This paper reports the results of the second stage of the Citizenship Information research project funded by the BLR&IC: a nation-wide survey, by personal doorstep interview, of the citizenship information needs of almost 900 members of the UK public. Major findings include: that the public obtain most of their information on current issues via the mass media, and that they generally feel well informed on these issues. The public feel, however, that government is not doing enough to inform them on European Monetary Union and on local government cutbacks. Small proportions of the sample had encountered problems concerning employment, education, housing or welfare benefits, and had consulted a range of information sources in order to overcome these problems. Over a quarter of respondents had experienced disadvantage through a lack of access to information. The majority of respondents felt well informed about areas relating to citizenship, but significant proportions were poorly informed in legal rights, welfare benefits and local politics. A highly significant majority (91.7%) believed that freedom of information was important for exercising their rights as citizens. Respondents tended to overestimate their voting patterns, but there was little evidence of participation in other forms of political activity. Although access to computers in the home is presently limited, the majority of respondents would use computers to vote, convey opinions to government, and obtain government information. Public libraries were the preferred source of government information, and were seen as appropriate locations for a range of other types of citizenship information.
Chapter 1: Introduction . - Chapter 2: Intellectual Context: The Evolution of IO Theory . - Chapter 3: United Nations . - Chapter 4: United Nations Case Study: Rwanda/Genocide . - Chapter 5: The World Bank . - Chapter 6: World Bank Case Study: Environmental Behavior and Performance . - Chapter 7: The International Monetary Fund . - Chapter 8: International Monetary Fund Case Study: IMF and the Global Financial Crisis . - Chapter 9: The World Trade Organization . - Chapter 10: World Trade Organization Case Study: Intellectual Property, Trade, and Access to Medicine . - Chapter 11: Regional Organizations/European Union . - Chapter 12: Regional Organizations Case Study: African Union Peace Operations
ABSTRACT: The main purpose of this article is to analyze how sovereign risk influences the loan supply reaction of banks to monetary policy through the bank lending channel. Additionally, we aim to test whether this reaction differs in easy and tight monetary regimes. Using a sample of 3,125 banks from the euro zone between 1999 and 2012, we find that sovereign risk plays an important role in determining loan supply from banks during tight monetary regimes. Banks in higher sovereign risk countries reduce lending more during tight regimes. However, we find little evidence to support any relationship between sovereign risk and loan supply reaction to monetary policy expansions. These results are very interesting for the way monetary policy is conducted in Europe. Banking union, banking system strength, and the budget control of governments would be necessary measures to reduce the heterogeneous transmission of the monetary policy in the euro zone.
The effects of financial capital mobility on monetary policy autonomy are relatively well understood, but the importance of particular monetary regimes in distinct national-institutional settings is not. This article is a theoretical and empirical exploration of the effects of monetary policy regimes on unemployment in different national wage-bargaining settings. Based on a rational expectations, two-stage game of the interaction between the wage behavior of labor unions and the monetary policies of governments, I argue that monetary policies have real (employment) effects in all but the most decentralized bargaining systems. Specifically, in intermediately centralized bargaining systems a credible government commitment to a nonaccommodating monetary policy rule will deter militant wage behavior with salutary effects on unemployment. In highly centralized systems, by contrast, restrictive monetary policies will clash with unions' pursuit of wage-distributive goals and produce inferior employment performance. Only in highly fragmented bargaining systems is money "neutral" in the sense that employment performance is unaffected by monetary regimes. The model has clear consequences for the optimal design of central banks and collective bargaining arrangements and suggests new ways to study institutional change (hereunder the causal effect of increasingly globalized capital markets). The argument is supported by pooled time-series data for fifteen OECD countries over a twenty-one-year period.
