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Students of Latin American political parties have long assumed a strong correlation between social class and party identification, yet this assumption has never been tested empirically in any of the Latin American nations. This is probably due in large part to the lack of reliable survey data; however, even the mass of aggregate voting data has seldom been analyzed systematically. As a result, most of what we know—or think we know—about voting behavior in Latin America is based upon the intuitive assumptions of North American scholars. "If I were a member of the Chilean middle class, I would probably vote for the Radicals or Christian Democrats, but on the other hand if I were quite wealthy I would probably vote for the Conservatives."Students of Argentine politics assume that the Conservative parties, always representing the interests of the nation's aristocracy, have received the bulk of their votes from the large landowners; that the interests of this group consistently have been opposed by the Radical parties who receive their electoral support from the urban middle classes; and that the more recently formed Peronist parties have championed the cause of, and been supported at the polls by, the industrial workers. It is the purpose of this article to test these assumptions, primarily through analysis of aggregate voting data, but also by examining the social backgrounds of party leaders and their actions while in power.

The purposes of organized society in New York City, as in every metropolitan community, are made manifest through groups. By no means exclusively political, these purposes are social, cultural, and economic; they are expressed as objectives of individuals identified with each other by having common national and racial origins, common religion or residence or partisan affiliation. The articulation of these purposes is accomplished through group representatives who, in one way or another, acquire power over their fellows. Relationships between individuals composing these groups are of two kinds: vertical and horizontal. In each vertical group, there is a hierarchy of power, with the few at the top of the pyramid exercising authority over those below—authority that is never unlimited, but always dependent on the observance of established modes of behavior and the recognition of sudden shifts of opinion. The horizontal relationships between the officials on comparable levels of the various vertical groups are normally cooperative in character; but in certain cases they are combative. The theory of the party system requires, for example, the leaders of the parties to contend with each other for the support of the marginal voters. All of the individuals composing these groups are humanly frail and uncertain in their loyalties. Consequently, the equilibrium of forces just described is often disturbed by revolt within the vertical associations and by the constant re-formation of alliances among the horizontal groups.

This essay introduces & discusses some central themes in the political philosophy of the British/South African idealist, Arthur Ritchie Lord (1880-1941). Lord was the author of the most substantial text of third generation 'British idealist' political thought, The Principles of Politics (1921), but many of his manuscripts from the 1920s to early 1940s have only recently been prepared for publication. I argue that Lord's work provides valuable insights into the development of later idealist political philosophy, particularly on two themes that distinguish it from that of Lord's idealist predecessors, T. H. Green & Bernard Bosanquet -- namely, democracy & freedom. This study also raises the question of whether the distinctively pluralistic context of South Africa had an influence on Lord's analysis of these themes. 36 References. Adapted from the source document.

Competition in political debate is not always sufficient to neutralize the effects of political rhetoric on public opinion. Yet little is known about the factors that shape the persuasiveness of political arguments. In this article, I consider whether cognitive biases influence the perceived strength of political arguments, making some arguments more persuasive than others. Lessons from neurobiology and recent political psychology research on emotion lead to the expectation that individuals are more likely to be persuaded by political arguments that evoke loss aversion via a fearful response—even in the face of a counterargument. Evidence from two experiments corroborates this expectation. I consider the normative implications of these empirical findings and potential avenues for future research.

Do women need to be represented by women in public policy-making forums? If so, are positive actions necessary to achieve that &, if they are, why is the Labour Party planning to abandon its most successful instrument for doing so? In May 1999, both the National Assembly for Wales & the Scottish Parliament achieved extraordinarily high levels of women representatives (40%) in their first elections, making them both among the most gender-balanced legislatures in the world. In both cases, this was due primarily to the Labour Party's use of a positive action measure, ie, the twinning (or pairing) of constituencies in order to put forward equal numbers of male & female candidates in the election. However, the experience of the twinning process for those seeking selection & election was by no means uniform. In parts of Wales, for example, twinning was fiercely contested although the principle of gender balance in the Assembly was supported. This article considers the case of Wales as a vehicle for addressing the general issues of women's political representation outlined above. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

From the liberal largesse of George Soros to the big-spending ways of Republican financiers like Sheldon Adelson, the 2012 U.S. presidential election is being shaped almost as much by billionaire backers as by the voters and candidates themselves. America's permissive campaign finance laws give these political sugar daddies unique clout, but it's not a purely American phenomenon. When it comes to behind-the-scenes moneymen, it's a global bull market. This article details billionaire backers in other countries. Adapted from the source document.

