Suchergebnisse

Focusing on social movement organizations (SMOs) in the Czech Republic, this article explores the level of transnational activism of these actors. Although knowledge exists on domestic interest groups' choice of European Union (EU) venues for lobbying, the influence of EU funding on protest and public campaigning by actors such as SMOs remains under-studied. We show what the level of transnationalization of SMOs is, what types of transnational strategies SMOs employ, and what explains these choices. Specifically, the article examines the effect the EU has had on Czech SMOs. We are interested in whether EU funding contributed to their de-radicalization and co-optation by the political elite, or rather empowered them to engage in transnational protest. The results of our analysis support the empowerment hypothesis. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

European support for integration is shaped by a range of economic, cultural, and political factors. However, in recent decades, scholars have argued that utilitarian calculations have become less important as European integration has advanced, and political entrepreneurs have mobilized nationalist identities. We analyze 24 years of responses to the Eurobarometer (1995–2018) to assess the influence of economic factors on public attitudes toward European integration. We find strong evidence that utilitarian factors are important across the entire panel. The performance of the macro-economy, as measured by unemployment, and an individual's position in the labor market, are consistent predictors of public support for and satisfaction with the European Union. Collective identity is also associated with attitudes toward the European Union. However, an individual's identity is also shaped by economic circumstances.

The author analyses the goals and instruments of the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), discusses approaches which theorise its functioning, examines its policy content and develops a framework for its evaluation

Does the n-issue space in domestic European polities reduce to one, two, or more dimensions? How do these dimensions relate to each other? More broadly, how does dimensionality vary across countries? We attempt to advance our understanding of political contestation in Europe by mapping the dimensionality of the political space across 24 countries using Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) data. We test how well different models of the European political space fit the CHES data and find that three-dimensional models best fit the data in all countries. However, there is considerable cross-national variation in how the three dimensions relate to one another. Given this, we present a new measure of dimensional complexity that captures the degree to which these three dimensions are related. In so doing, we improve our understanding of the complexity of the political space in European countries.

I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999—2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes.

The book assesses the EU performance in the broader UN setting after the Lisbon Treaty. Distinguished scholars with expertise in EU-UN relations use a comprehensive analytical framework of performance to examine various aspects of the complex EU engagement in UN politics. Performance goes beyond the achievement of agreed-upon objectives and engulfs the underlying, intra-organizational, agreement-reaching processes. The contributors examine the output of the intra-EU policy-making process and its impact within the UN setting. They cover thematic areas of special importance for the EU such as environment, human rights, disarmament and peacekeeping operations as well as special UN bodies and forums where the EU is particularly active, such as the UN General Assembly and its main Committees, the International Labour Organisation, UNESCO and the Non-Proliferation Review Conferences.--

I extend the standard spatial model of legislative voting to account for vote-specific party inducements and procedural differences. Focusing on voting in the 1999-2004 European Parliament, I find evidence of vote-specific party inducements in a large share of the roll call votes. Furthermore, MEPs position themselves differently across procedures. As most roll call votes are taken on non-legislative votes, these estimates may overemphasize voting pattern on these votes and downplay voting pattern on legislative votes. As such, these estimates may be a poorly suited for studying within party heterogeneity on legislative votes. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article takes issue with conventional explanations of state preference formation on European integration. It tests the hypothesis that Left-Right ideology is a better predictor than nationality of party views on integration, then tests the relationship between government ideology and government position on several dozen proposals considered during the intergovernmental conference leading up to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. It finds no significant relationship between nationality and preferences on integration, posing a challenge for liberal, functional and historical theories of state preference formation. However, there appears to be a significant and robust relationship between party ideology (and the resulting ideology of governments) and their preferences regarding integration generally, and the Amsterdam negotiations specifically.

Few political communication studies deal with the European Parliament during non-election times even though it takes decisions in a wide range of policy areas. This study examines the patterns and external drivers of European Parliament broadsheet coverage by analysing 2155 articles from six European Union countries during a routine period (2005–2007). Generally, it finds that the European Parliament receives regular coverage. However, developments in the domestic context also influence European Parliament news coverage. Public support for the European Union increases the number of reports about the European Parliament. While national elections do not compromise its news coverage, higher levels of party political contestation over the European Union and trust towards the national parliament lead to lower coverage. The implications are discussed with reference to the European Parliament's democratic legitimacy.

The relationship between public opinion and public policy provides a potential criterion for assessing the democratic quality of the European Union. The few existing time series analyses in this area assume that there exists a European-wide public mood towards integration. Analyzing West-European series of public opinion from 1974 to 2011, this article finds considerable support for this assumption. However, the analysis also points towards a 'periphery-trend', driven by the UK, Ireland and Denmark, in contrast to a 'core-trend', driven by the founders of the European Economic Community (EEC). The analysis further shows that both opinion trends are cointegrated with public policy in this area: European integration appears to be significantly influenced, or constrained, by public opinion both in the core and periphery.

The literature on party group switching in the European Parliament contends that members re-affiliate primarily for strategic reasons. This article advances the discussion by also considering the occurrence of non-strategic switches which follow the collapse of weakly institutionalized groups. Using an original dataset which includes DW-Nominate scores (1979–2009), I operationalize policy-seeking behavior among strategic switchers by deriving member- and delegation-to-group policy distance variables. The pooled logistic regression models using a penalized maximum likelihood estimator make it possible to address quasicomplete separation, and the results show that members from large groups and delegations have significantly lower odds of switching. Further, as members or delegations become incongruent with their group, the odds of switching increase. The study has important implications for research investigating the relationship between weak party institutionalization and parliamentary behavior.

This article tries to evaluate the impact of domestic and international factors on both deficits and deficit reduction in the European Union. Based on data covering 14 countries and 20 fiscal years (1978-97) we test the major hypotheses in the political economy literature. Beyond the investigation of the causes of cross-sectional variations in budget outcomes, we are also interested in changing patterns of influences over time, resulting from so-called `structural breaks'. On the one hand, our pooled time-series analyses show that very few political and institutional factors influenced the budget outcomes of the EU member states during this period. On the other hand, our estimation results provide suggestive support for our assumption that `Maastricht' amounted to a decisive structural break.

Volt is a pan-European, Eurofederalist party that seeks to deepen and democratize European Union integration. It participated in elections in nine European countries and won representation in the Dutch Parliament and German constituency for the European Parliament. We examine Volt Netherlands, which studies the possibilities of a pan-European party. We look at the importance of its pro-European positions for voting for this party; this is an issue that all national branches of Volt share. We also examine the specific political opportunity structure of the Netherlands, where pro-nuclear environmentalism was an open niche. In this way, we weigh the importance of the party's pan-European appeal and the country-specific political opportunity structure. We show the importance of the country-specific factors for new party support and thus cast doubt on the ability of pan-European parties to mobilize voters all over Europe with the same message.