme leader. Given that the incumbent Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is currently 84, it can't be ruled out that the newly elected assembly will have to choose his successor. To ensure the clerical continuity of the Islamic Republic, the establishment has apparently chosen to run as little risks as possible and accordingly narrowed the field to the most loyal of the loyalists. That explains the exclusion of Rouhani from running. In another significant upset, the former chief justice Ayatollah Sadeq Amoli Larijani, a brother of the former speaker of the parliament Ali Larijani, failed to secure a seat in the assembly, even though he, as opposed to Rouhani, was allowed to run.These developments suggest that the establishment is clearly less concerned with the popular legitimacy and representativity of the institutions than with ensuring a smooth transition to a new leadership.This aversion to risk also helps explain why Iran's foreign policy is in fact more moderate in practice than its rhetoric suggests. Iran's focus is on vindicating its diplomatic and moral leadership in the Islamic world as the leader of the "resistance" over Palestine rather than seek a military confrontation with Israel and/or U.S. Such a confrontation could bear unacceptable security and economic costs and derail the main priority which is to carefully stage-manage the transition.Iran's influence may help to explain why there was no escalation following the U.S. strikes on Iran-allied Shiite militias in Iraq and Syria carried out on February 2 in retaliation for the drone attack that killed 3 U.S. service members in Jordan. It is particularly meaningful that there was no response from Kataeb Hezbollah, one of the closest Iranian allies in Iraq, to the killing of one of its top commanders by the U.S. — even though it took place after the group announced, presumably in coordination with Tehran, that it was halting its attacks on the Americans.Elsewhere, Iran has continued its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, despite the latter's cozying up to Israel. While in late 2022, Tehran conducted war drills on the border with Azerbaijan — unlike Saudi Arabia, an open ally of Israel's — it is now busy discussing new transit deals with Baku. There are even signs that Iran's opposition to Israel itself may be less stringent than its rhetoric suggests: Tehran backed at the U.N. and at the Organization of Islamic Conference resolutions calling for a two-state solution between Israel and Palestine, thus implicitly recognizing Israel's right to exist. There is a decent chance that a departure of Khamenei, who holds strong personal and ideological animus against Israel, may further tilt Iran in a pragmatic direction. And Tehran, even under the current hardline government, occasionally showed an ability to deal with Washington — witness the prisoners swaps and the agreed unfreezing of Iranian assets in September of 2023. The elections in Iran have gone a long way from removing any lingering pretense of democratic legitimation of the system. Little change, however, is expected in the country's foreign policy: Tehran is likely to continue talking tough while seeking deals where possible.

For a conflict discussed in starkly moralistic terms, the ways the Ukraine war is talked about by its most enthusiastic Western supporters can be remarkably cynical about the human carnage involved. "Aiding Ukraine, giving the money to Ukraine is the cheapest possible way for the U.S. to enhance its security," Zanny Minton Beddoes, editor-in-chief of the Economist, recently told the Daily Show's Jon Stewart. "The fighting is being done by the Ukrainians, they're the people who are being killed." This view is not unique to Beddoes. It's been widely expressed by those most in favor of an open-ended, prolonged war and most against the kind of peace negotiations that would shorten it. "Four months into this thing, I like the structural path we're on here. As long as we help Ukraine with the weapons they need and the economic support, they will fight to the last person," said Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-S.C.) early into the war, accidentally voicing what the war's critics have often said about the war — that the U.S. will fight it "to the last Ukrainian." Later, Graham called it the "best money we've ever spent." "It is a relatively modest amount that we are contributing without being asked to risk life and limb," Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, told the Associated Press last year. "The Ukrainians are willing to fight the fight for us if the West will give them the provisions. It's a pretty good deal." "I call that a bargain," North Dakota Governor Doug Burgum has said about the war funding, pointing to the damage Ukrainian forces had inflicted on the Russian military. "No Americans are getting killed in Ukraine. We're rebuilding our industrial base. The Ukrainians are destroying the army of one of our biggest rivals. I have a hard time finding anything wrong with that," U.S. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) remarked.Americans "should be satisfied that we're getting our money's worth on our Ukraine investment," wrote Sen. Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), because "for less than 3 percent of our nation's military budget, we've enabled Ukraine to degrade Russia's military strength by half," and "all without a single American service woman or man injured or lost." But politicians aren't the only armchair warriors who look at the enormous death and destruction suffered by Ukraine by prolonging the war as akin to a brilliant business decision. Hawkish think tanks have made similar arguments. "When viewed from a bang-per-buck perspective, U.S. and Western support for Ukraine is an incredibly cost-effective investment," Timothy Garten Ashe wrote for the weapons maker-funded Center for European Policy Analysis. "Support for Ukraine remains a bargain for American national security," wrote Hudson Institute Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Europe and Eurasia Peter Rough. "For about 5 percent of total U.S. defense spending over the past 20 months, Ukraine has badly degraded Russia, one of the United States' top adversaries, without shedding a single drop of American blood." And major U.S. newspapers have likewise published similar perspectives. "We have a determined partner in Ukraine that is willing to bear the consequences of war so that we do not have to do so ourselves in the future," former top George W. Bush officials Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates celebrated in the pages of the Washington Post. "For all the aid we've given Ukraine, we are the true beneficiaries in the relationship, and they the true benefactors," wrote Bret Stephens at the New York Times, pointing to the fact that NATO is paying in only money, while "Ukrainians are counting their costs in lives and limbs lost." What's distasteful about this is not just the flippant way it treats the unimaginable scale of loss of life, permanent disability and emerging long-term crises being experienced by Ukrainians — as mere abacus beads to be moved around in a cost-benefit analysis centered on the United States and its NATO allies. It's also the fact that, far from being "willing," "determined" and ready to "fight to the last person," many Ukrainians have demonstrated that they do not want to risk their lives in this war — a share of the population that is getting larger and more vocal the longer the war has gone on. Since the start of the war, when many fleeing Ukrainian men were stopped at the border and ordered to return to potentially fight, thousands of Ukrainians have defied the government's ban on men aged between 18 and 60 leaving the country — to the point of spending large sums of money and even risking their lives to get out. Many hunkered down in their homes to dodge enlistment officers, while tens of thousands signed a petition opposing increasingly aggressive conscription practices. Early last year, Ukraine's parliament upped the punishment for desertion, which soldiers have this year admitted is still a growing problem. By November 2023, the BBC determined that a total of nearly 20,000 Ukrainian men had fled the country to avoid being drafted, while the State Border Service revealed a month later that more than 16,500 had been stopped from leaving. At one point, the country's law enforcement uncovered a massive scheme across nearly a dozen regions that gave out falsified medical certificates declaring someone unfit for military service in return for as much as $10,000. This phenomenon has only intensified as Kyiv has dramatically expanded its conscription plans to make up its disadvantage in manpower, including proposals for lowering the draft age and creating a central database of potential recruits, all while resorting to more aggressive drafting tactics and recruiting increasingly older and less healthy men. These plans have engendered massive opposition, with protests by soldiers' families that have taken place around the country since last year calling for a cap on the length of military service continuing and intensifying; earlier this month. One hundred women blocked a road and mistakenly attacked another woman due to rumors of draft officials coming to take the village's men away. "I don't see the 500,000 more people ready to die," admitted a former Ukrainian government minister and current army captain last November. It increasingly appears that many of those who are most enthusiastic to keep the war going and avoid a negotiated end aren't, as we keep being told, the Ukrainians who are most likely to be killed or wounded in the fighting. Instead they are politicians and commentators far, far away from the front line in other countries who view its attendant death and destruction as akin to a board game — or, in their words, as a "good deal," a "bargain," and a satisfying "investment" for their own countries.In other words, it looks increasingly like all too many other U.S.-led wars.

UPDATE 2/12 6:00 a.m. EST: According to reports the election commission has released final results, showing that Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party came out on top. According to al Jazeera, a number of independent candidates allied to help the party to a surprise lead with 97 of the 265 seats, though with "no party winning a majority, and numerous contenders claiming vote tampering, Pakistan's political future is very uncertain." UPDATE 2/9 1:00 p.m. EST: . The release of the election results have been significantly delayed, fueling fears that rigging is taking place behind the scenes and discrepancies exist in reported numbers. It is clear that Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party came out on top, but whether they will be permitted to form a government is the real question. Even critics of PTI within Pakistan have raised alarms over the results. While countries worldwide, including the United States, expressed concern, there seems to be no intent to exert pressure on Pakistan's military establishment. It is being treated as an internal matter.The U.S. State Department issued a statement today expressing concern about "undue restrictions" on the electoral process and alleged interference. However, the statement also conveyed that, "The United States is prepared to work with the next Pakistani government, regardless of political party, to advance our shared interests.""Pakistan's elections are taking place under compromised conditions, with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party effectively sidelined. Nevertheless, as results come in, PTI candidates are winning across the country by a large margin. If these results are ignored, Pakistan's democracy would face serious turmoil.The party, led by former Prime Minister Imran Khan, and popular in urban centers and among younger middle-class Pakistanis, has been subjected to intimidation and dismantling, with Khan himself in jail. Even PTI's electoral symbol was prohibited on ballots, making it harder for voters to identify PTI candidates.Pakistan's military systematically disassembled Imran Khan's PTI party, repeatedly arresting senior members and even targeting their children and party workers, with some facing trial in anti-terrorism courts. To maintain momentum, PTI has resorted to creative tactics, such as organizing large virtual political demonstrations and gatherings, even in the face of internet disruptions.Today, there were reports of certain polling stations opening late, forcing voters to endure lengthy waits in line. Additionally, cell and internet services were cut across the country, ostensibly for security reasons, creating logistical challenges for voting. The elections are occurring amid threats from militant groups like ISKP, particularly in Pakistan's northwest, but as of now, significant violence has been largely avoided.The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), known for its stronghold in Punjab and led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who returned from self-imposed exile last October, was projected to win, but current polling suggests otherwise.Pakistan's flawed democracyPakistan's political system is commonly characterized as a hybrid regime, incorporating both democratic and authoritarian traits. While there are regular (although sometimes delayed) elections and democratic institutions, such as a prime minister, parliament, and an activist judiciary, the military wields considerable influence in defense and foreign relations. Persistent issues like censorship, restrictions on civil liberties, and extrajudicial detentions are common.A "elite bargain" prevails among the country's political and business elites and the security establishment, with the ruling party benefiting the most, while the opposition politicians act as a counterbalance or are marginalized. Notably, politicians critical of the military in opposition tend to support it when in power, prioritizing personal and party interests. This is true for Nawaz Sharif and Imran Khan alike. This dynamic has led many, both in Pakistan and abroad, to perceive the military as more reliable and resilient compared to the political parties' shifting alliances, defections, infighting, and nepotism.What Pakistan's security establishment prefers is an elected head of state who is compliant and a robust political opposition that can serve as a check on their power.However, the ongoing feud between Imran Khan and the military has disrupted this cyclical arrangement. Public criticism and protests against the military by PTI supporters last spring reached unprecedented levels, facilitated by the ease of expression on social media.Additionally, if Nawaz Sharif becomes the next prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, serving as a political counterbalance, will not be available unless he is released from jail. It is also uncertain whether Nawaz Sharif and his PML-N party will willingly cooperate with the military if they come into power, particularly as time progresses. While a PML-N victory may temporarily appease the military, the absence of a strong political opposition could lead to conflicts between the PML-N and the generals over time.If PTI comes out on top and the results are ignored, then Pakistan's democracy will be placed into question and turmoil could follow.What Does This Mean for U.S.-Pakistan Relations?Washington consistently communicates that it supports free and fair elections in Pakistan but the public statements stop there. After Imran Khan's arrest last May, the State Department issued cautious statements, expressing hope for Pakistan to adhere to the rule of law.Khan's arrests have been referred to as an "internal matter" for Pakistan which is music to the military's ears. Some members of Congress have voiced concern but it is not a top priority for elected officials. Imran Khan's PTI party is quite popular among the Pakistani American diaspora, but the diaspora itself is not large or organized enough to exert real pressure on elected officials. Furthermore, U.S.-Pakistan policy is largely crafted within the White House.Imran Khan complicated the possibility of Washington providing moral support, even if it were inclined, by framing his removal from office through a vote of no confidence as a U.S.-backed regime change conspiracy. This move heightened anti-American sentiment in the country. The Biden administration is likely cautious about risking its relationship with Pakistan's military over the fate of one political party led by a perceived unpredictable leader, and a strong U.S. statement is unlikely to benefit PTI figures or advance civil liberties. U.S. financial support for Pakistan has also significantly decreased compared to previous years. A lesson from the Afghanistan war is that Washington cannot change the decisions of Pakistan's generals once their minds are made up.Washington's key priorities in Pakistan are preventing large-scale conflict between Pakistan and India, maintaining political and economic stability, and counterterrorism. Initiatives like democracy promotion and education are important but secondary. Washington will engage with Pakistan as it exists. This explains why Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Pakistan's army chief during his visit to Washington last December, even though they are not direct counterparts. Despite limitations, Pakistan has elections, a vibrant press, and civil society. Although election outcomes may be partially engineered, the democratic challenges in Pakistan are not new, as no prime minister has ever completed their term.A showdown over valid election results could, however, place Washington in a precarious position.