This study examines how quality of political institutions affects the distribution of government budget and how development of government spending in major sections shapes the political institutions in Iran. This question has become especially important due to recent international sanctions, aiming to change the political behavior of Iran. We use the impulse response functions (IRF) and variance decomposition analysis (VDC) on the basis of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model with annual data from 1960 to 2006. Our results show the importance of political institutions in patronage and public goods provision spending in Iran. The results imply that a shock in positive changes of democratic quality of institutions leads to negative and statistically significant response of military spending and positive and statistically significant response of education expenditures in short term. If sanctions are successful to change the political behavior of Iran in short run (Dizaji and Bergeijk, 2013), then one can also expect to see a reduction in allocated budget for military in Iran.

This study examines how quality of political institutions affects the distribution of government budget and how development of government spending in major sections shapes the political institutions in Iran. This question has become especially important due to recent international sanctions, aiming to change the political behavior of Iran. We use the impulse response functions (IRF) and variance decomposition analysis (VDC) on the basis of Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model with annual data from 1960 to 2006. Our results show the importance of political institutions in patronage and public goods provision spending in Iran. The results imply that a shock in positive changes of democratic quality of institutions leads to negative and statistically significant response of military spending and positive and statistically significant response of education expenditures in short term. If sanctions are successful to change the political behavior of Iran in short run (Dizaji and Bergeijk, 2013), then one can also expect to see a reduction in allocated budget for military in Iran.

One prominent criticism of John Rawls's The Law of Peoples is that it treats certain non-liberal societies, what Rawls calls 'decent hierarchical societies', as equal participants in a just international system. Rawls claims that these non-liberal societies should be respected as equals by liberal democratic societies, even though they do not grant their citizens the basic rights of democratic citizenship. This is presented by Rawls as a consequence of liberalism's commitment to the principle of toleration. A number of critics have claimed that Rawls's treatment of these non-liberal societies is symptomatic of a more general problem with political liberalism, namely, its reliance on toleration as its 'fundamental principle'. Against this view, I argue that the principle of toleration should not be understood as political liberalism's 'fundamental principle'. This is revealed through a consideration of the normative basis of what Rawls calls the 'Liberal Principle of Legitimacy'. A correct understanding of political liberalism's 'fundamental principle', which I claim is a principle of equal 'civic respect' for citizens, shows that Rawls's toleration of non-liberal societies is in fact a misapplication of political liberalism to the global domain. Moreover, I explain that political liberalism must assert that the principle of equal civic respect for citizens is the correct principle to govern the public political relations of citizens in all pluralist societies, and that most 'decent hierarchical societies' are pluralist in nature. Identifying political liberalism's fundamental principle as that of equal civic respect for citizens helps to render political liberalism, in both the domestic and international domains, a more coherent and compelling approach to thinking about fundamental political issues.

THIS PAPER DISCUSSES FREUD'S POLITICAL ANALOGIES AND METAPHORS, THE PERSUASIVE DISCOURSE BY MEANS OF WHICH POLITICAL VALUES ARE PRESUPPOSED, CONCEALED, CRITICIZED OR JUSTIFIED IN HIS INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY. IT IS THE AIM OF THIS PAPER TO CHALLENGE THE CLAIM THAT, 'TO TRY AND FIND IN FREUD'S WRITINGS AN ARTICULATED OR COHERENT SOCIAL THEORY OR ETHIC... IS A VAIN TASK.' ON THE CONTRARY THE AUTHOR ARGUES THAT EVEN FREUD'S INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY CONTAINS A POLITICAL THESIS, FORMULATED IN METAPHORS AND ANALOGIES BORROWED FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF THE SOCIAL WORLD AND USED AS STRUCTURING PRINCIPLES IN THE ELUSIVE REALM OF THE MIND.

The Basel III Accord was the centerpiece of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis, setting new capital requirements for internationally active banks. This paper explains the divergent preferences on Basel III of national regulators in three countries that approximate what are frequently presented as distinct varieties of capitalism in Europe – Germany, the United Kingdom and France. It is argued that national regulators faced a 'trilemma' in setting capital requirements, having to prioritize among banking sector stability, the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. Different varieties of national financial system – specifically, banking system and different kinds of 'banking champions' – explain the different prioritization of objectives in the 'trilemma' and hence for the divergent preferences of national regulators on Basel III capital requirements. ; Intermediate version 2015/07/07; Final version: University of Edinburgh, School of Law Research Paper 2015/19; Europa Institute Working Paper 2015/03