Suchergebnisse

This article presents the case of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Pakistan's former North-West Frontier Province, and its provincial educational assessment policies and practices. These policies and practices affect millions of Culturally Linguistically Diverse and Exceptional (CLDE) children who live in rural and remote areas, and areas afflicted by conflict and insurgency. The article raises questions about political interference, ethical conduct, and fairness in the administration and marking of the assessments. It discusses efforts for systematic administration and collection of learning assessment data, teacher professional development programs to improve assessment practices, policies which address the educational needs of the diverse students in the province, and challenges and barriers to province-wide sustainable education development. In conclusion, the author offers suggestions and recommendations for policy makers and education stakeholders towards capacity building and improvement of assessment practices for all learners while it attempts to shed light and dispel misconceptions about KP and its people.

This is a conference paper. ; The Lord Resistance Army lead a rebellion in Northern Uganda that resulted into displacement of 2.2 million people into Internally Displaced Peoples Camps. The insurgency which span for two decades created a serious humanitarian crisis, people lived in camps without adequate water and sanitation facilities. Hand pump boreholes as source of water was not sufficient and as an emergency response, Government and International Relief Agencies motorized the boreholes and water supplied through piped systems. With peace, people returned to their original homes leaving behind the piped water infrastructures. Government with support from Development Partners initiated Water and Sanitation Development Facility programme as a mechanism for funding water and sanitation investments in all small towns. Through this programme, the emergence systems in the former IDP camps are being resized, rehabilitated and constructed to match the current population and development process, people are sensitised and so far changes are being registered.

Does previous experience with conventional warfare harm a military fighting an insurgency? Or, conversely, does prior experience with a counterinsurgency lower a military's likelihood for winning a conventional interstate war? Whereas firepower, maneuver, and associated tactics are essential for conventional warfare, counterinsurgency requires restrictions on firepower and effective policing in order to "win hearts and minds." These competing requirements for military preparedness for conventional warfare and counterinsurgency have been extensively debated. However, the consequences of fighting counterinsurgency on a state's readiness for fighting conventional wars (and vice versa) have been unexplored. We examine the relationship between past experiences with one type of conflict and war outcomes of the other type of conflict through a quantitative analysis of all wars that ended between 1838 and 2005. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that past experiences with either counterinsurgency or conventional warfare have little association with future success in war, conventional or not. (International Interactions (London)/FUB)

Military rule as a form of autocratic governance can mean either rule by a military strongman unconstrained by other officers or rule by a group of high-ranking officers who can limit the dictator's discretion. We label the latter form a military regime. Both military strongmen and military regimes are more likely to commit human rights abuses and become embroiled in civil wars than are civilian dictatorships. The behavior of strongmen diverges from that of more constrained military rulers in other areas, however. Military strongmen start more international wars than either military regimes or civilian dictators, perhaps because they have more reason to fear postouster exile, prison, or assassination. Fear of the future may also motivate their resistance to transition. Military strongmen are more often ousted by insurgency, popular uprising, or invasion than are military regimes or civilian dictators. Their tenures rarely end in democratization, whereas the opposite is true of military regimes.

The Indian state faces a substantial internal security threat in the form of a Maoist insurgency, but decades of relying predominantly on military strength have not been a successful strategy for resolving the conflict. Recently, there has been a growing interest in whether anti-poverty programs can increase the effectiveness of the government forces by improving the relationship between citizens and the state and making civilians more willing to share information on insurgents. A prime candidate for such a program is the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), the world's largest public-works program. We find that the introduction of NREGS leads to an increase in violence in the short run that is driven by police-initiated attacks, and an increase in the number of captured Maoists. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that civilians assist the police because of NREGS, and suggest that the role of civilians in internal conflicts should not be ignored.

The thrust of the survival of any nation is embedded on its security situation. Insecurity is a threat to development because it produces economic stagnation. However, the situation is not absolutely, if at all so in Nigeria given the insurgency of Boko Haram and its attendant negative consequences on the economy of the country. The work utilized the theory of Good Governance and National Security in analyzing Boko Haram insurgence and the Nigerian economic development. Deriving from the above, it was discovered that there is a close relationship between and among good governance, national security and economic development through the study of Boko Haram insurgence. The study therefore argued that the only thing that can sustain development and curb insurgencies in Nigeria is good governance, as what we are witnessing presently is the resultant implication of contrapuntal maladministration that had hitherto characterized the Nigerian state. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2014.v5n17p31

Military rule as a form of autocratic governance can mean either rule by a military strongman unconstrained by other officers or rule by a group of high-ranking officers who can limit the dictator's discretion. We label the latter form a military regime. Both military strongmen and military regimes are more likely to commit human rights abuses and become embroiled in civil wars than are civilian dictatorships. The behavior of strongmen diverges from that of more constrained military rulers in other areas, however. Military strongmen start more international wars than either military regimes or civilian dictators, perhaps because they have more reason to fear postouster exile, prison, or assassination. Fear of the future may also motivate their resistance to transition. Military strongmen are more often ousted by insurgency, popular uprising, or invasion than are military regimes or civilian dictators. Their tenures rarely end in democratization, whereas the opposite is true of military regimes.

Повстанческие бандформирования являлись наиболее опасными вооруженными группами в 1920-1921 гг. на территории Сибири. Бандформирования ставили своей целью свержение Советской власти путем вооруженных выступлений в ходе нападений на местные правоохранительные органы и вооруженные силы. Их действия выражались в совершении терактов и актов вредительства на важнейших государственных объектах. Повстанческое движение и крестьянские восстания как формы острого вооруженного конфликта между населением и действующей властью спровоцировали рост бандитской преступности. ; Gangs of the rebels were the most dangerous armed groups on the territory of Siberia. Gangs were aiming to overthrow the Soviet power through armed actions in the course of attacks on local law enforcement authorities and armed forces. Their actions were in committing terrorist attacks and acts of sabotage on the most important state objects. The insurgency and the peasant uprising as a form of acute armed conflict between the population and the current government provoked an increase in gang crime.