Last month, the U.S. announced Operation Prosperity Guardian, a naval coalition aimed at deterring Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Bahrain was the only Arab nation to join. The reasons why — and why other U.S. allies and partners in the region did not — should be of interest to us.Many countries have valid concerns about the Gaza war's further regionalization. The Houthis say they are targeting commercial vessels that are Israeli owned or heading for Israeli ports with missile and drone strikes, and have already hijacked a ship. They vow to continue these attacks until Israel agrees to a ceasefire.The U.S. has been thwarting most of these attacks with their naval-based missile defenses.Much is at stake economically with the Red Sea's security crisis. Separating the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa is the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which links the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Roughly 30 percent of all global containers transit the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, as does about 12 percent of all world trade. But since the Houthi attacks in the southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden began in October, major shipping carriers have stopped transiting the Suez Canal and have re-routed their vessels around Africa, threatening consumer prices hikes. This disruption to Red Sea trade can seriously harm economies across Europe, which were already contracting before this crisis.Operation Prosperity GuardianThat Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which were the two main states in the Arab military coalition that began fighting the Houthis in 2015, did not join Operation Prosperity Guardian is quite significant. Also notable is the fact that Egypt, a major Arab country with a 930-mile Red Sea coast, refused to join, too. Most Arab states avoided formally joining Operation Prosperity Guardian for several reasons. First, Arab societies are so enraged about Israel's indiscriminate bombing, forced starvation, and displacement of millions of Palestinians in Gaza, that the governments in the region do not want to be seen as complicit by openly siding with Washington, which is clearly funding and arming Israel's operations.Second, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member-states — particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE — want to avoid actions that could trigger a resumption of Houthi attacks on their energy and civilian infrastructure or further destabilize the Red Sea, where many of Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 projects exist. Third, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi fear that joining this security initiative could upset their détentes with Tehran, which sponsors the Houthi movement.Bahrain's Unique PositionBahrain, which the George W. Bush Administration recognized as a Major non-NATO Ally in 2002, made a different calculation. An important factor to keep in mind is that Bahrain hosts the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet. Also, Bahrain and the U.S. signed the Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, a strategic security and economic pact, in September."Bahrain has long perceived an existential threat from Iran that shapes its security stance, so by providing a home for U.S. assets, Bahrain gains protection and relevance which is another layer beyond the security protection it receives from Saudi Arabia and the UAE," said Steven Wright, an associate professor of international relations at Hamad Bin Khalifa University, in an interview with Responsible Statecraft."Other GCC members seem to have more complex calculations: for Saudi Arabia and UAE, existing efforts to climb down tensions with Iran explains their position," he added.Joseph A. Kéchichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies in Riyadh, noted that Bahrain, which has a single guided missile frigate and two smaller guided missile ships called corvettes, has not sent these assets to join the task force, at least not yet."Manama's contribution may be similar to Amsterdam's and Canberra's, as The Netherlands and Australia announced that they would send military personnel, but no vessels," he said. "Yet, because Bahrain is the headquarters of the US Navy's Fifth Fleet, as well as the home of the Combined Maritime Forces that coordinate coalition operations in the area, it makes sense for the kingdom to join if only to provide and receive information of actual maneuvers."He suggested that other Gulf Cooperation Coalition (GCC) members would be sharing information vis-a-vis the new task force, although it is unclear how that would occur. "As far as it is known, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which could have deployed naval vessels, opted to stay out of Operation Prosperity Guardian because they disagreed with its narrow objectives," added Kéchichian.Post-Oct. 7 Blowback in BahrainHaving normalized with Israel in 2020, Bahrain has been in an awkward position since October 7. When it comes to relations with Israel, there is a major divide between the Bahraini leadership and its citizenry. This divide has deepened amid the Gaza war.As Gaza's Palestinian death toll steadily rises, Bahraini authorities must contend with increased risks of blowback at home given how unpopular the Abraham Accords are with Bahraini citizens across the country's political spectrum and among diverse civil society groups. As Human Rights Watch recently documented, Bahraini authorities have used oppressive tactics to repress Palestine solidarity protestors across the country."The Al Khalifa monarchy has proven adept historically at subduing dissent through a variety of tools. It seems clear that Bahrain has calculated that involvement in the Abraham Accords serves its overall economic, foreign policy and security interests despite criticism," offered Wright."The bottom line is that the economic perks and U.S. backing is outweighing public opinion objections from its domestic political groups," said Wright.Courtney Freer, a fellow at Emory University, noted to RS that Bahrain's elected lower house of parliament issued a statement in November claiming that the country's ambassador had left Israel and that economic ties between the two states had been severed."It is worth noting that this language is coming from a primarily loyalist parliament, which suggests that such feelings of animosity towards Israel are not just associated with opposition parties, which, in turn, may make it more difficult to ignore," said Freer. "Notably, citizens have become involved in pro-Palestinian protests, and so there is anger, but it is uncertain whether this anger will be translated into political risk for the regime."Bahrain's diplomatic relations with Israel and military alliance with the U.S. may subject the archipelago kingdom to blowback from Iran-aligned actors in the region. But Bahrain abrogating the Abraham Accords or fundamentally changing its relationship with Washington is highly unlikely. Ultimately, Bahrain's leadership seems to assess that such risks of blowback are worth the benefits of normalized relations with Israel and American support."The Al Khalifa monarchy has proven adept at managing domestic dissent through various means, so the risks from Iran within this context will be viewed as manageable. Any public concerns over cooperation with Israel/U.S. is unlikely to seriously challenge its stability and at most is likely to be limited in scale," Wright said."Basically, Bahrain is seeking to be relevant to the U.S. by backing its counter-Houthi maritime initiative," he added. "This allows it to further cement its relationship with both the U.S. and also Israel, given that this is part of an approach to counter Houthi and Iranian geopolitical reach."

The Biden administration's foreign policy record in 2023 won't give the president much to boast about in next year's election. The U.S. is even more overstretched at the end of 2023 than it was at the beginning, and the president has had very few policy successes. For most of the year, there weren't any major debacles, but that changed over the last two months as the president gave the Israeli government a blank check to wage a brutal war in Gaza. The president committed Washington to support another foreign war in the wake of the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel while the conflict in Ukraine settled into a stalemate. Even though the U.S. was under no obligation to support this war, the president made a point of turning it into one of his signature policies and linked it closely with support for Ukraine in his public rhetoric. Biden did not, and has not made a compelling case that unconditional support for Israel's campaign is in the best interests of the United States, and the costs of that support have been rising ever since. Furthermore, backing the war exposed U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria to renewed attacks from local militias, and it has also led to increasing risks for U.S. ships in the Red Sea as the Houthis have been launching attacks on commercial shipping to protest the war. The risks that the conflict could escalate and spread into other parts of the region have been growing, and so has the risk that the U.S. could become directly involved in a multi-front war. The president's instinct to back Israel to the hilt has made a wider war more likely and it has put U.S. forces in greater danger.U.S. support for Israel in Gaza has not only overshadowed the rest of Biden's foreign policy agenda, but it has also tied the U.S. to an indiscriminate bombing campaign and a punishing siege that is driving hundreds of thousands of Palestinian civilians into famine conditions. The Biden administration has not only torched whatever remained of Washington's credibility on human rights and international law, but it has closely associated the U.S. with the war crimes committed against Palestinian civilians.The damage to America's reputation has already been considerable, and the damage to American interests in the Middle East and beyond over the longer term will likely be significant.The setback for Biden's own agenda has been undeniable. The administration's biggest diplomatic initiative of 2023 — the ill-advised pursuit of Saudi-Israeli normalization — stalled when the war in Gaza showed the administration's understanding of the region to be fundamentally flawed. Having bought into the false assumption that U.S.-facilitated normalization agreements between Israel and Arab clients would stabilize the region, the administration failed to recognize how bad things were getting in occupied Palestine. Like their predecessors, the Biden administration did nothing to keep Netanyahu's coalition government in check as it pursued its creeping annexation of the West Bank. Believing that the Palestinians could be safely sidelined and that their grievances could be ignored, the administration was trying to find out what inducements it would take to get Mohammed bin Salman to endorse normalization. If they had been successful, it would have meant another security commitment and more costs for the United States, so it was just as well that this policy was derailed.It isn't clear how much of a factor the push for Saudi normalization was in contributing to Hamas' decision to attack, but it clearly wasn't helpful for the U.S. to waste so much effort on trying to entice the Saudis into a deal while tensions between Israel and the Palestinians was about to explode. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's infamous line uttered shortly before the start of the war about how the region was quieter than it had been in decades reflected how much the administration had come to believe its own press releases. Support for the war has cost the U.S. a lot of goodwill in countries of the Global South, and the administration's stubborn opposition to a ceasefire has left the U.S. as deeply isolated at the United Nations as it has ever been on a major issue. The administration had earlier emphasized the importance of competing for influence with other major powers in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, but with its hardline position on Gaza it seems to have frittered away most of whatever gains it has made. Especially for an administration that constantly talks about the importance of America's leadership role, it has outdone itself in alienating and driving the rest of the world away from the U.S. on this issue.U.S. support for the war in Ukraine has been undermined by backing for the war in Gaza in two ways. First, it has diverted U.S. attention and resources away from Ukraine as the U.S. has turned its focus once again to the Middle East. It has also made a mockery of the administration's rhetoric in support of Ukraine. The U.S. spent the better part of two years extolling the importance of international law to rally support for Ukraine, and then demonstrated that the U.S. doesn't hold its own clients and partners to the same standard that it expects from other states. The Biden record this year wasn't all bad. On the plus side, the U.S. made some modest progress in stabilizing relations with China near the end of the year after months of deteriorating ties in the wake of the spy balloon incident in February. There was a small diplomatic breakthrough with Iran in the summer that led to the release of five Americans that had been wrongfully detained by the Iranian government. Unfortunately, the administration then reneged on releasing Iranian funds that had been frozen under "maximum pressure" sanctions because they didn't want to be seen as "rewarding" Iran following Hamas' attack.The administration also recently secured another prisoner release agreement with the Venezuelan government. While these were positive results, they were also hardly earth-shattering.The Biden administration had more success in working with established allies. They further developed the technology-sharing AUKUS arrangement with Australia and Britain, and they took advantage of a temporary improvement in relations between South Korea and Japan to strengthen ties with both. In both cases, the administration was pushing on an open door, and it is questionable whether either arrangement will endure, but they can at least point to these things as examples of advancing Biden's agenda. Even more than in previous years, the Biden administration's foreign policy in 2023 has been defined by too much reliance on military tools and too little effort put into diplomatic engagement. That may be one of the reasons why the public now broadly disapproves of Biden's handling of foreign policy. Both for his own sake and for the sake of U.S. interests, the president needs to make some major course changes in 2024 in Gaza and in his overall approach to the world.

