Suchergebnisse

Die Finanzkrise 2007/2008 und die derzeitige "Euro-Krise" stellen das bisherige Weltwährungssystem in Frage. Sie legt die Schwächen des aktuellen Systems schonungslos offen und zeigt, welchen herausragenden Stellenwert das internationale Währungssystem nach wie vor für die Stabilität von Märkten und ganzen Volkswirtschaften hat. Das DIW Berlin hat im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums der Finanzen untersucht, ob es grundlegende Alternativen zum bestehenden Wechselkursregime gibt. Grundsätzlich erweist sich keine der beiden Extremformen - komplett freie oder fixe Wechselkurse - als geeignet. In dem daher grundsätzlich zu empfehlenden Mischsystem sind aber Verbesserungen zum Status quo sinnvoll. Anzustreben ist ein Wechselkursregime mit einigen wenigen, großen Währungsraumen, die untereinander durch flexible Wechselkurse verbunden sind. Korrespondierend hierzu sollte sich ein multipolares Leitwährungssystem herausbilden, in dem neben dem gegenwärtig dominierenden US-Dollar auch der Euro und der chinesische Renminbi eine wichtige Rolle spielen dürften. Begleitet werden sollten diese Entwicklungen durch substanzielle Verbesserungen der regulatorischen Rahmenbedingungen der Finanzmärkte. Hierzu gehört neben einer verstärkten globalen und insbesondere europäischen wirtschaftspolitischen Koordinierung auch eine international abgestimmtere und durchsetzungsfähigere Finanzmarktaufsicht.

On July 6 and 7, 1948 a meeting was held in Washington to which were invited representatives of the 36 governments which had signed the International Wheat Agreement concluded there March 6, 1948. Representatives of the following countries informed the meeting that their governments had ratified the agreement and had deposited their formal instruments of acceptance with the United States State Department by the deadline of July 1: Australia, Austria, Canada, China, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, India, Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Belgium, Cuba, Greece, the Netherlands, and Poland indicated that their legislatures had ratified and that formal instruments of acceptance would be deposited early that month. The representatives present discussed the possibilities of further ratifications, particularly the prospects of ratification by the United States Government, and decided that prospects of ratification during the 1948–49 crop-year were remote. Thereupon, representatives of some of the ratifying states gave notice that their governments withdrew from the agreement, because the guaranteed quantities of countries which had formally accepted it were insufficient to ensure its successful operation. A preparatory committee was appointed consisting of the representatives of Australia, the Benelux customs union, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States to keep under review prospects of concluding a new international wheat agreement. The United States was invited to convene the meeting as soon as it considered the time propitious to negotiate a new international agreement.

'International Human Rights' by Linda A. Malone is reviewed.

Defence date: 17 June 2016 ; Examining Board: Professor Piero Gottardi, EUI, Supervisor; Professor Paola Conconi, Université Libre de Bruxelles; Professor Bernard Hoekman, RSCAS; Professor Thierry Verdier, Paris School of Economics. ; This thesis tackles three topics in international trade: (i) the motives behind restrictions on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) and the role of investment agreements, (ii) the determinants of services trade policies, and (iii) the role of domestic institutions in affecting trade flows and the gains from trade. Tariffs have almost completely disappeared but various barriers that restrict FDI still remain. Many trade agreements and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have been signed to lower tariffs and reduce the risks of expropriation whereas few agreements have been signed to lower entry barriers. The first chapter looks at the interaction between political and economic motives for protectionism. Lobbies give contributions to the governments to affect the policies. The repatriation of profits by foreign affiliates leads governments to restrict the entry of multinationals. Given these two motives, the cooperative outcome, which differs from the chosen policy, can be implemented through an agreement. However I highlight two reasons that can explain why such agreements might be unnecessary. First foreign lobbying counteracts domestic lobbying and, under certain conditions, can push the government to choose the cooperative outcome without signing an agreement. Second the presence of tax havens where firms shift their profits removes the gains from cooperation and makes an agreement unnecessary. The second chapter focuses on the determinants of services trade agreements. Most of the literature on trade policy and agreements has focused on goods, tariffs and trade agreements whereas, in this paper, we study services, foreign direct investment and services agreements. We provide a rationale for governments to commit to liberalize. The third chapter contributes to the debate on the role of various institutions in affecting economic exchanges. We focus here on the role of contract enforcement in shaping the optimal organization of firms and the allocation of entrepreneurs across sectors. Different institutional qualities are a source of comparative advantage and export specialization. We find that liberalization leads to asymmetric gains of trade in terms of productivity and reallocation of resources. The country with the poorest institutions benefits less from trade than the country with the best institutions.