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The article examines the effect of the phenomenon of the right of force in state-organized societies and societies that did not yet know the state forms. The phenomenon of the law of force was investigated by domestic lawyers for the most part in the context of the criminal activity of individuals. The most significant results in the study of this phenomenon were achieved by the representatives of the humanities of the West. In this regard, the task of studying the current conditions for the emergence and implementation of the right of force in both Ukraine and in other states looks urgent. There is postulated the hypothesis of the study, which consists in the assertion that the right of force - is the presence of any benefits to individuals over others, the exercise of the right of force will be understood as the implementation of the domination of one subject over the other (a group of subjects, their community), obtrusion of others' will to them. From this angle, socio-economic formations (tribal, tribal, slaveholding, feudalism, capitalism) are analyzed for the purpose of finding the grounds for the emergence and mechanisms for the exercise of their right to force. It is argued that during the conscious history of mankind, the factor of the power of rights played a significant role in the organization of society. This is that individuals who had certain advantages over others (initially physical, later – intellectual, economic, organizational), were able to gain a privileged position in all spheres of human activity. With the change of feudalism by capitalism, the legal right of force was replaced by the right of formal equality, which did not remove the actual inequality of individuals, which ultimately helped them again occupy the dominant positions in the socio-political, business hierarchy. This is confirmed by the data of anthropological and synergetic theories of legal thinking. On this basis, the conclusion was made that the power of law existed and exists, and this is not the atavism of the legal system, it is reproduced by the selfish nature of individual representatives of mankind, unfortunately the most active and mobile in comparison with others in achieving their goals. Examples of the force of law in modern practice of the functioning of state institutions of Ukraine, Italy and America are given. The forms and mechanisms for implementing the right of force are considered. Among the latter is the manipulation of consciousness, which is typical for developed civil societies with democracy as their political form. The above conclusions are illustrated by examples of mass media activities. In this context, attention is also drawn to the exercise of the right to force through the trade and economic mechanisms of individual international organizations and institutions. At the end of the study, the results are summarized, which are reduced to the next. Summarizing all of the above, we can draw the following conclusions. First, the right to force is a right arising from the existence of any advantage of one subject over another (physical, intellectual, economic, organizational, etc.), which, under certain conditions, the weakness of the other party (lack of appropriate qualities) can be implemented in the relationship between them. Secondly, the power of law has not disappeared from modern history, it continues to exist as in the relationships of individual individuals, individuals and states, and in the relations of individual states. Third, the existence of democracy as a political regime does not exclude the existence and exercise of the right to force. Fourthly, manipulation of consciousness as a kind of power of law is one of the main means of governance in the conditions of the existence of civil societies and democracies as a political form, which necessitates dictating the demand for improvement of the latter in order to prevent distortion of opinion of citizens in such societies. For example, by expanding the forms of people's participation in the exercise of power through the institutes of direct democracy, which is known to be widely used in one of the wealthiest and happiest countries in the world - Switzerland ; Феномен права силы исследовался отечественными правоведами преимущественно в контексте преступной деятельности отдельных индивидов. Наиболее существенные результаты в изучении этого явления достигли представители гуманитарных наук Запада. В связи с этим актуальным выглядит задача исследования современных условий возникновения и осуществления права силы как в Украине, так и в других государствах. Постулируется гипотеза исследования, которая заключается в утверждении, что право силы - это наличие каких-либо преимуществ у отдельных индивидов над другими, под осуществлением права силы будет пониматься осуществление господства одного субъекта над другим (группой субъектов, их сообществ), навязывание им своей воли. Под этим углом зрения анализируются общественно-экономические формации (родо-племенная, рабовладельческая, феодализм, капитализм) на предмет поиска оснований возникновения и механизмов осуществления у них права силы. Утверждается, что в течение сознательной истории человечества фактор права силы играл существенную роль в организации социума. Это заключается в том, что отдельные индивиды, которые имели определенные преимущества перед другими (сначала физические, позже - интеллектуальные, экономические, организационные), смогли завоевать себе привилегированное положение в любых сферах человеческой активности. Со сменой феодализма капитализмом юридическое право силы было заменено на право формального равенства, что не устранило фактического неравенства индивидов, в конечном счете помогло