The EU Council summit of December 14-15 offered a significant, if perhaps mainly symbolic, gesture toward Ukraine in agreeing to the formal opening of accession negotiations. But at the same meeting, the bloc failed to approve financial (not military) support for Ukraine for the four-year period through 2027, amounting to 50 billion euros. Approval of this aid was vetoed by Hungary. Thus, a very muddled message about how EU countries are dealing with the Ukraine war issue, nearly two years from the start of the Russian invasion in Feb. 2022. Supporters of the aid package have agreed to take it up again in January, and, if necessary, to get commitments from the 26 supporters of the package to provide the funding for Ukraine bilaterally, rather than as part of the EU budget. In the lead-up to the meeting, Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orban pledged to block both the opening of accession talks and the financial aid package. In the end, he left the room just before the vote to open accession talks was held. He may have done so because, days before the Council meeting, the Commission unblocked 10 billion euros of funding for Hungary that had been suspended because of Hungary's failure to meet EU rule-of-law standards. In acquiescing to the opening of accession talks for Ukraine, Orban is very much aware that the process will require unanimous approval by the Council at many junctures ahead. Moreover, it may be very protracted: accession talks are still ongoing with North Macedonia (since 2020), Montenegro (2012), Serbia (2014) and Albania (2022). But the war aid issue is much more urgent. According to the Kiel Institute's Ukraine assistance scorecard, the EU institutions have been to date by far the largest provider of financial support to Ukraine. The IMF has cautioned that even a brief delay in providing this support could potentially destabilize Ukraine's precarious fiscal situation and the provision of essential services to its people. ​The mood in Europe shifting?Efforts to persuade Orban to end his opposition to the Ukraine aid package could well produce results in time for a January reconsideration, but the optics of the EU hesitations are not good, coming as they do in lockstep with those of Washington. These developments have been widely depicted in Western media as a failure of President Zelensky's personal lobbying efforts to unblock essential U.S. and EU aid before the end of 2023. Hungary was alone in open opposition to the two measures of support for Ukraine. It is nevertheless clear that the mood in Europe has turned cooler on Ukraine, given the Eurozone's weak economic performance and the failure of the counteroffensive to make any significant territorial gains. The recent electoral success of the populist, Euro-skeptic Freedom Party in the Netherlands, whose leader Geert Wilders has long opposed military aid to Ukraine, can be interpreted as part of a trend toward Ukraine fatigue in Europe. On the other side of the ledger, pro-European and pro-Ukraine Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who led liberal forces to victory in October against the nationalist-populist former ruling party, made his inaugural appearance at the Council summit and firmly aligned himself against Orban. Although French President Emmanuel Macron had also personally lobbied Orban to change his position, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz claimed credit for persuading him to leave the room when the accession vote was about to be taken. Interpreting the accession decision— strategic intent and economic constraintsThe EU Council voted unanimously to open EU accession talks with Ukraine for "strategic" reasons — because not doing so would have been seen as a rebuke to Ukraine's deepest aspirations. The appeal of this message of encouragement to Ukraine apparently was enough to assuage the worries in several member states in Central and Eastern Europe about the potential impact on their own national economics of eventual EU membership for Ukraine. A leaked internal analysis from the Commission estimates the budgetary impacts of an EU enlarged to include Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and six western Balkans states. By far the most significant impact would be due to Ukraine's accession. The study found that EU agricultural and cohesion funds for Ukraine as an EU member would amount to 186 billion euros in the first seven years. Agricultural support to other EU members would need to fall by about a fifth, and the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus and Malta – would no longer be eligible to receive cohesion funding. Unless there were a dramatic reform of EU programs, the enlargement to include nine new members would turn several net recipient countries into net contributors to the EU budget. The politics of such a dramatic reversal of fortunes in countries accustomed to EU largesse could be difficult to manage and might well give rise to greater popular euro-skepticism. Early indications of this potential impact have arisen in Poland, where popular support for the Ukrainian war effort remains quite robust. However, the situation has been clouded since mid-2023 by emerging grievances among those affected by competition from Ukraine. Troubles arose earlier this year among Polish grain producers affected by cheaper Ukrainian grain. Since November 6, Polish truckers' grievances have erupted in protests involving hundreds of trucks at all major border crossings, bringing Ukrainian trucks' passage to a standstill. The protesters claim that a relaxation of permit requirements for Ukrainians trucks entering the EU — a measure adopted by the European Commission to support Ukraine's economy after Russia's invasion — has harmed the livelihood of Polish truckers. In recent weeks, Hungarian and Slovakian truckers have joined in blocking major border crossings with Ukraine to their respective countries. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has stated that he will end the blockade but will do so in a way that meets some of the Polish truckers' grievances. Even as a convinced European, Tusk is proceeding cautiously. The opening of accession talks is a substantial watershed for Ukraine, but it seems highly unlikely that Ukraine could accomplish the daunting agenda of legal and institutional reforms required for accession while being engaged in a full-scale military confrontation on its territory. Bulgarian regional expert Ivan Krastev argues that the providing of this long-term perspective to Ukraine in fulfillment of its aspirations to be recognized as fully European and a part of the West may induce greater willingness by Ukraine's leaders to consider pursuing a negotiated settlement. "Only strong security guarantees and a promised European future could persuade Ukrainians to accept territorial concessions at some point," he said.In other words, the promise of Europe, while genuine on its own terms, may also serve as encouragement of efforts to end the war short of the full accomplishment of Ukrainian war aims.

With presidential elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) scheduled for December, concerns about pre-election human rights violations are already being raised in Washington. Given the alleged role the United States played in anointing the election victor in 2019, many expect the U.S. to be influential again, even if its original decision to recognize Félix Tshisekedi tipped the scales of that contested election. Many are hoping U.S. influence will result in an election period more respectful of human rights. In the five years since Tshisekedi was declared the winner, much-anticipated human rights reforms have not materialized. Still, the U.S. has an opportunity, and obligation, to center human rights in its relationship with the DRC, especially amid increasing human rights violations in the pre-election period. Failure to do so would expose the hard reality that the Biden administration continues to fail at following through on its human rights agenda. A New Partnership Since Tshisekedi assumed the presidency, the U.S.'s working relationship with the DRC has warmed. Almost immediately upon taking office, President Tshisekedi visited Washington and quickly joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. He further solidified his position as a strong ally by voting with the U.S. in the U.N. General Assembly. In return, the U.S. increased its bilateral aid to the DRC, resumed military cooperation, and explored new opportunities for U.S. investment, including in the mining sector. Both Secretary of State Antony Blinken and acting Deputy Secretary Victoria Nuland have proffered coveted visits to Tshisekedi, demonstrating a strong and privileged relationship. The upcoming elections present an urgent opportunity for the U.S. to demonstrate a commitment to human rights by pushing their protection in the pre-election period and setting policy priorities that will benefit people living in the DRC regardless of the election outcome. The Congolese people should have a government committed to protecting their rights, after years of violence, abuses, impunity, and plunder of resources at the expense of human rights protections. The US-Congo Bilateral RelationshipThe relationship between the U.S. and the DRC is a complicated one — made more so by the DRC's rich deposit of critical minerals the U.S. government wants to access and that the Chinese government currently dominates. While the U.S.'s engagement with the DRC has rarely centered on human rights, it has engaged on these issues across several administrations as human rights violations became harder to ignore. This renewed focus has led to concrete actions. In 2006 President Bush established an Executive Order to sanction those fueling the conflict, and accompanying human rights abuses. He also met with the leaders of both the DRC and Rwanda to press them to end violence in the east. The U.S. Congress also played a critical role in driving policies aimed at protecting human rights, most prominently by passing legislation such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo Relief, Security, and Democracy Promotion Act of 2006 and section 1502 of the Dodd Frank Act in 2010. While imperfect, these policies have sought to protect the rights of the Congolese people to their own wealth and elevate human rights when under threat. Human Rights Context Leading into the Elections While Tshisekedi's election was touted as one of change by both Trump and Biden officials, the reality for many Congolese is that little has changed. Tshisekedi came into office committing to critical security services reforms, judicial reforms, civic space expansion, and anti-corruption efforts. However, few of these have been implemented. In addition, demonstrable examples exist of shrinking civic space. Take the "State of Siege" which has been in place in eastern DRC since May 2021. Under this measure there are restrictions on civilians gathering and the military has taken over all aspects of civilian governance. Amnesty International found that under the "State of Siege," the security situation has deteriorated further while authorities have used it to silence critics. The crackdown on freedom of expression goes beyond eastern DRC with Amnesty that two years into the Tshisekedi administration there was an increase in oppression against journalists. This has only escalated in the pre-election period. What US Policy Should Do About It While some may argue that human rights concerns are less important than the domestic need for access to clean energy minerals, this is a false dichotomy. Ignoring human rights violations for the sake of investment not only hurts the Congolese people who first and foremost should be benefitting from the wealth but does little to secure access long term. Tshisekedi may still make deals with other countries giving better offers. Furthermore, U.S. companies would benefit from the confidence in their investments created by a government committed to anti-corruption, human rights, and to ensuring that communities thrive alongside companies. It is in the long-term interest of the U.S. to promote a rights-first approach. Furthermore, the U.S.'s credibility will be lost if it does not leverage its partnership it has cultivated with the Tshisekedi administration to secure respect for human rights. Instead, civil society and the Congolese people will see another example where the U.S. meddles in the country's affairs but fails to center human rights in its diplomacy. In the spirit of a rights-forward relationship, there is much Washington can do to help ensure rights are respected in the pre-election period. U.S. officials should take advantage of their close relationship to have candid conversations about necessary human rights actions and reforms. First, there are already instances in the pre-election period where Congolese security forces have disproportionately reacted to opposition rallies and protests. Meanwhile journalists are increasingly harassed and arbitrarily arrested. Despite this, the U.S. has remained largely silent publicly, giving the impression to civil society and citizens that they are accepting of a violent and repressive pre-election environment. The United States has also not issued a single public statement condemning the "State of Siege" despite repeated pleas by Congolese and other human rights organizations. The Biden administration must publicly call for an end to this measure, which is in violation of the Congolese constitution and international human rights law, before any more criticism is silenced or people are denied their rights to freedom of speech or assembly. Finally, the Biden administration must center its relationship with the DRC moving forward around human rights, justice, and accountability. Indeed, much of the instability can be addressed if those involved stop focusing on a military response and instead focus on ending impunity and ensuring justice. The U.S. can do that by funding programs that address impunity and build the capacity of the Congolese justice system. When Blinken launched his foreign policy he argued that human rights would be central. Yet in the DRC the Biden administration has been silent as its partner has failed to implement promised reforms and instead further restricted the rights of the Congolese people. There is still time for the U.S. and DRC to work together and solidify respect for the rights for the Congolese people. Washington must not miss this opportunity.

