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This article introduces a theoretical model that shows how four mechanisms (work–life balance, psychological, gatekeeper bias and diversity mechanisms) explain why pursuing a nomination as list Members of Parliament is the more attractive option for women in mixed-member electoral systems. It also demonstrates how women's resulting greater likelihood of being list Members of Parliament creates what we call a gendered cycle, further reducing women's interest in the single-member district tier. To empirically test our model, we present quantitative data for the case of New Zealand and Germany, as well as qualitative interview data collected from members of German parties' women's auxiliary organisations.

'Predicting Party Sizes' connects party systems and government duration to electoral systems. This book provides an overview of electoral systems, worldwide, and supplies evidence for models that tie simple electoral systems to the number and sizes of parties and government duration

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of representative democracy with endogenous party formation. Coalition formation may occur before and after elections, and the expected payoffs from the after-election majority game affect incentives to form parties before the elections. In this way Duverger's hypothesis can be formally explained by the strategic behaviour of political elites. If politicians care primarily about private benefits, the equilibrium policy outcome under a proportional electoral system coincides with the median party's position. On the othoer hand, with quasilinear utility, the distance from the median voter outcome may be lower with plurality rule.