The article of record as published may be located at http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.dg ; Security and governance in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan are threatened by resource conflict dynamics: groups focus on exploiting lootable resources in the short term while weak institutions and conflict persist. Elements within the Afghan government and insurgent organizations alike expand their power and influence in this manner. Understanding how criminal organizations operate within the regional political economy is essential to reducing the leverage these networks, associated criminal syndicates, and corrupt government officials have on the community. We proffer three hypotheses for development and stability practitioners to monitor as transition approaches in 2014, as well as recommendations for mitigating the onset of resource conflict in Ghazni as the province experiences a downgrade in foreign security forces. Adopting effective, anti-insurgency policies will be fundamental to mitigating the malicious effects on the population and providing incentives for peace, rather than continuing conflict.

We study effects of wartime violence on social cohesion in the context of Nepal's 10‐year civil war. We begin with the observation that violence increased levels of collective action like voting and community organization—a finding consistent with other recent studies of postconflict societies. We use lab‐in‐the‐field techniques to tease apart such effects. Our causal‐identification strategy exploits communities' exogenous isolation from the unpredictable path of insurgency combined with matching. We find that violence‐affected communities exhibit higher levels of prosocial motivation, measured by altruistic giving, public good contributions, investment in trust‐based transactions, and willingness to reciprocate trust‐based investments. We find evidence to support two social transformation mechanisms: (1) a purging mechanism by which less social persons disproportionately flee communities plagued by war and (2) a collective coping mechanism by which individuals who have few options to flee band together to cope with threats.

One of the most important events in U.S. congressional history is the 1910 revolt against Speaker Cannon. The rebellion had myriad ramifications for the inner workings of the House of Representatives and dramatically altered the chamber's power structure. Despite its significance, we do not have a clear understanding of the character of the revolt and why the 42 Republican insurgents revoked their allegiance to Cannon and their party. Did the insurgents rebel because of their strong progressive ideals or for more pragmatic reasons, such as political survival or retribution? Using data gathered from Cannon's personal papers and other sources, we systematically explore disparate explanations credited for the revolt. For the progressive core of the insurgency, our analysis indicates that policy differences drove their behavior. These early insurgents were later joined by a group of less progressive members who appear to have supported the rebellion for electoral and retaliative reasons.

Can targeted land reform reduce levels of civil war conflict by mitigating the factors that contribute to rural rebellion? This article uses new micro-level data on land reform and insurgency at the municipal level from Colombia from 1988 to 2000, a country with high rates of land inequality and informal land ownership, to test whether land reform undercut subsequent guerrilla activity. The reform had two distinct aspects. Politically powerful large landholders blocked most large-scale reform, which resulted primarily in an enduring, low-intensity, and geographically dispersed reform that spurred low levels of insurgent activity. Larger-scale reforms were only implemented in areas that threatened serious violence and had the potential to harm elite interests, and in these limited areas reform reduced guerrilla activity. This suggests that while land reform can be an effective counterinsurgency policy, it may be politically difficult to implement at a sufficient scale because it threatens the status quo.

Terrorism is a mounting global threat for national security, yet the rise of social media facilitates prosumption and the spread of alternative grassroots stories in response to civic militarization and state propaganda. This article discusses the structural and cultural conditions underlying the production and spread of online user-generated content as radical media tactics. By presenting a case study on the escape and man-hunting of a key terrorist in Southeast Asia, the article examines prosumption and transmediation practices whereby official stories of the terrorist escape are appropriated, remediated, and virally disseminated across different social media–blogs, vlogs, and digital games–to help clarify how new media supports critical citizen engagement. The identification of online activities exhibiting middle-ground resistance, including rumors, political parodies, and infotaining play, illustrates counter narrative responses to mainstream media representations. Findings have implications for the management of tensions in wired global insurgency and strategic communication performances.

Making an agreement to stop the war (armed conflict) in Colombia, should not mean the end of conflict, is only the first step that would show: - by the insurgency, to continue the struggle for their ideals without arms and - by the state, to make reforms, not the congress grounds and the Palace of Nariño, but from and to the application of real democracy, is to say, the direct participation of the people. ; Lograr un acuerdo para detener la guerra (conflicto armado interno) en Colombia, no debe significar el fin del conflicto, es apenas el primer paso que darán muestra: - por parte de la insurgencia, de seguir la lucha por sus ideales sin las armas y - por parte del estado, de realizar las reformas, no desde el recinto del congreso y del palacio de Nariño, sino desde y con la aplicación de la democracia real, es decir con la participación directa del pueblo.

The Niger Delta of Nigeria is the largest mangrove forest in Africa and the chief source of wealth to the Nigerian state. This naturally endowed region once became a hot bed of kidnapping, violence, insurgency, crude oil bunkering, gang war and hostage taking. This paper investigates the challenges of democracy and development in Nigeria.s Niger Delta region. It relied heavily on secondary data. Using the Marxist political economy approach, the paper reveals that the tensions that rob the region of its peace and stability were the people.s quest to get a reasonable share of the states resources. Since democracy and development cannot thrive under a restive atmosphere, it recommends that current measures at restoring peace and infusing a massive infrastructure in the area should be maintained. Lastly, the provision of life sustaining skills for the youths of the region should be continued. This will enable them survive without recourse to violence and criminality.