With the world's eyes understandably focused on the carnage in the Gaza Strip, violent manifestations of the Israel-Palestinian conflict in the Israeli-occupied West Bank have been getting even less attention than they normally get, and less than they deserve. Amid concerns about possible spreading of the current war in Gaza, spreading already has begun in the West Bank, with the potential there of stimulating still more spread.Casualties have spiked in the West Bank since the Hamas attack on October 7. More than 100 Palestinians, including civilians, have been killed there.Most of the casualties have been incurred as part of accelerated operations in the West Bank by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), in the form of raids, mass arrests, and crackdowns on protests. The stepped-up Israeli use of force has even included an airstrike on a mosque in a refugee camp in the city of Jenin — a rarity in the West Bank, where the Israelis usually rely on ground forces.Additional violence has come at the hands of Israeli settlers — some of the 670,000 Israelis whose residence in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem is widely recognized as a violation of international law. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded in just the first two weeks of the current crisis 100 attacks by Israeli settlers against Palestinian residents. The U.N. office noted that this represented an average of almost eight such incidents per day, up from a daily average of three incidents since the beginning of this year.The connection between this settler violence and the events this month in southern Israel and the Gaza Strip has two aspects. One is that Israeli anger over the Hamas attack and the blurring of such emotion into a general hatred of Palestinian Arabs has made the current moment even more of an open season on Palestinians than it was before. The second is that the current focus of attention on Gaza among the press, foreign governments, and the world generally has represented an opportunity for settlers to conduct violent and illegal business in the West Bank while drawing little notice. Mairav Zonszein, an Israel-based analyst with the International Crisis Group, notes that a difference between now and before is that the settler violence is occurring "without almost any media attention being paid to it."These developments are a continuation, in intensified form, of longer trends in the physical suffering of West Bank Palestinians. Many of the nearly 1,600 deaths of Palestinians at the hands of Israelis between 2015 (that is, since the last big Israeli attack on Gaza in 2014) and August of this year were in the West Bank. The violence accelerated in 2023, even before October 7. This year was already on pace to be the deadliest year for residents of the West Bank since the United Nations began keeping such records in 2005.The upsurge in Israeli violence in the West Bank clearly is related to the coming to power at the beginning of this year of an extreme right-wing Israeli government. Far from policing or discouraging the settler violence, the de facto Israeli response often has been to permit or condone it, with IDF soldiers standing aside or even participating in some of the violence. One of the most prominent of the extremists currently in power, minister of national security Itamar Ben-Gvir — himself a West Bank settler — promised to distribute as many as 10,000 free rifles to Israeli citizens, including West Bank settlers.All this is part of a longer-term process of one people, defined in ethnic and religious terms, subjugating another people similarly defined, and of the determination of successive Israeli governments to maintain Jewish Israeli supremacy over all the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River. Part of the formula for doing this has been to cordon off some two million of the Arab residents into the Gaza Strip and to rely on blockades, periodic "mowing the grass " with military force, and an occasional misery-alleviating sop to keep those Arabs from interfering with Israeli ambitions. The Hamas attack, of course, shattered some of the assumptions underlying that strategy.The other part of the formula has been the piecemeal displacement of West Bank Palestinians from their land. Although much of the settler violence manifests simple hatred and bigotry, much of it is a more calculated effort to make life for Palestinian neighbors so miserable — or so uneconomic, given settler tactics such as vandalism of olive groves or denial of water and pastures needed by herded livestock — that those neighbors will give up and move. The accelerated anti-Palestinian settler activity this month has included much of this kind of intimidation. The Israeli human rights watchdog organization B'Tselem reported earlier this month that in the previous week, eight entire West Bank communities, numbering 472 people, had abandoned their homes out of fear for their lives and livelihoods.The current war, replete with Israeli orders for millions of Gaza residents to evacuate what the Israeli military has turned into a free-fire zone, has raised fears throughout the region of a new Nakba or catastrophe — another installment of the war in the 1940s that caused the mass displacement of longtime Palestinian residents from what became the state of Israel. The fears gained credibility from the leak of an Israeli government planning document that calls for forcibly transferring the population of the Gaza Strip to the Sinai. Perhaps the only thing preventing Israel from trying to implement such a plan is that the Egyptian government has multiple reasons to refuse to participate in any such scheme.That scheme was about Gaza, but West Bankers probably have the most to fear from any new mass displacements or ethnic cleansing. Gaza is the open-air prison, but the West Bank, with East Jerusalem, is the prize — the land that Israeli hardliners want for, and only for, their own people.The other dynamic that has made the West Bank increasingly become a powder keg since October 7 is the unsurprising increase in anger and resentment among the Palestinians who live there. Fear of a new Nakba is part of it. The casualties from increased settler violence and IDF use of military force are part of it. And so are the miseries in everyday life that have come from roadblocks and other obstructions to movement that the IDF has increased this month.Another big part of it is anger over the death and devastation that the Israeli assault on the Gaza Strip has imposed on the Palestinian brethren who live there. This is not a matter of support for Hamas. It is a matter of feeling the pain of co-nationals and of general outrage over the infliction of mass suffering.The chance of a new intifada, or popular uprising, in the West Bank, was already significant before this month and is now even higher. In the current atmosphere, a new intifada would likely be at least as violent as the last one. It would by itself represent a significant spread of the war in Gaza. And by making the entire Israeli-Palestinian conflict that much larger, it would increase the chance of further spread, such as by drawing in Lebanese Hezbollah.

 I know that I should not even bother to engage with such things, but I saw someone retweet this from Christopher Rufo on X-Twitter. I think that it is revealing about two fundamental different ways of thinking about diversity and differences in a university. First, as Judith Butler states in the video posted below (11:49), that classes in women and gender studies are filled with debate and discussion. This is something that I think anyone who has been in a classroom would probably agree with. I would argue that it extends that it goes beyond gender studies to other subjects of supposed indoctrination such as critical race theory or even Marxism. Christopher Rufo's response to this is to focus not on what happens in such classrooms, he has probably never been in one, but to cite some supposed fact that faculty in gender and interdisciplinary studies are 100% left. I am not sure what he means by that, or if he is including all interdisciplinary programs, but I am going to assume that the left he is referring to is voting patterns, since that is an obsession of many critiques of higher education. 
One could say if one wanted to be generous that what we have is two different ways of thinking of what difference means. Butler focuses on the differences internal to the classroom, the debates and discussion of issues of gender and sexuality, and Rufo focuses on voting, on what happens outside of the classroom. If one wanted to be generous one could call this a differend, in Jean-François Lyotard's sense, a disagreement about the terms of disagreement itself, about what it means for something to be the same or different. That is too generous, however, it is more like a bait and switch. The right's critique of indoctrination in the classroom often uses activity and speech outside of the classroom as a supposed indicator of internal classroom dynamics. Voter registration of faculty is supposed to be an indicator of what and how people teach. Or, to take another example, a faculty members activity outside the classroom, a tweet or protest, is taken to be an indicator of their bias in the classroom. I have even had this happen to me in which my blog, this one, was offered as evidence of my supposed bias in teaching. Just to be clear, if your argument about faculty bias or indoctrination looks to such evidence as faculty voter registration, tweets, political engagement or other activity outside of the class as evidence then you have not proven what you claim to prove. That does not stop people from using this standard. I even know of faculty who have internalized this standard, who curtail their own political activity so as not to appear biased, to be objective. I have heard of political science professors who refuse to register with a party or donate to candidates for fear of appearing biased. Academic freedom and free speech are confused enough to curtail each. The focus on electoral politics also explains one of the ongoing obsessions of the right wing pundit sphere. There is a whole niche publishing market of books arguing that liberalism, Marxism, postmodernism, critical race theory are all THE SAME. I believe that Christopher Rufo even wrote such a book.  Such a claim is demonstrably false from the perspective of the respective histories, ontologies, and epistemologies of different political ideologies. It does, however, make sense on one level and that is the one thing that all these different politics and philosophies have in common is that they are not likely to vote Republican. All of these shoddy, intellectually dishonest, and often anti-semitic books about the secret history of Cultural Marxism and Critical Race Theory are all attempts to give an intellectual basis to a rather Schmittian distinction of friend versus enemy, to prove that everyone who is against you is actually part of the same conspiracy. That your enemies are enemies of freedom and rationality itself. The focus on voting registration or party affiliation also seems to carry an odd assumption that the political makeup of any activity, any institution, or group, should reflect the overall division of the US. That unless a college major, or discipline, is roughly thirty percent Republican and Democrat, with forty percent unaligned or uninterested in the whole thing, it must be because of indoctrination. It seems odd to suppose that every part of society should function as a microcosm of the society. Would one also assume that all rifle clubs, churches, country clubs, and so on must reflect society at large? Which brings me to the last assumption of this overanalyzed tweet, and that is a causal one. It is assumed that the uniformity of voting or party affiliation, or whatever other paltry measure, of a department of discipline is an effect of what happens in the classroom. That is the supposed indoctrination. As Spinoza argues, however, one of the fundamental aspects of imagination, of what we could call ideology, is confusing effects for causes. I can only speculate here, but I can imagine that maybe the students who sign up for a gender studies course, or women studies, might already have a politics that corresponds with their interest. The same thing could be said for a course on global warming or the history of civil rights or any other issue seen as indoctrination, the students are already educated, already engaged, before they enter the classroom. To put it bluntly, a party that has made ending abortion rights (not to mention in Florida the persecution of gay, lesbian, and trans people) part of its central platform should not be surprised that a women studies or gender studies course has no members in it. All of this obsession with the political make up of different major and disciplines is happening at the same time that one party is openly declaring hostility towards knowledge about science (climate change, Covid), history (slavery), society (gender), and even current events (the 2020 election). I stress open hostility, because the other party, the Democratic Party might declare that climate change is real, but that does not mean it is going to do anything about it--active nihilism versus passive nihilism. Universities seem ill equipped to deal with this assault, maintaining their standard neutrality towards "both sides" of any issue, but this neutrality towards politics on part of the institutions of knowledge is being confronted by a politics that is anything but neutral with respect to knowledge. 