более состятельным из них снова занять доминирующие места в общественно-политической, бизнесовой иерархии. Это подтверждается данными антропологической и синергетической теориями правопонимания. Исходя из этого, сделан вывод - право силы было и существует, и это не атавизм правовой системы, оно воспроизводится эгоистичной природой отдельных представителей человечества, к сожалению наиболее активных и мобильных по сравнению с другими в достижении своих целей. Приводятся примеры действия права силы в современной практике функционирования государственных институтов Украины, Италии и Америки. Рассматриваются формы и механизмы осуществления права силы. Среди последних - манипуляция сознанием, которая характерна именно для развитых гражданских обществ с демократией как их политической формой. Указанные выводы иллюстрируются примерами деятельности масс-медиа. В этом контексте обращается также внимание на осуществление права силы через торговые и экономические механизмы отдельных международных организаций и учреждений. В конце исследования подводятся итоги, которые сводятся к следующему. Во-первых, право силы - право, которое следует из наличия какого-либо преимущества одного субъекта над другим (физической, интеллектуальной, экономической, организационной и т.д.), которое при определенных условиях - слабости другой стороны (отсутствие соответствующих качеств) - может быть реализована в отношениях между ними. Во-вторых, право силы не исчезло из современной истории, оно продолжает существовать как во взаимоотношениях отдельных индивидов, индивидов и государств, так и во взаимоотношениях отдельных государств. В-третьих, наличие демократии как политического режима не исключает существования и осуществления права силы. В-четвертых, манипуляция сознанием как разновидность права силы является одним из главных средств управления в условиях существования гражданских обществ и демократий как их политической формы, что с необходимостью диктует требование совершенствования последней для предотвращения искажения мнения граждан в таких обществах. Например, путем расширения форм участия народа в осуществлении власти через институты непосредственной демократии, что, как известно, широко используется в одной из самых богатых и счастливых стран мира - Швейцарии ; Феномен права сили досліджувався вітчизняними правознавцями здебільшого в контексті злочинної діяльності окремих індивідів. Найбільш суттєві результати у вивченні цього явища досягли представники гуманітарних наук Заходу. В зв'язку з цим актуальним виглядає завдання дослідження сучасних умов виникнення та здійснення права сили як на теренах України, так і в інших державах. Постулюють гіпотеза дослідження, яка полягає у твердженні, що право сили – це наявність будь-яких переваг у окремих індивідів над іншими, під здійсненням права сили буде розумітися здійснення панування одного суб'єкта над іншим (групою суб'єктів, їх спільнотою), нав'язування їм своєї волі. Під цим кутом зору аналізуються суспільно-економічні формації (родо-племінна, рабовласницька, феодалізм, капіталізм) на предмет пошуку підстав виникнення та механізмів здійснення в них права сили. Стверджується, що на протязі свідомої історії людства чинник права сили грав суттєву роль в організації соціуму. Це полягає в тому, що окремі індивіди, які мали певні переваги над іншими (спочатку фізичні, пізніше – інтелектуальні, економічні, організаційні), змогли завоювати собі привілейоване становище в будь-яких сферах людської активності. Зі зміною феодалізму капіталізмом юридичне право сили було замінено на право формальної рівності, що не усунуло фактичної нерівності індивідів, що в кінцевому рахунку допомогло більш спроможним з них знову зайняти домінуючі місця в суспільно-політичній, бізнесовій ієрархії. Це підтверджується даними антропологічної та синергетичної теоріями праворозуміння. Виходячи з цього, зроблений висновок право сили існувало та існує, і це не атавізм правової системи, воно відтворюється егоїстичною природою окремих представників людства, на жаль найбільш активних та мобільних у порівнянні з іншими у досягненні своїх цілей. Наводяться приклади дії права сили у сучасній практиці функціонування державних інститутів України, Італії та Америки. Розглядаються форми та механізмі здійснення права сили. Серед останніх – маніпуляція свідомістю, яка характерна саме для розвинутих громадянських суспільств з демократією як їх політичної формою. Зазначені висновки ілюструються прикладами діяльності мас-медіа. В цьому контексті звертається також увага на здійснення права сили через торгові та економічні механізми окремих міжнародних організацій та установ. В кінці дослідження підводяться підсумки, які зводяться до наступного. По-перше, право сили – право, що випливає з наявності будь-якої переваги одного суб'єкта над іншим (фізичної, інтелектуальної, економічної, організаційної тощо), яка при певних умовах – слабкості іншої сторони (відсутність відповідних якостей) – може бути реалізована у стосунках між ними. По-друге, право сили не зникло з сучасної історії, воно продовжує існувати як у взаємовідносинах окремих індивідів, індивідів та держав, так і у взаємовідносинах окремих держав. По-третє, наявність демократії як політичного режиму не виключає існування та здійснення права сили. По-четверте, маніпуляція свідомістю як різновид права сили є одним з головних засобів управління в умовах існування громадянських суспільств та демократій як політичної форми, що з необхідністю диктує вимогу вдосконалення останньої для запобігання спотворення думки громадян в таких суспільствах. Наприклад, шляхом розширення форм участі народу у здійсненні влади через інститути безпосередньої демократії, що як відомо, широко використовується в одній із найбільш заможних та щасливих країн світу – Швейцарії