"Geldregal bedeutet das hergebrachte Vorrecht des Staates, in seinem Hoheitsbereich die offizielle Währung zu bestimmen und die gesetzlichen Zahlungsmittel in dieser Währung zu schöpfen und in Umlauf zu bringen. Daraus erwächst dem Staat ein Geldschöpfungsgewinn. Dieser wird als Seigniorage bezeichnet. Die Seigniorage besteht in der Differenz zwischen den Produktions- und Bereitstellungskosten der Zahlungsmittel einerseits und ihrer Kaufkraft andererseits, die der Staat realisiert, indem er neu geschöpfte Zahlungsmittel durch öffentliche Ausgaben in Umlauf bringt. Vor der Währungsunion betrugen die Produktionskosten eines 1-Mark-Stücks 16 Pfennige. Die Seigniorage, hier als Münzgewinn, betrug damit 84 Pfennige oder 84% abzüglich der Verwaltungs- und sonstigen Transaktionskosten. Die Produktion einer deutschen Banknote kostete durchschnittlich 15 Pfennige. Auch die Herstellungskosten für die jetzigen Euro-Banknoten betragen im Durchschnitt 7–8 Cent pro Geldschein. Dabei handelt es sich zumeist um 10, 20 und 50 Euro-Scheine (Figna 2004). Bei Banknoten ist die Seigniorage also noch höher als bei Münzen, und bei unbaren Sichtguthaben am höchsten, da die Herstellungskosten (nicht die Transaktionskosten) in diesem Fall nahe null liegen – oder richtiger gesagt, sie wären es, würde dieses Geld durch Staatsausgaben in Umlauf gebracht und nicht, wie heute, durch Kredit der Zentralbank an die Banken bzw. der Banken an das Publikum." (Textauszug)
Calling into question the meaning of "independence" in contemporary central banking, the present article investigates the social origins and post-crisis persistence of the European Central Bank's (ECB) core macroeconomic model, despite broad acknowledgement of its failure to anticipate the financial crisis. We trace the making of the model; the process by which it became dominant in European central banking and beyond; criticism in the wake of its failure to predict the financial-cum-Eurozone crisis; and its persistence, nonetheless, in the crisis' aftermath. We argue that the formation, meanings, and persistence of the ECB's model cannot be understood as effects of the bank's independence or the model's intrinsic qualities. Rather, the model's trajectory is best understood in light of the ECB's transnationally embedded social location in international finance, professional economics, and European governing institutions. The necessity of calculating Europe, irrespective of the accuracy or predictive strength of the model being used, has less to do with the ECB's independence from domestic politics and more to do with its transnational embeddedness - or, stated differently, that the ECB is, in a sense, too embedded to fail.
"Based on a post-Keynesian model of the relationship between wages, prices and employment, this paper begins by studying the extent to which unit labour cost trends have been responsible for disinflation and deflationary tendencies in Germany and Europe. Thereafter, the reasons for the deflationary development of unit labour costs in recent years, in particular in Germany, are analysed. Finally, the impact of deflationary wage policies on German and European stagnation are discussed and it is concluded that the excessive wage restraint in Germany not only exacerbates stagnation and deflationary tendencies in Germany but might also have a deflationary impact on the other EMU countries." (author's abstract)
Статья посвящена изучению роли международных политических институтов в интеграционных процессах евразийского региона. Автор рассматривает Организацию Договора о коллективной безопасности, Шанхайскую организацию сотрудничества и Организацию за демократию и экономическое развитие. В статье отмечена существующая проблема дублирования функций интеграционных объединений евразийского региона. Также автор приходит к выводу о том, что опыт, накопленный государствами евразийского региона в сфере военно-политического сотрудничества, необходимо использовать при формировании отдельных структур будущего Евразийского союза. ; The article is devoted to studying the role of international political institutions in the integration processes of the Eurasian region. The author examines the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. The problem of duplication of integration associations of the Eurasian region is noted in the article. Also the author makes the conclusion that the experience of the Eurasian region in the sphere of military-political cooperation should be used in the process of formation of individual structures of the future Eurasian Union.
L'affaire Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), qui a vu s'opposer le Tribunal constitutionnel fédéral allemand et la Cour de justice de l'Union européenne (CJUE) sur la question de la conformité au droit de l'Union européenne de l'action de la Banque centrale européenne (BCE) lors de la crise des dettes souveraines de 2010-2012, constitue sans aucun doute, à ce jour, l'illustration la plus éclatante de la controverse relative à l'existence (ou non) d'une mutation constitutionnelle tacite du mandat de la BCE. Dans son arrêt du 21 juin 2016, le Tribunal constitutionnel fédéral confirme la conformité du programme monétaire OMT au droit de l'Union et à la Loi Fondamentale allemande mais n'en maintient pas moins de « sérieuses objections » à l'encontre du raisonnement de la CJUE, témoignant ainsi de la persistance de certaines tensions entre, d'une part, les interventions de la BCE et, d'autre part, les dispositions du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne (TFUE) relatives à ses compétences ; The German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) judgment of June 21, 2016 