News media manufactures consent, and one way that happens is by manufacturing amnesia — burying a government's past misdeeds makes it easier to sell future ones. The catastrophic floods that Storm Daniel unleashed on Libya, which have killed as many as 10,000 people, are both a natural disaster and a human-made one. In the week following Storm Daniel, a large portion of the media coverage described "war" as a reason the country was ill-equipped to handle the catastrophe. However, media discussion of NATO's contribution to what has become Libya's forever war has been almost non-existent. NATO's intimate involvement — albeit by proxy — in the current war in Ukraine makes the omission all the more remarkable.War in contemporary Libya is traceable to February 2011, when protests against Muammar Gadhafi's government evolved into an armed conflict. In the initial days of the fighting, the U.S. media amplified claims that the Libyan air force was bombing demonstrators despite statements by top Pentagon officials that there was "no confirmation whatsoever" that such bombing was happening. Western media outlets and politicians accused Gadhafi of carrying out a systematic mass slaughter of civilians, and of intending to do more of the same, particularly as government forces advanced on rebel-held Benghazi. In this climate, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1973 in March 2011, which authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians.NATO dubiously interpreted the resolution as granting it the right to overthrow the Libyan government. NATO forces — primarily Britain, France and the U.S. — subsequently conducted roughly 9,700 strike sorties and dropped over 7,700 precision-guided bombs during their seven-month campaign. The bombing not only assured eventual victory for the rebels — a mostly ragtag, disparate collection of local and tribal militias, Islamist fighters, and disaffected soldiers united only by their opposition to Gaddafi (whose death was facilitated by a NATO airstrike). It also killed scores of the civilians it claimed to be protecting and left Libya without a functioning government (in addition, it enabled the proliferation of tens of thousands of arms stockpiled by Gaddafi's government to insurgents throughout Libya, the Sahel, and beyond, notably in Syria).For most of the period since Gadhafi's overthrow, Libya has been afflicted by a civil war that has seen the country split between two heavily armed rival factions claiming to be the government: Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord in the west.There is no evidence that NATO bombing directly contributed to the collapse of the dams that caused the catastrophic flooding in Derna (although the war reportedly interrupted rehabilitation work by a Turkish construction company). However, it is beyond question that NATO's intervention contributed to the destruction of the Libyan state and social fabric, helping bring about years of warfare, one consequence of which has been the inability to maintain critical infrastructure. Yet this context has been all but invisible in U.S. mainstream media coverage of the recent floods, even in those reports that identified "war" as a factor that helps explain the scale of the cataclysm.I used the news database Factiva to search material published in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post — arguably the three most influential national newspapers — between Sunday September 10, the day that Derna was flooded, and Saturday September 16. I searched the words "Libya" and variations on "flood," such as "flooding" and "floods," and got 67 results, the great majority of them supposedly "objective" news reports rather than op-eds., Forty of the 60 included the word "war." But only three of these also used the term "NATO," or just 7.5 percent of the content. Two additional articles contained the words "NATO," "Libya," and "flood," but not "war," instead using the word "intervention" to describe NATO's role. Thus, only five articles — or 7.4 percent — of the week's total coverage of the floods referenced NATO.Typical of the coverage in those articles when "war" was mentioned as a contributing cause of the disaster was a Post report noting that Libya was "battered by more than a decade of war and chaos, and split between rival governments, with no central authority to shore up infrastructure or draw up plans to save residents." Later, the article stated that "Oil-rich Libya has been ravaged by conflict since the fall of its longtime dictator, Moammar Gadhafi, in 2011," again with no mention of NATO's contribution.Similarly, the Times ran a piece calling Libya "a North African nation splintered by a war, [which] was ill-prepared for the storm….[D]espite its vast oil resources, its infrastructure had been poorly maintained after more than a decade of political chaos." Regarding the events of 2011, the articles goes to note that "Libya endured 42 years of autocratic rule under Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi before he was overthrown in a revolt in 2011." This account suggests that Gaddafi's ouster was strictly an internal affair and completely obscures the decisive role played by NATO's campaign on the side of the anti-government forces, creating the conditions for further instability and warfare.According to the Journal, "The natural disaster [in Libya] was decades in the making — a result of years of official neglect of two nearby dams during the authoritarian regime of Moammar Gadhafi and the political crisis and war since his ouster in a 2011 revolution." The authors highlight the role that war played in setting the stage for the floods but gloss over how the NATO intervention against the Gadhafi government helped generate societal and governmental collapse, and post- Gadhafi warfare.Of course, simply mentioning NATO doesn't necessarily mean that a news article has given readers an accurate picture of what the alliance did in Libya. For example, a Post story says Gadhafi ruled Libya until "he was killed by rebel forces during a NATO-backed Arab Spring uprising." This phrasing is ambiguous at best: it gives readers no sense of what form NATO's "back[ing]" of Libya's "Arab Spring uprising" took. An analysis by the Post's Ishaan Tharoor, which was not published in the paper's print edition, was much closer to the mark when it says that "Libya's unstable status quo" is both the result of domestic political forces in Libya and of "the intervention of outside actors. That began with the NATO-led intervention in 2011."The Times, Journal, and Post repeatedly noted the link between the flooding in Libya and armed conflict in the country. However, with very few exceptions, the publications declined to acknowledge that, in 2011, NATO opted to bomb Libya until its government was overthrown. In this regard, the papers have failed to remind their readers that NATO's intervention was part of the chain of events that led to this month's calamity. Such a reminder would seem especially pertinent today in light of NATO's much-touted reinvigoration and northern expansion owing to its growing role in supporting Ukraine against the Russian invasion.

The vitriolic dispute between Poland and Ukraine brings out some aspects of the West's approach to the war in Ukraine that the Ukrainian government would do well to study carefully.

The dispute originated in charges by Poland and other central European governments that Ukraine's greatly increased grain exports to Europe — a consequence of the Russian closure of the Black Sea to Ukrainian maritime trade — were flooding European markets and depressing prices for Polish and other farmers.

The relaxation of EU limits on Ukrainian shipments was supposed to allow Ukraine to resume exports to Egypt and other countries where vulnerable populations are suffering from increased prices as a result of the war. A considerable proportion has in fact gone to the EU itself instead. The EU imposed a temporary ban, which, however, it refused to lift when it expired on September 15th. Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have however continued the ban, in defiance of EU rules.

The Ukrainian government has brought charges against Poland at the World Trade Organization, and alleged that the Polish move has been motivated chiefly by the government's desire to hold onto farmers' votes in next month's Polish general elections. Speaking to the United Nations, President Volodymyr Zelensky accused Poland and other countries of engaging in theatrics and "making a thriller out of grain." Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki hit back ferociously:

"I want to tell President Zelensky never to insult Poles again, as he did recently during his speech at the U.N. The Polish people will never allow this to happen, and defending the good name of Poland is not only my duty and honor, but also the most important task of the Polish government."

Polish President Andrzej Duda added:

"Ukraine is behaving like a drowning person clinging to anything available. A drowning person is extremely dangerous, capable of pulling you down to the depths…and drowning its rescuer."

In a move widely interpreted as retaliation for Ukraine's protests against the grain ban, moreover, Poland has halted arms shipments to Ukraine, insisting that it will now concentrate on equipping its own armed forces to defend Poland.

What makes this so extraordinary is that Poland has long portrayed itself as Ukraine's greatest friend in the West, and has accused other Western governments of cowardice for not doing more to arm and support Ukraine.

The first lesson to be learned from all this is that even in countries whose populations are most supportive of Ukraine, that support will have limits when it imposes high and visible costs on themselves, and that politicians will inevitably exploit the resulting political backlash. This has implications in particular for Ukraine's chances of joining the European Union.

In the case of Poland and other former Communist states of Central Europe, their path to EU membership was helped by copious amounts of EU financial assistance. The EU's Regional Development Fund continues to support depressed areas of Poland and its neighbors. Supporting Ukraine to the point where it could enter the EU will, however, be a task of a different order of magnitude. Even before the Russian invasion, Ukraine was one of the poorest countries in Europe, with an average GDP per capita in 2021 of only $4,828 (compared to an EU average of $38,436) and its chances of joining the EU in the foreseeable future were considered vanishingly small.

Moreover, EU countries (in Western as well as Central Europe) were always fearful of cheap Ukrainian food imports. Ukraine's Association Agreement with the EU explicitly barred most Ukrainian grain exports as part of the EU's strategy of defending European farmers through its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This ban was removed by Brussels only in response to the Russian invasion and blockade. Poland has now restored it.

In March of this year, the World Bank estimated the cost of postwar reconstruction up until then at around $411 billion, and that cost will of course increase further the longer the war goes on. The whole of EU spending on depressed areas within the EU in the seven years from 2014 to 2021 was $200 billion. To judge by Poland's latest moves, it seems improbable that a future Polish government would ask its voters to pay Poland's share of such costs; and if Poland won't, who will?

The other thing to which Ukrainians should pay attention is that, as dramatized by Poland's latest actions, hatred for Russia and real sympathy for Ukraine are not at all the same thing and may even contradict each other. Concerning Polish hatred of Russia, there can be no doubt; but underlying the remarkably harsh rhetoric of recent days has been the fact that historically speaking, Poles and Ukrainians also used to be bitter enemies.
The Polish kingdom, and the Polish republic between 1919 and 1939, sought to Polonize their Ukrainian subjects just as the Russians tried to Russify theirs. Ukrainian revolts against Polish rule massacred Poles along with Jews. Political struggles between Poles and Ukrainians for control of Galicia helped undermine the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the years before 1914. After 1918, Poland annexed the Ukrainian areas of Galicia by force, and held them until they were transferred to Soviet Ukraine by Josef Stalin as a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact - which is why they are in Ukraine today, and not in Poland.
During and immediately after the Second World War, Ukrainian nationalist partisans massacred tens of thousands of ethnic Poles, and Ukrainians serving in the 1st Galician Division of the Waffen SS participated in ruthless German operations against the Polish resistance. In recent years, both Kyiv and Warsaw have sought to play down this history, but memories of it continue to flow very close to the surface on both sides.

This history is peculiar to Poland and Ukraine; but with regard to the United States too, Ukrainians should ask themselves how much of U.S. support for Ukraine is motivated by real sympathy for them, and how much is devoted to killing as many Russians as possible and weakening Russia as much as possible, no matter how many Ukrainians die and how much Ukraine is weakened in the process — as some statements by U.S. politicians and officials have tended to suggest. Thus Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky) recently boasted, "We are destroying the Russian army without losing a single American soldier."

Other hawkish U.S. commentators have argued that it is necessary to defeat Russia in Ukraine in order to weaken China - which is not why Ukrainian soldiers think they are fighting and dying.
An indefinite war with no clear victor will indeed weaken Russia; but it will also ruin independent Ukraine — something that now appears to be a key Russian war aim; and a ruined Ukraine will never be able to join the EU. If this is the case, then Western promises and declarations about Ukraine's Western path will ultimately count for nothing. Ukraine will remain — as it was for most of history — an impoverished borderland between Poland and Russia.That is not an outcome that the West should be working towards, however much Russia may also be hurt in the process.

Was sagen Politik und Wissenschaftsszene über den WissZeitVG-Entwurf aus dem BMBF? Eine erste Übersicht von Kommentaren und Reaktionen.





DER FORSCHUNGSPOLITISCHE SPRECHER der FDP-Bundestagsfraktion, Stephan Seiter, sagte, der BMBF-Entwurf reize "die Möglichkeiten des WissZeitVG aus".Er erfülle die Vereinbarungen
aus dem Ampel-Koalitionsvertrag unter Berücksichtigung der vielfältigen Meinungen aus der Wissenschaftscommunity. "Das Einende in der Koalition muss auch mit dem überarbeiteten WissZeitVG das
Streben nach wissenschaftlicher Exzellenz bleiben." Hervorzuheben sei eine verbesserte Planbarkeit durch Schaffung von Mindestvertragslaufzeiten. "Dies gibt jungen Wissenschaftlerinnen und
Wissenschaftlern ausreichend Zeit, das Promotionsverfahren voranzubringen." Eine weitere Verkürzung der Postdoc-Phase auf unter vier Jahre würde dagegen der akademischen Realität nicht
gerecht "und hätte zu einer starken zeitlichen Belastung des Wissenschaftsnachwuchses geführt". Seiter sprach von "teils unvereinbaren Erwartungen aus der Wissenschaftscommunity", die von Anfang
an "nicht einzig und allein" in dieses Gesetz hätten gegossen werden können, das nur die Befristungspraxis im Wissenschaftssystem regele. "Das WissZeitVG kann nur Regeln zur Befristung von
Stellen leisten. Reformen, die darüber hinausgehen, bedürfen mehr Engagement der Länder." 



 



Zwar seien in den WissZeitVG-Verhandlungen alle Seiten engagiert auf der Suche nach guten Lösungen und kompromissbereit gewesen, sagte die wissenschaftspolitische Sprecherin der grünen
Bundestagsfraktion, Nina Stahr. "Dass wir jetzt trotz der bereits sehr langen Verhandlungen noch kein abschließendes Ergebnis haben, bedauern wir, aber der letzte Vorschlag des BMBF war
für uns Bündnisgrüne noch nicht konsensfähig." Vor allem hätten die grünen Bedenken nicht ausgeräumt werden können, dass das vom BMBF vorgeschlagene Postdoc-Befristungsmodell den Druck auf
individuelle Wissenschaftler*innen nicht noch verstärken werde. "Darum haben wir uns insbesondere dafür stark gemacht, den Geltungsbereich des Gesetzes noch klarer auf die wirkliche,
wissenschaftliche Qualifizierung zu begrenzen, die Rolle der Tarifpartner zu stärken, gemeinsam mit den Ländern zusätzliche Dauerstellen zu schaffen und Befristungshöchstquoten zu verankern."
Doch auch der insgesamt noch nicht geeinte Referentenentwurf erhalte bereits gute Ansätze und grüne Verhandlungserfolge, fügte Stahr hinzu: "von der Verankerung von Mindestvertragslaufzeiten bis
zur Ausweitung der familienpolitischen Komponente auf viele Drittmittelbeschäftigte". Deshalb sei man zuversichtlich, "dass in der weiterhin kollegialen Zusammenarbeit aus dem Entwurf des BMBF
bald ein gemeinsames Gesetz wird, das unser Wissenschaftssystem insgesamt stärkt".