Kimberly Hutchings on Quiet as a Research
Strategy, the Essence of Critique, and the Narcissism of Minor Differences










As a job, International Relations requires carving out one's position by being vocal. Being vocal entails making
oneself heard, forwarding identifiable 'contributions'. But what if the biggest
contribution one might make would actually consist of quieting down? 

In a
provocative and wide-ranging Talk,
Kimberly Hutchings—amongst others—challenges us to take postcolonialism seriously
as an invitation to hush, and provides compelling suggestions as to what
critique means in a time of proliferating criticality.






Print version of this Talk (pdf)




What is (or should be), according to you, the biggest
challenge / principal debate in current International Relations? What is your
position or answer to this challenge / in this debate?



In my view, the
main challenge for IR right now is to deal with postcolonialism and
decoloniality, which would entail a kind of decentering of the standpoint of
judgment within the study of international politics. Essentially, we should move
away from the kind of common-sense starting points of Western theory, Western
history and all the rest of it. To be sure, this does not necessarily mean
disregarding them. Instead, we should avoid always seeing them as the
authoritative, and find a way to keep them at a distance in order to make space
for the inclusion of other voices. Practicing this inclusion, answering 'what
would you do about it', or 'where do you stand' I find more difficult; I have
discussed questions of decoloniality and postcolonialism with my colleagues and
we all find it very tough to do something different or to suggest alternatives.
Especially since we are—or at least I am—educated and structured within a
particular (eg. Western) realm of understanding. Because it is so difficult for
'us' to do so, our starting point should therefore exactly be to start from the
empirical and theoretical engagement of the political actors on the periphery.
By doing so we can begin to decenter our work and the debates. There is an enormous
amount of really brilliant decolonial and postcolonial work our there. Here, I
think the work of people like Arlene Tickner has been great in attempting to do
carve out this space. This goes to prove that scholars are suggesting alternative ways and that it can be done differently.



So perhaps
paradoxically, I would summarize my central contribution as a hush—scholars
like I have to dampen down our voices in order to allow other voices to be
heard. Keeping this is mind can prove to be a really important lesson for
theorists. At least I attempt to do so within my particular subfields of
theory.





How did you arrive at where you currently are in your
thinking about International Relations?



During my route through
academia I have been inspired by a number of theorists, books and historical
events and I continue to be. However, there are two or three specific points of
inspiration that I can draw out; some more philosophical or theoretical ones and
others almost accidental to how my thinking has progressed.



Largely, I have
arrived at where I am today because I started my PhD on the philosophies of
Kant and Hegel. This has set up certain parameters for my way of thinking; for
thinking about ethics and about critique, and this has influenced my way of
thinking and ultimately my work ever since. Another factor was my time as a
young scholar working at the Wolverhampton Polytechnic where I met Steve Gill. He suggested I attended the BISA conference to
present a paper on war in relation to Kant and Hegel. He knew this was my field
of interest and in the end I accepted. The first panel I attended was okay,
though only two people participated. The second panel was far more interesting
and featured amongst others Rob Walker. Walker talked about bringing Foucault's insights and
ideas about critique to bear on thinking about international politics. This
made me realize that my purely philosophical way of thinking in relation to
Kantian critique and the problems of Kantian critique were already being worked
through within the domain of International Relations as a field of study. It
spurred my initial interest as I came to think of IR as a kind of case study of
applied political philosophy more generally. In some ways, you could say that
the questions I was asking from a political philosophy perspective were being
addressed more progressively in IR. Certainly, I caught on to IR when they were
being very consciously addressed. The timing and shift in IR spoke directly to
me and, in my view, pushed me to think about questions of judgment and argument
shifts. Here, one should attempt to genuinely relate to an international or
global frame of reference rather that simply taking for granted a kind of
methodological nationalism, which, I suspect, up till then had been. In this
sense IR pushed my thinking.



