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This book examines behavioral biases and their impact on investment decisions. It also explores the applicability of econometric data modelling in behavioral finance markets and financial innovations in various fields of micro finance, public private partnership, mergers and acquisitions and behavioral finance.

AbstractThe rational choice theory is based on this idea that people rationally pursue goals for increasing their personal interests. Here, we present a new concept of rational choice as ahyper-rational choicein which the actor thinks about profit or loss of other actors in addition to his personal profit or loss and then will choose an action that is desirable to him. We implement the hyper-rational choice to generalize and expand the game theory. Results of this study will help to model the behavior of people considering environmental conditions, the type of behavioral interaction, valuation system of itself and others, and system of beliefs and internal values of societies. Hyper-rationality helps us understand how human decision-makers behave in interactive decisions.

Abstract
It is widely believed that experimental results of behavioral game theory undermine standard economic and game theory. This paper suggests that experimental results present serious theoretical modeling challenges, but do not undermine two pillars of contemporary economic theory: the rational actor model, which holds that individual choice can be modeled as maximization of an objective function subject to informational and material constraints, and the incentive compatibility requirement, which holds that macroeconomic quantities must be derived from the interaction and aggregation of individual choices. However, we must abandon the notion that rationality implies self-regarding behavior and the assumption that contracts are costlessly enforced by third parties.

Much of the prior literature on arbitrator acceptability is focused primarily on demographic characteristics of arbitrators and parties. This article draws from several behavioral theories to build a single conceptual model of arbitrator acceptability. Key concepts from the theory of planned behavior, control theory, organizational justice theories, and the decision making literature are integrated into a single framework that enhances our understanding of this topic and provides useful directions for future research.

Behavioral Economics: Evidence, Theory, and Welfare provides an engaging and accessible introduction to the motivating questions, real-world evidence, theoretical models, and welfare implications of behavioral economics concepts. Applications and examples-- from household decisions, finance, public finance, labor, business, health, development, politics, education, energy, and sports-- illustrate the broad relevance of behavioral economics for consumers, firms, markets, and policy makers alike. This textbook provides readers with both the intuition and analytical tools to apply behavioral economics concepts in understanding the complex social world. Each part of the book covers a key concept, beginningwith a range of empirical evidence that is anomalous within the standard economics framework. In light of this evidence, a second chapter introduces and applies a nonstandard behavioral modeling approach. The last chapter of each part explores market reactions and policy responses to individuals behaving in nonstandard ways. Numerous exercises of varying types and levels provide readers the opportunity to check and enrich their understanding. The book's clear structure orients readers to the many concepts of behavioral economics. It also highlights the process by which economists evaluate evidence and disentangle theories with different social welfare implications. Accessible to students from diverse economic backgrounds, this textbook is an ideal resource for courses on behavioural economics, experimental economics and related areas. The accompanying Solutions Manual further extends learning and engagement

This dissertation introduces a new theory of practice for land planning in America based on behavioralism. It is called culture based incentive planning, or CBIP. The CBIP model and techniques are based on four pillars: cultural snesitivity, behavior analysis, engineered incentive regimes, and the tools of persuasion. CBIP is designed to provide an adaptable framework from which to approch regulatory reform in planning. The framework is applicable to the full range of planning implementation strategies from commond and control to market-based approaches. CBIP, as a systems model, has been engineered to create a cooperative rather than adversarial relationship between government and the regulated community by recognizing issues of cultural sensitivity, market response, and behavioral motivations. Under the model, effective implementation of planning objectives is directly tied to the role that incentives play in human behavior. Based on the foundation of incentive theory, CBIP integrates a variety of principles and techniques from applied behavior analysis and behavioral economics to align incentives that drive personal behavior with public planning objectives. CBIP utiliizes a variety of incentives in planning practice including economic, process, lifestyle, social, behavioral, and technical assistance inducements. ; Ph. D.

Most theories of elections assume that voters and political actors are fully rational. While these formulations produce many insights, they also generate anomalies--most famously, about turnout. The rise of behavioral economics has posed new challenges to the premise of rationality. This groundbreaking book provides a behavioral theory of elections based on the notion that all actors--politicians as well as voters--are only boundedly rational. The theory posits learning via trial and error: actions that surpass an actor's aspiration level are more likely to be used in the future, while those that fall short are less likely to be tried later. Based on this idea of adaptation, the authors construct formal models of party competition, turnout, and voters' choices of candidates. These models predict substantial turnout levels, voters sorting into parties, and winning parties adopting centrist platforms. In multiparty elections, voters are able to coordinate vote choices on majority-preferred candidates, while all candidates garner significant vote shares. Overall, the behavioral theory and its models produce macroimplications consistent with the data on elections, and they use plausible microassumptions about the cognitive capacities of politicians and voters. A computational model accompanies the book and can be used as a tool for further research.