 



Die SPD-Wissenschaftspolitikerin Carolin Wagner zählte ebenfalls "viele Verbesserungen für Beschäftigte" auf, die man in den WissZeitVG-Verhandlungen vereinbart habe, darunter
die Mindestvertragslaufzeiten Promovierte, das Aufbrechen der Tarifsperre, die Regelungen für Studentische Hilfskräfte und die Ausweitung des Nachteilsausgleichs für Drittmittelbeschäftigte in
der Qualifizierungsphase. Auch in der Postdoc-Phase habe man sich mit der Anschlusszusage "auf ein neues Werkzeug" geeinigt", wobei der SPD wichtig gewesen sei, dass dieses einen
individual-arbeitsrechtlichen Charakter habe und die vereinbarten Ziele und der Evaluationsmechanismus im Arbeitsvertrag festgelegt würden. "Ausschlaggebend ist aber für uns die Frage, wann das
neue Werkzeug der Anschlusszusage greift – unserer Ansicht nach muss dies zügig nach der Promotion erfolgen." Die SPD-Fraktion könne deshalb den vorgelegten Entwurf wegen der darin enthaltenen
"4+2-Regelung" für die Postdoc-Phase nicht mittragen. "Hier fehlen uns verlässliche Perspektiven für die Beschäftigten, dass dies zu einem Wandel in den Hochschulen und Forschungseinrichtungen
hin zu mehr entfristeten Stellen führt." Von Seiten der SPD habe es bei dieser Frage "an Vorschlägen nicht gemangelt", betonte Wagner. "Wir wollten über eine wirklich kurze Orientierungsphase von
maximal zwei Jahren das sogenannte Personalkarussell abbremsen. Danach hätte eine weitere Befristung in unseren Augen nur mehr mit Anschlusszusage erfolgen dürfen. Dieser Vorschlag aber wurde
kategorisch abgelehnt, auch für den Fall scharf umrissener Ausnahmeregelungen für besonders gelagerter Fälle."



 



Die Koalition sei beim Wissenschaftszeitvertragsgesetz zerstritten und demonstriere offen ihre Handlungsunfähigkeit, kommentierte der forschungspolitischen Sprecher der
Unionsfraktion, Thomas Jarzombek. CDU/CSU gingen "der Verantwortung in dieser komplizierten Situation" nicht aus dem Weg. "Wir bieten auch auf Basis dieses Referentenentwurfs die
Zusammenarbeit für eine pragmatische und konstruktive Mehrheit an." Die Zeit der Planungsunsicherheit in Wissenschaft und Forschung solle schnellstmöglich beendet werden. "Unser Ziel ist
über das Wissenschaftszeitvertragsgesetz hinaus eine Mittelbaustrategie zu formen, die zu mehr Verlässlichkeit und Planbarkeit führt und gleichzeitig Anreize für eine Modernisierung und
Professionalisierung von Strukturen setzt." Damit einhergehen müsse auch die Verankerung klarer Standards der Personalentwicklung und -begleitung.



 



Der Präsident der Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (HRK), Walter Rosenthal, sagte: "Der nach einem intensiven und transparenten Beratungsprozess lange erwartete Text wird helfen, die
Diskussion über die angemessene Ausgestaltung des notwendigen Sonderbefristungsrechts in der Wissenschaft und über flankierend sinnvolle Maßnahmen, die aber nicht Gegenstand des Gesetzes sind,
weiter zu versachlichen." Hinter den weitgehend unstreitigen Reformvorschlägen des BMBF sollten sich alle Akteur:innen vereinen können, "die die unterschiedlichen Interessen in der Wissenschaft
konstruktiv gegeneinander abwägen". Die Hochschulen, so Rosenthal, begrüßten den Vorschlag einer Postdoc-Phase mit einer Befristungsmöglichkeit nicht unter vier Jahren: "Nur so kann es den
Postdoktorandinnen und Postdoktoranden in vielen Fächern gelingen, nach der Promotion einen neuen Schwerpunkt in Forschung und Lehre und ein eigenständiges wissenschaftliches Profil zu
entwickeln. Ob eine dauerhafte Karriere in der Wissenschaft – oder außerhalb – möglich und aussichtsreich ist, entscheidet sich in dieser Qualifikationsphase." Auch die Mindestlaufzeiten für
Erstverträge von Promovierenden und Postdocs stießen auf Zustimmung der HRK, die vorgesehene Tariföffnung berge dagegen das Risiko mangelnder Verlässlichkeit und Transparenz für die
Mitarbeitenden, auch die Mobilität zwischen den Ländern, Hochschulen und Wissenschaftseinrichtungen werde dadurch beeinträchtigt.  




Das Netzwerk für Gute Arbeit in der Wissenschaft (NGA Wiss) bemängelte, dass der Referentenentwurf "in einem Pressegespräch hinter verschlossenen Türen" vorgestellt worden
sei. Inhaltlich habe das BMBF weitestgehend die Position der Hochschulen und außeruniversitären Forschungseinrichtungen übernommen. Damit gebe das Ministerium "nun vollständig einen
eigenständigen Gestaltungsanspruch auf", sagte Lisa Janotta vom Koordinationskreis NGA Wiss. "Die geringfügig neu zugeschnittenen Zeiten lassen die Situation einer überbordenden
Befristung bei weitestgehend fehlenden klaren Berufsperspektiven unberührt." Dass die Hochschulen Promovierte nun über vier statt sechs Jahre bedingungslos befristet beschäftigen dürften,
werde sie nicht dazu bewegen, an den bestehenden Personalstrukturen etwas zu ändern, "sie werden weiterhin versuchen, sich durchzumogeln". Weiter kritisierte NGA Wiss, der überregionale
Zusammenschluss von Mittelbauinitiativen und Einzelpersonen aus dem akademischen Mittelbau, dass die Tarifsperre nur in Teilen fallen solle. "NGAWiss fordert eine Normalisierung des Arbeitsrechts
in der Wissenschaft in Belangen der Vertragsgestaltung sowie des Streikrechts."



 



Die Gewerkschaft ver.di warf Bundesbildungsministerin Bettina Stark-Watzinger vor, sämtliche gegen die WissZeit-VG vorgebrachten Argumente und Proteste zu ignorieren. "Hoch
qualifizierte Beschäftigte, die nach ihrem Studium auch die Promotion abgeschlossen haben, sollen weiterhin auf Jahre hinaus befristet sein, weil sie sich angeblich noch qualifizieren müssen. Das
ist absurd", sagte ver.di-Vorstandsmitglied Sylvia Bühler. Die auch künftig zulässige sachgrundlose Befristung nach der Promotion werde  den Druck auf die Beschäftigten
absehbar nur weiter erhöhen. Die im Koalitionsvertrag zugesagte Planungssicherheit und attraktive Berufswege in der Wissenschaft würden so nicht erreicht. "Nun ist der Bundestag gefragt, den
Entwurf deutlich nachzubessern." Positiv sei dagegen das Vorhaben, Mindestvertragslaufzeiten festzuschreiben, allerdings müsse bei deren Länge noch nachgebessert werden. 



 



HRK-Vizepräsidentin Anja Steinbeck, Sprecherin der Universitäten in der Hochschulrektorenkonferenz, twitterte hingegen, es sei ein "Irrglaube anzunehmen, 2 Jahre
Postdoc-Befristung führten zu einem 'Systemwechsel'". An der Düsseldorfer Heinrich-Heine-Universität, deren Rektorin Steinbeck ist, hätten zur Zeit 38 Prozent der promovierten wissenschaftlichen
Mitarbeiter Dauerstellen, eine Erhöhung auf bis zu 50 Prozent sei geplant. Der Bedarf in den Fakultäten sei allerdings sehr unterschiedlich. Daran, so Steinbeck, würde auch
Höchstbefristungsgrenze von zwei Jahren nichts ändern. "Effekt wäre, dass in dieser kurzen Zeit die Bildung eines eigenen wissenschaftlichen Schwerpunkts und damit Qualifizierung für eine
Juniorprofessur auf Haushaltsstellen nicht mehr möglich wäre."



 



Der stellvertretende GEW-Vorsitzende Andreas Keller warf dem BMBF vor, dass es bei der Neuregelung der Postdoc-Befristung "eins zu eins" dem Ansatz der Allianz gefolgt sei. "Die
Ampelkoalition muss den Entwurf stoppen und auf einen fairen Interessenausgleich statt eines Kotaus vor den Arbeitgebern pochen." Die Mitinitatorin von "#IchbinHanna", Amrei
Bahr, twitterte, dass mit SPD und Grünen zwei von drei Ampelfraktionen sich klar gegen die vierjährige Postdoc-Befristung ohne Perspektive positionierten, "zeigt, wie wichtig es ist,
dass #IchBinHanna #IchBinReyhan #ProfsFürHanna #ProfsFürReyhan laut sind & es bleiben. Wir werden gehört. Also weiter so!"



 



Der Vorstandsvorsitzende des Universitätsverbundes German U 15, Georg Krausch, nannte die Postdoc-Befristungsregelung im vorgestellten Referentenentwurf unterdessen "deutlich
besser als die drei Jahre, die das Eckpunktepapier vom 17. März vorgesehen hat". Zugleich sei klar: "Karrierewege nach der Promotion werden zukünftig anders aussehen als bisher.
Universitäten sind in der Verantwortung, diese Transformation aktiv zu gestalten, mit dem Ziel, attraktive Arbeitsbedingungen und verlässliche Karrierewege zu gewährleisten."




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Vier Jahre, kein Konsens



Bundesforschungsministerin Bettina Stark-Watzinger präsentierte den WissZeitVG-Referentenentwurf. Letzte Bemühungen, bei der Frage der Postdoc-Höchstbefristungsdauer eine
Einigung mit den Ampel-Koalitionspartnern zu erreichen, waren zuvor gescheitert.
(06. Juni 2023) >>>

Die Hochschulen hätten nicht die wissenschaftspolitische Stellung, die ihnen von ihrer Bedeutung her zustehe, sagt der neue HRK-Präsident Walter Rosenthal. Welche Folgen das für den Wettbewerb um Forschende und Studierende hat – und wie er das ändern will: ein Interview.






Walter Rosenthal, 68, ist seit 2014 Präsident der Friedrich-Schiller-Universität Jena – und seit Dienstag zusätzlich neuer Chef der
Hochschulrektorenkonferenz (HRK). Mit 226 zu 181 Stimmen setzte er sich im ersten Wahlgang gegen Oliver Günther durch. Es gab allerdings auch 34 Enthaltungen und neun nicht abgegebene
Stimmen. Foto: HRK/Jürgen Scheere.






Herr Rosenthal, herzlichen Glückwunsch zur erfolgreichen Wahl schon im ersten Wahlgang. Ging das am Ende doch einfacher als
gedacht?



 



Es war durchaus knapp mit nur einer Stimme über dem erforderlichen Quorum. Aber in der Tat hatten viele eine langwierige Wahl vorhergesagt, weil die allgemeine Meinung war, dass es zwei gleichwertige Kandidaten gab. 