It is
interesting how it often is the texts you read early on that shape you as a
scholar. To me it was the texts I read in the late 1980s, early 1990s, when
critical IR was really getting off the ground, which were formative for me. Initially,
it has been Kant's political thought and Hegel's philosophy of rights. Additionally,
there has been a range of theorists within critical writing; retrospectively
the work of Hannah Arendt and The Origins
of Totalitarianism in particular. Moreover, Foucault has also been
essential to my work; particularly Discipline
and Punish and The History of
Sexuality have been really crucial in terms of me looking at a kind of 'fate
of critique', if you like, in Western thought in the 20th century. Within
IR Andrew Linklater's work is really important, especially his book on Men and Citizens, and afterwards his
postcolonial community book from the late 1990s. They are important as a sort
of interlocutors, which I in fact reacting against, because I saw them as carrying
through this very Habermasian line of thought, with which I did not agree. Obviously
also the work of feminists scholars amongst others Cynthia Enloe (TheoryTalk #48) and Christine Sylvester, whose books were very
important to me. Again, they enabled me to widen my scope and see how broader
themes of feminist philosophy were being addressed in IR.





What would a student need to become a specialist in International
Relations or understand the world in a global way?



In order to
become a specialist in IR a student's main qualities should be intellectual curiosity,
openness, and willingness to engage with ideas. However, it is importing not to
insist on 'you must know your Foucault backwards' or 'you must know your Hegel
backwards'. To me this is not essential; instead, the focus should be on one's
interests and curiosity, and to locate yourself in terms of where you are 'thinking
from'. In this way, you are able to relate your ideas and arguments to a
specific problematique—perhaps one concerning the political contexts you
derived from yourself, and maybe because of the particular intellectual
trajectory that you have taken.



Then again,
knowing your classic theorists as Foucault and Hegel is definitely beneficial
when engaging with IR. When I entered the field of IR, it meant I was already
loaded with a set of intellectual parameters, interests and political
commitments. Ultimately, this enabled my participation and outcome of conversations
with different trajectories within IR. Therefore, what are most important to me
are intellectual curiosity, openness, willingness to listen, and a sense of
where you are coming from to the conversation. Yet, the great thing about IR is
that you do not have to be trained in IR, in any straightforward way. In my
view IR is a cross-disciplinary field, where many disciplines and arguments
merge; students from law, political science, sociology, who all can have lots
to say to IR, and IR can in return have lots to say to you.



The key to
combining academia with your own starting point lies to me in education; if you
get a good education, there should be space for the individual engagement. Particularly
if you are interested in antiracism or in feminism, I would assume, an IR
scholar speaking to those areas would encourage you to make space for independent
thought. However, all academic work is at the same time a discipline, which at times can be painful to adjust to and actually
take on board. Academia is not for everyone; to some it ends up being a waste
of time and they long for something different, which is completely fine as
well. But in my view it is sign of a poor university education if it closes
things down to an extent where you cannot find the space to articulate your
views or relate them to the things that you are learning. And that is a fault
of the education, not of the student.





You fall squarely among
'critical' IR scholarship. What does it mean, for you, to be critical?



First of all, the term 'critical' is highly contested and in a way it
can become a useless label. In my view one of the problems with critical IR is
you tend to get into the sort of narcissism of minor differences, which also
involves getting into a kind of competition for philosophical antecedence, in
which scholars argue either through Marx, through Heidegger or through
Foucault. The second problem of critical IR, which I have discussed in my work
at various points, is the suspension of judgment forever. Since you can never
find the ground, the sort of desire to find the authority in some sense ends up
paralyzing judgments. I would argue that when there is a kind of risk that
comes with people's willingness to make claims that it can ultimately suspend
judgment. Yet, there is still dynamism, and the fact that your claim-making can
be precisely deconstructed as in fact a reinforcement of what you are trying to
undermine is part of the excitement and the interest of doing critique. The neverendingness
of it is challenging in itself. In a sense we would like to be sort of God and
in a sense we say 'well, I know that this is right and it just is'. Critique
stops you doing it. That is why it is healthy, even though it at the same time
can be quite frustrating.



