Suchergebnisse

SCIENCE INVOLVES THE ACCUMULATION OF KNOWLEDGE, WHICH MEANS NOT ONLY THE FORMULATION OF NEW SENTENCES ABOUT DISCOVERIES BUT ALSO THE REFORMULATION OF EMPIRICALLY FALSIFIED OR THEORETICALLY DISCREDITED OLD SENTENCES. SCIENCE HAS THEREFORE A HISTORY THAT IS MAINLY A CHRONICLE AND INTERPRETATION OF A SERIES OF REFORMULATIONS. IT IS OFTEN ASSERTED THAT POLITICAL SCIENCE HAS NO HISTORY. ALTHOUGH THIS ASSERTION IS PERHAPS MOTIVATED BY A DESIRE TO IDENTIFY POLITICS WITH BELLES LETTRES, IT MAY ALSO HAVE A REASONABLE FOUNDATION, IN THAT POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MAY CHANGE FASTER THAN KNOWLEDGE CAN BE ACCUMULATED. TO INVESTIGATE WHETHER PROPOSITIONS ABOUT EVANESCENT INSTITUTIONS CAN BE SCIENTIFICALLY FALSIFIED AND REFORMULATED, I EXAMINE IN THIS ESSAY THE HISTORY OF THE RECENT AND NOT WHOLLY ACCEPTED REVISIONS OF THE PROPOSITIONS COLLECTIVELY CALLED DUVERGER'S LAW: THAT THE PLURALITY RULE FOR SELECTING THE WINNER OF ELECTIONS FAVORS THE TWO-PARTY SYSTEM. THE BODY OF THE ESSAY PRESENTS THE DISCOVERY, REVISION, TESTING, AND REFORMULATION OF SENTENCES IN THIS SERIES IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IN AT LEAST ONE INSTANCE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE HAS BEEN ACCUMULATED AND A HISTORY EXISTS.

When one is asked to speak on the past, present, and future of social science history, one is less overwhelmed by the size of the task than confused by its indexicality. Whose definition of social science history? Which past? Or, put another way, whose past? Indeed, which and whose present? Moreover, should the task be taken as one of description, prescription, or analysis? Many of us might agree on, say, a descriptive analysis of the past of the Social Science History Association. But about the past of social science history as a general rather than purely associational phenomenon, we might differ considerably. The problem of description versus prescription only increases this obscurity.

The possible contributions of history to social scientific knowledge are explored. Many historians find the social sciences unsatisfactory, criticizing their tendency to abstract & generalize, often from a single historical situation, & their inability to explain the actions of specific individuals in specific situations. It must also be noted, however, that the criticisms of historians are often based on a misunderstanding of social science goals. History offers an expanded range of cases against which general theories can be tested. However, questions of method inescapably arise when it is used for this purpose. Much of the new social scientific history has tended to neglect issues of theory & method. Problems arise in particular through the use of vaguely defined concepts & because of the fragmentary character of historical data, which require more sophisticated methods of statistical analysis than historians normally use. The historical method tends to resemble that of law more than that of science. Social scientific history differs from traditional history in treating diversity not as an end in itself, but as a means to the development of more general theories. Any such attempt, however, must deal with the obstacles of fragmentary historical sources, formulation of strong working theories, & sophisticated mathematical methodologies. W. H. Stoddard.

Analysis of the pre-1989 situation; The development of political science since 1989; Core theoretical and methodological orientations; Thematic orientation and funding; Public space and academic debates; Views on further development and major challenges.

Analysis of the pre-1989 situation; The development of political science since 1989; Core theoretical and methodological orientations; Thematic orientation and funding; Public space and academic debates; Views on further development and major challenges.