 



Das mit den gleichwertigen Kandidaten haben einige Hochschulchefs auch als mangelnde inhaltliche Auswahl empfunden – weil Sie und Oliver Günther in allen zentralen Fragen praktisch einer Meinung waren. So erklärt sich vermutlich auch,
dass es so viele Enthaltungen und nicht abgegebene Stimmen gab. Sagen Sie: Was wird in der HRK jetzt anders laufen, als es mit einem Präsidenten Oliver Günther gelaufen wäre? 



 



Nach meiner Meinung müssen wir dringend und grundsätzlich über die Rolle der Hochschulen im Wissenschaftssystem diskutieren. Die Hochschulen erfahren nicht die gesellschaftliche und politische
Anerkennung, sie haben leider nicht die wissenschaftspolitische Stellung, die ihnen angesichts ihrer Bedeutung zusteht. Um die Hochschulen herum bilden sich schließlich die zentralen Netzwerke in
der Wissenschaft, sie sind Schaltstellen und Vernetzer, die Treiber von Entwicklung in Gesellschaft und Wissenschaft. 



 



"Wer von Transfer in die Gesellschaft und die
Wirtschaft spricht, meint vor allem uns Hochschulen."



 



Woraus was folgt?



 



Daraus folgt unter anderem die Botschaft an die Politik, dass wer von Transfer in die Gesellschaft und die Wirtschaft spricht, vor allem uns Hochschulen meint. Die Hochschulen bringen jedes Jahr
eine enorm große Zahl an Ausgründungen und Startups hervor, kein anderer Player in der Wissenschaft kann das auch nur annähernd leisten. Und vergessen Sie nicht die besondere Ausstrahlung der 50
Kunst- und Musikhochschulen in die Kunst- und Kulturszene hinein. Oder unser Kerngeschäft, die hunderttausenden Absolventinnen und Absolventen, die wir jedes Jahr der Gesellschaft und der
Wirtschaft zur Verfügung stellen. Mein Eindruck ist, das wird allzu oft nicht hinreichend wahrgenommen und wertgeschätzt. Das müssen wir ändern.



 



Sie wollen mehr Geld. 



 



Es geht hier nicht nur um Geld. Wir müssen der Politik und vor allem der Bundespolitik sehr deutlich machen, dass wir als Hochschulen Gewaltiges für das Gemeinwohl leisten und dafür an den
strategischen Überlegungen über die Zukunft des Wissenschaftssystems beteiligt werden wollen. Dazu gehört auch, dass wir über Geld sprechen müssen. Allein der Investitionsstau im Hochschulbau –
wir sprechen hier mittlerweile über 60 Milliarden Euro – entspricht der Größenordnung eines bundespolitisch neuerdings viel zitierten Sondervermögens. Das hat gravierende Folgen: Wir können im
Wettbewerb um die besten internationalen Forscherinnen und Forscher auch deshalb nicht immer mithalten, weil unsere Infrastrukturen teilweise sehr zu wünschen übriglassen. Und auch viele der
begabtesten Studierenden werden eher dorthin gehen, wo sie in ansprechenden Gebäuden lernen können. Unsere Hochschulen müssen ein Ort zum Leben werden für Studierende, wie sie es in anderen
Ländern längst sind.



 



Was meinen Sie damit?



 



Der ideale Tag eines Studierenden sollte von morgens bis abends an der Hochschule stattfinden können. Nicht weil man das muss, sondern weil es sich um einen umfassend inspirierenden Ort handelt,
der Möglichkeiten eröffnet, an dem man sich gern aufhält. Vielleicht beginnt der Tag mit einer Vorlesung oder einer Übung in Präsenz, danach geht man an einen ruhigen Ort zum Lernen oder trifft
sich anderswo zum gemeinsamen Diskutieren oder zum Entspannen. Später loggt man sich dann vielleicht in ein digitales Seminar ein, auch das natürlich aus Räumen der Hochschule heraus. Die
Hochschulen müssen aber auch mit ihren Studienangeboten attraktiver werden, sie müssen flexibler werden, Orientierungsphasen und mehr Wahlmöglichkeiten bieten – und ein weniger vollgepacktes
Curriculum.   



 



"Ich werde mich dafür einsetzen, dass wir den Weg zu wirklicher Gleichberechtigung stringent beschreiten."



 



Apropos Wettbewerb um die Talente: Im vergangenen Jahr gab es in der HRK einen heftigen Streit um die Gleichstellung. Dass es dann nur zwei männliche HRK-Präsidentschaftskandidaten gab, ist
vielen Rektorinnen, aber auch Rektoren sauer aufgestoßen. Welche Bedeutung hat Frauenförderung in der Wissenschaft für Sie, Herr Rosenthal?



 



Wir müssen alles tun, um hier besser und schneller zu werden. Ich sehe nicht, dass in diesem Punkt  gravierende Meinungsverschiedenheiten in der HRK gibt. Ich werde mich dafür einsetzen,
dass wir den Weg zu wirklicher Gleichberechtigung stringent beschreiten.



 



Was heißt das konkret? Ebenfalls am Dienstag hat das HRK-Plenum beschlossen, dass eine Kommission den Entwurf einer Selbstverpflichtung erarbeiten soll – der dann nach Beschluss
durch die Hochschulrektorenkonferenz die einzelnen Hochschulleitungen beitreten sollen. Das kann, wenn der neue HRK-Präsident sich dahinterklemmt, einen großen Unterschied machen. Und wenn nicht,
ein Papiertiger werden, oder?



 



Die Hochschulrektorenkonferenz kann den einzelnen Hochschulen nichts diktieren, aber ich werde mich entschieden dafür einsetzen, dass diese Selbstverpflichtung so konkret und belastbar wie
möglich wird. Stichworte sind aktive Rekrutierung, die Formulierung und Verfolgung von Gleichstellungszielen auf der Ebene der Hochschulleitung und in den Fakultäten, Stellenausschreibungen, die
Gleichstellungsaspekten Rechnung tragen und vieles mehr. 



 



Auch die Einführung einer Quote?



 



Ich bin kein Quotenbefürworter. Denn wenn man Quoten schlicht herunterbricht auf die Entscheidung zwischen zwei Bewerbungen, können  Entscheidungen, die nicht qualitätsbasiert sind, die
Folge sein. 



 



Was, wenn man sich den Zustand akademischer Karrierepfade anschaut, derzeit nicht unbedingt ungewöhnlich ist an deutschen Hochschulen, oder?



 



Sie haben insofern Recht, dass wir mehr Transparenz brauchen, mehr Verbindlichkeit und klar strukturierte Wege auch für Dauerstellen in der Wissenschaft. Künftig sollte es mehrere Karrierepfade
neben der Professur geben, die zu entfristeten Anstellungen führen. 



 



Also insgesamt mehr Dauerstellen als bislang?



 



Das hängt von der Grundfinanzierung der Hochschulen ab. Bleibt diese, wie sie derzeit ist, reden wir wohl leider nicht vorrangig von mehr unbefristeten Stellen, sondern vom schrittweisen Aufbau
einer anderen Stellenstruktur. Das wären vor allem Karrierewege, die weniger Hierarchie und mehr Unabhängigkeit für junge Forschende bringen. Es ist wichtig, dass wir diese neuen Karrierewege so
gestalten, dass es nicht zu Insellösungen und Alleingängen in einzelnen Bundesländern kommt. Wichtig ist generell, dass junge Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler früh eigenständig werden,
etwa dadurch dass sie eigene Fördermittel beantragen und selbst Zugang zu Forschungsinfrastrukturen haben.



 



"Der Fachkräftemangel wird dafür sorgen, dass die Hochschulen massive Personalprobleme bekommen, wenn sie als Arbeitgeber nicht attraktiver werden."



 



In der Debatte um die Novellierung des Wissenschaftszeitvertragsgesetzes (WissZeitVG) geht es ganz entscheidend um die Frage, wann der Übergang zu Dauerstellen stattfinden soll. Was sagen
Sie?



 



Die HRK hat sich vor über einem Jahr darauf festgelegt, dass eine Befristung nach der Promotion im Rahmen einer Gesamtqualifizierungsphase von zehn Jahren noch für mindestens vier Jahre möglich
sein sollte; länger ist besser. Gegenüber dem bisherigen BMBF-Vorschlag von drei Jahren brauchen wir auf jeden Fall eine Ausweitung. Denn wenn man derart stark an der Entfristungsschraube dreht,
werden Karrierewege und Karrieremöglichkeiten viel zu früh abgeschnitten. Darum gab es von allen Seiten Proteste gegen den BMBF-Vorschlag. Natürlich müssen flankierend zu jeder WissZeitVG-Novelle
die Karrierewege anders gestaltet werden, diese müssen transparenter und verlässlicher werden, und es muss neue Karrierewege geben – so, wie ich es gerade beschrieben habe. Dafür müssen sich die
Hochschulen verbindliche Regeln geben.



 



Warum sollte das mit den Selbstverpflichtungen denn dann klappen?



 



Weil die Rahmenbedingungen sich grundsätzlich geändert haben. Der Fachkräftemangel wird dafür sorgen, dass die Hochschulen massive Personalprobleme bekommen können, wenn sie als Arbeitgeber nicht
attraktiver werden. Wir werden dann schlicht nicht mehr alle unsere Promotions- und Postdoc-Stellen besetzen können. 



 



Nicht immer haben Sie sich in der Vergangenheit als Reformer präsentiert. Als die ersten HAWs in Hessen und anderswo das Promotionsrecht erhielten, haben Sie sich entschieden gegen eine
Übertragung auf Ihr Bundesland ausgesprochen. Doch seit kurzem plädieren Sie für ein bundesweites HAW-Promotionsrecht. Woher kommt der Meinungsumschwung?



 



Ich war und bin Befürworter der kooperativen Promotion. Doch wir müssen ehrlich feststellen, dass dieses Model nicht so erfolgreich war, wenn nur 150 von rund 26.000 Promotionen jährlich auf
diesem Weg zustandekommen. Die Einführung eines HAW-Promotionsrechtes ist daher richtig. Außerdem ist die Evaluierung der HAW-Promotionsmodelle in Hessen und Nordrhein-Westfalen erfolgreich
verlaufen. Alle anderen Bundesländer sollten jetzt nachziehen und das Promotionsrecht für HAW einführen. Wir können uns keinen Flickenteppich leisten. 



 



Ein Wort noch zu Ihrer persönlichen Zukunft, Herr Rosenthal: Normalerweise vergehen Monate, bis man nach der Wahl HRK-Präsident wird. So dass man Zeit hat, seine Angelegenheiten zu
ordnen. Sie sind seit Annahme Ihrer Wahl bereits im Amt. Was sagen Sie jetzt zu Hause an der Universität Jena?



 



Das ist ja eine Ausnahmesituation, die dadurch entstanden ist, dass es keinen regulär amtierenden HRK-Präsidenten mehr gab. Ich habe jetzt zwei Präsidentenämter, das in Jena im Hauptamt, das in
der Hochschulrektorenkonferenz im Nebenamt. Natürlich habe ich in Thüringen an der Universität und mit dem Wissenschaftsministerium Gespräche geführt, um für den Fall meiner Wahl vorbereitet zu
sein. Insofern werden wir jetzt alle daran arbeiten, einen zügigen, aber eben auch geordneten Übergang hinzubekommen, so dass aus meinem neuen Nebenamt bald mein neues Hauptamt wird.




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A year and a half ago I published an Op-Ed article and
Blog post on the great popular revolt in Cuba motivated by economic hardship
and the lack of future prospects, aggravated by the pandemic. I speculated that
since the Army was the country's most powerful and best-organized institution, some generals might try to maintain their advantageous economic
positions by avoiding participating in the repression and seeking a reformist
accommodation. This was not the case. The week after the revolt, five high-ranking
generals died without the causes being clarified and a few months later General
Luis-Alberto Rodríguez López-Calleja, head of the business and financial
conglomerate of the Revolutionary Armed Forces that controls the main landmarks
of the Cuban economy, including the tourism sector, and one of the most
important men in the command structure in Cuba, also died suddenly.

