Jenseits der Anarchie: Widerstand und Herrschaft im internationalen System
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS ; Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft. Sonderheft, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 299-318
ISSN: 0720-4809
2110260 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Politische Vierteljahresschrift: PVS ; Zeitschrift der Deutschen Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft. Sonderheft, Band 56, Heft 2, S. 299-318
ISSN: 0720-4809
In: American economic review, Band 104, Heft 5, S. 552-556
ISSN: 1944-7981
Disparate commitments to reduce GHG emissions create demands for border carbon adjustments (BCAs) to prevent negative competitive effects and carbon leakage. BCAs that accomplish economic objectives and are administratively feasible, WTO-legal, and politically acceptable may be impossible. BCAs should be limited to a few basic energy-intensive and trade-exposed products and should be based on the lower of the carbon content of production in the importing country and actual carbon content, or perhaps "best available technology." Whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) would condone BCAs is unclear. BCAs violating basic trade rules might qualify for a special exception.
In: Wasserwirtschaft: Hydrologie, Wasserbau, Boden, Ökologie ; Organ der Deutschen Vereinigung für Wasserwirtschaft, Abwasser und Abfall, Band 104, Heft 1-2, S. 94-97
ISSN: 2192-8762
Multinational companies can shift profit and income between branches in order to reduce the overall tax liabilities of the company. The result is a tax competition between countries. In this paper we consider the sequential choice of tax rates to illustrate the potential effects of tax leadership. We use a profit shifting model with multinational firms that operate in two countries, large and small. Governments compete by setting source-based corporate income taxes. We show that: (i) the sequential tax equilibria always Pareto dominate the simultaneous tax equilibrium. (ii) Each country prefers to follow than to lead the tax game. (iii) The tax leadership by the large country risk-dominates the tax leadership by the small country. Therefore our analysis provides a plausible explanation for the endogenous emergence of the tax leader- ship by the large countries. The results are contrasting with previous results in the literature.
BASE
In: NBER Working Paper No. w19854
SSRN
In: NBER Working Paper No. w20585
SSRN
In: International Practice Theory, S. 59-75
In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 1, Heft 2
ISSN: 2194-5624
AbstractThis paper aims to show that fairness in trade calls for relaxing existing WTO rules to include a greater liberalisation of labour migration. After having addressed several objections to global egalitarianism, it will argue, first, that the world's rich and the world's poor participate in a same multilateral trading system whose point is primarily to reduce trade barriers, and hence to establish global economic competitions, in order to raise their standards of living; second, that these competitions are subject to requirements of formal and substantive fairness; and, third, that the substantive fairness of the competitions that are taking place in the field of trade in goods is likely to require a greater liberalisation of labour migration, especially low-skilled labour from developing countries.
In: Guide to the English School in International Studies, S. 59-75
In: Fair Trade Special Issue guest-edited by David Miller. Moral Philosophy and Politics, S. 289-313
SSRN
Working paper
In: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS PP 2014/04
SSRN
Working paper
In: Wege und Irrwege des Krisenmanagements: von Afghanistan bis Südsudan, S. 225-231
Multinational companies can shift profit and income between branches in order to reduce the overall tax liabilities of the company. The result is a tax competition between countries. In this paper we consider the sequential choice of tax rates to illustrate the potential effects of tax leadership. We use a profit shifting model with multinational firms that operate in two countries, large and small. Governments compete by setting source-based corporate income taxes. We show that: (i) the sequential tax equilibria always Pareto dominate the simultaneous tax equilibrium. (ii) Each country prefers to follow than to lead the tax game. (iii) The tax leadership by the large country risk-dominates the tax leadership by the small country. Therefore our analysis provides a plausible explanation for the endogenous emergence of the tax leader- ship by the large countries. The results are contrasting with previous results in the literature.
BASE
In: Journal of policy analysis and management: the journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Band 33, Heft 4, S. 929-931
ISSN: 0276-8739
In: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie: ARSP = Archives for philosophy of law and social philosophy = Archives de philosophie du droit et de philosophie sociale = Archivo de filosofía jurídica y social, Band 100, Heft 4, S. 514-526
ISSN: 2363-5614