is the last episode of a long saga in which the FCC and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have opposed each other regarding the European Central Bank (ECB)'s compliance with European Union law in its action during the sovereign debt crisis, and especially concerning its Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) Program. In accordance with its role as guardian of the German constitutional legal order, the FCC implemented its jurisprudential-based ultra vires review (i.e. checking that EU institutions did not infringe their mandate attributed by the German Act of Approval of EU Treaties). In this context, the FCC referred for the first time in its history to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling concerning the ECB's mandate (Articles 119 and 127 TFEU) and the monetary financing prohibition (Article 123 TFEU). However, this first direct jurisdictional dialogue resulted in an arm-wrestling match between the FCC and the CJEU rather than in any genuine judicial cooperation: the reference for a preliminary ruling was closer to an ultimatum and a "pre-declaration of invalidity"; in response, the CJEU ruling, behind its apparent openness, totally rejected the FCC reasoning, declared the OMT program consistent with EU primary law, and stressed the primacy of EU law over domestic law—even constitutional—as well as the binding nature of the solutions identified in its decisions. Finally, in its decision of June 21, 2016, the FCC accepted the CJEU's position and confirmed the conformity of the OMT Program with EU law and German constitutional law. Nevertheless, this acceptance certainly does not imply approval and endorsement and the FCC maintains "serious objections" against the CJEU's position, which are not, we believe, totally groundless. In spite of the arguments often developed about the irrationality of the markets on the one hand, and the state of exception (the sovereign debt crisis) on the other, it can indeed be argued, in our opinion, that the ECB's mandate is subject to a tacit constitutional change, its OMT Program being one of the manifestations, and, consequently, that there was indeed a breach of the Treaties. These "serious objections" expressed by the FCC therefore bespeak the persistence of a profound disagreement on the interpretation to be given to the EU primary law concerning the distinction between monetary and economic policies and the resulting distribution of powers. In this context, the legal inconsistency consisting of transferring competences to the ECB without beforehand amending the Treaties is particularly likely to lead in the near future to new jurisdictional tensions between the FCC and the CJEU. ; Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfG) vom 21. Juni 2016 ist die letzte Episode einer langen Saga, in der sich das BVerfG und der Gerichtshof der Europäischen Union (EuGH) in Bezug auf die Einhaltung des EU-Rechts durch die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) während der Staatsschuldenkrise gegenüberstanden. Entsprechend seiner Rolle als Hüter der deutschen Verfassungsordnung hat das BVerfG seine auf der Rechtsprechung gründende Ultra-vires-Kontrolle durchgeführt (d.h. prüfen, ob die EU-Institutionen ihr Mandat, das ihnen durch das deutsche Gesetz zur Zustimmung zu den EU-Verträge aufgetragen wurde, nicht verletzt haben). In diesem Zusammenhang hat das BVerfG zum ersten Mal in seiner Geschichte dem EuGH eine Frage zur Vorabentscheidung über das Mandat der EZB (Artikel 119 und 127 AEUV) und das Verbot der monetären Finanzierung (Artikel 123 AEUV) vorgelegt. Dieser erste direkte gerichtliche Dialog zwischen diesen obersten Gerichten führte jedoch eher zu einem Tauziehen zwischen dem BVerfG und dem EuGH als zu einer echten gerichtlichen Zusammenarbeit: Das Vorabentscheidungsersuchen des BVerfG glich eher einem Ultimatum und einer "Voranerkennung der Nichtigkeit"; daraufhin lehnte das EuGH-Urteil – trotz seiner scheinbaren Offenheit – die Argumentation des BVerfG vollständig ab, erklärte das OMT-Programm mit dem EU-Primärrecht vereinbar und unterstrich den Vorrang des EU-Rechts gegenüber dem nationalen Recht – sogar dem Verfassungsrecht – sowie den verbindlichen Charakter der in seinen Entscheidungen getroffenen Lösungen. Schließlich hat das BVerfG in seinem Urteil vom 21. Juni 2016 die Position des EuGH akzeptiert und die Übereinstimmung des OMT-Programms mit dem EU-Recht und dem deutschen Verfassungsrecht bestätigt. Dennoch ist Akzeptanz nicht gleichbedeutend mit Zustimmung und Übernahme. Das BVerfG hält die "gewichtigen Einwände" gegen die Position des EuGH aufrecht, die unserer Meinung nach nicht völlig unbegründet sind. Trotz der oft geäußerten Argumente über die Irrationalität der Märkte einerseits und den Ausnahmezustand (die Staatsschuldenkrise) andererseits, kann unseres Erachtens durchaus argumentiert werden, dass das Mandat der EZB Gegenstand einer stillschweigenden Verfassungsänderung ist – wovon das OMT-Programm eine der Erscheinungsformen ist – und das somit in der Tat ein Verstoß gegen die Verträge vorliegt. Diese von dem BVerfG geäußerten "gewichtigen Einwände" deuten daher darauf hin, dass nach wie vor eine tiefe Uneinigkeit über die Auslegung des EU-Primärrechts hinsichtlich der Unterscheidung zwischen Währungs- und Wirtschaftspolitik und der daraus resultierenden Kompetenzverteilung besteht. In diesem Zusammenhang ist es besonders wahrscheinlich, dass die rechtliche Inkonsistenz, die darin besteht, der EZB Zuständigkeiten ohne vorherige Abänderung der Verträge zu übertragen, in naher Zukunft zu neuen gerichtlichen Spannungen zwischen dem BVerfG und dem EuGH führen wird. ; Peer reviewed