My own personal understanding of what 'critique' and 'critical' means,
comes out of my engagement with ideas of Kantian critique. The Kantian critique
represent a foundational moment in the sense that both Marxist critique and
post-Marxist critique refer back to Kant. In this way, the Kantian critique
becomes a very rich starting point, as it has been able to branch out in all
kinds of directions, from the sort of Hegelian/Marxist direction to other very
different ones. The sort of typical critique is about questioning the
assumptions or the authoritative basis of any kinds of claims. In doing so,
critique is largely about disturbing the conditions or possibility of a claim
that is made, and this is basically what Kant's transcendental move is about.
This means that critique can go in lots of directions, some of them more
helpful than others. Critique can also end up as a claim to a new authority and
in my view, certain forms of post-Kantian critique have done that. I would also
argue that there are aspects of Kant's work, where he did the same; in
particular in how he moves from one possible ground to another to attempt to
underpin some kind of authority for his claims. This might be contentious, but
this is my reading of Kant, whereas others probably would argue he construes
the space of critique very openly. Put simply, my reading of Kant is in line
with Foucault's: critique is the admission that you are always in a tentative
position in which any claim to authority is going to be questionable. Within any
argument, you are always going to be holding something steady in order to
question other parts, which mean you cannot ever escape from having to claim
some sort of authority in the arguments you make. However, this does not mean
that arguments become an overweening or foundational kind of ground. In a sense
it is about keeping things moving, and I quite like the Foucauldian expression
of it being an ethos, an attitude, a way of being, rather than a set of
techniques or a claim to a moral high ground, which then enables you to show
how everybody else is wrong. That is how I think of the concept of 'critical'.





Classical theory plays a
big part in your work. If bygone thinkers spoke to the issues they saw in their
times, then what do the minds of bygone eras have to say to contemporary
issues?



I am never quite sure what the answer to that is. There is a tradition
of thinking about canonic thought in the UK, Quentin Skinner is one of them,
that is really dubious about talking about Kant or Heidegger in relation to
contemporary problems or trying to suggest you can have a philosophical
conversation across time and space. I have spent some time on this argument and
in my view they are to a great extent right, at least if you think of a conversation
with the 'real Hobbes' or someone else. However, there is a sense in which I
start from a position in which there is no 'real' whoever. Instead, it should
be viewed as a text with arguments and ideas, which you read and interpret in
the light both of your time and place, but also the course of a whole set of
secondary engagements with that. When reading such texts you are dealing with
two hundred years of interpretation of Kant and Hegel. In this sense one must
note that the voices of those philosophers as highly mediated in many different
ways. If you can still engage with them and find useful insights, then sort of
'why not' seems reasonable. A second argument in terms of philosophers as Kant
and Hegel is, the time they wrote in was obviously radically different.
Meanwhile, it also had features in terms of the shape the state were taking, the
beginnings of what we would now recognize as the modern capitalist market
state. They were there, they were before that, and they were looking at the
beginnings. They were around during the Napoleonic wars, mostly Hegel but also
Kant was at point when the European colonialism or imperialism took off in
particular ways. Here, a lot of the categories of race, culture etc. took shape
under their noses. In this sense we are still within a frame that they were a
part of, rather than excluded from. If you look at Machiavelli, he was speaking
in a radically different time and space. There is an argument there about
occupying a world that in some sense we still recognize or perhaps of Kant and
Hegel trying to construct ways of understanding and judging a world that still
has links to the world we inhabit today. That is another reason why they are
still useful today. We all get our ideas from somewhere; as long as we do no
argue that referring to Kant, Hegel, Foucault or Arendt makes it right. Instead,
use ideas as they come and mix and match them, it is reasonable to be eclectic,
depending on what kinds of claims you are making. If you attempt to do a solid
reading of Kant, then you must know both the texts and the context, but if you
wish to discuss critique in IR you can, in my view, take some elements of Kant
or the post-Kantian legacy and use them to illuminate a contemporary debate.





