Suchergebnisse

In this article, we explain the puzzling continuous success of the far right-wing parties in Europe by using micro-organizational factors such as charismatic leadership and cohesive party organization, contributing to the process of party institutionalization and demonstrating the success of the extreme right-wing parties. We attempt to solve what appears to be a paradox of the institutionalization of far right charismatic parties on the basis of theories of party leadership and party institutionalization. In this endeavour we first define the concept of charismatic parties, and then outline our argument regarding the paradox of charismatic institutionalization and present criteria for measuring institutionalization of charismatic parties. Finally, we outline a proposed theory of `hard charismatic parties' institutionalization. The French FN (Front National) and the Austrian FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) serve as case studies to test our proposed model.

The principal democratic institutions in democracy are political parties. Party law plays a crucial role in institutionalizing multi-party politics. Institutionalization of a party system is vital for the success of democratic system. Unfortunately, several writers show a bleak picture concerning the institutionalization of African political system in general and the party system in particular (Lindberg, 2007; Bogaards, 2003). Given multiparty politics is a late comer in Ethiopia, this problem is perhaps more direr in Ethiopia. Observation of their structure, social base, resources, procedure of internal decision-making, and the like clearly show the weak level of institutionalization as assumed by democratic theory. Thus, they are less likely to fulfill their democratic functions in democracy. Given these problems, strict implementation of the regulatory regimes, especially in the areas of internal democracy and transparency of financial management, is an important in step towards institutionalization. But, there should be a delicate balance as heavy-handed regulation at early stage of party development may become counterproductive (Randall, 2008: 256).

AbstractThis article is a comparative study of the institutionalization of the migration policy frameworks of post‐Soviet states Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. All three countries share common historical legacies: a Soviet past, wars and conflicts, unemployment, high emigration, and commitment to integration into European bodies. To what extent do the migration policies of these three countries (driven by contextual forces, i.e. domestic challenges) address country‐specific migration dynamics? Or are they imposed by the European Union? In which dimensions have the national policies on migration of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia evolved, and around which issues have they converged or diverged? Have these trends led to an integration of migration policymaking at the regional level in the South Caucasus?