Suchergebnisse

If an important part of the political scientist's mission is to anticipate and explain "the critical problems that generate turbulence" in that part of the world which attracts his attention, then, in the study of administration, bureaucratic "imperialism" must be of compelling interest. If systematic data directly assembled for the purpose are lacking, and if there are some signal problems of theory which have been little investigated, there is still enough evidence from studies of other political problems that it seems worthwhile to set out some trial-run ideas in the hope that they will elicit further discussion.Bureaucractic imperialism seems pre-eminently a matter of inter-agency conflict in which two or more agencies try to assert permanent control over the same jurisdiction, or in which one agency actually seeks to take over another agency as well as the jurisdiction of that agency. We are thus primarily concerned with the politics of allocation and shall, except incidentally, bypass some other interesting aspects of inter-agency politics such as cooperation between agencies sharing missions, competition for favorable "one-time-only" decisions which do not involve jurisdictional reallocation, or the critical problems of the "holding company" administrative organization and its internal politics. For the moment, our concern with the politics of allocation leads to a focus on what would appear to be the likely behaviors of those decisionmakers who have both inclination and opportunity to look after the institutional well-being of agencies.

The purpose of this paper is that the author tries to explain the concept of bureaucracy and government. In addition, the author also describes the differences between bureaucracy and government in terms of definition, theory, and task. This paper also aims to discuss the position of the bureaucracy in the trias politica system where there is a classification of power, namely the executive, legislative and judiciary. Then, this paper will lead to the administration and implementation of public services. The conclusion from this paper is that government and bureaucracy are two different things and bureaucracy can become its own entity outside of the executive, legislative and judiciary and those in charge of providing public services are the bureaucrats, not the government, although actually bureaucrats and government have different roles in responsibility to deliver public service.

"Bureaucracy in Latin America" published on by Oxford University Press.