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Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface to the Fourth Edition -- Introduction: The Scope and Focus of Policy Process Research and Theory -- Part I: Theoretical Approaches to Policy Process Research -- 1. The Multiple Streams Framework: Foundations, Refinements, and Empirical Applications -- 2. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in Public Policymaking -- 3. Policy Feedback Theory -- 4. The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Overview of the Research Program -- 5. The Narrative Policy Framework -- 6. The IAD Framework and the SES Framework: An Introduction and Assessment of the Ostrom Workshop Frameworks -- 7. Innovation and Diffusion Models in Policy Research -- Part II: Comparisons and Conclusions -- 8. Comparison of Theories of the Policy Process -- 9. Struggle and Triumph in Fusing Policy Process and Comparative Research -- 10. Moving Forward and Climbing Upward: Advancing Policy Process Research -- About the Contributors -- Index

Arguments for collaborative rather than adversarial approaches to governance rest partly on two axioms: first, that collaborative approaches mitigate conflict to intermediate levels and second, that collaborative approaches help integrate science and values through various joint fact‐finding strategies. Using questionnaire data in 1984 and 2001 of policy participants involved in Lake Tahoe water quality policy, this article investigates whether a shift from an adversarial to a collaborative policy subsystem is associated with (i) convergence in beliefs regarding water quality problems and policy proposals; and (ii) an increase in the use of science‐based empirical beliefs and a decrease in the use of normative beliefs in supporting policy proposals. The findings send a mixed message to policymakers and researchers about science and collaboration. The analysis suggests that collaborative policy subsystems are associated with convergence in some beliefs between rival coalitions, but it also suggests that policy participants are no more likely to rely on science‐based, empirical beliefs in collaborative than in adversarial policy subsystems.

This study explores how trust arises among policy elites engaged in prolonged face-to-face negotiations. Mirroring recent evidence that citizens' procedural preferences (as opposed to policy preferences) drive trust in government, we find thatinterpersonaltrust among stakeholders in consensus-seeking partnerships is explained by the perceived legitimacy and fairness of the negotiation process more so than by the partnership's track record of producing mutually agreeable policies. Overall, hypotheses derived from social psychology do as well or better than those based on rational-choice assumptions. Important predictors of trust include small and stable groups, generalized social trust, clear decision rules, political stalemate, congruence on policy-related beliefs, and absence of devil-shift (the belief that one's opponents wield more power than one's allies). Surprisingly, null or negative correlations exist between trust and network density, measured by membership in voluntary associations. The study illustrates the value of behavioral models that integrate institutional, rational, and psychological explanations.

An evaluation of three theories of internal interest-group dynamics that vary in their predictions concerning the degree of belief congruence between group leaders & members. Exchange theory expects to find substantial congruence, except when selective incentives are important. Commitment theory argues that leaders should be more extreme in their views than ordinary members, while the moderating elite approach suggests they should be less extreme. Questionnaire survey data obtained at 2 times from leaders & members of an environmental & an economic interest group in Lake Tahoe, Calif (N = 518 & 538, respectively), provide some support for exchange theory, even more support for commitment theory, & no support for the moderating elites approach. A synthesis involving elements of the supported theories & additional factors, eg, level of conflict in the policy subsystem, is suggested. 4 Tables, 75 References. Adapted from the source document.

Most studies of belief congruence between elites and their constituencies have dealt with a single type of political institution, such as legislatures, political parties, or bureaucracies. This article compares the extent of congruence between governmental and interest group elites with their constituencies. After discussing elites' incentives to appeal both to their very broad "claimed" constituency and to a much narrower "activist" constituency, we suggest a number of reasons for hypothesizing that governmental elites will do a better job than interest group leaders of mirroring the beliefs of their broader "Claimed" Constituency. Survey data from a number of governmental and interest group elites involved in a longstanding environmental dispute at Lake Tahoe generally support this contention.

A brief review of the major works published since 1974 on the formulation & implementation of policy dealing with air & water pollution, land use (from an environmental perspective), & the protection of natural resources is presented. Emphasis is placed on those works that have attempted to apply the cumulative knowledge of the profession & have made potentially significant contributions to the general understanding of the policy-making process. The material is organized in terms of stages in the policy process & classified in terms of agenda-setting, policy formulation & legitimation, & policy implementation & evaluation. Agenda setting examines the manner in which political culture, public opinion, interest groups, governmental elite, & other variables affect issues & their presentation on societal & political agendas. Policy formulation & legitimation focuses on attitudes of legislators & chief executives, transfer of authority for regulating land use from local governments to regional &/or state institutions, & the effects of public opinion on environmental legislation. Three methods of enforcing pollution control standards are examined in policy implementation & evaluation: (1) the traditional regulatory approach embodying emission regulations, (2) effluent charges, & (3) the development of markets in pollution rights. Modified HA.