The encounter between the
West and the non-West is an important theme running through your work, and you
liberally engage with post-colonial theory. So how does that work in practice?



The problem to someone who is trying to critique Eurocentrism or get
away from it is that you cannot do it in an isolated way. One of the ways in which
people try to think about the inclusion of other voices was in terms of the
notion of dialogue. This was actually why I ended up writing about dialogue. My
problem here was that some of the ways of thinking about dialogue seemed to me
to simply confirm the centrality of the West and the position of the non-West
as other. The big question is then how do you articulate the non-West? In my
view the thing is that you simply do not; instead one must think constructively
about how you quiet down, how you moderate dominant voices and create spaces
for others. Sometimes it may just be a question of just being quiet, it may be
about encouraging other work, it may be about encouraging theoretical investment
in other places.



I am talking to you now, but in some sense what I am doing is enforcing
the position of the privileged white, Western, middle-class woman. In my
position talking about Eurocentrism and critique is merely by the fact of doing
it, I am reinforcing a certain privilege and a certain sense of it. And this is
not to say that you therefore you do not do it. Sometimes it is not useful to
have someone like me on a panel; it is a much better thing to have somebody
else, somebody younger or somebody from a different part of the world. To me
this is what you have to think about, and as a scholar you have think about how
you can contribute to creating spaces within which other voices can be included.
To be honest, I do not think I have done a very good job of doing that. To
quiet yourself down is really difficult; especially since there is so many
institutional and other incentives for you to try and occupy the center stage. In
my view it is something that maybe feminist scholarship has been better at.



In this sense it relates to a much bigger set of issues that social
science is about; social sciences were and are kind of an imperialist project
in their foundation. Whether or not you can ever make them to anything else, I
doubt. It might be that you cannot, in which case the move to aesthetics, for
example, which you see in some bits of IR, is understandable. It is difficult
in the sense that we cannot do what we want to do by staying within the vocabularies
of social science. We have to move to another kind of discourse in order to do
what we think we need to do.





So here we navigate the
space between scholarship and activism. I remember this picture of you
delivering a lecture on a road blocking an arms convoy.



Yes, my very minor piece of activism, except it was the people that
were being handcuffed on the road who were the real activists, not me. I think
it is really important to be clear that doing critical theory as an IR scholar
does not make you a political activist, and I think it is important, because it
can sometimes feel really good to make a gesture of whatever, you know, 'being
critical'. And that's all great, but actually it's all within an incredibly
privileged forum and you're not really making any difference to anything. So,
I'm a bit I think Hegelian in the sense that I think that philosophy or
academic work is about understanding more, trying to understand and to think,
and it may well generate frameworks and ideas that make it useful in various
ways, and it may well not, but if you want to have revolution, go out and start
organizing. You know, don't think that you can somehow do it by being on ISA
panels. Marx was a political activist, he didn't just sit around writing, he
was part of the movement, part of an organization, and that's the only way you
really can help bring fundamental change, and quite often it'll go wrong. Being
a political activist is much more scary and difficult than being a critical IR
thinker.



Kimberly Hutchings is Professor of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. She is a leading scholar in international relations theory. She has extensively researched and published on international political theory in respect to Kantian and Hegelian philosophy, international and global ethics, Feminist theory and philosophy, and politics and violence. Her work is influenced by the scholarly tradition that produced the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory. She is the author of Kant, Critique and Politics, International Political Theory: rethinking ethics in a global era, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy and Time and World Politics: thinking the present. Her current focus is on the areas of global ethics, assumptions about time and history in theories of international relations, and the conceptual relationship between politics and violence in Western political thought.







Related links





Faculty Profile at Queen Mary's




Read Hutchings' Ethics, Feminism and International Affairs (2013) here (pdf)
Read Hutching's What is Orientation in Thinking? On the Question of Time and Timeliness
in Cosmopolitical Thought (2011) here (pdf)
Read Hutching's World Politics and the Question of Progress (2004) here (pdf)




Print version of this Talk (pdf)

Wage inequality has declined in Mexico since 2000. Using data from Mexican labor surveys for the period between 2000 and 2014, this paper investigates whether the decline was driven by wages declining more sharply for younger or older workers. The analysis finds that the wages of older workers declined and the decline was more pronounced in the older cohort. This would seem to support the hypothesis that older workers' skills have become obsolete.

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