Cuba had experienced in July 2021 the largest
anti-government protests since the Revolution. The previous crisis, the
Maleconazo of 1994 (the subject of the documentary Balseros, co-produced
by TV de Catalunya and nominated for an Oscar) ended with 300 people arrested.
The 2021 revolt generated 1,400 detainees, 790 prosecuted and 128 sentenced to
prison terms of up to thirty years.

Between the two crises, the Cuban opposition lost its
historic leaders. Oswaldo Payá was the victim of a probable assassination
attempt; Gustavo Arcos, whom I visited in Havana, died; Elizardo Sánchez, whom
I also met, was held captive by spies and infiltrators. Cardinal Jaime Ortega
must be in Heaven.

In parallel, the exile voice in Miami has almost been extinguished
after the death of its veteran leaders and the adaptation of the next
generation born in the United States. Neither the conservative Mas Canosa nor
the social democrat Jesús Díaz, in whose magazine I collaborated, are among us
anymore, while my friend the liberal Carlos Alberto Montaner has already
written his memoirs. The last time I went to the Café Versailles on 8th Street,
it looked like an abandoned place.

According to economist Albert Hirschman, there are three
alternatives to a political regime: voice, loyalty, and exit. As I have
described, voice has been harshly repressed in Cuba for the last year and a half. But at the same time, the economic situation has worsened, and loyalty to
the regime has diminished.

Last September there was a referendum on gay marriage and
other family issues, which could have been viewed positively given the
Revolution's homophobic record. But it turned into a plebiscite on the regime
and more than half of the census did not vote or voted against, null or blank.
In November there were municipal elections in which 40% of the census did not
participate or rejected the candidates selected by the single party. This
disaffection is unprecedented in Cuba, where in Fidel Castro's time 95% voted.
In the regime's typical response mobilization, they had to get Raul Castro out
of bed, at 91 years of age and without any official position, to see if this
would revive the revolutionary spirit. 

Hirschman explains that when the voice is eliminated and
loyalty is lowered, the only alternative is the exit, i.e., emigration. Thus,
since the July 2021 revolt, some 250,000 Cubans have left the island, a figure
far higher than the sum of all previous emigration crises.

Leaving Cuba by sea is illegal without a visa. Donald
Trump dismantled the U.S. consulate in Havana and suspended the issuance of
visas. But according to the Cuban Adjustment Act, anyone who sets foot on land,
even without a visa, is considered a refugee. Faced with the massive flight, the
U.S. Coast Guard has captured at sea and returned to the island more than two
thousand Cubans trying to reach Florida this past year. At least 100 died in
the crossing.

The other way out requires traveling by plane to the
Bahamas, Panama, Nicaragua, or Mexico and attempting to cross the Mexican
border with the United States on foot. For a Cuban with an average salary
equivalent to thirty-three dollars a month, this type of journey involves a cost
of eight to ten thousand dollars, including ransoms to coyotes and polleros
and bribes to corrupt officials. Despite all this, the number of Cubans who
manage to cross the southern border of the United States has steadily increased
to 35,000 in a month.

During the year 2022, with the presidency of Joe Biden,
the US issued some 20,000 immigrant visas. A few days ago, on January 4, the
Consulate in Havana resumed its services. Long lines and hundreds of thousands
of petitions to leave the island legally are expected, the vast majority of
young people without vital expectations.

Fidel Castro repeated several times his curse that
"first the island will sink into the sea before abandoning
communism". Posthumously, he may end up succeeding.In Catalan and Spanish in daily ARA:https://www.arabalears.cat/opinio/cuba-enfonsa-mar-josep-colomer_129_4596330.htmlCOMMENTSResumen certero, conciso y por desgracia triste, de la actualidad de Cuba. Lo he circulado en mi chat hispano-latinoamericano (aún hay irredentos que creen en la revolución cubana).Saludos cordiales.RamónRamón Puig de la Bellacasa AlberolaEmbajador…Impresiona lo que cuentas sobre Cuba, en lo que te veo te has involucrado a fondo. Yo recuerdo mis amigos nicaragüenses, y ahora veo con lo que tienen que vivir, si es que no han salido del país…Víctor Pérez DiazSociólogoMuchísimas gracias por el último articulo que me has enviado sobre cuba.Un fuerte abrazoJose Manuel BandrésTribunal SupremoTerrific article. Gracias.Alfred CuzanWest Florida UniversityTriste realidad!Pedro FreyreAkerman's International PracticeMuy difícil el panorama cubano; no hay mejor metáfora que la referida maldición de Castro que citas. Acabo de regresar una semana, entre la inflación y la depauperación generalizada…Carlos-Manuel Rodríguez-ArechavaletaUniversidad Iberoamericana, MéxicoBellísima y elocuentes palabras. Gracias por abordar este tema. No había pensado lo del vacío de liderazgo miamense que mencionas.Javier CorralesAmherst College, MassachusettsGracias, Josep, por un elocuente y triste artículo.Leandro Prados de la EscosuraUniversidad Carlos IIIAgraït . Desconeixia les actuals tensions a Cuba.Josep M.BricallBarcelonaArtículo muy interesante, como todos los tuyos, que leo con devoción. Merece amplia difusión. En los tiempos que corren, visto lo que sucede en Brasil, USA y Europa, provoca gran curiosidad lo que pueda suceder en Cuba en relación con la democracia.Oscar Rodriguez BuznegoUniversidad de OviedoEnhorabuena por lo atinado de tu texto, aunque sea un escenario lamentableManuel AlcantaraUniversidad de SalamancaMolt bé Josep! El curs passat vaig ser uns mesos a RDom i ho vaig veure d'aprop. El 10 de Febrer me'n hi torno.Joan Maria ThomàsUniversitat Rovira i VirgiliMolt bon article. Important trencar el silenci.Andreu Claret SerraEl PeriodicoMuchas gracias! Un recordatorio necesarioManuel Villoria MendietaUniversidad Rey Juan CarlosExcel·lent. Com sempre.Carlos Castro SanzLa Vanguardia

This thesis consists of five chapters: the first three deal with the evolution of Chinese foreign aid from its inception to the publishing of China's first foreign aid White Paper in 2011; the two remaining chapters are reform case studies taking us up to the present. Chapter 1, "Relational Foreign Aid: Tracing the Origins of the Chinese Aid Thinking", traces the origins of the concepts that are considered basic principles of China's foreign aid today and explains when and in which context they were formulated first. Furthermore, the chapter suggests that China's early foreign aid was likely influenced by interactions between the Chinese Communists and the representatives of the United States in China. It shows, in particular, how the Communists' attempts to obtain economic assistance from the U.S. and the U.S.'s denial of ideological grounds on ideological grounds appear to have shaped the principle of political non-interference. Finally, chapter 1 argues that Chinese foreign aid was relational, in the sense of trying to find "common interests" (gongtong liyi 共同利益) in order to create relational power and overcome the international isolation China was faced with after 1949, and claim the China seat from the Republic of China (on Taiwan) in the United Nations General Assembly. Drawing on the Relational Theory of world politics, proposed by Qin Yaqing's 秦亚青 (2018), it analyses how foreign aid was linked to constructed common interest of building economic independence, which China saw as a precondition for political independence. In the process, this chapter challenges several dominant assumptions: first, that foreign aid was dominated by Mao Zedong and driven by ideology, and second, that Chinese aid was "merely an extension of Soviet aid". Chapter 2, "The Long March to "Win-Win": Assembling Chinese Foreign Aid Thinking", continues my historical enquiry and fills a gap that has been largely neglected in the research on Chinese foreign aid: the years between 1978 and 1995. It zooms in on government-linked foreign aid discourses and argues that the major foreign aid reform of 1995, namely the introduction of foreign aid concessional loans (对外援助优惠贷款) managed by the newly set-up China Exim Bank, were the outcome of a reform process, that started in 1979. Thereby, the chapter first debunks the assumptions that foreign aid lost its importance with the new leadership, often found in the literature on Chinese aid. It shows that, quite to the contrary, it was in 1979 (at least according to known documents) that foreign aid was explicitly called a strategic foreign policy tool, which was indispensable to secure a stable international environment for China's modernisation policy. It argues that the new "Four Principles of Economic and Technical Co-operation" (Jingji jishu hezuo de si xiang yuanze经济技术合作的四项原则), whose emphasis on "co-operation" was perceived by many as a departure from aid, in fact, represented an attempt to strike a delicate balance between finding ways to maintain good relations with recipients and to promote China's own economic development. Second, this chapter uses primary and secondary source material to show that the shift away from aid toward economic co-operation-which China's government had indeed sought and which works on Chinese aid or Sino-African relations repeatedly described as having occurred in the early 1980s-essentially did not take place. This happened only after China faced a new crisis: the Tian'anmen square protests, which ended with a violent crackdown and led to sanctions imposed by Western countries. It was then perceived as necessary to significantly increase aid to developing countries in order to ensure their political support – and this, in turn, led to the creation of foreign aid concessional loans as a new mode of aid delivery. Finally, the chapter argues that in order to understand the thinking and action logic behind Chinese foreign aid today, one has to understand the assemblage of Chinese concessional loans. Chapter 3, "Chinese Aid Meets the West – Tracing (Hidden) Reform Debates", discusses how contrary to widespread assumptions in the West that behind Chinese aid there was a clearly defined strategy, the Chinese aid system was (and in fact, still is) characterised by policy experimentation. As argued by Sebastian Heilmann (2018, 111), policy experimentation has been an asset and the key to the adaptability of China's political economy, allowing this authoritarian regime to find innovative solutions to long-standing or newly emerging challenges. Yet, in foreign aid policy experimentation has created a system that is described as highly complex, fragmented and ineffective by its stakeholders. The chapter follows a foreign aid reform debate that started in 2010 – and initiated a reform process that is still ongoing. Although this debate addressed many of the concerns DAC donors voiced towards Chinese aid after 2005, it remained "hidden" because it was conducted almost exclusively in Chinese. The chapter concludes by analysing the first visible outcome of this (hidden) reform debate: the White Paper on China's Foreign Aid which was published in 2011 and spelt out the official master narrative for Chinese foreign aid for the first time in the history of Chinese aid. Chapter 4, "Reform of the Foreign Aid Administration" and Chapter 5, "Credit Risk Management Regulations for Chinese Policy Banks", introduce two reform case studies: The first case study deals with the introduction of the first comprehensive legal document on foreign aid, the "Measures for the Administration of Foreign Aid" in 2014 (MOFCOM 2014b), and the establishment of the new foreign aid agency China Internationa Development Co-operation Agency (CIDCA) in 2018, which replaced the Ministry of Commerce as the lead administration actor for foreign aid. The second case study deals with the introduction of new credit risk management regulations for China's two policy banks, China Development Bank (CDB) 国家开发银行 and China Export-Import (Exim) Bank 中国进出口银行, which issue Chinese government loans to developing countries: the "Measures for the Supervision and Administration" (Jiandu guanli banfa 监督管理办法), issued in November 2017. The function of the case studies is not only to analyse the legal documents and legal processes at the centre of both reforms. Rather, they serve as exemplary cases of how major reforms, which addressed aspects of Chinese aid that have been hotly debated in the West, went completely unnoticed because the related information was available only in Chinese. Furthermore, the case studies are also methodological suggestions on how to trace reforms as they unfold. The thesis concludes with five arguments: China's foreign aid is relational; it is based on policy experimentation; it is guided by historical memory, which is in part responsible for the fact that China's foreign aid is an externalisation of China's domestic modernisation policy; China's foreign aid is not a China story but a global story, it is embedded in a global context and has been directly or indirectly shaped by global shifts.