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"Behavioral Public Administration" published on by Oxford University Press.

Book Cover; Title; Contents; Acknowledgments; Introduction; A theory of the market process; Equilibrium prices and information; 'Bounded rationality' and the price system; Change, responsiveness and co-ordination; Conclusions; Notes; References; Index

ABSTRACTWe investigate the capacity investment decision of a supplier who produces a critical component for a buyer. An incentive conflict is present, because the buyer possesses private forecast information about end customer demand. We use laboratory experiments to test the performance of nonlinear capacity reservation contracts offered by the supplier. We show that both bounded rationality and fairness preferences consistently lead to buyer contract choices that harm supplier performance and overall supply chain performance. We therefore examine several capacity reservation contracts that take into account the buyer's inability to maximize utility (bounded rationality) and/or the buyer's motives (inequity aversion). We find that considering these behavioral aspects in contract design enhances supply chain performance.

In recent years institutions have regained their lost prominence throughout the social sciences. A host of rules, routines, and norms shape social and political interaction, the new institutionalists agree. However a sociological and a rational choice approach have disagreed on a number of issues, most notably on how institutions shape political action. Notwithstanding this, the conception of man and human rationality is the root of most controversies. In contrast to other presentations this essay argues that the most promising aspects of the two traditions are already converging. If the rational choice approach abandons its narrow conception of rationality, and if the sociological approach concedes that human beings have a capacity of conscious reflection over goals and values irrespective of context, one of the critical obstacles for mutual theoretical enrichment has been swept away. A more reasonable conception of rationality sees preferences as culturally bounded and shaped by experiences constrained by institutions. Within this framework, dialogue between the two approaches is possible; different theories of institutional change can be seen as being complementary or as rivals; a host of politically germane issues can reenter our research agenda. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

AbstractIn recent years institutions have regained their lost prominence throughout the social sciences. A host of rules, routines, and norms shape social and political interaction, the new institutionalists agree. However a sociological and a rational choice approach have disagreed on a number of issues, most notably on how institutions shape political action. Notwithstanding this, the conception of man and human rationality is the root of most controversies. In contrast to other presentations this essay argues that the most promising aspects of the two traditions are already converging. If the rational choice approach abandons its narrow conception of rationality, and if the sociological approach concedes that human beings have a capacity of conscious reflection over goals and values irrespective of context, one of the critical obstacles for mutual theoretical enrichment has been swept away. A more reasonable conception of rationality sees preferences as culturally bounded and shaped by experiences constrained by institutions. Within this framework, dialogue between the two approaches is possible; different theories of institutional change can be seen as being complementary or as rivals; a host of politically germane issues can reenter our research agenda.